PCT, Simplicity and Truth

CSGnet Archive CSG2004
1

From[Bill Williams 12 May 2004 12:20 PM CST]

  [From Bill Powers (2004.06.12.0418)]

  Michelle Ivers (2004.06.12 1400 EST --

Bill Powers in responding to Micelle in defense of Ed Ford, takes another whack at Martin Taylor, Bruce Nevin and me saying,

I'm sure you can see, in the writings you cite, [Ed Ford's] evidence of
older points of view. I might point out that this is also true in the
writings of highly intelligent academics who are trying to work control
theory into their own world views, and they don't necessarily grasp the full > technical meaning of PCT, either,...

But, what is "PCT?" Powers describes PCT as something that is so highly technical that "highly intelligent academics" fail to grasp it. However there is only an accidental connection between control theory and what I have been describing as the "sophistology" of PCT. PCT has among it axioms the proposition that "It is all perception." and also an assertion that PCT is based upon physics and chemistry. As Bill Powers says, you have to start somewhere. But, this starting point, contrary to what Bill Powers says above is not a highly techinical point that is difficult to grasp. The question involved isn't in any meaningful sense a "technical" question. Rather it is a matter of the consistency and consequences of the arbitrary and contradictory sophistological starting points that Bill Powers used in attempting to construct a PCT cosmology. The initial assertion that "It is all perception." amounts to a claim that subjective experience exhausts the realm of reality. And, this o!
bviously is untenable. Then without justification a quite different proposition is introduced that, PCT is based upon physics and chemistry. Now physics and chemistry are concerned with material substances. So, there is a contradiction between the designation of reality in terms of a private subjective experience and the claim that PCT is based upon physics and chemistry. When a scheme contains inadaquate and contradictory propositions it is possible to come to quite different results depending upon which among the assumptions one employes for some particular argument. By attempting to combine reality based upon an individualist conception of experience that, "It is all perception." with an assertion that in effect "It is all subjstance."--that is physics and chemistry, a basis has been established to derive arbitrary and idiosyncratic conclusions. One of these is a persistent misconception that the introduction of a control theory analysis into a social situation can be,!
  as Bill Powers describes it, "simple."

But, Bill Powers' PCT is constructed out of various contradictory but seemingly "simple" propositions. Significantly, Bill Powers has never in a sustained exposition elaborated on how the simple but contradictory elements that make up his PCT scheme fit together. In the passage I quote below, Hillary Putnam observes that the starting point of "It is all perception." if rigorously adhered to would exclude the criteria of "truth."

Nussbum, Martha C and Glover, Jonathan. eds. 1995 _Women, Culture, and
  Development: A Study of Human capabilities_ Oxford: Clarendon
  Press

  Hillary Putnam p. 22O.

    maxims

    Pragmatists "... insisted that when one human being in
    issolation tries to interpret even the best maxims for
    himself or hereself and does not allow to criticise the
    way in which he or she interpretes these maxims, or the
    way in which he or she applies them, then
    the kind of 'certainty' that results is always fatally
    tainted with subjectivity. Even the notion of 'truth'
    makes no sense in such a 'moral solitude' for
    'truth presupposes a standard external to the thinker'
    Notions like 'simplicity' for example have no clear
    meaning at all unless inquirers who have proven their
    competence in the practice of inquiry are able to agree,
    to some extent at least, on which theories do and which
    theores do not possess 'simplicity.' p. 22O.

The problem as Putnam points out with a notion of "simplicity" when considered from a purely subjective consideration is precisely that it is subjective. Meanings, including "truth" Putnam argumes are inter-subjective-- and, neither the mantra "It is all perception." nor the substances treated by physics and chemistry provide an adaquate basis for an inter-subjective inquiry.

Putnam's argument has a connection with a somewhat different argument that appears in John Dewey's Logic. Dewey's point in the passage below has application to a consideration of the meaning of PCT. If no systematic exposition exists, we can't have anyway of knowing, in sytematic terms, what PCT is.

Dewey, John. 1938 _Logic: The Theory of Inquiry_

     "[A] failure to translate influential conceptions into
      _formulated_ propositions is especially harmful. For
      only explicit formulation stimulates examination of
      their meanings in terms of the consequences to which
      they lead and prompts critical comparison of alternative
      hypotheses. Without systematic forumulation of ruling
      ideas, inquiry is kept in the domain of opinion and
      action in the realm of conflict. For ultimately the only
      logical alternative to open and above board propositional
      formulation of conceptual alternatives (as many as
      possible) is formulation of controlling ideas on the
      ground of either custom and tradition or some special
      interest." p. 5O8.

In terms of Dewey's criteria, PCT isn't as yet an idea, rather it remains in
Dewey's terms an opinion. And, worse, it is an opinion that contains contradictory elements. The emphasis of this PCT sophisology is a characteristicly American form of individualism. It is an individualism that has links to positivism-- the use of the icons of physics and chemistry. Is PCT a science? Is PCT based upon control theory? No. It is closely associated with science and with control theory, however, PCT is a fundametnally arbitrary and internally contradictory set of opinions who's only ultimate unity is that they are Bill Powers' opinions.

