Prediction (was Learning)

CSGnet Archive CSG2004
21

[From Rick Marken (2004.12.28.1620)]

Bruce Abbott (2004.12.28.1905 EST) --

Rick Marken (2004.12.28 1155) --

I would have been just as surprised and frightened if the milk were in there
with the porcupine. I think this is because I have references for what the
inside of a refrigerator should look, in terms of neatness, cleanliness,
lack of living organisms, etc.

Now this is really amazing! I, too, would be surprised to find a porcupine
sitting in my refrigerator, but I never dreamed that I had a reference for not
seeing a porcupine in there. Wow!

I guessed at a reference for not having living organisms. But I don't really
know what to call the reference. All I know is that having a porcupine (or
spilled milk, etc) would be be a disturbance to the desired perception.

So, not seeing a porcupine in my refrigerator is a reference I have

If you say so. I was the one with the reference for not seeing _any_ living
organisms in there.

···

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MindReadings.com
Home: 310 474 0313
Cell: 310 729 1400

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22

[From Bill Powers (2004.12.28.1900 MST)]

Bruce Gregory (2004.1228.1848)–

Well this is certainly a clear
demarcation between your views (and PCT

to the extent it is a reflection of your views) and those of
Hawkins

and Llinas. Are you really saying that planning and anticipation
are

not fundamental human activities? I find this very hard to
believe.

Yes, that’s what I think. Planning employs some basic mental
capacities, but they’re the same capacities we use for doing algebra,
learning to play the harpsicord, and driving a car (for a few examples).
The really basic mental capacities, I think, are those that make planning
and prediction possible, but are used for many other purposes as well.
Some people plan or predict in particular circumstances, others handle
the same situations in other ways. That is a special case of my General
Theory of Social Behavior, which in its purest form reads

“Some do, and some don’t.”

Is there some reason I should know who Hawkins and Llinus are?

Best,

Bill P.

23

[From Bruce Gregory (2004.1228.2121)]

Rick Marken (2004.12.28.1615)]

I consider controlling to be fundamental, by the way, because 1)
organisms
exist in a negative feedback relationship with respect to their
environment
2) organisms produce consistent results in a disturbance prone
environment
and 3) organisms act to bring certain consequences of their actions to
goal
states, protecting those consequences from the effects of disturbance.
While
organisms do predict, plan and anticipate, they do these things (when
they
do them) in the service of controlling.

Llinas and Hawkins might say that organisms control in the service of
what they predict, plan, and anticipate. They might say that control is
a method to an end rather than an end in itself.

The enemy of truth is not error. The enemy of truth is certainty.

24

[From Bruce Gregory (2004.1228.2127)]

Bill Powers (2004.12.28.1900 MST)

Bruce Gregory (2004.1228.1848)--

Well this is certainly a clear demarcation between your views (and PCT
to the extent it is a reflection of your views) and those of Hawkins
and Llinas. Are you really saying that planning and anticipation are
not fundamental human activities? I find this very hard to believe.

Yes, that's what I think. Planning employs some basic mental capacities, but they're the same capacities we use for doing algebra, learning to play the harpsicord, and driving a car (for a few examples). The really basic mental capacities, I think, are those that make planning and prediction possible, but are used for many other purposes as well. Some people plan or predict in particular circumstances, others handle the same situations in other ways.

What other ways do you have in mind? If I didn't think that taking a particular route would get me to where I want to be, what other reason might I have for taking that route?

Is there some reason I should know who Hawkins and Llinus are?

No reason at all. Unless you have some interest in neuroscience.

The enemy of truth is not error. The enemy of truth is certainty.

25

In a message dated 12/28/2004 7:16:17 P.M. Eastern Standard Time, marken@MINDREADINGS.COM writes:

[From Rick Marken (2004.12.28.1615)]

Bruce Gregory (2004.1228.18480) –

Bill Powers (2004.12.28.1601 MST)

I’ve never denied that people predict. I just don’t think it’s a very
important skill in most cases, and I certainly don’t think it’s a
fundamental property of organisms.

Well this is certainly a clear demarcation between your views (and PCT
to the extent it is a reflection of your views) and those of Hawkins
and Llinas.

