# Powers (1973), etc.

**URL:** <http://discourse.iapct.org/t/powers-1973-etc/9007>\
**Category:** CSG1993\
**Created:** [September 7, 1993, 6:12pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/powers-1973-etc/9007 "1993-09-07T18:12:43Z")\
**Posts on this page:** 3\
**Page:** 1

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**Author:** ![Michael\_Fehling](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/m/7feea3/32.png) [@Michael\_Fehling](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Michael_Fehling)\
**Post date:** [September 7, 1993, 6:12pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/powers-1973-etc/9007/1 "1993-09-07T18:12:43Z")

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[Michael Fehling 930907 10:42 AM PDT]

I've just spent a couple of days enjoying Bill Powers' book on PCT (1973). To  
the chagrin of my wife (who wanted to go out) I've now completed 15 chapters  
and hope to finish the remainder by next weekend.

&nbsp;&nbsp;Although I am \_very\_ busy finishing up some funded research tasks, I cannot  
resist a few quick comments:

1. From now on I will recommend this book to my students alongside other  
classics such as Ross Ashby's \_Design\_for\_a\_Brain\_ and \_Introduction\_to\_  
\_Cybernetics\_ and Norbert Weiner's \_Cybernetics\_ and \_God\_and\_Golem\_.

2. It is clearly the intellectual community's loss that it has not been  
exposed to this work. The so-called "cognitive revolution" in psychology  
failed to address some of the most important failures of behaviorism. Had  
that movement been cognizant of Bill's insights and application of cybernetic  
concepts, perhaps we would have made more real progress. Based on my exposure  
to Bill's book and CSG-L I am developing some hypotheses about why this  
important work has been so widely ignored. Once I have convinced myself that  
I understand this work, I hope to offer some friendly criticisms intended to  
remedy this unfortunate disconnect with the wider research community.

3. I particularly applaud Bill's insights into the \_methodological\_ as well  
as the substantive limitations of behaviorism and his willingness to offer an  
alternative. His remarks apply equally today, in spite of the so-called  
cognitive revolution. The methods of cognitive science largely replay  
methodological ideas of behaviorists such as Tolman or Hull (cf., Allen  
Newell's book, \_Unified\_Theories\_of\_Cognition\_). E.g., most cognitive models  
describe a system of variables and transforms that \_intervene\_ between stimuli  
and responses. So, while cognitive \_theories\_ ascribe purposive behavior to  
subjects, the empirical methods used to test these theories obviate the  
any operational concept of purpose.

4. Bill's treatment of consciousness, awareness, and volition, although  
brief, was one of the most fascinating surprises in the book. These topics  
were absolutely taboo in scientific psychology when this book was published.  
Now, the research community has grudgingly begun to open up to these issues.  
(E.g., I am an editor of the new journal \_Consciousness\_and\_Cognition\_. There  
has been a flurry of books and major articles on these topics published  
recently by highly regarded authors (e.g., Baars, Dennett, Searle, Jackendoff,  
etc.). This spring I participated in the 25th annual Carnegie Symposium on  
Cognition, where the focal topic was "consciousness as a scientific topic.")  
&nbsp;&nbsp;Here again, I think that the inclusion of PCT would improve and clarify the  
ideas finally being explored openly by the scientific community. Let me tell  
you what I am doing to remedy this. I was asked to write a commentary for the  
our journal on a paper entitled "Why volition is a foundational problem for  
psychology." I have told the editor that I am deferring my writing of this  
commentary until the next issue so that I can reflect my best understanding of  
PCT. This may turn into a full article depending on how much progress I make  
with my understanding of PCT, my other duties, etc. At the very least I want  
the readers to know that someone was willing to address these very difficult  
issues well before they became fashionable to the mainstream.

5. I am also quite pleased to see how well my own work on consciousness and  
volition (with Bernard Baars) seems to parallel PCT's treatment. We view the  
intelligent agent in terms of its ability to control its perceptions of itself  
and its world. We are exploring a model of the cognitive-connative-affective  
system as a (roughly) hierarchical collection of "unconscious processors" that  
contribute to operation of "control loops" at various levels. In a manner  
similar to PCT, our model proposes operations within a "global workspace" (GW)  
that \_controls\_ the reorganization of this hierarchy of processors. Finally,  
as with Bill's treatment in his PCT book, consciousness, awareness, and  
volition are all explained in terms of the interaction between the  
hierarchical system and the GW as the reorganizing controller.  
&nbsp;&nbsp;Surely, we shall find discrepancies between PCT and our own model of an  
intelligent system as we go forward. However, my first reading of Bill's book  
has already made clear the importance of modeling more explicitly the  
\_control\_loops\_ to which the unconsconscious processors contribute. (We have  
not made this focus sufficiently clear up to now.) In fact, I find that PCT  
offers a much more principled neurobiological model on which to build a  
psychological theory than the current stock of "connectionist" models (which  
are largely based on behaviorists' S-R perspective). So, PCT is having an  
immediate impact on my own work.

