[From Chris Cherpas 951017.1113 Pacific]
[re: Bill Powers (951017.1000 MDT)]
The danger inherent in behaviorism is that of confusing the means of
control with the object of control -- of seeing overt behavior as an end
in itself, like seeing crying simply as an expression of an internal
state caused by traumatic stimuli rather than as a means to an end. When
we look at other people, we simply _don't see_ what they are really
doing, because without a rather extended investigation, we can't even
guess at what perceptions they are controlling. All we can see is the
set of movements, sounds, and bodily or facial configurations by means
of which they attempt to counteract disturbances of their perceptions.
Behavior as a means to an end sounds like operant behavior to me.
Even perceptual behavior (e.g., see Skinner's _About Behaviorism_)
can occur in the absence of the thing seen because of high deprivation
as when we "see" a friend in a crowd whom we miss -- according to
(radical) behaviorism. Unfortunately, when we talk about a "stimulus,"
and this is particularly true in a discussion of "reinforcement",
it is not always clear whether this is meant to be from the observer's
("procedural") or the subject's ("effective") perspective. From my
understanding, the radical behaviorist assumes that "effective"
stimuli always involve perceptual behavior, and this includes the
perception of the reinforcing "stimulus."
In the behaviorist literature, numerous analyses are made with respect
to feedback functions, such that, for example, a certain rate of
key-pecking (the "independent variable") controls a given rate of
reinforcement (from a procedural perspective, but, in this context,
the "dependent variable") on a given schedule of reinforcement.
People who like optimization models have made elaborate analyses
of schedule performance using such functions. An instantiation of
"melioration" theory assumes that the variable being controlled
is local reinforcement rates; whenever a difference is detected
across alternatives, relatively more behavior shifts to the locally
more reinforcing alternative. When all alternatives are experienced
as equally valuable, then behavioral allocation is stable.
There are places, however, as in verbal behavior, where the behavior of
a listener is necessarily what the speaker's behavior controls. In this
case the difference between what the "experimenter" sees as
relevant can be quite close to what the verbal behaver is controlling.
Best regards,
cc
ps: apologies that I'm just learning about PCT and
may be making superficial or incorrect use of
the term "control;" however, I feel pretty
confident of my characterization of a radical
behaviorist position (Bruce, what do you think?).