On what basis do Hawkins and Llinas conclude that prediction is a
fundamental property of organisms?
Evolution. But what do you mean by ‘fundamental property’? If you mean ‘main’, then I think you are mistaken in attributing this to Llinas. If you mean ‘contributing’, then I think that would reflect a more accurate position.

My conclusion that prediction is not
fundamental is based on the fact that much controlling – which I do
consider to be a fundamental – can be explained without it.
Of course you do, but then again, that is one of the reasons why your position is different then Llinas and Hawkins. Is that a crime? Not that I know of.

I consider controlling to be fundamental, by the way, because 1) organisms
exist in a negative feedback relationship with respect to their environment
2) organisms produce consistent results in a disturbance prone environment
and 3) organisms act to bring certain consequences of their actions to goal
states, protecting those consequences from the effects of disturbance. While
organisms do predict, plan and anticipate, they do these things (when they
do them) in the service of controlling.

Good for you, and I think Llinas feels the same way you do, With one exception. He does not believe control is the entire solution, only part of it.

DM

26

[From Bill Powers (2004.12.29.0540 MST)]

Bruce Gregory (2004.1228.2127)–

Some
people plan or predict in particular circumstances, others handle the
same situations in other ways.

What other ways do you have in mind? If I didn’t think that taking a
particular route would get me to where I want to be, what other reason
might I have for taking that route?

To get to the destination you have picked. That’s enough, if you’ve
become organized to get there by a certain route. Another reason for
taking a specific route is that this time you want to pick up some
groceries on the way, even though it’s not the shortest route.
You don’t do everything for a “reason”. You open doors, pick up
pencils, scratch an itch, wield a fork the way you do because you have
acquired control system organizations for accomplishing such ends. No
cognition to speak of is involved.
If someone asks you to explain why you do these things as you do,
you can no doubt come up with a reason, but it’s not likely to have much
to do with reality, unless you go around explaining every little move to
yourself and can’t do anything until you can explain why you do
it.
It’s easy to forget about levels of control. There are many cases in
which you do reason out how to do something, or discover that doing
something one way has advantages over doing it another way. It’s
appropriate to describe such processes as choices or decisions or plans
or reasons. You may even work some process out and predict that doing it
a certain way will prove very efficient, and then do it that way and find
that you were right. This is the sort of thing we learn to do at our
higher levels of organization, and do when the need arises.
But once having made the decision, reasoned out the process, predicted
that a certain method would work, or made the plan, you then have to put
the result into practice. That means you have to convert from a
description of an action or process into the actual thing itself.
You have to do it. You have to practice until for any degree and
direction of error, lower-level systems are given the right reference
signals to maintain the relevant perceptions at whatever reference levels
they are given, smoothly, accurately, and immediately. In short, once you
have predicted what action will work, you then have to make a bunch of
control systems work without having to pause for predictions every
time.
Predicting, choosing, deciding, planning, reasoning are (by my reckoning)
activities in, roughly, the 7th to 10th levels that I have proposed, or
if you don’t like those definitions, in the “cognitive” levels
of organization where we manipulate images and symbols in imagination and
arrive at descriptions of actions to take. The “thought”
levels. These levels become organized though the process I have called
“reorganization” and defined as a guided random walk through
different organizations, the guiding being done in terms of outcomes.
Once organized, they can be used to carry out processes like predicting
and so on, if that is how a given person has learned to maintain control.
But these same levels can become organized to work in terms of any
symbol-manipulating method. People do things “intuitively” or
“spontaneously” or according to arbitrary beliefs,
superstitions, mathematical systems, rituals, and other formal processes
(like inspecting entrails or statistical tables).
Once organized, these cognitive systems no longer make decisions
or choices. They operate in a fixed manner until some failure results in
further reorganization. Once you know that the way to grandma’s house
starts with a left turn, you no longer have to make predictions about the
consequences of turning in different directions, or create a plan for the
route, or choose between equiprobable possibilities like left and right.
You just turn left. It would be horribly inefficient to have to go
through all those cognitive processes every time you did something you
often do. We acquire control systems with fixed organizations because
that leads to immediate success and immediate correction of errors even
when there are unpredictable and unanticipated disturbances. The
properties of control systems at all the levels of organization, once
organized, add up to a system that rarely has any further need to plan,
predict, reason, or choose. Or, if you like, a system that has the
leisure to cognize about things not directly relevant to
behavior.

