Perception or Reference

[From Richard Kennway (2006.08.06.1940 BST)]

[From Rick Marken (2006.08.05.1115)]
You'll have to run this by me again. It seems to me that there will only be conflict if the two people are controlling functionally equivalent perceptions of the same environmental variables. I don't understand what you're proposing here.

Here is an example of conflict where no perceptual variable of either party resembles any perceptual variable of the other.

Suppose there are three environmental variables x, y, and z, and two entities A and B, which are each controlling two perceptions: a1 and a2 for Z and b1 and b2 for B. Suppose that each of a1, a2, b1, and b2 is a linear combination of x, y, and z.

Then A and B cannot simultaneously control each of their perceptions at arbitrary reference levels. This is true whether or not either of A's perceptions resembles (i.e. is the same function of x, y, and z as) either of B's. Four linear combinations of three variables cannot be made to simultaneously take any four values.

For a given set of reference values, the set of values of x, y, and z which satisfy A's references forms a straight line in xyz space. The values which satisfy B's references form another line. The two lines need not intersect.

If either A or B relinquishes control of one of their perceptions, then if the remaining three are linearly independent, they can be simultaneously controlled. It is only the combination of all four that results in conflict.

A and B can also be the same person. Compare the saying "Good, fast, cheap: choose any two."

···

--
Richard Kennaway

[From Bill Powers (2006.08.06. 1325 MDT)]

Richard Kennway (2006.08.06.1940 BST) --

Here is an example of conflict where no perceptual variable of either party resembles any perceptual variable of the other.

Very nice, I'd forgotten about that one.

I'm wondering, though, whether this is a case where the equations can have an approximate solution even if there's no exact solution. Suppose the two non-intersecting lines are not very far apart at the minimum distance. Then all the systems will end up experiencing some error, but still will be controlling to some degree. The idea of a "solution" implies "exact solution". But exact solutions are seldom required.

In the ThreeSystems demo, each of three control systems senses and acts on all of three environmental variables. The input weights are selected at random and the output weights reorganize to achieve control. If the determinant of the input matrix (three systems by three weights) is zero, no solution is possible -- but the probability of the determinant being exactly zero is pretty close to zero. What we see is that the three systems produce outputs that are as large as necessary to overcome the interactions, so independent control is still possible (there is no limit on the amount of output that a system can produce).

In your case there are fewer degrees of freedom in the environment than in the controlled variables, so a solution is truly impossible. But what are the actual limitations if we say that an error of 1%, or 10%, is acceptable?

Is there something here about the likely number of systems at any given level of control? For all systems to be workable, there must be fewer degrees of freedom under control at the higher level than the total number of reference signals at the next lower level. Either that, or something must limit the number of systems at the higher level that can be active at the same time.

Best,

Bill P.

[From Rick Marken (2006.08.06.1720 PDT)]

Richard Kennway (2006.08.06.1940 BST)

[From Rick Marken (2006.08.05.1115)]
You'll have to run this by me again. It seems to me that there will only be conflict if the two people are controlling functionally equivalent perceptions of the same environmental variables. I don't understand what you're proposing here.

Here is an example of conflict where no perceptual variable of either party resembles any perceptual variable of the other.

Good example. Actually, your example works on what is basically the same principle as the conflict in my Cost of Conflict demo at Cost of Conflict. In my demo, two different (ie. orthogonal) perceptual degrees of freedom are turned into what is virtually a single output degree of freedom via connections in the environment.

But let me take this opportunity to try to state my point once again. My point is _not_ that conflict cannot exist when systems control two different perceptual variables. Your example and my conflict demo show that this is not the case. Conflict definitely _can_ exist even when systems are controlling two completely different (orthogonal) perceptual variables.

My point (which I'm prepared to abandon if it's wrong) is that conflict is not a direct result of systems controlling different perceptual variables that that it is a direct result of systems controlling the _same_ perceptual variable. Colloquially, seeing things differently is _not_ the basis of conflict; seeing things the same way is. Conflict can occur when people see things differently, but it is not _because_ they see things differently that the conflict occurs.

I know that conflict _can_ occur when systems are controlling different perceptual variables; but this conflict (as in your example and in my conflict demo) is not the result of controlling different perceptual variables, per se. It occurs as a result of constraints on the effect that outputs can have on these different perceptions. But when systems are trying to control the same perceptual variable relative to even slightly different references there will be conflict.

Best

Rick

···

---

Suppose there are three environmental variables x, y, and z, and two entities A and B, which are each controlling two perceptions: a1 and a2 for Z and b1 and b2 for B. Suppose that each of a1, a2, b1, and b2 is a linear combination of x, y, and z.

Then A and B cannot simultaneously control each of their perceptions at arbitrary reference levels. This is true whether or not either of A's perceptions resembles (i.e. is the same function of x, y, and z as) either of B's. Four linear combinations of three variables cannot be made to simultaneously take any four values.

For a given set of reference values, the set of values of x, y, and z which satisfy A's references forms a straight line in xyz space. The values which satisfy B's references form another line. The two lines need not intersect.

If either A or B relinquishes control of one of their perceptions, then if the remaining three are linearly independent, they can be simultaneously controlled. It is only the combination of all four that results in conflict.

A and B can also be the same person. Compare the saying "Good, fast, cheap: choose any two."

--
Richard Kennaway

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[From Rick Marken (2006.08.06.1730)]

Fred Nickols (2006.08.06.0803)--
      

Rick Marken (2006.08.05.1640)--

That sounds like error, which does "govern" itself, I suppose
(increasing error leads to action that decreases error and vice versa).
So OK;-)

Well, I don't want to confuse "feedback" with "error." As I understand it, "error" is the result of comparing an actual (perceived) condition with an intended condition. (I go back to my gunnery days and use the ordered position of a gun mount as the intended position and the measured position of the gun mount as the actual condition. The measured position of the gun mount is just that: its measured position. In isolation, it tells us nothing except the current position of the gun mount. The measured position of the gun mount becomes feedback only when it is viewed in relation to the ordered position. If the ordered position of the gun mount and its measured position vary, then there is an error.

