From Tom Bourbon (930617.1447)
[Martin Taylor 930617 13:45]
(Tom Bourbon 930617.0943)
But, Martin, doesn't your request for more -- I hesitate to use the word --
information about (in the sense of facts about) the output function vitiate
the claim that a modeler can reconstruct the disturbance from the perceptual
signal alone? That would be the challengs confronting the organism modeled
by the ECS. Or was the claim, not that information in p about d is
essential to the organism if it is to control, but that a modeler can
reconstruct d using p and other facts, none of which are available to the
organism modeled by the ECS?
There are two separate issues involved.
(1) My claim initially that I could derive the structure of the
hierarchic control system from information theory. You pointed
out that all sorts of people have claimed to be able to deduce
things from information theory that have not proved to be so. I
recognized the truth of what you said, and so have held back on that
one until I can satisfy myself that the analysis is correct. This
I have still not done.
Thank you for reporting the status of that project.
... But the claim rests on a sub-claim, that
to the extent that the disturbance is countered by the output of a
control system, information about the disturbance passes through the
perceptual signal and is used to form the appropriate compensating
output. This is NOT, and never was, a claim that a modeller can
reconstruct the disturbance from the perceptual signal alone. The
claim is that information about the controlled part of the disturbance
is passed through the perceptual signal.
Can you tell me (a) how *you* (MT) distinguish between controlled and
uncontrolled parts of a disturbance, as they occur in a perceptual signal,
and (b) whether, and if so, how, an organism, *modeled* as a PCT system,
does so in order to control? I am having a hard time imagining what you
mean. Do you mean that information about the part of the disturbance that is
*not* controlled at time t "passes through the perceptual signal" and becomes
controlled at time t+x?
...Control itself allows the
information to be used. The control system does not have to "know"
its own output function, because that is handled by bringing the
error to zero. The "knowledge" is implicit in the fact of control.
That a control system does not "know" its own output function, I agree.
You did not answer my inquiry about your definition of "output
function," but I suspect that you mean the time series of actions,
not the operator that transforms error signals into actions. Did Rick give
you the operator, or the time series? (From what you say later, I infer it
was the latter.)
..
(2) A demand by Rick, supported by Bill, that we demonstrate the
existence of information about the disturbance in the perceptual
signal by reconstructing the disturbance waveform given the perceptual
signal under the assumption that the reference signal remains zero.
This seems to be a reasonable and modest proposal.
We pointed out that success in this endeavour would conclusively
demonstrate that the perceptual signal contained information about
the disturbance, and Rick agreed that it would.
I would agree.
When we showed
by example what should have needed no demonstration, reconstructing the
disturbance exactly, knowing the output function exactly, Rick then said
it was insufficient, and produced a series of examples using different
output functions and/or changing reference signals (I forget which).
But what you did was to construct the disturbance waveform from the output
waveform. That was not the demonstration you described in the earlier parts
of this paragraph. Had I been actively on the net when Rick gave you the
output data, I believe I would have registered a protest. The additional
data dramatically changed the nature of the demonstration, away from
showing:
existence of information about the disturbance in the perceptual
signal by reconstructing the disturbance waveform given the perceptual
signal under the assumption that the reference signal remains zero.
You demonstrated a reconstruction of the disturbance from the output time
series. If Rick protested that shift in the focus of the demonstrations,
I agree with him, but you shouldn't have been given the chance to use the
additional data in the first place.
The two issues, reconstruction and information about the disturbance in
the perceptual signal, are separate. Success at reconstruction proves
the point that information about the disturbance is available in the
perceptual signal. Failure of reconstruction does not disprove it.
That the two issues are separate, I do not agree -- not if our purpose is to
construct better generative, freely-functioning, models of control systems.
If you believe discussions *about* control systems are more complete or
satisfying or precise if you include the idea that "information about the
disturbance is available in the perceptual signal," that is one thing. It
seems quite another to claim that a PCT model would behave more realistically if
should you include an identifiable quantity that represents information
about the disturbance, as a modeled feature of the perceptual signal. The
former preference seems to be from the perspective of an observer, striving
for an aesthetically pleasing description. The latter, from the perspective
of a modeler who believes the new measure will demonstrably improve the
performance of the model. Am I very far from the mark with this
interpretation? In which sense do you think we should embrace the idea that
"information about the disturbance is available in the perceptual signal?"
Given that your demonstration is not the one originally proposed, I do not
see how it confirms your original claim.
As for the idea that a (single) failure to reconstruct does not disprove the
original claim, I agree. The claim was about a fact of nature. The failure
of a model to reconstruct the fact does not invalidate the fact. (Not any
more than a successful reconstruction offers "final" proof that a model is
"the correct one.") But a failure to reconstruct does invalidate that
particular rendering of the model.
I thought the claim was an ability to reconstruct
the disturbance from the perceptual signal, and that the claim was not yet
borne out. The demonstration that the disturbance can be reconstructed from
the perceptual signal, given a known output function, mnust have appeared
before I was reliably on the net.
The demonstration is simple. Create a "mystery function" M(p-r), where
M has exactly the form of the output function O. To the extent that
the output of O is equal and opposite to the disturbance (a claim by
Rick and Bill that is simply a statement of perfect control), then
the negative of the output of M is the disturbance waveform minus an
arbitrary starting constant. It should have been sufficient simply to
point this out in order to move the discussion to the next stage, but
it wasn't. Rick said it wouldn't work as we thought. We had to (and
did) demonstrate that it worked with real data. And then the rules
kept changing in ways that confused us as much as they seem to confuse
you.
Is M a convenient function for an observer who tries to reconstruct the
disturbance from the output function of a PCT model, or is it a feature of a
PCT model -- a feature that leads to more realistic performance by the model?
Given that you demonstrated something different from what you said (at the
beginning of (2) in your post), I have the impression you speak from the
position of an observer when you speak of M, and of the original claim about
information in the perceptual signal. Or do I misread you? Do you now
suggest that M is a function in the model of an elemental control system?
I am afraid my confusion over your interpretation of these demonstrations
has not been allayed. To me, much of my confusion comes, not from
interpretations of the meanings of theoretical terms, but from what I see
as a dramatic shift in the goal of your demonstration and in the nature of
the data you use to perform the reconstructions.
Until later,
Tom Bourbon