6. Based on what I have read so far (including on CSG-L), it seems clear that  
a great deal of work remains to be done to clarify the higher levels of Bill's  
model, in particular the "program" and higher levels. In fact, I think I may  
be able to help here. For now, let me note the following interesting  
correspondence between Bill's model and the elements of a so-called symbolic  
programming language, (e.g., LISP). The basic element of LISP is are data  
structure called \_symbols\_ and \_lists\_. A symbol is an \_index\_ into possibly  
unnamed structure. The associated structure can represent a pattern (i.e.,  
configuration) of quantities (e.g., vectors). On first reading, this compares  
favorably with the sensation-configuration-sequence levels in the PCT  
hierarchy. Logical operations, programs and other higher level entities  
(e.g., heuristics) can be modeled in terms of operations with and on these  
basic "symbolic" entities. If this correspondence can be made to hold water  
then the modeling tools we have been using might be well suited to push more  
deeply into PCT's higher levels of organization. In return, I am confident  
that this excercise will also clarify just what a \_symbol\_ really is.

7. The issues being debated regarding organizations (per se) as control  
systems seem clearer to me as well. Bill's monograph gives me needed guidance  
on how best to approach the debate (along with the excellent posts on this  
list, of course). I'll have more to say about this later, when I respond to  
the challenge to show how the organizations we are studying qualify as control  
systems.

&nbsp;&nbsp;In the long run I may or may not find myself a full-fledged supporter of  
PCT. It's too soon to tell. Perhaps my own stubborn commitment to my  
preformed theories will impair my perceptions. Regardless, I \_can\_ say that  
whatever direction my theoretical musings take, PCT is now thoroughly installed  
as a significant influence on my work.

&nbsp;&nbsp;Thanks, Bill. I'm enjoying the hell out of this!

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**Author:** ![\_Avery\_Andrews](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/_/848f3c/32.png) [@\_Avery\_Andrews](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/_Avery_Andrews)\
**Post date:** [September 8, 1993, 3:40pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/powers-1973-etc/9007/2 "1993-09-08T15:40:22Z")

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[Avery Andrews 930809.1025]  
(Michael Fehling 930907 10:42 AM PDT)

\>I am developing some hypotheses about why this  
\>important work has been so widely ignored.

This is a very interesting topic. One of its more depressing chapters in  
it is the misrepresentation of PCT by Turvey and various of of his  
associates, which to my mind, borders on willful distortion. Look at  
the `Theoretical Line' paper in the Schmidt 1980 volume `Tutorials in  
Motor Behavior', for example. I can collect additional citations and  
commentary if you are interested (we've been collecting this sort of  
material under the heading of the `Devil's Bibliography' project).

I conjecture that one of the obstacles has been that Jack Adams, in particular,  
made a terrible hash of presenting control-theoretic ideas in the early  
seventies, so people then just assumed that it had to be garbage & wrote  
off the whole approach without actually trying to think through the issues,  
or examining specific cases in detail.

Avery.Andrews@anu.edu.au

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**Author:** ![Michael\_Fehling](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/m/7feea3/32.png) [@Michael\_Fehling](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Michael_Fehling)\
**Post date:** [September 8, 1993, 1:11am UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/powers-1973-etc/9007/3 "1993-09-08T01:11:02Z")

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[Michael Fehling 930907 5:59 PM PDT]

In re Avery Andrews 930809.1025 --

Avery,

I'd be very pleased to see the citations. By Turvey I presume you mean  
Michael Turvey, right? Send me the full refs. I hope to have time to look  
into this issue more carefully. Thanks in advance.

&nbsp;&nbsp;I have had some experience with Jack Adams, too. I mentioned in a previous  
msg that, when I was an undergrad at the U. of Illinois, I was able to study  
Weiner and other cybernetic theory with Ross Ashby. Well, I was also an  
honors student in psychology. Jack Adams was on the faculty at that time  
(he'd just written a somewhat book on learning.) Adams got very interested in  
the my studies with von Foerster and Ashby. He wanted to spend time talking  
with me about control. The trouble was, he seemed \_very\_ confused about the  
idea of feedback, e.g., always confusing positive with negative feedback in  
his remarks. I'm not at all surprised that he "made a terrible hash" of  
control ideas. On the other hand, I doubt that Adams would have been able to  
persuad much deeper thinkers against control concepts. I suspect that their  
minds were already paradigmatically set by the longer standing biases of  
Watson, Hull, Skinner, and other behavioral theorists.