Does that sound reasonable?

Yes!

Best

Rick

···

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Tracy Harms (2006;08,06.20:00 Pacific)

Marc Abrams wrote (2006.08.05.2233) --

PCT cannot currently "explain" the purposeful
behavior going on because PCT does not address
the most important aspect of understanding this
mess and that is; how do we construct our
perceptions?

Bill Powers replied (2006.08.06.1055 MDT):

You've said this before, and I still don't know
what your question is. ...

It seems to me that the first step is always to
describe WHAT is happening, and this includes
what perceptions people seem to be controlling.
Right now I can't specify the neural networks
that are producing the perceptions (nor can
anyone else), so what's left is to try to
establish the conditions under which people
are likely to reorganize their perceptions
(the method of levels is about that). I don't
have to know how the neural networks operate
to do that.

I agree that PCT is worthwhile despite (and perhaps
even because) the problems of underlying mechanism
remain unsolved and apparently very difficult. While
there seems to be value in Marc's warnings against
imagining that PCT has provided more than it actually
has in the way of explanation by identification of
mechanism, I may disagree with Marc in the degree to
which I think PCT may be constructively applied
without resolving the substructural problems of "how".

Sorry that I have time only for such a brief note at
present.

Tracy Harms

···

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[From Rick Marken (2006.08.06.2115)]

Bill Powers (2006.08.06.1830 MDT)

(Just to acknowledge one point: I don't think anyone is saying that conflict arises because people are controlling different perceptions).

Great. Then the point I was trying to make is irrelevant.

It seemed to me that very often discussions about the fact that people don't perceive things the same way are aimed at showing that this is the basis of conflict. The implication (sometimes made explicitly) is that people don't get along -- they get into conflict -- because they don't see (perceive) things the same way and/or that they don't recognize the legitimacy of other ways of perceiving the same situation.

I must be reading stuff into what I'm hearing.

Best

Rick

···

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[From Richard Kennaway (2006.08.07.0912 BST)]

[From Bill Powers (2006.08.06.1830 MDT)]
I discussed this a long time ago on the net in terms of one person trying to enter a group of people who form a society, and the effects of overpopulation. Up to a point, it is possible for a group of people to find variables to control that are independent enough to avoid conflicts, especially in an environment that is rich in alternative ways to accomplish almost anything When a new person tries to join this society (for example, by immigrating or being born) it's easy to find a niche in which the person can find something relatively unique to do to survive without arousing opposition from others. But as population grows, it becomes harder to find that empty niche, and at some point we can formally say that overpopulation has begun: the last niche has been filled, and from now on, adding another person means that everyone will experience a slight increase in error.

But new people introduce new degrees of freedom, new niches. There isn't a fixed set of roles to fill, which once occupied allow of no new entrants except at the expense of those already there. The masses of immigrants to the US did not fit into an existing richness of alternative ways, they created it. Overpopulation is a matter of physical resources, not roles, and the resources are elastic as well. Overpopulation is always relative to available technology.

It occurs to me now, from your remarks, that an obvious way to postpone the onset of social conflict as the population grows is for someone somehow to force people to adopt the same reference conditions.

Er...

Then we can have groups of people contributing their efforts to the achievement of agreed-on (or forced) goals without getting into conflict with each other, or with less conflict.

Uh...

This sounds a lot like certain political systems which emphasize (and enforce) solidarity and group efforts. It's possible that such systems arise when the population reaches a size where the number of independent controllers starts to exceed the degrees of freedom in the resource pool. The totalitarian society is, in fact, one solution to the problem of avoiding internal conflict as population grows or resources dwindle.

Boggle...

That idea surprised me -- I thought I was about to write

Did the end of your message get lost? A paragraph in which you knock down the totalitarian illusion that you just presented? Because the foregoing does not read like anything the author of B:CP could have written.

I mean, how do you force people to adopt the same reference conditions, other than holding guns to their heads and getting at best foot-dragging compliance? How does forcing people to adopt them avoid conflict, when by definition it *is* conflict? Doesn't the history of totalitarian societies show that they do not in fact provide a solution, that far from avoiding internal conflict, they operate by means of it, and that they invariably make worse use of their resources than non-totalitarian societies?

···

--
Richard Kennaway, jrk@cmp.uea.ac.uk, Richard Kennaway
School of Computing Sciences,
University of East Anglia, Norwich NR4 7TJ, U.K.

From [Marc Abrams (2006.08.06.0831)]

First, I’d like to dispel the notion that I feel that PCT is somehow “deficient” in the way it handles and defines perceptions and this is simply not true.

What I am suggesting is that perceptions may be understood profitably from any number of different perspectives. Given the micro focus of PCT I don’t see how perceptions could be handled any other way than how it has been handled, and that is as a “signal”.

But my interests are different than those of Bill’s. Where Bill is interested in the ultimate causation and “science” involved in perceptual control, my focus is on the consequences of the controlling actions.

So, I really don’t care how this all takes place, or even why it takes place. Bill has convinced me that perceptual control is indeed a “real” phenomenon.

The details of how this all takes place physiologically is still pretty much up in the air so I have taken a metaphorical approach in trying to understand the consequences of perceptual control without having to be able to show “scientifically” that control does indeed exist.

As a metaphor I can hold it out there and let people see if in fact the facts fit the theory rather than trying to do, what I believe to be the impossible at this time, and that is to show scientifically that perceptual control exists. I believe one day we will be able to do so but not right now.

So what do we do until the right time comes? Sit on our hands? I believe that there is much value in looking at perceptual control as a synthesizing metaphorical framework for all of psychology and the social sciences

That is, if PCT is the proper foundational theory of human behavior, and I believe it is, than all other theories if legitimate should be explaining certain parts of the control process, and in my research that is precisely what I have found.

Bill, you have often stated that Cog Sci and Behaviorism each represent a part of the perceptual control model and I agree, so its not as if everyone is talking about stuff from Mars. It is amazing, at least from my perspective, how each theory can help inform the others. By inform I don’t necessarily mean make it better. Sometimes you can see why a theory went down the wrong path and what to avoid.

