Perceptual Conflict (was Re: WinterSchool_HumanActionControl)

[Martin Taylor 2017.02.08.10.56]

[From Rick Marken (2017.02.07.1210][

Memory is a funny thing. It would be quite interesting if someone

who was not on CSGnet when Bill was seriously active there would go
back to the archives and see whether they would agree with that
characterization. My perception of the interactions on these (and
other) topics is quite different. I remember being in
quasi-permanent conflict with Rick, but not with Bill, despite
occasional scientific disagreements, most of which were settled
quite quickly.

But that was then and this is now. When reading the message to which

I am responding, let’s remember that there is (according to Rick
recently) no such thing as an environmental variable that
corresponds to the controlled perception.

      [From Rick Marken

(2017.02.02.1400)]

    RM: Hopefully, you can see now

that it makes no sense to talk about an “actual” environmental
variable, like distance, that corresponds to the perception that
the controller is controlling. Indeed, one could say that the
“actual” variable being controlled is the perceptual variable.

"One could say"? Isn't that what Bill Powers spent nearly 60 years

trying to get people to understand?

[From Rick Marken (2017.02.07.1210][
  The main ones I remember are "control of

behavior" (I said it was possible; everyone else said no),
“control of perception versus control of CEV” (I said control of
perception was the same as control of the aspect of the
environment defined by the perception; everyone else said it is
only perception that is controlled

There's a question either of language or of logic here. I doubt that

Bill would have let either pass without using his (usually) gentle
Socratic method of correction by asking questions that made the
other think. I have no intention of playing the “What would Bill
Powers have said” game, and am not good at his technique, so I make
do with what I can do, as follows.

As I use language, if "control of perception [is] the same as

control of the aspect of the environment defined by the perception",
then it is highly illogical to say that the " aspect of the
environment defined by the perception" doesn’t exist.

If we are talking in a community that assumes PCT to be basically

correct, as I understand a control loop, it can contain only one
controlled variable, and the variable that is controlled is
determined by the asymmetry between the input- and output-side gains
of the loop. This is the critical asymmetry that allows us to talk
about the “Behavioural Illusion”. It is what determines that the
output effect on the (non-existent) environmental variable is just
what is needed to counter the disturbance influence on that
variable, rather than the details of the internals of the control
unit inside the body of the organism.

On the other hand...

[From Rick Marken (2017.02.08.1050)] to Warren Mansell.
  RM: Your comment has helped me understand

why you see merit in Martin Taylor’s ideas about the relationship
between the controlled perception, p, and the controlled quantity,
q.i (which he calls the CEV). Both you and Martin seem to believe
that p, the perceptual signal, is controlled while q.i, the
environmental correlate of p, is only “apparently” controlled, as
a side effect of controlling p. In order to believe this, you have
to take the theory as fact and the fact to be explained – that
q.i is being controlled – as theory.

That's a rather interesting perception of the situation, which again

does not correspond to mine. The perception that q.i behaves
as if it were controlled is the fact. That it is controlled is a
theory. A perception in the desert of what appears to be a lake in
the distance is a fact. That it is a lake from which one could drink
water is a theory.

How qi is apparently controlled is a refinement of the theory. That

refinement is called PCT. PCT is a theory that shows why q.i appears
as though it is controlled, and why it is not controlled. Like the
lake in the desert, control of q.i is a convincing mirage until you
look at what must be the case if it is indeed controlled. For a
variable to be controlled, it must have a reference value and a
mechanism for comparing its actual value to its reference value. PCT
supplies those for the control of a related variable, which Powers
called the “perception” of the environmental variable that appears
to be controlled.

The counterpart of the "Behavioural Illusion" is, I think, the

“control illusion” in which an external observer perceives that an
environmental variable (that on Thursdays does not exist) is being
controlled when what is controlled is (according to PCT) a
perception of that (non-existent) environmental variable.

Both illusions depend on the quality of control, the Behavioural

Illusion more so than the Control Illusion. In the “Control
illusion”, the output appears to be determined by the Disturbance,
which is exactly the S-R view on the loop – in other words, it is a
manifestation of the Behavioural Illusion. From a PCT view of
“control”, the Disturbance seems to be acting as a reference value
for minus the output. When you analyze a well-functioning control
loop, however, the perception is influenced strongly by the
reference while the disturbance has little effect, whereas its
symmetrical counterpart, the output influence on the apparently
controlled variable, is influenced almost equally strongly by both.