Bill Williams

2

[From Bill Powers (2004.06.12.1402 MDT)]

Bill Williams 12 May 2004 12:20 PM CST --

Just to set your mind at rest, the intelligent academics to whom I was
referring were people like Flach, Turvey, Kelso, Posner, Edelmann, and the
many others who have failed to grasp the basics of negative feedback
control and have tried, without notable success, to invent their own
explanations of purposive behavior.

As to your quotations of other people's opinions, you may believe every
word you read but I don't. Writings like those are like Rohrschach tests:
you read into the vague and abstract language support for whatever opinion
you wish to shore up. Does truth, indeed, presuppose a standard external to
the thinker? That's what the words say, and so the thinker might wish,
hoping to impose his truth on others with something more than his own
unprepossessing authority to back it up. But to others, truth is simply our
best and most honest effort to describe experiences faithfully and reason
in a self-consistent way. How do you judge whether any proposed external
standard is a sufficient guidepost to truth? By trying to describe
faithfully and think straight, and nothing external to you can subsitute
for that. You have to decide for yourself what is an adequate external
standard, and there is no external standard for making that decision. If
there were, there would be no decision to make. So the whole idea of an
external standard for truth is a quick shuffle with the walnut shells and a
pea.

I'm sure you disagree, but that doesn't put you in a position to look down
your nose at anyone with a different idea.

Consider the idea that all we can know of the world exists as perceptions
in our brains. A clever argument (which you did not offer) might be that if
this is true, then it also is a perception in our brains, as is the idea
that we have brains, and so on down the slippery slope. But there is
another approach to this conundrum, called recursion. One of the more
difficult concepts in mathematical proof is the idea that you can use an
undefined term as part of the definition of itself. The game Wff-'N-Proof
was an example of this concept. A WFF is a Well-Formed-Function, which is
defined as any statement that meets certain criteria AND is combined with a
Well-Formed-Function. As it turns out, you can always decide whether a
statement is a WFF on the basis of this recursive definition. That's the
general idea -- it's been a long time since I actually played the game, but
I think that's close to right.

This is actually no more mysterious than saying

x = -36/x - 12.

This equation has x on both sides, so it may seem that you can't solve the
equation unless you already know what x is. Of course we know that you can
multiply both sides by x, collect terms, and get

x^2 + 12x + 36 = 0

from which we can deduce that x = -6.

PCT is constructed somewhat the same way. First we assume that the
neurological model and the models of physics are correct. According to
those models, all that the brain can experience arises from physical
stimuli acting on nerve-endings. This requires certain other postulates
about the role of brain chemistry as well. It also requires that we reject
ideas such as ESP and similar things that flout the physical and
neurological models. This is not unreasonable, as it would be incumbent on
anyone proposing alternative routes for acquiring knowledge to refute the
physics model and the neurological model, an undertaking that I don't think
anyone can seriously propose to do just now.

If we accept this picture, if follows that all experience of and knowledge
about the world have to be constructed out of the neural signals that arise
from the set of all primary sensory endings. The problem now is to
construct a model in which the brain contains sufficient capacities to
build a picture of the world like the one we experience, without requiring
more than a nervous system can do, given present knowledge.

That is what I have attempted to do in the model of a hierarchy of negative
feedback control systems. The concept of negative feedback is critical, for
it explains how we can learn to control arbitrary perceptions by acting on
the external world, without having to know the properties of the external
world. This gives us a kind of existence theorem for accepting a Real
Reality outside the purview of the senses, while at the same time showing
that we can never hope to verify our models beyond doubt.

A model is a proposition about the Real Reality that we can never
experience -- according to the best of our models. We have a recursive
situation here, but not one of infinite regress, because it converges to a
model that correctly predicts the behavior of the system and our experience
of it. The ultimate criterion against which any theory is judged is human
experience, which we call observation. A good theory is one that any person
can verify given the necessary resources. If a model says that what we
experience consists of neural signals, and predicts what observations will
occur (and thus, by implication, what neural signals will occur), then we
can accept it as a good model and work with it. If the model fails to agree
with observation at the critical points, or predicts events contrary to
observation, we have to discard or modify it.

So far, PCT has survived all tests of the model that we have been able to
produce, although in some cases details of the original model have had to
be adjusted. The lowest levels of control, for example, appear to involve
both force and position control, with an extremely interesting system that
switches automatically from position to force control when a limb contacts
an object with significant mass. This sort of modification will probably
happen many times as we extend our experiments to higher levels, and as
neurology improves and tells us more about how functions are actually
carried out in the nervous system and brain.

The initial assertion that "It is all perception." amounts to a claim
that subjective experience exhausts the realm of reality. And, this
obviously is untenable.

You have objected to this idea a number of times, but you have never
actually said what it wrong with it. If it really is so obvious, then you
ought to be able to show, in a few well-reasoned and succinct sentences,
the errors in the concept. Pardon my effrontry if I doubt that you can do
so. But prove me wrong if you can, by all means.

In the meantime, until you do so, I trust that others will take your claims
with a grain of salt.