The cornerstone of understanding perceptual control in my view is first, in having an understanding of what a “perception” is. For a PCT model and analytic theory, a signal is good perspective. From a metaphorical perspective of consequences I would define my perceptions differently. My view is a functional one. That is, every perception is a personal construct of ours. Although arbitrary I have found that every perception has four major functional components. First, our sensory inputs . These vary from six to twenty-two depending upon who you are talking with and about. Second, is our imagination. Here it is what we both predict and anticipate on perceiving that matters. We “perceive” in “wholes” and we fill-in-the-blanks where needed in order to make each perception cohesive. Third, are our emotions. Our emotions act as an early warning guidance system and every perception has an emotional component!
, everyone. Fourth are our past experiences. Our sensory inputs tend to modulate what we think we already know. When we see a picture of our friend Joe, all kinds of other info, including emotional, suddenly become available to us. And finally of course is the feedback we experience.

I believe our perceptions are the integral of all of these components. Now each perception is different and for each perception each component will have a different amount of influence.

That is, some perceptions will be more “emotional” than others and others will rely more on what we anticipated, etc.

All of this of course needs to be researched, and that is precisely what I hope to do with the end result being applied by me to my work in economics.

So I hope you can see that I am not criticizing PCT for how it has defined and used the concept of a perception. I find my categorization and functional approach better suited to looking at the consequences of control rather than the causes of it.

Regards,

Marc

···

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[From Richard Kennaway (2006.08.07.1523 BST)]

[From Bill Powers (2006.08.04.1905 MDT)]

Maybe this points to an answer. If both people try to control the same environment, the differences in their perceptual and output functions will show up as conflict, because the same environmental variables are then required to behave in two different ways at the same time. This conflict would be puzzling to them because each seems to be in full control of the three perceptions. Yet what one person does to control them results in disturbing what the other person is doing to control them, even if somehow they manage to agree that they are controlling the same variables. And even if their perceptual signals are actually behaving the same way!

Richard Kennaway, is this a solution to the epistemological problem? I've been looking (for years!) for ways in which we could tell that two people are not seeing the environment in the same way -- and do it without giving either of them a way of knowing what is actually happening outside them. The existence of a conflict may be the evidence of non-congruity. And that might be the basis for reorganizing to make the two control systems more nearly alike, even without ever knowing how the environment is really organized.

There are several examples where it is quite easy to tell that people are (literally!) seeing the environment in different ways. For example, eye tests, colour-blindness tests, hearing tests, synesthesia tests, and so on.

All of these tests work by determining what discriminations the subject can reliably make. It isn't necessary to know anything about their internal constitution or to rely on their subjective reports. If someone looking at a number written in green dots on a background of red dots cannot say what number it is, then one can conclude that they cannot perceive a distinction between red and green. With non-human experimental animals, test to see if they can learn which colour of button releases the food. Whatever things they can distinguish in the environment, they must have (or be able to acquire) perceptual functions that discriminate between those things.

But conflict doesn't come into this: the experimenter is just setting up an environmental contingency and seeing if the animal can use it to control something.

Further up the hierarchy it becomes harder to compare people. In fact, I suspect that the further up you go, the more people are unlike each other. People's basic senses are pretty much all the same, except for gross deficiencies like colour-blindness. There is only one version of normal vision. Typefaces in books and newspapers are all about the same size, audio equipment is designed for around 16Hz to 20 Khz, and so on. But something as simple as a ticking clock that goes either tick-tock or tock-tick already shows variations.

I wonder if a demo program could be designed to demonstrate reorganisation to avoid conflict. Have two systems A and B as in my earlier example, each controlling two variables, each of which is a function of three environmental variables, so that they cannot both control both their perceptions.

Let A and B be able to reorganise their output weights, as in one of the existing demos. Each on its own will then be able to bring its two perceptions under control.

When they are run together, they cannot both succeed in reorganising to control successfully. What we would like is for them to reorganise at a higher level, perhaps by changing the references they have for their perceptions. The higher level reorganisation would have to proceed at a slower pace than the lower level one, so that low level reorganisation has a chance to work.

···

--
Richard Kennaway, jrk@cmp.uea.ac.uk, Richard Kennaway
School of Computing Sciences,
University of East Anglia, Norwich NR4 7TJ, U.K.

[From Rick Marken (206.08.07.0840)]

Marc Abrams (2006.08.06.0831)--

Bill, you have often stated that Cog Sci and Behaviorism each represent a part of the perceptual control model and I agree, so its not as if everyone is talking about stuff from Mars. It is amazing, at least from my perspective, how each theory can help inform the others. By inform I don't necessarily mean make it better. Sometimes you can see why a theory went down the wrong path and what to avoid.

I don't think Bill ever said that Cog Sci and Behaviorism represent _part_ of the perceptual control (PCT) model. I'm pretty sure that what Bill might have said is pretty close to what I said in my "Blind men and the elephant" paper in _More Mind Readings_: If organisms are organized as input controllers then their behavior can _appear to be_ caused by internal mental plans (Cog Sci) or by external stimuli (Behaviorism). But, according to PCT, the Cog Sci and Behaviorist views of behavior are _understandable_ mistakes. PCT shows why scientists have succumbed to either point of view but it also shows that both points of view are wrong. So Cog Sci and Behaviorism can't really help inform PCT but PCT can't help inform Cog Sci and Behaviorism by showing that these are theories of what is basically an illusion.

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[From Rick Marken (2006.08.07.0900)]

Rick Marken (206.08.07.0840)--

So Cog Sci and Behaviorism can't really help inform PCT but PCT can't help inform Cog Sci and Behaviorism by showing that these are theories of what is basically an illusion.

Oops. I meant to say: So Cog Sci and Behaviorism can't really help inform PCT but PCT _can_ help inform Cog Sci and Behaviorism by showing that these are theories of what is basically an illusion.

