i.kurtzer (990504.0845)
[From Bill Powers (990504.0845 MDT)]
I find this whole coercion argument pretty baffling. If A can make B do
anything that A wants, what difference in the outcome is produced by what B
wants?
It makes a difference to us, the observers, to know what B wants. A's do go to
sleep sometimes, and then whatever B's intentions are will be manifest. B
might flee or spoon next to A.
B, inside, may feel either controlled or uncontrolled, but what does
A care about that? And what difference does it make in any visible outcome?
Perhaps the answer to Isaac's oft-repeated slogan (you need two people to
have a relationship) is that forcing another person to act by using
overwhelming physical force is not a relationship between two people. It's
a relationship between one person and a thing. When you're controlling a
thing, you simply increase the force you're using until the thing does what
you want. Some things are easier to force than others, but if you can
muster enough resources, you can control most of them.
This is not "a slogan". It has practical research consequences like where to
look to undestand something.Also, forcing another is not a relationship among a
thing, but over an overpowered control system who gives a durn about their
perceptions, and that fact will become very obvious when A goes to sleep.
i.
[From Bill Powers (990505.1202 MDT)]
i.kurtzer (990504.0845)
[From Bill Powers (990504.0845 MDT)]
I find this whole coercion argument pretty baffling. If A can make B do
anything that A wants, what difference in the outcome is produced by what B
wants?
It makes a difference to us, the observers, to know what B wants. A's do
go to
sleep sometimes, and then whatever B's intentions are will be manifest. B
might flee or spoon next to A.
We have jails so that A can sleep while B is kept safely confined. So it
doesn't matter to B what A would do if not in a cell. A is not not in a cell.
We, as observers, will predict that A might or might not try (in vain) to
get out of the cell, or to pretend compliance with B, or try to win B's
friendship (and other such ruses that always work in movies and cartoons).
But we can also predict that unless B is extraordinarily stupid, A will
still be in the cell in the morning, and will go on doing what B intends,
or will die. So we don't need to know very much about A: it's B's
intentions that are going to determine what happens to A, in all
probability. B may not even view A as human; he may treat A as an
experimenter treats a lab rat: as a preparation.
What A does is of very little importance when B is an intelligent and
powerful coercer. B does not need to worry about A. B needs to worry about
_other people like A_ over whom he does not have such irresistable control.
Best,
Bill P.