Best,

Bill P.

3

[From Bruce Nevin (2004.06.12 22:00 EDT)]

Bill Powers (2004.06.12.1402 MDT) --

A model is a proposition about the Real Reality that we can never
experience -- according to the best of our models. We have a recursive
situation here, but not one of infinite regress, because it converges to a
model that correctly predicts the behavior of the system and our experience
of it. The ultimate criterion against which any theory is judged is human
experience, which we call observation. A good theory is one that any person
can verify given the necessary resources.

There is good reason for the "any person can verify" clause. Corroboration
by independent observers is an essential part of science. One person's
report of observations in principle does not suffice. (As we know, in
practice much research is not replicated which ought to be subject to this
requirement.)

This, in my view, is a proper challenge to the radical subjectiveness
against which Bill Williams has been inveighing. The slogan "it's all
perception" is of course an overstatement. All that we can know, we know by
means of our perceptions, and the knowledge itself is still more
perceptions. But we have more confidence in perceptions that are
corroborated by others. That we do so is not superstition, it has a sound
basis in fundamental assumptions that we all make, and must make, such as
that we are constructed alike, that reality (whatever it is) is consistent
e.g. the laws of physics do not vary arbitrarily, and so on. This
preferential confidence in intersubjective agreement is codified as an
essential for doing science.

Accept corroboration and you accept social phenomena of the sort that I
have been trying to clarify; deny it, and you deny the possibility of
science, as generally understood.

         /Bruce Nevin

···

At 03:14 PM 6/12/2004 -0600, Bill Powers wrote:

4

From[Bill Williams 13 May 2004 9:50 PM CST]

[From Bruce Nevin (2004.06.12 22:00 EDT)]

Bill Powers (2004.06.12.1402 MDT) --

···

At 03:14 PM 6/12/2004 -0600, Bill Powers wrote:

A model is a proposition about the Real Reality that we can never
experience -- according to the best of our models. We have a recursive
situation here, but not one of infinite regress, because it converges to a
model that correctly predicts the behavior of the system and our experience
of it. The ultimate criterion against which any theory is judged is human
experience, which we call observation. A good theory is one that any person
can verify given the necessary resources.

There is good reason for the "any person can verify" clause.

While I aggree with most of Bruce Nevin's arguments and conclusions, I would continue to maintain that it isn't literally true that "any person can verify" a properly forumulated scientific proposition. There are some problems involved with the notion of "verification." Replication is certainly a good idea. But, however often and throughally "verified" a scientific propostion is always subject to a valid counter example. Karl Popper's notion of falsification which avoids this difficulty may have its problems as well.

My main point i think adds to the social element in even the physical and biological sciences. It takes a trained observer to make and evaluate at least some scientific assessments. And, there may be difficulty in distinguishing between scientific training and indoctrination. Recently Eddingnton's "confirmation" of Einstein's prediction of the gravitational bending of a light wave has become controversial. The acceptance of multi-level selection in biology seems to have been delayed in evolutionary theory because it was mathematically intractible.

I don't myself see any barrier to the consideration of culture, properly defined, in control theory. However, PCT defined and expounded as it is now appears to exclude such a consideration. Among the crucial questions appears to be whether norms are merely statistical tendencies or whether norms are of the nature of agrements.

Bill Williams

5

[From Bill Powers (2004.06.14.0614 MDT)]

Bruce Nevin (2004.06.12 22:00 EDT) --

There is good reason for the "any person can verify" clause. Corroboration
by independent observers is an essential part of science. One person's
report of observations in principle does not suffice. (As we know, in
practice much research is not replicated which ought to be subject to this
requirement.)

The reason that one person's report of observations does not suffice (or
one person's interpretation of even agreed-on observations) is the "false
positive" problem. A person who wants to believe some proposition finds
himself very easy to persuade of its truth. Even discounting that (one who
knows it can be extra careful) a single person's viewpoint is just that, a
viewpoint, and someone looking from another viewpoint can often discover
that some observations are illusory. And even beyond that, no person's
reasoning is infallible, and when we check our own reasoning we can keep
making the same mistake again and again. An independent thinker can often
show us our mistake (or discover his or her own mistake).

So I agree completely with your views on science as depending critically on
social cooperation and cross-checking, and all that. This is as much a part
of my perception of reality as I assume it is of yours. The only difference
between us seems to be that I recognize everything in the preceding
paragraph as an idea in my head, a line of reasoning based on my models of
reality. I can't prove it is correct; I can say only that it is my
conclusion drawn from my experiences. I trust this conclusion, but this
does not mean that I have crossed the line and begun believing that I can
know Real Reality Itself, with or without the help of culture and society
(which I also recognize as reasonably reliable perceptions of my own.

This, in my view, is a proper challenge to the radical subjectiveness
against which Bill Williams has been inveighing.

What "radical" subjectivism? It seems to me that Bill Williams is arguing
for a radical objectivism in claiming that the individual does not even
exist.Has he, or have you, suddenly become infallible in observing that
societies and cultures "really" exist, other than in your perceptions? Can
anything other than an individual perceive at all?