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[From Rick Marken (2006.08.07.0910)]

Richard Kennaway (2006.08.07.1523 BST)--

I wonder if a demo program could be designed to demonstrate reorganisation to avoid conflict. Have two systems A and B as in my earlier example, each controlling two variables, each of which is a function of three environmental variables, so that they cannot both control both their perceptions.

Let A and B be able to reorganise their output weights, as in one of the existing demos. Each on its own will then be able to bring its two perceptions under control.

When they are run together, they cannot both succeed in reorganising to control successfully. What we would like is for them to reorganise at a higher level, perhaps by changing the references they have for their perceptions. The higher level reorganisation would have to proceed at a slower pace than the lower level one, so that low level reorganisation has a chance to work.

This is a great idea. I'm going to think about this and try to come up with something.

Best

Rick

PS. Can you believe it's only been two years since we met in Oxford! So much has happened since then it seems like ages. I hope you can come to the next meeting in Minnesota. I think I can get the CSG treasurer to help you come out, if you need it!

···

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[From Bill Powers (2006.08.07.0955 MDT)]

Marc Abrams (2006.08.06.0831) --

The details of how this all takes place physiologically is still pretty much up in the air so I have taken a metaphorical approach in trying to understand the consequences of perceptual control without having to be able to show "scientifically" that control does indeed exist.

Not totally up in the air -- a good deal is known about sensory processes at low levels of organization, and a certain amount is known about what happens to input information at higher levels, though not as much as we'd like. I tried to define levels that are at least not contradictory to what is known about the neurology (as of some time ago, of course). I keep up with Science and Nature and have seen some corroboration of my guesses (though I wouldn't have guessed HOW some perceptual systems turn out to work).

As a metaphor I can hold it out there and let people see if in fact the facts fit the theory rather than trying to do, what I believe to be the impossible at this time, and that is to show scientifically that perceptual control exists. I believe one day we will be able to do so but not right now.

There are various ways of showing that it exists without necessarily knowing how it works. A simple test: try threading a needle with your eyes shut. If you can't perceive the eye of the needle and the thread, you can't do it. Other types of tests show that if you perceive incorrect information about the effects of your actions, control also fails in just the way the theory would predict. I think such tests are perfectly "scientific," though I don't know exactly what you're referring to by the term.

So what do we do until the right time comes? Sit on our hands? I believe that there is much value in looking at perceptual control as a synthesizing metaphorical framework for all of psychology and the social sciences.

I prefer not to work just with metaphors, but you don't have to satisfy my preferences.

That is, if PCT is the proper foundational theory of human behavior, and I believe it is, than all other theories if legitimate should be explaining certain parts of the control process, and in my research that is precisely what I have found.

I haven't seen any of your research so I can't evaluate it one way or the other.

Bill, you have often stated that Cog Sci and Behaviorism each represent a part of the perceptual control model and I agree, so its not as if everyone is talking about stuff from Mars.

Rick expressed my view correctly, if a little chip-on-the-shoulderishly. They both assume that behavior (action) is the end-product, though they assign different initiating processes to their models. Thus they both miss the significance of the central fact of closed-loop control. If you trace just the part of the control loop from the reference signal ("command") through the comparator to the output function to the environment where action is visible, you have the cognitive architecture. If you trace just the path from the input quantity ("stimulus") through the input function and comparator to the output function to the environment, you have the stimulus-response architecture. So neither approach can make correct predictions -- they would both predict, for example, that if you doubled the sensitivity of the output function, the behavior would double. You have to use the closed-loop model to deduce correctly that the error signal would halve and the behavior would remain about the same.

The cornerstone of understanding perceptual control in my view is first, in having an understanding of what a "perception" is.

I'd put that as "proposing a working model of perception," which we both have done. My definitions of the levels and their relationship to each other came from examination of my own experiences and trying to see what I was taking for granted. Since no actual research has been done to see how many other people would see the same things in their experience, I tell people not to memorize these levels, but just take them as an example of how it looks to one person.

For a PCT model and analytic theory, a signal is good perspective.

"Signal" belongs to a different universe of discourse -- the explanatory universe rather than the descriptive. Descriptively, perception is just what it seems to be: the world we experience. To say that these experiences are really experiences of neural signals rather than direct contact with the external world changes nothing about experience; it just offers a different kind of explanation of experience. The explanation is intended to be a proposal about how the physical system is organized, and that gets us into models, mathematics, physics, and all those other theories and constructs. The intention is to find an underlying mechanism which, working with just the properties we have given it, can generate the kinds of things we experience. I'll be the first to admit that we haven't yet gone a long way down that road.

As to your classifications of perceptions, I have no objections to them, nor do I support them. When you figure out how to test them, so anyone can perform the tests and come out with the same conclusions, they will have to be taken seriously. The same goes for mine. I think that's a way off yet.

Best,

Bill P.

From [Marc Abrams (2006.08.07.1139)]

[From Bill Powers (2006.08.07.0300 MDT)]

Richard Kennaway (2006.08.07.0912 BST) –

Sorry to have caused so much boggling, but I was writing without much explanation as the ideas occurred to me.

I completely agree that the totalitarian solution is not really a solution. What occurred to me is that it might be a natural thing to try >when people start stepping on each other’s toes.

That’s one option. Another one might be to have a Democratic Republic and a limited government. It seems to me that all kinds of government must be coercive to certain segments of the population. If not, you could never enact or enforce any laws.

And as Frank Sinatra would say;“I’ll do it my way” is more than just a stanza in a song. For a control system it is a way of life.

Trying to homogenize large groups of people will always fail, regardless of the type of government is in place. If science is about observation than observing 2500 years of human behavior should give us a hint.

Some advocate the elimination of government. I don’t believe that would work either. By limiting the number of people exposed to any one set of rules and laws will naturally reduce the amount of coercion needed. A Democratic Republic, at least theoretically, allows folks to live side by side without getting into each other’s hair.

As long as you do not infringe upon the rights of others and people voluntarily decide to live under a certain set of rules (laws) than peace should reign. Infringe upon the ability of someone else to control what they need to and you are headed for conflict.

