I do not say that all imagination occurs there. I said that the abstract imagery subjectively experienced during mental manipulation of concepts is analogous to the control of relationships and transitions of configurations by motor control because the same kinds of cerebellar structures are involved. There are certainly many forms of imagination other than the mental manipulation of concepts. Among them, of course, is imagined control by functions in the A[nterior] C[erebellum] of configurations perceived to be present as objects in the environment or remembered or imagined so.
A second problem with your oversimplification to a straw man is that control of transitions (including events) and relationships of configurations in imagination can extend down the hierarchy to imagined control of sensations and intensities in vivid imagination.
Yes. That is what I’m talking about. And those perceptions exist “in the head” rather than in the world because they are grounded in imagined control at lower levels rather than being grounded in input from the environment.
Yes indeed. That’s what commands the trial-and-error testing by sending reference signals for relationships and transitions among configurations, and that’s what receives perceptual input resulting from those imagined control processes below them in the hierarchy.
Did you intend that to be sarcastic? I’m asking because it seems so to me, and I don’t want to make assumptions.
Piqued by what Frans has told me, and its relevance to my field of linguistics, I put a few hours into an unprofessional search of the literature about the cerebellum. My field is linguistics. I don’t have the resources to find out what tasks can be performed by people with different kinds of cerebellar strokes. Nor if I did do I have the time free from grant and other obligations, which is a reason for the long delay responding. But it’s a good suggestion.