The slogan "it's all perception" is of course an overstatement. All that
we can know, we know by means of our perceptions, and the knowledge itself
is still more perceptions. But we have more confidence in perceptions that are
corroborated by others.

Does that solve the problem of experiencing Reality? I'm not objecting to
your having perceptions that seem very reliable to you, so you can predict
them, act on them, and learn from their behavior. I'm not saying that
having perceptions corroborated by what we perceive as "others" is not
useful, or I would go so far as to say, based on my own experiences,
essential. This still does not take us outside the world of private
perception, as far as I can see. You have to back up that final step and
see that it's ALL perception,not just some of it, with the rest being a
source of Certainty.

That we do so is not superstition, it has a sound basis in fundamental
assumptions that we all make, and must make, such as that we are
constructed alike, that reality (whatever it is) is consistent e.g. the
laws of physics do not vary arbitrarily, and so on. This preferential
confidence in intersubjective agreement is codified as an essential for
doing science.

I don't object to or deny any of that. I, too, make similar assumptions and
rely on intersubjective agreement (as I see it, though agreement isn't
really quite that easy to establish) for doing science. But they are
assumptions, not observations, That they are not observations is precisely
why we must assume them without proof. These assumptions are part of a
world picture, a system concept that we have formed in our heads. I speak
in the plural, but of course I experience only my own assumptions, my own
system concepts, in terms of which I understand your descriptions of your
assumptions.

Accept corroboration and you accept social phenomena of the sort that I
have been trying to clarify; deny it, and you deny the possibility of
science, as generally understood.

Then perhaps we have been talking about the same thing all along and simply
didn't recognize our agreement. I accept the phenomenon of corroboration,
and I accept social phenomena, and I recognize these things as phenomena:
appearances. My old dictionary gives the _philos._ meaning of phenomenon as
"any object known through the senses rather than thought or intuition;
specif., with Kant, the object of experience." Of course this could be
taken literally, as if the object is known _through_ the transparent
senses, as Gibson would have it. But it can also be taken to mean, as I do,
that all phenomena derive from the senses and are constructed from the
senses: it's all perception.

Any reasonable statement can prove to be wrong, eventually. We can't tell
just from looking at the statement. Only experiences will show, indirectly,
whether our symbolic systems are reasonably in tune with whatever is real.
I think that losing sight of the subjectivity of all concepts, even
concepts about societies and cultures, leads to unwarranted certainty and
failure of self-criticism. If science teaches us anything, it is that the
search for certainty is vain. Certainty is not in that pot at the end of
the rainbow -- I'm pretty sure. It won't hurt to look in the pot, of
course, if you can get to it.

Best,

Bill P.

6

[From Bill Powers (2q004.06.14.0704 MDT)]

Bill Williams 13 May 2004 9:50 PM CST --

I don't myself see any barrier to the consideration of culture, properly
defined, in control theory. However, PCT defined and expounded as it is
now appears to exclude such a consideration.

I don't see why. We postulate a physical reality and represent it in our
models of control-system behavior, don't we? In a model of tracking, part
of the model represents the "real" mouse, the "real" target, and the "real"
disturbances that act on the cursor outside the behaving person. Then we
propose a perceptual input function that generates a signal proportional to
whatever we guess is the controlled variable, such as the physical
separation between target and cursor. The reference signal, comparator, and
output function then complete the unobservable part of the model, taking us
back to the environment in the form of the actions that move the mouse.

So what is to prevent us from postulating a real society or culture outside
the subject, and proposing perceptual input functions that create
perceptual signals proportional to verious perceived aspects of the culture
or society? We can then propose the rest of the control systems inside the
agent, with the outputs being some actions that alter part of the world
outside the agent and thus affect the agent's perceptions of the society or
culture. When we model in this way, we don't quibble about whether the
external part of the loop really exists -- we know we're using a model, and
we just work with it. In my econ004 model, I postulate a real plant, a real
household, real bank accounts, real goods and services, and so on. More
real entities will be added to the model of the environment as the overall
model expands. And I postulate that there are specific persons or groups of
persons who have specific reference levels for specific perceptions derived
from the real environment. The control systems in these individuals are
what make the model do something. We could say that among the perceptions
in the individuals are some concerning the position of a person relative to
a neighbor, or anything else we want to propose about how one person is
affected by knowledge of other persons. If you like, you could say that
each businessman adjusts prices in relation to the prices other businessmen
are setting, to see what will happen. All of this can be cast in terms of
hierarchy of control systems perceiving a model of a real world (including
each others' actions) and interacting with each other.

Among the crucial questions appears to be whether norms are merely
statistical tendencies or whether norms are of the nature of agrements.

Whatever you want to propose along these lines, you can put into a
control-system model. What's to stop you? I'm not saying that formulating
models of this sort is easy -- if it were, it would already have been done
by someone. Of course it would help if you could establish experimentally
whether the phenomena you're putting into the model are replicable, or
merely a product of the way you perceive the situation. Some social
phenomena can be modeled as purely statistical effects, while others, quite
likely, would require models in which there can be agreements. I don't see
that PCT requires any particular assumptions, as long as the basic
architecture is preserved. And you don't even have to preserve the basic
architecture, if you think you have a different kind of model that will
work better.