Fortunately, here in the US we have the structure that could theoretically provide this. Unfortunately we also have a large group of folks who believe a strong central government is needed. The political polarization you see in the US today is no different than it was 275 years ago. In fact its a probably not as intense.

This country was founded on the separate but equal property of each of the original states and would never have formed if the demand for homogeneity among all states existed as it does today.

Yes, it’s done with a gun to the head and it gets grudging compliance – but for a time it may seem to work better than having >people competing for resources and jobs so some people have nothing at all.

Do not confound the political with the economic. As the Chinese have shown, you can have a communistic capitalistic country.

You have two choices when it comes to limited resources. An economic solution says that the market always determines what is produced and in what quantities. The only alternative is to have it done politically, or through central planning. As a control system I don’t need or want others deciding for me what I should or should not have and in what quantities.

It seems the folks in the former USSR had similar ideas.

I don’t think China has famines any more, but we have to notice also that they decided that the real problem is population (more >guns to the head, of course). When I was there I was staggered by the endless huge clusters of high-rise apartment buildings in the> hundred or so miles between Hong Kong and Guangzhou, and wondered how on earth they get enough food and water in and >waste out and clothing and things for people to do to earn a living.

Yes, a similar statement was made to Margaret Thatcher by a visiting Soviet official to Great Britain. Couldn’t quite comprehend how it all happened without central planning.

Maybe that train trip is behind what I wrote, because I remember suddenly having a pang of sympathy for those who are trying to >administer this gigantic chaotic mess. Maybe central control seems like the only way to impose some sort of order and prevent >disasters from happening on their watch. Maybe the reason for the harsh measures and tight control isn’t just that bad people are in >charge – they may see nothing else that would work.

Maybe for you, but not for me. I don’t mind the state of flux. It shows that progress is being made and the old is being replaced by the new, but most important, what you are seeing is what the people want. they are getting and no government will stop it now. The death nell for communism has been sounded and its only a matter of time before the folks demand and get the freedom they want.

But not everyone wants “freedom” some prefer the “security” of the state and there should be a place for those folks as well. If you want to contribute your entire paycheck to a general pool of money that gets redistributed by some political body than you should have the opportunity of doing so. Just don’t force that on me.

As to your faith in the ability of technology and human inventiveness to handle the degrees of freedom problem, I don’t share it. >We’ve been experiencing increasing shortages of degrees of freedom ever since I was a child. I once (in the '50s) tried to camp in >Yosemite park and gave up when I saw that the pine needles in the campground had been pulverized by passing feet into a kind of >fine flour, and the ropes bracing adjacent tents were overlapping each other. There were no degrees of freedom left, no niches >that Mary or I wanted to occupy in that locality. That was just a foretaste. I’ve noticed that everywhere you go there are people, >and you have to avoid bumping into them or wait until they’re finished before you can do what or go where you want. It didn’t used >to be that way. When I got to Durango I built a little observatory to take advantage of the altitude with its clear air and dark skies up >on my hill. Now 15 years later the mesa below my house, extending for miles, is covered with yard-lights all night, and it just isn’t dark >any more. Where I am going to move, north of Denver, there are giant developments consisting of condos, apartments, and houses >spreading for tens of miles across what used to be empty prairies and farms. They don’t grow food or graze livestock there any more, >of course. One development, Broomfield, has become its own county. I found an apartment complex (in what used to be a small >town) where the buildings are a little farther apart, so it’s semi-tolerable. But basically that whole area is pretty horrible.

There are already water shortages in Colorado and people are beginning to fight over who gets the rights. The town of Durango is >trying to obtain some senior water rights to protect the rafting and white-water kayaking that is big around here – and of course >the resorts upstream and the farmers downstream are screaming NO. The sportsmen, tourists, and entrepreneurs and those who >get the taxes they pay are screaming YES. The gas extraction industry which has wells all over the Fruitland mesa (25 miles across, >south of Durango) is begining to see the yield dropping off, so they’ve manage to persuade the authorities to let then increase the >density of wells from one every 160 acres to one every 80 acres, and use more water for injecting into wells to increase gas flow. >Home owners, ranchers, and farmers are objecting strenuously since the well pads and the roads to them are plopped down onto >their property and they can’t stop it. When the gas runs out, property taxes in this country will have to go up about 60% to make >up for the loss of revenue from British Petroleum, and others. And those who own mineral rights on their property will suffer a drastic> drop in income.

Bill, there are still plenty of open spaces in this country. You may not want to live there for any number of reasons but should others be denied? Places become populated because they are attractive for any number of reasons. Who gets to decide who lives where?

The interdependence is getting denser and denser. Conflicts both big and little are everywhere. I think we’re running out of degrees of freedom, or that finding unused ones is getting harder and harder.

No, I don’t believe this. The more that we demand that others do what we want them to do, the more conflict there will be. We have been interdependent for a very long period of time. What we have not done is demand that the folks in Durango live under the same set of laws as those who live in NYC. Each locality needs to determine what laws and rules need to be followed. Again, without the infringement on others.

Regards,

Marc

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[From Rick Marken (2006.08.07.1150)]

Marc Abrams (2006.08.07.1302)--

Rick Marken (206.08.07.0840)--

I'm pretty sure that what Bill might have said is pretty close to what I said in my "Blind men and the elephant" paper in _More Mind >Readings_: If organisms are organized as input controllers then their behavior can _appear to be_ caused by internal mental plans (Cog Sci) or by external stimuli (Behaviorism). But, according to PCT, the Cog Sci and Behaviorist views of behavior are _understandable_ mistakes.

Sorry Rick, they are _not_ mistakes.

Right. They are _understandable_ mistakes.

They are _incomplete_ views and understandings

If PCT is right, then Cog Sci and Behaviorism are not just incomplete; they are misinterpretations. If Cog Sci and/or Behaviorism are right, however, then PCT is a misinterpretation. But I think we have a number of demonstrations that show that PCT is right (at least, righter than Cog Sci and Behaviorism).