Best,

Bill P.

27

[From Bruce Gregory (2004.1229.0850)]

Bill Powers (2004.12.29.0540 MST)

Once organized, these cognitive systems no longer make decisions or choices. They operate in a fixed manner until some failure results in further reorganization.

I can now understand why many of the questions and objections I have raised throughout the years have caused you so much frustration. I am tempted to say that your experience of life is very different than mine, but I find that difficult to believe. So I'll simply leave it that the story you tell about being alive is very different from the story I tell.

The enemy of truth is not error. The enemy of truth is certainty.

28

[From Fred Nickols (12.29.0931 EST)] –

I’m not trying to butt in here but I’ve
been following this exchange and I have a question about Bill’s answer
and Bruce G’s response to it.

From Bruce Gregory (2004.1229.0850)]

Bill Powers (2004.12.29.0540 MST)

Once organized,
these cognitive systems no longer make decisions or choices. They operate in a
fixed manner until some failure results in further reorganization.

I can now understand why many of the questions and objections I have
raised throughout the years have caused you so much frustration.

I am tempted to say that your experience of life is very different
than mine, but I find that difficult to believe. So I’ll simply leave it that

the story you tell about being alive is very different from the
story I tell.

I take Bill’s comment to mean that once
we solve a particular problem we tend not to go through the problem solving
process when next we encounter the same or a similar problem. Instead, we
invoke, more or less automatically, the solution we worked out earlier.
That seems to me to be a clear fit with the widely accepted concept of the
development of “automaticity” in psychomotor skill development and
it is just as good a fit with what I’ve seen practiced in the workplace.
There, people leap to action with little or no thought and step back to give
the matter some thought only when what they attempted doesn’t work (and
not always then because many simply try, try again). I’m aware of
arguments that the brain processes information so quickly that we are unaware
of our own thought processes but that is simply an assertion that leaves open
the door to a plan-and-execute view of behavior.

Anyway, my question to Bill is this:
Does your comment about “once organized” roughly equivalent to what
I’ve said about once a problem is solved we simply invoke the solution with
little or no thought.

My question to Bruce is this: Does
what I’ve said about problems and solutions make sense to you? If
so, it would seem to me that my story about being alive has at least some
things in common with what Bill P described so how do the stories about being
alive differ?

Regards,

Fred Nickols

nickols@att.net

29

[From Bruce Gregory (2004.1229.0958)]

Fred Nickols (12.29.0931 EST)

My question to Bruce is this: Does what I’ve said about problems and solutions make sense to you? If so, it would seem to me that my story about being alive has at least some things in common with what Bill P described so how do the stories about being alive differ?

I would say that first you need to recognize that the situation you now face resembles one you faced in the past. Then you have to recall the solution you used on that occasion. They you have to try that solution and see if it works. You anticipate (predict) that it will work, otherwise you would not proceed with it. Only if it fails do you try something else. Most likely what you now try will be based on your recognition of a different similarity between another problem solved in the past and the one you are now encountering.

The enemy of truth is not error. The enemy of truth is certainty.

30

[From Bruce Gregory (2004.1229.1034)]

I just came across the following in a book by Llinas that may help to
answer a question Rick raised:

"The issue of subjectivity is a hotly debated topic in the fields of
philosophy and the cognitive sciences. But is subjectivity necessary at
all? Why is it not just enough to see and react, as a robot might
do?... For myself, I suspect that subjectivity is what the nervous
system is all about, even at the most primitive levels of evolution."

it seems to me that the distinction between this view and Bill's is
pretty stark.

The enemy of truth is not error. The enemy of truth is certainty.

31

[From Rick Marken (2004.12.29.0815)]

Bruce Gregory (2004.1228.2121)--

Rick Marken (2004.12.28.1615)--

While organisms do predict, plan and anticipate, they do these
things (when they do them) in the service of controlling.

Llinas and Hawkins might say that organisms control in the service of
what they predict, plan, and anticipate.

What I like most about Powers' approach to understanding human nature is
that it's based on testable, working models. My experience with building
and testing these models has taught me that many behaviors that appear to
involve prediction, planning or anticipation actually do not.