Best,

Bill P.

7

From[Bill Williams 14 June 2004 10:30 AM CST]

[From Bill Powers (2q004.06.14.0704 MDT)]

Bill Williams 13 May 2004 9:50 PM CST --

I don't myself see any barrier to the consideration of culture, properly
defined, in control theory. However, PCT defined and expounded as it is
now appears to exclude such a consideration.

I don't see why.

I don't see wny either. Perhaps this element in PCT has been a hold over from an older point of view individualism taken up in reaction to a mistaken point of view on the part of many cultural theorists.

Based upon what you say in today's post I don't see that there should be any basis for disagreement regarding the question of culture-- a conception of culture handled properly from the standpoint of control theory. However, treating people as if they were individuals as the term is commonly understood, is just as mistaken as treating people as if they were cultural puppets.

If a genuine fresh start is to be made from the standpoint of a control theory conception of human behavior, both the older conceptions "individualism" and the cultural puppets school approach will have to be discarded. And, the new point of view clearly articluated. The dispute about the role of culture in PCT indicates that such a re-construction hasn't as yet taken place.

Bill Williams

8

[Martin Taylor 2004.06.14.23.06]

[From Bill Powers (2004.06.14.0614 MDT)]

Can
anything other than an individual perceive at all?

Surely that depends on what you mean by "perceive". Do you mean the
everyday notion of something that intrudes into a person's
consciousness, or do you mean the PCT definition? If you mean the
former, you ask about a tautology, perception having been defined as
something that happens inside a person.

But if you mean the PCT definition (roughly: some variable within the
boundaries of the system under consideration that is some function of
arguments that include something that occurs at the boundary of the
system as a consequence of soemthing outside the system), then of
course it is possible (unless you define "an individual" as being the
system under consideration, in which case you are back to the
tautology).

Define "perceive" and define "an individual" and you can have
whichever answer you like. But if you take a strict control-theoretic
viewpoint, the existence of a skin bag to delimit "the system" is not
required.

Yes, it is theoretically quite possible for entities other than "an
individual" to perceive. However, it would be hard for a conscious
human to imagine or empathize with what perceptions of a system other
than a human individual might be.

Martin

9

From[Bill Williams 15 June 2004 1:15 AM CST]

[Martin Taylor 2004.06.14.23.06]

[From Bill Powers (2004.06.14.0614 MDT)]

Can anything other than an individual perceive at all?

Bill Powers goes on using an ideological term in a physiological
or sophistological context. This notion of an individual is one
of those old hold overs from the old pre-control theory days.

The litteral effect of the slogan "All I know is what I percieve."
is to reduce Bill Powers' position to "know nothingness." According
to the slogan we don't know anything about things, and we never
can. Of course you can't tell much of a story if you don't know
anything.

I am starting to think that this term "perception" is just a massive exercise in equvocation. Is perception defined in terms of some transfer function between the environment and awareness or not. If it is then we have an awareness that is connected to reality and the slogan "All I know is what a perceive." is false.

However, if there is no connection at all between a reality and the awareness generated by a perceptual process then what implications does this have for Bill Powers attempt to create a PCT sophistology based upon control theory. The only implication I can see is that with no established connection between an enviroment and a control loop the idea of control is meaningless.

Either way the "All I know is what I percieve." slogan generates nonsense. If the slogan is true then control theory is meaningless, and if control theory is true then the slogan is meaningless.

If control theory is meaningful then there is a connection through perception of a reality. And, it seems to me that the reality content of a valid perception is what allows a meaningful coordination with the environment to be established. And, this coordination is the process of control.

I think my escape from the sophistological PCT doctrine that we can not know reality is more mundane than Martin Taylors. Once the notion of perception is subject to a little bit of inspection, the PCT epistomological know nothingness can be seen to be a cracker barrel ideological ploy designed to connect the prestige of the physical and biological sciences to individualism.

The nightmare story that Bill Powers tells about how he lost all touch with reality and now "All he knows is what he percieves." is not the terrifying story he seems to think it is. And, when Bill Powers tries to tell this story for any period of time, it is obvious that he has to one way or another sneak big bits of reality into the story somehow. So, we jump from not knowing anything to suddenly having access to all the understandings of physics, chemistry, and even neurology. Still, we somehow or other we don't know anything. This is a confusing story. And, it is a confusing story because it really is confused.

Bill Williams

10

[From Bill Powers (2004.06.15.0628 MDT)]

Martin Taylor 2004.06.14.23.06 --

[From Bill Powers (2004.06.14.0614 MDT)]

Can
anything other than an individual perceive at all?

Surely that depends on what you mean by "perceive". Do you mean the
everyday notion of something that intrudes into a person's
consciousness, or do you mean the PCT definition? If you mean the
former, you ask about a tautology, perception having been defined as
something that happens inside a person.