So Cog Sci and Behaviorism can't really help inform PCT but PCT can't help inform Cog Sci and Behaviorism by showing that these are theories of what is basically an illusion.

Illusion? And who proclaimed that your ideas are not?

No one. I use the word "illusion" as in the "behavioral illusion". The behavioral illusion is something Bill observed about the behavior of control systems. The disturbance-output relationship in a control system appears to reflect characteristics of the system itself; in fact, this relationship reflect the nature of the feedback connection between output and the controlled input. The "behavioral illusion" is discussed and illustrated at Behavioral Illusion.

As to my ideas being an illusion, I consider that a real possibility. That's why I always try to test my ideas using modeling and experimental test. If Cognitive Scientists and Behaviorists were as open as PCT researchers are to the possibility that their explanations of behavior are based on an illusion, I think PCT would have already become the default model of behavior in the life sciences.

Richard S. Marken Consulting
marken@mindreadings.com
Home 310 474-0313
Cell 310 729-1400

From [Marc Abrams (2006.08.07.1357)]

[From Bill Powers (2006.08.07.0955 MDT)]

Marc Abrams (2006.08.06.0831) –

The details of how this all takes place physiologically is still >pretty much up in the air so I have taken a metaphorical approach in >>trying to understand the consequences of perceptual control without >having to be able to show “scientifically” that control does >>indeed exist.

Not totally up in the air – a good deal is known about sensory processes at low levels of organization, and a certain amount is known >about what happens to input information at higher levels, though not as much as we’d like.

Our perceptions are a great deal more than our just our sensory inputs. Yes, we have some decent knowledge about the psychophysics iof individual sensory inputs nvolved, but there is much we don’t know about how all of our sensory inputs, imagination, past experiences, and emotions it all comes together so we are able to construct our perceptions.

I tried to define levels that are at least not contradictory to what is known about the neurology (as of some time ago, of course). I >keep up with Science and Nature and have seen some corroboration of my guesses (though I wouldn’t have guessed HOW some >perceptual systems turn out to work).

I’m not sure why you feel you have to defend your position. I can understand why you took it and why you believe it to be so. I think there is more than one way one may view the concept of perceptions. There is no one “right” way and no “best” way.

Your definition serves your puroposes and mine serves mine. Our views are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, there is no reason why we both can’t be correct in our interpretations.

If I view a monitor screen and talk about the picture in terms of pixels, am I any more correct or wrong if I talk about the picture in terms of the colors involved, or the actions perceived? Each view is useful for different puroposes.

As a metaphor I can hold it out there and let people see if in fact >the facts fit the theory rather than trying to do, what I believe >>to be the impossible at this time, and that is to show >scientifically that perceptual control exists. I believe one day we >will be >>able to do so but not right now.

There are various ways of showing that it exists without necessarily knowing how it works. A simple test: try threading a needle with your eyes shut. If you can’t perceive the eye of the needle and the thread, you can’t do it.

Yes, but if you are suggesting that “seeing” is required than I have to disagree with you and this is my point. I can in fact thread a needle blid-folded. I do it by touch alone. By “feeling” the needle I can “perceive” it.

Did you see the paintings in perspective by a blindman. Blind from birth he is able to “perceive” and draw not only perspectives but in colors as well.

Again, perceptions are a great deal more than the sum of our sensory inputs.

Other types of tests show that if you perceive incorrect information about the effects of your actions, control also fails in just the >way the theory would predict. I think such tests are perfectly “scientific,” though I don’t know exactly what you’re referring to by >the term.

You can’t have “incorrect” perceptions. You may misinterpret what is “out there” but your perceptions are your perceptions. For each of us our perceptions are “real” even though they may not correlate to anything directly in the environment.

So what do we do until the right time comes? Sit on our hands? I >believe that there is much value in looking at perceptual >>control as >a synthesizing metaphorical framework for all of psychology and the >social sciences.

I prefer not to work just with metaphors, but you don’t have to satisfy my preferences.

Right, and I won’t. Like all good control systems I will satisfy my preferences. I would hope that each of us could see the worth of the others work and ideas.

That is, if PCT is the proper foundational theory of human behavior, >and I believe it is, than all other theories if legitimate should >>be >explaining certain parts of the control process, and in my research >that is precisely what I have found.

I haven’t seen any of your research so I can’t evaluate it one way or the other.

What would you like to see? What can I show you that will not elicit a defensive knee jerk response from you? What do I need to do in order to convince you that I’m not interested in overturning PCT with some new theory? What can I show you that would show you the value of the perceptual control metaphorical framework?

Bill, you have often stated that Cog Sci and Behaviorism each >represent a part of the perceptual control model and I agree, so its> >not as if everyone is talking about stuff from Mars.

Rick expressed my view correctly, if a little chip-on-the-shoulderishly. They both assume that behavior (action) is the end-product, >though they assign different initiating processes to their models. Thus they both miss the significance of the central fact of >closed-loop control. If you trace just the part of the control loop from the reference signal (“command”) through the comparator to >the output function to the environment where action is visible, you have the cognitive architecture. If you trace just the path from >the input quantity (“stimulus”) through the input function and comparator to the output function to the environment, you have the stimulus-response architecture. So neither approach can make correct predictions – they would both predict, for example, that if you doubled the sensitivity of the output function, the behavior would double. You have to use the closed-loop model to deduce correctly that the error signal would halve and the behavior would remain about the same.

Yes, this is what I remember you saying.

The cornerstone of understanding perceptual control in my view is >first, in having an understanding of what a “perception” is.

I’d put that as “proposing a working model of perception,” which we both have done. My definitions of the levels and their >relationship to each other came from examination of my own experiences and trying to see what I was taking for granted. Since no >actual research has been done to see how many other people would see the same things in their experience, I tell people not to >memorize these levels, but just take them as an example of how it looks to one person.

