Message-Id: <f00a.294.34@think.net>
<..>
My problem is this: The expression to 'bring forth a world', being what an
observer does in languaging, still remains fundamentally problematic for me.
It is as if there is a blind spot in the approach: We have the experience of
looking at a world of objects. Mat. argues that perception arises as the
description of an organism in congruence with its environment, so
perception, in this account, is effectively structural coupling.
None of this gives me a visual field in which I can observe the congruent
behaviour of an organism. I still don't see how recursions in acts produce
a visual field.
Let me suggests that your 'experience of a perceptual field' is in a different
REALM from the languaging related to 'structural coupling' or 'brain
functions.'
In other words, experience comes into being, then disappears. There's no
way to 'explain' them.
<..>
Do you see what I mean. Computers or Terminator 2, don't really need to see
anything.
My (and many others) "problem" which requires a new set of concepts is that
our current models of perception are unable to account for the world of
colour and form that we look at, and which is a _cerebral achievement_ that
appears as if outside of our heads but which is "in" our heads. (Some find
Once again. Our perceptions are not IN any physical place. They are 'in' a
different realm of existence. The most one can say is that certain
functioning of the brain is correlated with certain reports of experiences
of certain people. Confusion arise when one tries to 'explain' phenomena
in one realm with phenomena from the other.
this shocking but the logic is unassailable).
The difficulty of course is that when a brain is perceived from the
perspective of a 3rd person (imagine being able to lift off someone's
cranium {trepanation} and take a look inside. There's no show going on. In
fact, what we as subjects see as a visual field, has no extrinsic
localisable coordinates, altho its 'in' the brain, yet not open to viewing
by another.
You appear to be making a materialist assumption. Perhaps even a reductionist
one. It is not sensible to try to reconcile such assumptions with M&V's
views, which are much more in line with buddhist approaches.
<...>
Do you see the flower?
Sure, I see it. But not my brain.
P.s. I once heard Mat. talk about Penrose and microtubules and quantum brain
dynamics. Mat doesn't like this stuff at all. But I can't remember why.
Maybe cos it opens up the closure of the n.system. Any one familiar with
this esoteric stuff?
I don't like it because they seemed to be asking the wrong questions.
For example, some people try to use quantum probabilistic metaphor to
'explain' free will. For me, free will is a certain type of experience,
perhaps an illusion. No explanation is needed. However, to the extent
that these speculations can inspire and further a constructive approach
to AI, they are valuable. For me, that's the ONLY way to settle the
question of whether artificial beings can be made. It is no more
(and no less) mysterious than how a single fertilized egg can develop
under the right environment into a human which we call a 'being.'
Regards,
A. Chu
···
From: P.Bains@uws.edu.au (Paul Bains)
Date: Thu, 09 May 1996 12:48:46 -0800
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