Yes, I thought it was a tautology, too. I use the word perception to mean
the process by which human beings (and probably other organisms) experience
things from intensities to system concepts. I accept the basic models of
physics and chemistry, which provide models of things happening outside of
organisms (not to exclude their roles inside organisms), and the neurology
model which explains how variables outside of organisms come to be
represented by signals inside organisms. I don't see that there is any
equipment available for a perception, defined in those terms, to take place
outside of organisms or in more than one organism at the same time.

But if you mean the PCT definition (roughly: some variable within the
boundaries of the system under consideration that is some function of
arguments that include something that occurs at the boundary of the
system as a consequence of soemthing outside the system),

Whoa, that's getting so general that it can include practically anything,
such as getting a knife through the heart. The trouble with climbing too
high on the ladder of abstraction is that with each step you unwittingly
include things other than the initial example, and very quickly start
including things having nothing to do with the original case.

then of
course it is possible (unless you define "an individual" as being the
system under consideration, in which case you are back to the
tautology).

By the word "individual" I mean the organized entity contained within a
person's skin. I do not include the person's twin brother, his parents, his
friends, his society, or the human species. You can define systems made up
of individuals, but you then need a different name for them -- which we have.

Define "perceive" and define "an individual" and you can have
whichever answer you like. But if you take a strict control-theoretic
viewpoint, the existence of a skin bag to delimit "the system" is not
required.

Yes it is. That is how I define the particular system I call a human being.
If you want to include in your definition of an individual human being his
clothes and the keys in his pocket, you and I will be talking about
different things. If you want to talk about two people, you will not be
talking about "an individual," at least not as I hear you.

Yes, it is theoretically quite possible for entities other than "an
individual" to perceive. However, it would be hard for a conscious
human to imagine or empathize with what perceptions of a system other
than a human individual might be.

If you want to dilute the term so it can mean absolutely anything, it
becomes useless. That would be like saying that the definitions of symbols
in an equation doesn't have to be consistent, because after all we can use
any symbol to represent any variable. That may be true, but once you start
to reason using symbol-manipulation rules, you had better decide on
definitions and stick to them, or the results will be gibberish.

Sorry, Martin, but I'm not sympathetic with your approach to abstraction.
But you knew that.

Best,

Bill P.

11

[From Bill Powers (2004.06.15.0909 MDT)]

Bill Williams 15 June 2004 1:15 AM CST --

> Can anything other than an individual perceive at all?

Bill Powers goes on using an ideological term in a physiological
or sophistological context. This notion of an individual is one
of those old hold overs from the old pre-control theory days.

Are these terms intended to arouse a display of emotion from me? I don't
see any other purpose for words like "ideological" and "sophistological,"
or "notion of an individual" or "old hold-overs," except to invite an
unwise response from me or someone else. If you remove those rather loaded
terms from the above sentences, what is left? I fear that you are moving
from mirroring to something less noble.

The litteral effect of the slogan "All I know is what I percieve."
is to reduce Bill Powers' position to "know nothingness." According
to the slogan we don't know anything about things, and we never
can. Of course you can't tell much of a story if you don't know
anything.

Am I allowed to object to these statements? I will await your permission.

I am starting to think that this term "perception" is just a massive
exercise in equvocation. Is perception defined in terms of some transfer
function between the environment and awareness or not. If it is then we
have an awareness that is connected to reality and the slogan "All I know
is what a perceive." is false.

Again, I don't want to express my objections to these statements without
making sure they will be met with straightforward replies. Can I say you
have misconstrued my proposals on these matters? Or is your construction of
them the final word?

However, if there is no connection at all between a reality and the
awareness generated by a perceptual process then what implications does
this have for Bill Powers attempt to create a PCT sophistology based upon
control theory. The only implication I can see is that with no established
connection between an enviroment and a control loop the idea of control is
meaningless.

I do have an answer to these comments. Please indicate whether any answer
will be treated as a sincere offering, or whether you will see it as a
further sign of my aberrations.

The same requests apply to the rest of the post.

Best,

Bill P.

12

From[Bill Williams 15 June 2004 2:20 PM CST]

[From Bill Powers (2004.06.15.0909 MDT)]

Bill Williams 15 June 2004 1:15 AM CST --

> Can anything other than an individual perceive at all?

Bill Powers goes on using an ideological term in a physiological
or sophistological context. This notion of an individual is one
of those old hold overs from the old pre-control theory days.

Are these terms intended to arouse a display of emotion from me? I don't
see any other purpose for words like "ideological" and "sophistological,"
or "notion of an individual" or "old hold-overs," except to invite an
unwise response from me or someone else. If you remove those rather loaded
terms from the above sentences, what is left? I fear that you are moving
from mirroring to something less noble.

You say "if you remove this rather loaded terms..." Well, all terms are loaded. So apparently we can use empty terms or loaded terms. Could we substitute "empty terms" in your passage above? How would that change the meaning of the passage? Isn't the whole point of the passage merely to provide some fluff that will serve as a lead in to your statement of your perception that "I fear you are moving from mirroring to something less noble." Now, let me ask you, "Who is responsible for this "fear?" Can my typing in an office in Kansas City generate a fear on a hill top out in Colorado?