Yes, and our views are not mutually exclusive. They represent different views based on different purposes and needs. Although we are each trying to explain “control” our perspectives are different. Your focus is on causation, and mine is on the consequences at the organism level. We are looking at opposite ends of the cow. I’ll leave it up to you to decide which end you are looking at. :wink:

For a PCT model and analytic theory, a signal is good perspective.

“Signal” belongs to a different universe of discourse – the explanatory universe rather than the descriptive. Descriptively, perception >is just what it seems to be: the world we experience. To say that these experiences are really experiences of neural signals rather >than direct contact with the external world changes nothing about experience; it just offers a different kind of explanation of >experience.

Yes, and our perceptions are a great deal more than just our direct experience with the environment.

The explanation is intended to be a proposal about how the physical system is organized, and that gets us into models, mathematics, physics, and all those other theories and constructs.

Yes, and as long as you stick to the “physics” involved you are on solid ground. Unfortunately our “perceptions” are in fact “mental” and not “physical” constructs and as such the “laws” of physics, mathematics simply do not apply.

Mathematics is no less a metraphor than any verbal explanation you can provide.

The intention is to find an underlying mechanism which, working with just the properties we have given it, can generate the kinds of> things we experience. I’ll be the first to admit that we haven’t yet gone a long way down that road.

Yes, this is your scientific, causal model and I wish you much luck in accomplishing this. My interest and expertise is focused more on the consequences of these control processes rather than the causes.

As to your classifications of perceptions, I have no objections to them, nor do I support them. When you figure out how to test >them, so anyone can perform the tests and come out with the same conclusions, they will have to be taken seriously. The same >goes for mine. I think that’s a way off yet.

Yes, but I don’t see why you think we are in some form of competition? And what would happen if I did produce a test? What would that have to do with you or your ideas? What am I not seeing here?

Regards,

Marc

Best,

Bill P.

···

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[From Bill Powers (2006.08.07.1447 MDT)]

Most people, however, just want something that
solves their problem today, and they hope tomorrow.

[From Marco Plas]

The question that keeps me up at night: do the majority of people have
the ability to identify problems (potential mismatch) days, weeks,
month or even years from now. My field is that of Risk management and
I stumble across this exact statement from Bill very often. People
seek a solution for their current problems. While looking ahead, the
potential mismatch is seldom seen. Potential mismatch in my case has
two variables (potential Impact & Potential Likelihood of occurrence).
It seems that people, although they might see the potential impact,
they reduce the potential likelihood (in thinking) to reduce the
potential mismatch, until it occurs.

If I compare this behaviour with that of lower life forms like, let's
say a squirrel, it puzzles me. Squirrels start to gather food in the
fall (when there is plenty available). In doing that, they must have
some mechanism for risk management or they would die in the winter.

Why is it that people are so poor in evaluating a potential mismatch,
a longer period of time before it occurs? Are they to preoccupied in
controlling current mismatches (then stress could be a factor) or are
people simply resistant to the idea that a mismatch could occur. The
tricky part in risk management is that often one individual will asses
the potential risk for a larger group of people.

Has anyone done research on 'potential' reference signals, causing
a 'potential' mismatch?

Thanx,

Marco

From [Marc Abrams (2006.08.08.1018)]

[From Bill Powers (2006.08.07.1447 MDT)]

Richard Kennaway (2006.08.07.1720 BST) –

I’m with you Richard.

Bill, I’m not sure why you feel there is a “scientific” answer for every problem. You seem to be saying that there is some “answer” out there that is not part of the reality we construct, and that we call perceptions.

It is ironic that at the end of the day, your “science” is fully dependent on your “observations” or perceptions of the situation. There can never be anything but that from being true. So no matter how sophisticated your “measuring” device is, any meaning you give the measurements is purely subjective, and any “science” you do is fully dependent on the foundational metaphysics involved

As a kid, when I was involved in a dispute and I found my self frustrated and not wanting to continue the discussion, a favorite refrain would be; “Prove it”. That would of course stop any discussion in its tracks because you can never “prove” any empirical fact.

You seem to like using the same tactic when you no longer want to discuss something. It is a discussion stopper and little else.

“Science” is a never ending quest. Never ending because even if we arrived at the “truth” how would we know it? How would we know that another theory does not exist that would provide better knowledge? Who decides what the “truth” is? That is, who decides the “rules” of the game?

Since no theory ever devised by man was or is perfect, holes exist. They existed for Newton and Einstein, and everyone else who ever devised a theory. So science is about finding and “fixing” those holes. Science is not about validation because the next test could very well be the one that shows the blemishes.

But Rick, does not understand that “testing” does not mean doing the same test an infinite number of times. It is about doing an infinite number of different kinds and types of tests to try and uncover the weak spots.

Regards,

Marc

···

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[From Bill Powers (2006.08.08.0820 MDT)]

Marco Plas (20060807) --

The question that keeps me up at night: do the majority of people have
the ability to identify problems (potential mismatch) days, weeks,
month or even years from now.

Well, as a practitioner of Risk Management, did you already have the innate ability to do this, or did you have to learn it? I suspect you had to learn quite a lot, and that a big part of what you learned consists of models of various processes in the world. So the question really is, do all people have the ability to learn such models and how to analyze them? I'd say that this ability would vary, just a mathematical ability varies across people.

If I compare this behaviour with that of lower life forms like, let's
say a squirrel, it puzzles me. Squirrels start to gather food in the
fall (when there is plenty available). In doing that, they must have
some mechanism for risk management or they would die in the winter.

I don't think they do. I don't think there's anything intellectual involved: I would guess that squirrels just get an urge to see a big pile of nuts when all the multiple signs of winter start to appear,. Why? Because those that did survived to reproduce, and those that didn't, didn't. Of course the fact that nuts tend to fall off trees before winter may have something to do with it, too. I know that rodents of several kinds have a tendency to hoard food at any time of the year; they eat what they want and then fill up their cheek pouches with more and take it back to the nest, even when there are no young. This doesn't look like risk management to me, but something much more elementary. Not more explainable in detail, of course.