When different statements are logically inconsistent, something has

to give. Either the language is being misused or misinterpreted or
at least one of the claims is false. In this case, I think “at
least” may be rather conservative. But I suppose it’s just Rick 1
arguing against Rick 2 again. If his two personae are treated as
different people, then I guess the inconsistency and illogicality
vanish. We just have to see which one, if either, is justified by
science.

Martin
···

RM: Since Bill passed away it seems to me like you
[Warren Mansell: MT] and everyone else on CSGNet has
disagreed with me on virtually every topic we’ve
discussed. The main ones I remember are “control of
behavior” (I said it was possible; everyone else said no),
“control of perception versus control of CEV” (I said
control of perception was the same as control of the
aspect of the environment defined by the perception;
everyone else said it is only perception that is
controlled) and, of course, the “power law”. I welcome the
criticism and the debate. But I do find it interesting
that these same topics (except for the power law, of
course) came up before Bill passed away and at that time
it was almost always everyone arguing against Bill and me.

[Eetu Pikkarainen 2017-02-09]

Dear all,

I hope you allow a short speculation from a newcomer. I believe this is quite basic / standard stuff of philosophy/ theory of science.

We can differentiate three interconnected spheres: 1) reality (“out there”), 2) perceptions/observations and 3) theories.

The thesis of theory ladenness of observations states that even if perceptions are “about” reality they are still constrained by the “theories” (broadly understood) of the observer. PCT makes it nicely understandable
how our input functions, memories and the whole structure of the control hierarchy in addition to our particular relationship (mediated by many kind of links) at the moment with the object of perception constrain our observations.

By theory I understand a structured collection of knowledge. If we include the tacit knowledge then our control hierarchies are theories.

Science is a collective enterprise to develop better explicit theories. There are two schools about the relationships between reality, perceptions and theories in science: 1) Instrumentalism (/empirism) sees that the
task of theories is to explain perceptions. 2) Realism (critical or scientific one) sees that theory should describe the reality behind the perceptions. These two positions are of course a coarse simplification allowing a vast prism of different opinions.

Now it seems that some of Rick’s statements are nearer instrumentalism. He stresses the importance of observations, and the observations seem to be “facts� for him. Theory is not so important because it only tries to
explain the gathered facts (=oservations). Theory is a secondary tool in relation to the tools of gathering facts.

For me it seems that Martin is more defending (scientific) realism while he stresses that the theory accounts for unperceivable realities like control of perception inside the organism.

I am more inclined to realism, so I am not quite neutral here. Chad ([Chad Green (2017.02.08.1622 EST)] )
nicely referred to second-order cybernetics, which for me means just the demand for self-reflectivity of life and cultural sciences. If the perceptions - and especially outputs - of a controlling organism are not faithful enough to the reality (or rather to
its relationship with the reality) then the reality strikes back. It is the same with science: reality rules. And it is the task of theory to account for those parts of reality which are not yet perceived. That is how I think that science can only proceed:
Theory ahead.

Eetu

···

From: Martin Taylor [mailto:mmt-csg@mmtaylor.net]
Sent: 9. helmikuuta 2017 8:22
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Perceptual Conflict (was Re: WinterSchool_HumanActionControl)

[Martin Taylor 2017.02.08.10.56]

[From Rick Marken (2017.02.07.1210][

RM: Since Bill passed away it seems to me like you [Warren Mansell: MT] and everyone else on CSGNet has disagreed with me on virtually every topic we’ve discussed. The main ones I remember are “control of behavior” (I said it was possible;
everyone else said no), “control of perception versus control of CEV” (I said control of perception was the same as control of the aspect of the environment defined by the perception; everyone else said it is only perception that is controlled) and, of course,
the “power law”. I welcome the criticism and the debate. But I do find it interesting that these same topics (except for the power law, of course) came up before Bill passed away and at that time it was almost always everyone arguing against Bill and me.

Memory is a funny thing. It would be quite interesting if someone who was not on CSGnet when Bill was seriously active there would go back to the archives and see whether they would agree with that characterization. My perception of the interactions on these
(and other) topics is quite different. I remember being in quasi-permanent conflict with Rick, but not with Bill, despite occasional scientific disagreements, most of which were settled quite quickly.

But that was then and this is now. When reading the message to which I am responding, let’s remember that there is (according to Rick recently) no such thing as an environmental variable that corresponds to the controlled perception.

[From Rick Marken (2017.02.02.1400)]

RM: Hopefully, you can see now that it makes no sense to talk about an “actual” environmental variable, like distance, that corresponds to the perception that
the controller is controlling. Indeed, one could say that the “actual” variable being controlled is the perceptual variable.

“One could say”? Isn’t that what Bill Powers spent nearly 60 years trying to get people to understand?