I happen to like my coinage of the term "sophistological." As people in economics are trying to think critically about the foundations of economic theory they need words to organize their thinking. In large part they find that there is in the older 19th century systems building era a vocabulary that is systematic and can be dusted off and put to use. So, people are talking about epistemology, and ontology and axiology. Of course the generic and encompassing term for this sort of discourse is philosophy. The root as I understand it is the love of wisdom. You as you have made entirely plain have no love for these old thoughts, and at least in my perception you make some giant leaps in your arguments in inconsistent directions. So, I asked myself what would be a good term to use to describe your approach. And, the term "sophistology" came to mind. Now you may view my innovative use of rhetoric as being empowered by less than noble motives. I see good rhetoric as a means to use in persuading people that the conclusions that you claim to have derived from control theory should be suspected of having a quite different character than the genuinely valuable work that you have done. The mantra "All I can know is what I perceive." appears to at least some people to provide a basis for encompassing conclusions about every possible issue imaginable. I've found it challenging to find a way to break down the impression that this mantra contains a theoretical basis that no further reasoning or evidence can over-turn. However, challenging as it, this mantra can be uprooted. I can show that the notion of "I" the notion of "know" the notion of "perceptive"

The literal effect of the slogan "All I know is what I perceive."
is to reduce Bill Powers' position to "know nothingness." According
to the slogan we don't know anything about things, and we never
can. Of course you can't tell much of a story if you don't know
anything.

Am I allowed to object to these statements?

Since I am not your dad, I don't see why you would ask such a question.

I will await your permission.

What if I don't give it? What then? Will you grow up to be a snotty kid?

I am starting to think that this term "perception" is just a massive
exercise in equivocation. Is perception defined in terms of some transfer
function between the environment and awareness or not. If it is then we
have an awareness that is connected to reality and the slogan "All I know
is what a perceive." is false.

Again, I don't want to express my objections to these statements without
making sure they will be met with straightforward replies.

OK. Then don't express your opinion.

Can I say you have misconstrued my proposals on these matters?

I suppose if you are really "captain of your own ship" you don't need anyone permission for anything.

Or is your construction of them the final word?

I don't know about "final word." If you want to go on slamming doors I suppose I might get to have the "last word."

However, if there is no connection at all between a reality and the
awareness generated by a perceptual process then what implications does
this have for Bill Powers attempt to create a PCT sophistology based upon
control theory. The only implication I can see is that with no established
connection between an environment and a control loop the idea of control is
meaningless.

I do have an answer to these comments. Please indicate whether any answer
will be treated as a sincere offering, or whether you will see it as a
further sign of my aberrations.

What, I would like to know, does the intended "sincerity" of a communication have to do with whether or not the communication contains or expresses an aberration?

However, I have an idea. Why don't you ask Martin to admit you the ECACS Forum. Then you could communicate there in all sincerity what it is that you wish to communicate. And, I will reply in an irenic mode. As in a sense acting as a host I wouldn't wish to insult a guest.

Bill Williams

···

________________________________

From: Control Systems Group Network (CSGnet) on behalf of Bill Powers
Sent: Tue 6/15/2004 7:54 AM
To: CSGNET@listserv.uiuc.edu
Subject: Re: PCT, Simplicity and Truth

[From Bill Powers (2004.06.15.0628 MDT)]

Martin Taylor 2004.06.14.23.06 --

[From Bill Powers (2004.06.14.0614 MDT)]

Can
anything other than an individual perceive at all?

Surely that depends on what you mean by "perceive". Do you mean the
everyday notion of something that intrudes into a person's
consciousness, or do you mean the PCT definition? If you mean the
former, you ask about a tautology, perception having been defined as
something that happens inside a person.

Yes, I thought it was a tautology, too. I use the word perception to mean
the process by which human beings (and probably other organisms) experience
things from intensities to system concepts. I accept the basic models of
physics and chemistry, which provide models of things happening outside of
organisms (not to exclude their roles inside organisms), and the neurology
model which explains how variables outside of organisms come to be
represented by signals inside organisms. I don't see that there is any
equipment available for a perception, defined in those terms, to take place
outside of organisms or in more than one organism at the same time.

But if you mean the PCT definition (roughly: some variable within the
boundaries of the system under consideration that is some function of
arguments that include something that occurs at the boundary of the
system as a consequence of soemthing outside the system),

Whoa, that's getting so general that it can include practically anything,
such as getting a knife through the heart. The trouble with climbing too
high on the ladder of abstraction is that with each step you unwittingly
include things other than the initial example, and very quickly start
including things having nothing to do with the original case.

then of
course it is possible (unless you define "an individual" as being the
system under consideration, in which case you are back to the
tautology).

By the word "individual" I mean the organized entity contained within a
person's skin. I do not include the person's twin brother, his parents, his
friends, his society, or the human species. You can define systems made up
of individuals, but you then need a different name for them -- which we have.

Define "perceive" and define "an individual" and you can have
whichever answer you like. But if you take a strict control-theoretic
viewpoint, the existence of a skin bag to delimit "the system" is not
required.