I am happy to consider the possibility that control is done in the service
of prediction, planning and/or anticipation if I am shown some evidence, in
the form of testable, working models, that this is the case. Unless Llinas
and Hawkins have such a testable (and tested) model, what they say about the
role of prediction, planning and/or anticipation in human behavior is not of
interest.

···

--
Richard S. Marken
MindReadings.com
Home: 310 474 0313
Cell: 310 729 1400

--------------------

This email message is for the sole use of the intended recipient(s) and
may contain privileged information. Any unauthorized review, use,
disclosure or distribution is prohibited. If you are not the intended
recipient, please contact the sender by reply email and destroy all copies
of the original message.

32

[From Bruce Gregory (2004.1229.1138)]

Rick Marken (2004.12.29.0815)

I am happy to consider the possibility that control is done in the
service
of prediction, planning and/or anticipation if I am shown some
evidence, in
the form of testable, working models, that this is the case. Unless
Llinas
and Hawkins have such a testable (and tested) model, what they say
about the
role of prediction, planning and/or anticipation in human behavior is
not of
interest.

That what anyone but Bill says is not of interest to you does not
surprise me in the least. Hawkins, for one, presents a list of
suggested tests of his model, but they involve neuroscience and not
spreadsheet simulations or tracking experiments.

I think it is important to keep in mind that what has been tested of
Powers' view constitutes but a very small portion of what is described
in B:CP. No one doubts that PCT is a working model of performance. When
it comes to motor tracking experiments, PCT is without peer as far as I
know. however, it remains to be shown that PCT has a wider domain of
applicability. I, for one, find Bill's recent descriptions of his views
almost bizarre. At one point I described PCT as a model of robotics.
Frankly, I had no idea how true that was.

The enemy of truth is not error. The enemy of truth is certainty.

33

[From Rick Marken (2004.12.29.0845)]

Dan Mayer (2004.12.28) --

Rick Marken (2004.12.28.1615)-

On what basis do Hawkins and Llinas conclude that prediction is a
fundamental property of organisms?

Evolution.

Are you referring to the fact of evolution or to a particular theory of how
evolution occurred? Actually, it's not at all obvious to me how one would
conclude that prediction is a fundamental property of organisms based on
either the fact or any theory of evolution that I know of. Perhaps you could
go over how they derived this conclusion from evolution?

But what do you mean by 'fundamental property'?

That's a good question. I guess I was thinking of "fundamental" in the sense
of the basic organizing principle. I think there are basically two
fundamental organizing principles that have been proposed as the basis of
life: lineal causal (the current basis of psychology and the other social
science, as evidenced by their approach to research; see the "Dancer and the
Dance" paper in _More Mind Readings_) and closed loop (the basis suggested
by PCT). Prediction can be explained in terms of either of those principles.
That's why I don't think prediction is a fundamental property of life.

I consider controlling to be fundamental, by the way, because 1) organisms
exist in a negative feedback relationship with respect to their environment
2) organisms produce consistent results in a disturbance prone environment
and 3) organisms act to bring certain consequences of their actions to goal
states, protecting those consequences from the effects of disturbance. While
organisms do predict, plan and anticipate, they do these things (when they
do them) in the service of controlling.

Good for you, and I think Llinas feels the same way you do, With one
exception. He does not believe control is the entire solution, only part of
it.

That's fine with me. I would just like to know why he believes this. Unless
someone can show me what he means in terms of testable, working models, I'm
really not interested.

···

--
Richard S. Marken
MindReadings.com
Home: 310 474 0313
Cell: 310 729 1400

--------------------

This email message is for the sole use of the intended recipient(s) and
may contain privileged information. Any unauthorized review, use,
disclosure or distribution is prohibited. If you are not the intended
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of the original message.

34

From Dan Mayer (2004.12.29.1153)

Sorry for the lack of list etiquette in my prior post.

In a message dated 12/29/2004 11:43:27 A.M. Eastern Standard Time, marken@MINDREADINGS.COM writes:

[From Rick Marken (2004.12.29.0845)]

Dan Mayer (2004.12.28) –

Rick Marken (2004.12.28.1615)-

On what basis do Hawkins and Llinas conclude that prediction is a
fundamental property of organisms?

Evolution.