[From Rick Marken (2017.02.07.1210][

The main ones I remember are “control of behavior” (I said it was possible; everyone else said no), “control of perception versus control of CEV” (I said control of perception was the same as control of the aspect of the environment defined
by the perception; everyone else said it is only perception that is controlled

There’s a question either of language or of logic here. I doubt that Bill would have let either pass without using his (usually) gentle Socratic method of correction by asking questions that made the other think. I have no intention of playing the “What would
Bill Powers have said” game, and am not good at his technique, so I make do with what I can do, as follows.

As I use language, if “control of perception [is] the same as control of the aspect of the environment defined by the perception”, then it is highly illogical to say that the " aspect of the environment defined by the perception" doesn’t exist.

If we are talking in a community that assumes PCT to be basically correct, as I understand a control loop, it can contain only one controlled variable, and the variable that is controlled is determined by the asymmetry between the input- and output-side gains
of the loop. This is the critical asymmetry that allows us to talk about the “Behavioural Illusion”. It is what determines that the output effect on the (non-existent) environmental variable is just what is needed to counter the disturbance influence on that
variable, rather than the details of the internals of the control unit inside the body of the organism.

On the other hand…

[From Rick Marken (2017.02.08.1050)] to Warren Mansell.

RM: Your comment has helped me understand why you see merit in Martin Taylor’s ideas about the relationship between the controlled perception, p, and the controlled quantity, q.i (which he calls the CEV). Both you and Martin seem to believe
that p, the perceptual signal, is controlled while q.i, the environmental correlate of p, is only “apparently” controlled, as a side effect of controlling p. In order to believe this, you have to take the theory as fact and the fact to be explained – that
q.i is being controlled – as theory.

That’s a rather interesting perception of the situation, which again does not correspond to mine. The
perception that q.i behaves as if it were controlled is the fact. That it is controlled is a theory. A perception in the desert of what appears to be a lake in the distance is a fact. That it is a lake from which one could drink water is a theory.

How qi is apparently controlled is a refinement of the theory. That refinement is called PCT. PCT is a theory that shows why q.i appears as though it is controlled, and why it is not controlled. Like the lake in the desert, control of q.i is a convincing mirage
until you look at what must be the case if it is indeed controlled. For a variable to be controlled, it must have a reference value and a mechanism for comparing its actual value to its reference value. PCT supplies those for the control of a related variable,
which Powers called the “perception” of the environmental variable that appears to be controlled.

The counterpart of the “Behavioural Illusion” is, I think, the “control illusion” in which an external observer perceives that an environmental variable (that on Thursdays does not exist) is being controlled when what is controlled is (according to PCT) a perception
of that (non-existent) environmental variable.

Both illusions depend on the quality of control, the Behavioural Illusion more so than the Control Illusion. In the “Control illusion”, the output appears to be determined by the Disturbance, which is exactly the S-R view on the loop – in other words, it is
a manifestation of the Behavioural Illusion. From a PCT view of “control”, the Disturbance seems to be acting as a reference value for minus the output. When you analyze a well-functioning control loop, however, the perception is influenced strongly by the
reference while the disturbance has little effect, whereas its symmetrical counterpart, the output influence on the apparently controlled variable, is influenced almost equally strongly by both.

When different statements are logically inconsistent, something has to give. Either the language is being misused or misinterpreted or at least one of the claims is false. In this case, I think “at least” may be rather conservative. But I suppose it’s just
Rick 1 arguing against Rick 2 again. If his two personae are treated as different people, then I guess the inconsistency and illogicality vanish. We just have to see which one, if either, is justified by science.

Martin

[Chad Green (2017.02.09.11:11 EST)]

"As a metaphor—and II stress that it is intended as a metaphor—tthe concept of an invariant that arises out of mutually or cyclically balancing changes may help
us to approach the concept of self. In cybernetics this metaphor is implemented in the ‘closed loop,’ the circular arrangement of feedback mechanisms that maintain a given value within certain limits. They work towards an invariant, but the invariant is achieved
not by a steady resistance, the way a rock stands unmoved in the wind, but by compensation over time. Whenever we happen to look in a feedback loop, we find the present act pitted against the immediate past, but already on the way to being compensated itself
by the immediate future. The invariant the system achieves can, therefore, never be found or frozen in a single element because, by its very nature, it consists in one or more relationships—and relationships are not in thingss but between them.