Of course an interest in risk management could be inherited. I won't risk guessing what inherited characteristics might lead to that. I know that my own concern with possible future problems, while not totally missing, is certainly much lower than that of other people I know. I spend very little time planning, which may be why I am replying to this post instead of putting more things in boxes, which is getting more urgent by the day.

Why is it that people are so poor in evaluating a potential mismatch,
a longer period of time before it occurs?

It may have something to do with the use they make of their own logic levels. A racing fan might wonder why other people are so poor at handicapping horses; a mathematician why others have such problems with simple differential equations, a musician why people get so worked up about reasoning things out. Is risk management so infallible that it's always worth the bother?

Are they to preoccupied in controlling current mismatches (then stress could be a factor) or are people simply resistant to the idea that a mismatch could occur. The tricky part in risk management is that often one individual will assess the potential risk for a larger group of people.

Correctly, or incorrectly? I think that the preponderance of incorrect predictions may explain why a lot of people don't trust those who predict disasters or good things -- look at the reactions to predictions about global warming. If weather forecasting were accurate for more than a few hours into the future, people might be more interested in longer-range forecasts. Also, in the prediction field you can always find people who will predict any of the possible outcomes, take your choice. Even if they're just guessing, some of them are bound to get it right, like the race-track con man who goes around touting each horse in the field to different people, in return for a share of the winnings. The ones who seem to get it right naturally claim success, but they can't necessarily do it again, and a lot of people know that.

What I think people do see fairly clearly is that as the complexities involved in a prediction increase, and as the distance of the prediction into the future increases, the value of the prediction falls pretty steeply. It also depends on the underlying models -- how complete they are. I will believe an astronomer if he says he can tell me where Mars will appear in the sky withinm one minute of arc at any time 100 years from now. I will not believe a stockbroker who tells me at lunchtime what the price of General Motors will be within 50 cents at the close of trading today.

Has anyone done research on 'potential' reference signals, causing
a 'potential' mismatch?

I don 't think there is any such thing. Perhaps you mean reference signals which relate to perceptions of potential mismatches, generated in imagination. Perceptions always exist in present time, even when they refer to something we conceptualize (now) as being in the future. Future and past are present-time imagined perceptions.

Best,

Bill P.

[From Bill Powers (2006.08.08.0910 MDT)]

Bill, I’m not sure why you feel
there is a “scientific” answer for every problem. You seem to
be saying that there is some “answer” out there that is not
part of the reality we construct, and that we call
perceptions.

No, I’m saying there are answers “in here” that we can get in
the usual way, by proposing hypotheses and testing them to see if they
check out. What’s wrong with that? To me, a “scientific” answer
is simply one I have some reason to believe. If I don’t have any reason
to believe something, why should I

believe it?

It is ironic that at the end of
the day, your “science” is fully dependent on your
“observations” or perceptions of the
situation.

Have I said anything other than that, ever? The whole idea is that the
world we know is a perceived world, not the world that exists beyond our
perceptions that is causing them. We can only guess about that world,
theorize about it, propose models and see if they can generate the sorts
of things we observe.

So no matter how
sophisticated your “measuring” device is, any meaning you give
the measurements is purely subjective, and any “science” you do
is fully dependent on the foundational metaphysics
involved.

Of course. Who around here ever said anything different? The
“foundational metaphysics” consists of the models we make, the
physics we have invented, the methods of reasoning we have worked
out. We try to apply these things systematically, in ways that others
(and we ourselves) can reproduce.

As a kid, when I was involved in
a dispute and I found my self frustrated and not wanting to continue the
discussion, a favorite refrain would be; “Prove it”. That would
of course stop any discussion in its tracks because you can never
“prove” any empirical fact.

No, but you can prove that a prediction is right or wrong. You can prove
that a proposed mathematical equality is true. You don’t need to prove
empirical facts because you can observe them. Of course you might have to
prove anything you say about them.

You seem to like using the same
tactic when you no longer want to discuss something. It is a
discussion stopper and little else.

I don’t know what you’re talking about here. I was proposing a measure of
overpopulation in the form of trying to see when the level of effort
required to reach goals begins to increase above the normal level
(because of conflicts). I haven’t actually come up with a workable
measure – I was just asking if such a thing might be found. Something
about that seems to have ticked you off, but I don’t know what it
is.

“Science” is a never
ending quest. Never ending because even if we arrived at the
“truth” how would we know it? How would we know that another
theory does not exist that would provide better knowledge? Who decides
what the “truth” is? That is, who decides the “rules”
of the game?

The last is easy: As Feynman, the physicist, said,“We make them
up.” We use the best theories we know about and can agree on that
have the most liklihood of remaining useful. You seem to be saying that
there’s no use in seeking truth because we will never know absolute
truth, that no theory is worth anything because there may be a better
theory (also worth nothing, I presume, but still “better”)
right around the corner. I think that’s a good formula for mental
paralysis.

Since no theory ever devised by
man was or is perfect, holes exist. They existed for Newton and Einstein,
and everyone else who ever devised a theory. So science is about finding
and “fixing” those holes. Science is not about validation
because the next test could very well be the one that shows the
blemishes.

That’s not a very good reason for rejecting theories altogether. We
choose theories that predict what will happen better than other theories
do, and we keep them as long as no other theory predicts better. This
means that our ability to predict keeps improving. We don’t start all
over from scratch each time a new theory comes along. Relativity theory
predicts better than Newtonian theory does in some circumstances, but
Newtonian theory didn’t suddenly lose its ability to predict the orbits
of spacecraft, planets, and stars. It still does that just as well as
relativity theory does, as far as we can judge from our measurements.
It’s just that Newtonian theory breaks down under extreme conditions like
velocities that are a significant fraction of the velocity of light, or
masses large enough to close space up around them. We don’t encounter
those very often on Earth or in the Solar System.

But Rick, does not understand
that “testing” does not mean doing the same test an infinite
number of times. It is about doing an infinite number of different kinds
and types of tests to try and uncover the weak spots.

How did Rick get into this? I thought you were talking to me.
Somnething’s going out of whack here. Let’s abandon this line.

Best,.

Bill P.