Are you referring to the fact of evolution or to a particular theory of how
evolution occurred? Actually, it’s not at all obvious to me how one would
conclude that prediction is a fundamental property of organisms based on
either the fact or any theory of evolution that I know of. Perhaps you could
go over how they derived this conclusion from evolution?
I’ll give it a shot, but I really hate speaking for anyone else. This of course is my interpretation of his work

Llinas believes that control is the basis for our adaptability and it provides our capacity to live in a variable environment. He believes control was and is an evolutionary answer for our need to navigate in an unfamiliar environment. But control by itself is not sufficient in his view.

Our consciousness provides both a ‘predictive’ capacity to deal with a largely unpredictable environment and ‘choices’ to be able to deal with the inevitable ‘errors’ the control systems will have to correct. I believe both of these capacities are ‘built’ into your model in the input and output functions but are not specified.

What ‘consciousness’ does, is to provide our control processes, with the necessary front and back ends to help the control process to be as efficient a process as it can be.

Our ‘predictive’ capacity is, at least according to Llinas, evolutions way of ‘restricting’, or ‘limiting’ the variability of input, and our ability to ‘think’ and make ‘choices’, enhances our ability to correct for error by providing high degree’s of freedom in behavioral selection.

Added to this Llinas believes that feelings/emotions are pre-motor initiators of control.

I happen to like Llinas story. But we all must keep in mind, that it is just a story. Just like the work of Bill Powers. A ‘story’ here represents the view an individual has about a certain aspect of life. We are all full of 'story’s. In fact that is all we have. I believe Bill might say it’s all perception. I would agree and add that all perceptions are used to make up the story’s we walk around with.

I’m sorry Rick, but I really have not done justice to Llinas work, I would suggest that if you have any real interest in this evolutionary approach you try reading his book i of the vortex 2001, MIT Press

But what do you mean by ‘fundamental property’?

That’s a good question. I guess I was thinking of “fundamental” in the sense
of the basic organizing principle. I think there are basically two
fundamental organizing principles that have been proposed as the basis of
life:
Hold on a second, when did the discussion turn to the evolutionary basis of life?

I am specifically talking about the evolution of humans and our ability to navigate in a changing environment. What are you talking about?

lineal causal (the current basis of psychology and the other social
science, as evidenced by their approach to research; see the “Dancer and the
Dance” paper in More Mind Readings) and closed loop (the basis suggested
by PCT). Prediction can be explained in terms of either of those principles.
That’s why I don’t think prediction is a fundamental property of life.
No, prediction may not be a ‘fundamental’ property of ‘life’, but it is, in my opinion, essential for the efficient and proper operation of our control processes that are involved in our navigation through, and in an unfriendly and variable environment.

That’s fine with me. I would just like to know why he believes this. Unless
someone can show me what he means in terms of testable, working models, I’m
really not interested.
Suit yourself, it’s your story.

DM

35

[From Rick Marken (2004.12.29.0945)]

Bruce Gregory (2004.1229.1138)]

Rick Marken (2004.12.29.0815)--

Unless Llinas and Hawkins have such a testable (and tested) model,
what they say about the role of prediction, planning and/or
anticipation in human behavior is not of interest.

That what anyone but Bill says is not of interest to you does not
surprise me in the least.

How you got to that from what I said above is not clear to me. In fact, I am
interested in what many people besides Bill say because they say it with
testable (and tested) working models.

Hawkins, for one, presents a list of
suggested tests of his model, but they involve neuroscience and not
spreadsheet simulations or tracking experiments.

Great. You could make a real contribution (finally) to CSGNet if you would
describe these tests, the model on which they are based and why the tests
would show that prediction, planning and/or anticipation are involved in
behavior.

I think it is important to keep in mind that what has been tested of
Powers' view constitutes but a very small portion of what is described
in B:CP.

That is your opinion. My view is that the tests of PCT that have been done
cover nearly all -- and certainly the most fundamental -- of the ideas
presented in B:CP.

No one doubts that PCT is a working model of performance. When
it comes to motor tracking experiments, PCT is without peer as far as I
know. however, it remains to be shown that PCT has a wider domain of
applicability.