If the self, as I suggest, is a relational entity, it cannot have a locus in the world of experiential objects. It does not reside in the heart, as Aristotle
thought, nor in the brain, as we tend to think today. It resides in no place at all, but merely manifests itself in the continuity of our acts of differentiating and relating and in the intuitive certainty we have that our experience is truly ours." - Ernst
von Glasersfeld (Cybernetics, Experience and the Concept of Self)

Best,

Chad

···

From: Eetu Pikkarainen [mailto:eetu.pikkarainen@oulu.fi]
Sent: Thursday, February 09, 2017 7:07 AM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: RE: Perceptual Conflict (was Re: WinterSchool_HumanActionControl)

[Eetu Pikkarainen 2017-02-09]

Dear all,

I hope you allow a short speculation from a newcomer. I believe this is quite basic / standard stuff of philosophy/ theory of science.

We can differentiate three interconnected spheres: 1) reality (“out there”), 2) perceptions/observations and 3) theories.

The thesis of theory ladenness of observations states that even if perceptions are “about” reality they are still constrained by the “theories” (broadly understood) of the observer. PCT makes it nicely understandable how our input functions,
memories and the whole structure of the control hierarchy in addition to our particular relationship (mediated by many kind of links) at the moment with the object of perception constrain our observations.

By theory I understand a structured collection of knowledge. If we include the tacit knowledge then our control hierarchies are theories.

Science is a collective enterprise to develop better explicit theories. There are two schools about the relationships between reality, perceptions and theories in science: 1) Instrumentalism (/empirism) sees that the task of theories is
to explain perceptions. 2) Realism (critical or scientific one) sees that theory should describe the reality behind the perceptions. These two positions are of course a coarse simplification allowing a vast prism of different opinions.

Now it seems that some of Rick’s statements are nearer instrumentalism. He stresses the importance of observations, and the observations seem to be “facts� for him. Theory is not so important because it only tries to explain the gathered
facts (=oservations). Theory is a secondary tool in relation to the tools of gathering facts.

For me it seems that Martin is more defending (scientific) realism while he stresses that the theory accounts for unperceivable realities like control of perception inside the organism.

I am more inclined to realism, so I am not quite neutral here. Chad ([Chad Green (2017.02.08.1622 EST)] ) nicely referred to second-order cybernetics, which
for me means just the demand for self-reflectivity of life and cultural sciences. If the perceptions - and especially outputs - of a controlling organism are not faithful enough to the reality (or rather to its relationship with the reality) then the reality
strikes back. It is the same with science: reality rules. And it is the task of theory to account for those parts of reality which are not yet perceived. That is how I think that science can only proceed: Theory ahead.

Eetu

[From Rick Marken (2017.02.09.1450)]

···

Martin Taylor (2017.02.08.10.56)–

  RM: ...Both you and Martin seem to believe

that p, the perceptual signal, is controlled while q.i, the
environmental correlate of p, is only “apparently” controlled…
MT: That’s a rather interesting perception of the situation, which again
does not correspond to mine. The perception that q.i behaves
as if it were controlled is the fact.

RM: Right, you think q.i is apparently controlled; it is “as if” it is controlled.Â

Â

MT: That it is controlled is a

theory.

RM: Right, the theory is the reality; the observation is only apparent. This is the “theory first” approach to PCT. You are welcome to it. I think it’s just nonsense.Â

BestÂ

Rick

How qi is apparently controlled is a refinement of the theory. That

refinement is called PCT. PCT is a theory that shows why q.i appears
as though it is controlled, and why it is not controlled. Like the
lake in the desert, control of q.i is a convincing mirage until you
look at what must be the case if it is indeed controlled. For a
variable to be controlled, it must have a reference value and a
mechanism for comparing its actual value to its reference value. PCT
supplies those for the control of a related variable, which Powers
called the “perception” of the environmental variable that appears
to be controlled.

The counterpart of the "Behavioural Illusion" is, I think, the

“control illusion” in which an external observer perceives that an
environmental variable (that on Thursdays does not exist) is being
controlled when what is controlled is (according to PCT) a
perception of that (non-existent) environmental variable.

Both illusions depend on the quality of control, the Behavioural

Illusion more so than the Control Illusion. In the “Control
illusion”, the output appears to be determined by the Disturbance,
which is exactly the S-R view on the loop – in other words, it is a
manifestation of the Behavioural Illusion. From a PCT view of
“control”, the Disturbance seems to be acting as a reference value
for minus the output. When you analyze a well-functioning control
loop, however, the perception is influenced strongly by the
reference while the disturbance has little effect, whereas its
symmetrical counterpart, the output influence on the apparently
controlled variable, is influenced almost equally strongly by both.

When different statements are logically inconsistent, something has

to give. Either the language is being misused or misinterpreted or
at least one of the claims is false. In this case, I think “at
least” may be rather conservative. But I suppose it’s just Rick 1
arguing against Rick 2 again. If his two personae are treated as
different people, then I guess the inconsistency and illogicality
vanish. We just have to see which one, if either, is justified by
science.