Yes it is. That is how I define the particular system I call a human being.
If you want to include in your definition of an individual human being his
clothes and the keys in his pocket, you and I will be talking about
different things. If you want to talk about two people, you will not be
talking about "an individual," at least not as I hear you.

Yes, it is theoretically quite possible for entities other than "an
individual" to perceive. However, it would be hard for a conscious
human to imagine or empathize with what perceptions of a system other
than a human individual might be.

If you want to dilute the term so it can mean absolutely anything, it
becomes useless. That would be like saying that the definitions of symbols
in an equation doesn't have to be consistent, because after all we can use
any symbol to represent any variable. That may be true, but once you start
to reason using symbol-manipulation rules, you had better decide on
definitions and stick to them, or the results will be gibberish.

Sorry, Martin, but I'm not sympathetic with your approach to abstraction.
But you knew that.

Best,

Bill P.

13

[Martin Taylor 2004.06.16.17.41]

[From Bill Powers (2004.06.15.0628 MDT)]

Martin Taylor 2004.06.14.23.06 --

[From Bill Powers (2004.06.14.0614 MDT)]

Can
anything other than an individual perceive at all?

Surely that depends on what you mean by "perceive". Do you mean the
everyday notion of something that intrudes into a person's
consciousness, or do you mean the PCT definition? If you mean the
former, you ask about a tautology, perception having been defined as
something that happens inside a person.

Yes, I thought it was a tautology, too. I use the word perception to mean
the process by which human beings (and probably other organisms) experience
things from intensities to system concepts.

...

Define "perceive" and define "an individual" and you can have
whichever answer you like. But if you take a strict control-theoretic
viewpoint, the existence of a skin bag to delimit "the system" is not
required.

Yes it is. That is how I define the particular system I call a human being.

Sorry, I had thought you were asking a serious question, or perhaps a
rhetorical one that you expected everyone would answer as you would
do. But now I see that you get your answer _by definition_. Unfair
rhetoric, if you don't supply the definition beforehand.

Your definition, however, doesn't help with the more interesting
question, which is whether the processes of perceptual control can
(and separately whether they do) operate in systems that are not
defined by a skin bag.

Yes, it is theoretically quite possible for entities other than "an
individual" to perceive. However, it would be hard for a conscious
human to imagine or empathize with what perceptions of a system other
than a human individual might be.

If you want to dilute the term ...

What term? "Perception"? I use only the strict PCT definition, which
I cited in my original. "Individual"? I'm trying to answer the
question as to whether anything other than an individual can
perceive, in the PCT sense (we've accepted that the answer is "No"
for the everyday sense of "perceive"). I took "individual" to be
defined much as you do (though I have a problem with the definition
of "an individual" when it comes to systems like the sprouting bodies
of slime molds, which come together and disperse according to the
perceptual controls of the individual cells).

... so it can mean absolutely anything, it
becomes useless. That would be like saying that the definitions of symbols
in an equation doesn't have to be consistent, because after all we can use
any symbol to represent any variable.

Do I hear a little of pot calling kettle black, here? I was calling
you out on what seemed to me to be a deliberate use of exactly that
ploy. I may have fallen into the same trap, but I think I was being
very consistent. Show me where I wasn't. and I'll re-think.

That may be true, but once you start
to reason using symbol-manipulation rules, you had better decide on
definitions and stick to them, or the results will be gibberish.

Exactly!!!! Please do.

Sorry, Martin, but I'm not sympathetic with your approach to abstraction.
But you knew that.

Yes, I know. When I read this last comment, I thought back to my
primary and high-school days, and realized that I always had problems
with arithmetic. Algebra was easier, calculus easier yet, but maths
didn't really mean anything until we talked about abstract functions.
I'm guessing, but I would imagine the opposite might have been true
for you.

We all have different ways of perceiving the world, don't we? I think
it does help if one is "sympathetic" to that fact, rather than
denigrating the way other people perceive the world. Different ways
of viewing the same object often lead to interesting insights into
the nature of the object, don't they? At least I think so. Maybe you
don't.

Martin

14

[From Bill Powers (2004.06.16.1655 MDT)]

[Martin Taylor 2004.06.16.17.41] --

Sorry, Martin, I'm feeling my age. Of course you have the right to your own
definitions. You're quite right about the difference in our approaches to
mathematics: my cutoff was at differential equations. I guess that's where
you started thinking it was easy.

It's been very difficult to give up hopes of the CSG developing a PCT model
of the economy. I can see now that I clung to an irrational hope long past
the time when it should have been obvious that it wouldn't happen. I'm
afraid that your post caught me at a time when I was not very open to
anything. I promise to get over it.

Best,

Bill P.

15

From[Bill Williams 17 June 2004 7:20 PM CST]

[From Bill Powers (2004.06.16.1655 MDT)]

[Martin Taylor 2004.06.16.17.41] --

I'm afraid that your post caught me at a time when I was not very open to
anything. I promise to get over it.

Perhaps one of the things Bill Powers might try to get over is the tendency to think that diagreeing with him is evidence of a malicious intent.

Bill Williams