The "tracking experiments" have show that people can control many different
types of perceptions, from "sensory motor" variables like intensities and
sensations to "cognitive" variables like sequences and programs. PCT is a
model of control, which sometimes involves performance (actions that
influence the state of the controlled variable(s)) and sometimes not (as
when controlling is done in imagination). PCT also proposes a mechanism for
building and/or changing control systems. This learning mechanism has been
tested in models (like the artificial cerebellum) and experiments (like the
Robertson/Glines "learning plateaus" study. The applicability of PCT to
memory, emotion and consciousness has also been shown. What remains to be
shown, it seems to me, is not the wider domain of applicability of PCT but
how well the PCT model explains all the phenomena to which it applies
relative to other models of these phenomena.

···

--
Richard S. Marken
MindReadings.com
Home: 310 474 0313
Cell: 310 729 1400

--------------------

This email message is for the sole use of the intended recipient(s) and
may contain privileged information. Any unauthorized review, use,
disclosure or distribution is prohibited. If you are not the intended
recipient, please contact the sender by reply email and destroy all copies
of the original message.

36

[From Fred Nickols (2004.12.29.1301 EST)] –

Bruce:

Regarding your reply below, are you saying
that I go through those steps consciously or that such steps or stages are
implied by my actions? I ask because I can think of situations in which I have
and I can think of situations in which I haven’t. I once found myself in a
session with a Bell System VP and his direct reports and it suddenly dawned on
me that I had encountered a very similar situation (in terms of the group and
leader-to-subordinate dynamics) several years earlier and so I did something
similar to what I had done years before and it proved to be quite effective.
On the other hand, I do lots of things that I once gave a great deal of thought
but no longer do and probably won’t unless I’m brought up short.

Regards,

Fred Nickols

nickols@att.net

···

From: Control Systems Group Network (CSGnet)
[mailto:CSGNET@listserv.uiuc.edu] On Behalf
Of Bruce Gregory
Sent: Wednesday, December 29, 2004
10:00 AM
To: CSGNET@listserv.uiuc.edu
Subject: Re: Prediction (was
Learning)

[From Bruce Gregory (2004.1229.0958)]

Fred
Nickols (12.29.0931 EST)

/x-tad-smaller>/color>/fontfamily>

My
question to Bruce is this: Does what I’ve said about problems and
solutions make sense to you? If so, it would seem to me that my story
about being alive has at least some things in common with what Bill P described
so how do the stories about being alive differ?

/x-tad-smaller>/color>/fontfamily>

I would say that first you need to recognize that the situation you now face
resembles one you faced in the past. Then you have to recall the solution you
used on that occasion. They you have to try that solution and see if it works.
You anticipate (predict) that it will work, otherwise you would not proceed
with it. Only if it fails do you try something else. Most likely what you now
try will be based on your recognition of a different similarity between another
problem solved in the past and the one you are now encountering.

The enemy of truth is not error. The enemy of truth is certainty.

37

[Bruce Gregory (2004.1229.1315)]

Rick Marken (2004.12.29.0945)

Great. You could make a real contribution (finally) to CSGNet if you
would
describe these tests, the model on which they are based and why the
tests
would show that prediction, planning and/or anticipation are involved
in
behavior.

Have you ever read any book other than B:CP? Are you dyslexic by any
chance? Anyone who is interested in Hawkins' model and the tests he
suggests is free to read _On Intelligence_. If the book is too much to
ask of you, the tests are described in "Appendix: testable predictions"
pp. 237-245. Perhaps you can get someone to read it to you.

That is your opinion. My view is that the tests of PCT that have been
done
cover nearly all -- and certainly the most fundamental -- of the ideas
presented in B:CP.

Tell that to Bill. Apparently he doesn't agree with you. He, unlike
you, is quite willing to acknowledge that much of what he proposes in
B:CP is in the form of preliminary conjectures that need to be worked
out and tested. But disciples are always more certain than masters,
aren't they?

No one doubts that PCT is a working model of performance. When
it comes to motor tracking experiments, PCT is without peer as far as
I
know. however, it remains to be shown that PCT has a wider domain of
applicability.

The "tracking experiments" have show that people can control many
different
types of perceptions, from "sensory motor" variables like intensities
and
sensations to "cognitive" variables like sequences and programs. PCT
is a
model of control, which sometimes involves performance (actions that
influence the state of the controlled variable(s)) and sometimes not
(as
when controlling is done in imagination).

