[From Bill Powers (951007.1500 MDT)]
Brian D'Agostino (951007.0700 EDT) --
That was an enlightening post, Brian.
I believe one of the most constructive and important tasks for the
CSG is to identify these implicit applications of PCT, and to weigh
in on the side of the proto-PCT theorists in their debates with
proto- behaviorist colleagues, showing how an explicit
understanding of PCT clarifies the debate to the advantage of the
former.
This, I'm afraid, is beyond me, because I know so little of the theories
that exist in all the fields where PCT might play a part. Fortunately
there are people like you who can draw the necessary parallels.
However, this model does not explain what maintains the war system
itself in the absence of specific conflicts. Under those
circumstances, the same positive feedback process should then work
in reverse. However, history is full of examples where such
disarmament initiatives began but were stymied by hawks who were
unwilling to relinquish military power, even in the absence of
external threats.
... The spiral model predicts that under such circumstances,
country A's force reductions, by reducing the threat posed to
country B, should result in country B reducing _its_ forces and
thus the threat it poses to country A, etc. The logic of this
process on a global basis should lead inexorably to general and
complete disarmament, and thus a state of affairs in which
_conflict_ could not lead to _war_ because all the potential
belligerants had beat their swords into plowshares.
This is an essential insight; few people understand the other side of
positive feedback (what goes up once it starts up is just as likely to
go down once it starts down). You really caught me off guard with this
one; you are perfectly right, of course. If disarmament, once begun,
does not continue to zero armament, there must be a bias toward
armament. This observation considerably strengthens your case for
personality factors (among others) acting as a bias.
One thing to remember, in applying PCT to this problem, is that the
_actual_ threats on each side are irrelevant. It is only the perceived
threat that people try to counter by their actions. An acquaintance of
mine (don't expect me to identify him) who had a high position in the
nuclear weapons area perceives the need for nuclear weapons to be just
as great as it ever was, because the weapons of the old CCCP still exist
and other countries as well have them. He is quite sure that we are
being tricked by Russia, and that if we let our guard down we will be in
great danger not only from Russia but from other countries as well. I
will admit that this person probably fits your "macho-hawk" profile
quite closely, but in speaking with him, something else struck me as an
explanation for his stance.
This man is afraid. He lives in a guarded enclave; he eyes strangers in
his neighborhoor suspiciously; he sees illegal immigration as a serious
national security risk, as well as an economic one. He uses "liberal" as
a swear word. He sees dangers everywhere to his physical and economic
security. Of course he would be classed as macho rather than "feminine"
because his way of dealing with all these perceived dangers is to take a
belligerent approach toward them all.
However, it is normal for a control system to produce whatever degree of
action is required to oppose perceived effects of (or anticipated)
disturbances, as long as doing so doesn't excessively disturb something
else of value. Belligerence per se is not necessarily pathological, even
using the term loosely. In PCT terms, the amount of action that we
observe simply indicates the amount of error that exists. Strong actions
imply large errors.
What all this suggests to me is that rather than looking for
characteristics having to do with modes of overt action, it would be
more to the point to try to estimate how much error a person experiences
from perceived dangers in the world. A person who perceives great danger
is likely to take extreme actions. This is a more immediate explanation
than tracing attitudes back to hypothetical conflicts in early life; we
are talking about a condition that exists now and has visible effects
now. It is quite possible that many of the people you are labeling
"hawks," far from actually being macho types, are actually unusually
fearful of the world. Just a suggestion.
I should also point out that building a large military establishment is
extremely lucrative to the arms industry and other industries. A great
deal of pressure comes from those who are neither hawks nor doves, but
simply want to make as much money as possible by any means, and happen
to be expert in the means involving supplying the materials of war.
Finally, there is a natural bias toward hawkishness in the military
profession, quite independent of personality factors. I have observed
some of them (being a consultant can get one into strange places), and
heard them talking about their ways of making decisions. One or two
military people for whom I ended up having considerable respect would
not be classifiable as hawks or doves. They considered that their job
was to protect this country against danger, and one of them even
admitted that this meant seeing threats where the chances of an actual
threat were obviously, to him, quite small. The latter person said that
his private attitudes didn't count (and I never could be sure what they
were); his task was to minimize risk and maximize national security, and
he made all his decisions on that basis, to the extent that his funding
allowed. That was what he felt the country expected of him. It was very
odd to talk with this man, because I found it impossible to disapprove
of him even though I am strongly against militarism.
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Bruce Abbott (951007.1110 EST) --
Having written three pages in response to your posts about the MSH
effect, I perceive that what I'm trying to do here is futile. You are
presenting conventional data obtained in the conventional way to show
that this is a good way to find out about behavior. I have a million
reasons why it is not a good way to find out about behavior, but every
one of them will be met by a counterargument that will satisfy you.
What I should really be doing is asking you what is wrong with this
study and all the others, in contrast with PCT. I am never going to find
a criticism that will change your mind.
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Best to all,
Bill P.