Martin

Richard S. MarkenÂ

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

[Martin Taylor 2017.02.10.11.21]

[From Rick Marken (2017.02.09.1450)]

What a weird inversion of my words! I point out that the observation

of how the observed variable changes over time is a perception, a
“fact”, according to Powers the only fact that we can have. Rick
calls that fact a theory. I point out that to explain the way the
observations are the way they are is a theory, and Rick says it’s a
fact. How can this interchange of the meanings of the words be
explained?

We certainly have a perceptual conflict in this. But it's necessary,

if Rick is to be able to call what I see as his “theory-first”
approach “facts first”, and my approach that starts with what I see
as the “facts first” basic perceptions of the world “theory first”.

Actually, I don't think either approach makes any sense by itself,

unless one is set on the word “first”, and has a clear theory about
what is a “fact”. I’m not sure I am clear about either.

As Powers (and many others (going back at least to Plato) have

pointed out, the only thing we can be sure of is what we perceive.
To relate what we perceive to anything outside ourselves we need a
theory. That theory is, according to another theory, embodied in our
perceptual functions. According to that “other theory”, our
perceptual functions constrain how anything we perceive can be
affected by anything that happens outside of us. So nothing that we
observe happening in the outer world can be considered a theory-free
“fact”. Fact and theory are intrinsically intertwined.

This thread is "Perceptual Conflict". Like all words about anything

at all, they are references to theories that explain “facts”
(perceptions) in ways that create new, theory-based, “facts”. Let’s
ask about the word “control”, which is in the title of another
concurrent thread “Control is”.

Just what IS "control". Rick has categorically stated that it's a

fact, which means that it is directly perceived. I don’t have such a
perception, in that I can’t directly perceive by looking at
something changing whether it is controlled or not. I can infer
(theorize) that it is probably controlled if I use perceptions that
I do have, using a theory about what must be the case if something
is controlled. But I can’t perceive it directly in the way I can
perceive the colour of a light. Rick says he can, so I am to Rick as
a colour-blind person is to a person who sees red and green as
different.

What can a colour-blind passenger perceive when the car stops in

front of a glowing light at an intersection? The passenger can
theorize that the light has a property that the driver would label
“red”. The driver might even say that the light is “red”. The
passenger has no perception of that “fact”. To the driver “red” is a
fact, a direct perception. To the passenger it’s a theory. Who is
correct?

I cannot perceive "control" directly. Rick can. To him it's a "fact"

when he looks at a changing variable, whereas to me it’s a theory.
Who is correct?

All "facts" are based on theory, whether that theory in the form of

perceptual functions has been developed over evolutionary time scale
and/or a life-time of reorganizations (according to one type of
perceptual control theory). All theories are based on such facts.
It’s not possible for “theory-first” to be in opposition to
“data-first” approaches. There’s only a possibility for differences
in emphasis and the possibilities of accounting for many
observations (perception, data) using few relationships (theories,
data, perceptions – Occam’s Razor).

In this particular exchange, Rick and I both can see changes in a

variable, just as both the car driver and passenger can see the glow
of the light. Those are facts for both parties. According to most
theories of how perceptions are constructed, Rick has a perceptual
function that includes among its inputs changes in the variable and
produces “control” or “not control” as output, just as the car
driver takes the input from the light and perceives as data that the
glow is “red” (or “green”). For the passenger “glow” is data, “red”
is theory. For me “variation” is data, “control” is theory.

The passenger is unlikely to construct a perceptual function that

produces “red” and “green” as possible values, and I am unlikely to
develop a perceptual function that produces “control” and “not
control” as outputs. I wonder how many people in the general public
have a direct perception of “control”? Given that we are told
(theory) that many ancient people saw control by Gods in everything
that happened, maybe I’m in a small minority. But were those old
Gods data (perceptions) or theories?

Martin
···

Martin Taylor (2017.02.08.10.56)–

              RM: ...Both you and Martin seem

to believe that p, the perceptual signal, is
controlled while q.i, the environmental correlate of
p, is only “apparently” controlled…
MT: That’s a rather interesting perception of the
situation, which again does not correspond to mine. The
perception that q.i behaves as if it were
controlled is the fact.

          RM: Right, you think q.i is apparently controlled; it

is “as if” it is controlled.

            MT: That it is

controlled is a theory.

          RM: Right, the theory is the reality; the observation

is only apparent. This is the “theory first” approach to
PCT. You are welcome to it. I think it’s just nonsense.