Oh. tell me about these tests of controlling done in imagination. What
data was used?

PCT also proposes a mechanism for
building and/or changing control systems. This learning mechanism has
been
tested in models (like the artificial cerebellum) and experiments
(like the
Robertson/Glines "learning plateaus" study. The applicability of PCT
to
memory, emotion and consciousness has also been shown.

Rick, I have no idea what you are smoking, but it sure must be killer
shit!

···

The enemy of truth is not error. The enemy of truth is certainty.

38

[From Bruce Gregory (2004.1229.1323)]

Fred Nickols (2004.12.29.1301 EST)

Regarding your reply below, are you saying that I go through those steps consciously or that such steps or stages are implied by my actions?

If you think about it, I believe that you will come to the conclusion that each of steps I described is a necessary one. The more you practice, the less conscious the steps are likely to be. But unless you recognize a problem as one you have encountered before (even if it involves a perfectly routine action) how would you even begin? After all, a door knob doesn't announce itself by saying, "Twist me and push to open."

The enemy of truth is not error. The enemy of truth is certainty.

39

I take Bill’s comment to mean
that once we solve a particular problem we tend not to go through the
problem solving process when next we encounter the same or a similar
problem. Instead, we invoke, more or less automatically, the
solution we worked out earlier.
[From Bill Powers (2004.12.29.1115 MST)]

Fred Nickols (12.29.0931
EST)–

Correct, that is what I mean. I will also add that we tend to solve
problems at the lowest possible level of organization, meaning the least
cognitive. An example has been discussed here several times: computing
where a target will be some time in the future and computing a path that
will get you there at the right time (as some people conceive of catching
a baseball). Once you have experimented with this for a while, you
realize that all you have to do is keep the target at a constant azimuth
and elevation, if you can, and you will intercept it without any
computations at all. So what you initially conceived of, and possibly
attempted, as a cognitive task has been reduced to a far simpler tracking
task. And that’s how you do it from then on.

But this principle also applies completely within the cognitive levels,
whatever you think they are. Once you have found the solution to a
problem, you don’t have to work out the method again: you already know
the method. You become organized in the same general way a computer
becomes organized when you program it. It make take some time to work out
the program, but once it’s installed no further “working out”
is required. You just run it.

Anyway,
my question to Bill is this: Does your comment about “once
organized” roughly equivalent to what I’ve said about once a problem is
solved we simply invoke the solution with little or no
thought.

Yes. What we call decision-making or problem solving or planning and all
that sort of stuff is really, I claim, the reorganization phase. You know
what I mean by “really.” After reading one of my accounts of
sequence control, Mary was delighted to showing me how this worked as she
copied notes from our little refrigerator whiteboard onto the slip of
paper to take shopping with her. She simply imagined herself in the store
traveling along the aisles in her standard pattern, worked out long ago,
and wrote down the items from the list inb the order that the pattern
took her to different sections of the store. So she never had to double
back or walk farther than necessary – and she got to the frozen food
last so it would have the least thawing time. Once you work out the
method, what’s left to decide or plan? No deviations from the sequence
required, unless the store is out of something and you have to think up a
substitute.

Best,

Bill P.

40

[From Bill Powers (2004.12.29.1142 MST)]

Bruce Gregory (2004.1229.0850)–

Once
organized, these cognitive systems no longer make decisions or
choices. They operate in a fixed manner until some failure results in
further reorganization.

I can now understand why many of the questions and objections I have
raised throughout the years have caused you so much frustration. I am
tempted to say that your experience of life is very different than mine,
but I find that difficult to believe. So I’ll simply leave it that the
story you tell about being alive is very different from the story I
tell.

It seems to me that you’re interpreting what I say in some strange ways,
or very selectively. Are you telling me that every time you sit down to
eat, you have to figure out what a knife and fork are for, and plan how
to reach out and pick them up, and how to move them in such a way as to
cut up food and convey it to – let’s see now, ear, pocket, mouth – ah
yes, the mouth? Is there nothing you have learned to do so well that you
no longer have to make plans, choices, or decisions about it? I don’t
mean to invade your privacy, but it seems to me that to live as
cognitively as you appear to do (or think you do) would be a great burden
and handicap.

Best,

Bill P.