[From Bill Powers (951005.0600 MDT)]
Bill Leach (951005.0010 EDT) --
It's interesting that most of your examples of cases where we DO want to
use population statistics are also cases in which it's a mass effect
we're concerned about. Not driving in Labor Day "traffic." Not opening a
store in a place where there will be few "customers." Not needing to
know about individual electrons in an electric "current."
This reminds me that there are political phenomena of the same nature --
wherever policy matters are determined by a vote or consensus. In
Congress, the outcome of many votes is predictable on the basis of
counting people who label themselves "democrat" or "republican:" for
example, a vote on a bill offered by Senator Dole. There are some strong
effects like that where correlations would be high even though the
number of votes on each side is not far from equal. In such cases it's
specifically a population measure -- a vote -- that we're concerned
about and that has an important effect.
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Brian D'Agostino (951004.1830) --
As I mentioned in my posting of 950930.0610, I am not interested in
individuals _as such_, but only in individuals inasmuch as some of
their attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors support or oppose wars, war
preparations, and war as an institution. The relevant methodology
for this kind of inquiry is what Max Weber called "ideal types,"
which is the methodology I chose. For my purposes, the endless
variations by which individuals deviate from the "hawk" or "dove"
belief systems are completely irrelevant; the only thing relevant
is the ideal type itself.
In the light of my reply to Bill Leach above, I think I see what you
mean. If there is a decision to go to war, it doesn't matter which
individuals voted that way; all that matters is that a preponderance of
them did. So this is a case where the population characteristics, not
the characteristics of any individual, make the difference.
However, if an entire nation goes berserk and kills hundreds of
thousands of men, most mainstream clinicians would not call that
psychopathology. They would call it war, or better yet, "defense."
So for me to suggest that war and war preparations have a
pathological dimension is heresy with a vengeance.
To suggest that there is such a dimension is not out of line with my
point of view, but we have to realize that PCT suggests some other
dimensions, perhaps more important ones. Going to war is not necessarily
pathological; it may simply represent the natural outcome of quite
normal control systems interacting under particular circumstances.
Aggression and defense are named according to your point of view. If you
say something I take as an insult, it doesn't really matter whether you
intended it that way; what matters is that I decide to defend myself
against the disturbance. By my defense, I may do something that you take
as a threat. In defending yourself against that disturbance, you may
draw upon resources that I perceive as giving you power not just to
insult me further, but to harm me, and I may start to draw upon my own
resources to improve my own defenses accordingly. And of course you can
see me doing that. Thus starting with a casual remark, we may both end
up armed to the teeth, and eventually one of us will perceive that
waiting for one more round will create a fatal disadvantage, so it is
necessary to commit an overt act that will reduce the other's power:
i.e., start a war. So a war can begin with both parties seeing
themselves as simply defending themselves against a disturbance, and
with nobody taking any voluntarily agressive action (in either party's
view of himself). It can, of course, also begin when both sides are
somewhat aggressive. But no extreme attitudes are necessary to set off a
conflict if the underlying goals are incompatible.
This is the basic PCT picture of conflict and how it escalates. My point
is that the control systems on both sides of the conflict are operating
perfectly normally -- there is nothing pathological in either of them.
What is pathogenic is the particular combination of goals that results
in direct conflict; defending against disturbances is not only not
pathological, it is a basic property of the behavior of properly-
functioning control systems.
Against this picture of the origins of war, it strikes me as a much
weaker argument to invoke the psychopathology of everyday life, such as
the Oedipal conflict, and to place the blame for war strictly on people
who view themselves as stereotyped males, or non-females. It can be
argued that the stereotyped feminine perspective can play just as large
a role in escalating conflicts as the stereotyped macho-male
perspective. The feminine role, after all, is traditionally one of
protection and nurture. Anything that threatens the ability to carry out
this role, such as perceived aggression on the part of someone else
(against home, children, husband, parent, or personal security) will
call forth, by perfectly natural means, a counter-effort, and that
counter-effort is quite likely to involve urging a bigger and stronger
male to do something about the threat (In modern times, I hasten to add,
the feminist is likely to take the required actions herself, although
with considerable reliance on the forbearance of the opposition).
Indeed, one explanation for the selection of macho males in policy-
making positions could be that many women feel safer with them in power.
They want to know that if they feel a threat to those whom they nurture,
those in power are willing to take steps to protect them. Of course I
speak in stereotypes (or "ideal types"), too, echoing the opposite
stereotype just to show that the picture is not completely unbalanced.
Because direct conflict is self-escalating, small events can lead to
large results. An excessively defensive person can start off a conflict
just as easily as an excessively aggressive person. In fact,
theoretically, any random fluctuation can trigger the conflict. So
trying to find the origins of war in personal characteristics may be
futile: the real origins, according to this PCT view, lie in the
existence of important goals that are mutually incompatible. Each goal,
in isolation, may be innocuous and even useful, but in combination they
are a deadly booby-trap waiting to be set off (I say this with a bow
toward Martin Taylor and his idea of "time bombs").
Such time-bombs are more likely to go off when groups are deciding on
courses of action than when individuals are. Groups are very much less
intelligent than individuals. For every good idea in a group, there is a
bad idea to cancel it. The decision is often simply the least bad idea
that the majority can agree with. The time required for a group to
arrive at a decision is far longer than for an individual. This is why
armies blunder around more by accident than by design, whereas a
basketball team can maneuver almost as a unit. "Brilliant" strategies in
war, when boiled down to what was actually done, would not be beyond the
average eight-year old if only individuals were involved.
Thus governments march toward war for the simple reason that they can't
agree, internally, on any but the most simple-minded strategies: someone
is pushing, so we have to push back. Governments are incapable of going
up a level. Perhaps to solve the problem of war, we need to be thinking
about how to give them that ability.
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Best,
Bill P.