responsibility

[From Bill Powers (980221.20200 MST)]

Bruce Gregory (980220.1712 EST)

We are responsible for what we control.

An interesting idea, but not at all obvious. What does
"responsible" mean in this context? Simply that our reference
levels are internal? Or something more?

There are two senses of the word "responsible." One is simply that of
"cause." To ask who was responsible for cleaning the blackboard can be
simply to ask who cleaned it. The other meaning is that of "obligation".
This is what you mean when you find the blackboard uncleaned, and ask the
same question. Now you mean to ask whose duty or obligation it was to see
to it that the blackboard is kept clean.

In the sense of causation, there is no praise or blame attached to
responsibility. But in the other sense, responsibility is imposed from
outside, and held to exist whether or not the person being held responsible
agrees to assume responsibility. The latter sense may or may not imply a
social contract. A person can be held to be responsible for something even
without agreeing to be responsible. Of course if you ask "Who wants to be
responsible for cleaning the blackboard this week?" and John volunteers, it
is reasonable for others to assume that cleaning the blackboard is John's
responsibility for the next 7 days, and that if it's not cleaned, there is
reason to complain to John. If John doesn't volunteer, however, but is
assigned the task, responsibility is not part of a contract; it's part of
controlling the behavior of a person, with all the disadvantages of doing
that.

So what happens when responsibility is assigned rather than agreed to? If
John doesn't clean the blackboard, he is in effect rejecting that duty.
Then social pressure may be brought to bear, to force an agreement by
making not cleaning the blackboard more onerous than cleaning it. John may
be presented with logical or moral arguments meant to persuade him that he
_is_ responsible in some objective sense, whether he agrees or not: that he
_has_ a duty or obligation independently of his own choices. And if John
still doesn't accept the responsibility, he becomes a social outcast, an
enemy of society.

We're clearly not talking about something basic to human nature here.
People may or may not accept responsibility, with or without persuasion or
threats. It's an invented concept, not a property of the brain. So it
really is a concept from outside PCT, as David Goldstein said.

A lot of misunderstandings about PCT come from failing to recognize when
concepts are irrelevant to PCT. PCT is supposed to be a model that explains
how people can do whatever it is that they do. Particular things they do,
particular ways they interact, are of no interest in themselves; they are
of interest only as examples of the kinds of things all people do in all
circumstances (like perceiving, comparing, and acting). PCT is not about
reading books, or doing arithmetic, or making predictions, or loving
others, or getting drunk. It's about trying to say what basic organization
of the brain must exist in order for any of these things to be done. If you
want to discuss things like responsibility, you first have to break down
the meanings of the term so you can see what basic properties of control
are involved. If you start asking whether people have or should have
responsibilities, you're not talking about how brains work any more; you're
simply using your brain to generate descriptions and arguments and
conversation.

Best,

Bill P.

[From Bill Powers (950203.1450 MST)]

Joel Judd (950203)--

     Sure, I'm responsible for knocking over the glass of juice when I
     went to answer the phone, but THAT consequence wasn't intended.
     There's always a reason when someone is murdered, but nevertheless
     someone did it.

I think Rick set the condition that we must be intentionally controlling
a consequence if we're to be said to be responsible for it. An
unintended side-effect of reaching for the phone may be to knock over
the juice glass, but that is an accident, not a purposive act. There was
no reference level for a knocked-over juice glass. A person is
considered a murderer only when the intent of the person was to kill
someone. Accidentally causing a death may open one to a charge of
negligent homicide, but only because others deem certain precautions to
be reasonably expected. Causing a death purely by accident is not
usually considered murder in any degree.

     ... we are responsible for the behavior with which we control
     perceptions.

I would suggest that we are responsible only for the intended
perceptions, and their external counterparts. The means by which we
control perceptions depend on the state of the environment. If an
environmental disturbance appears, our control systems will
automatically change their outputs to oppose the disturbance, and that
change may have unwanted side-effects considerably before we could
consciously refrain from opposing the disturbance (even if we wanted
to).

The main problem here is the difference between _being_ responsible and
_being held_ responsible. I can hold you reponsible for anything I
please, reasonable or unreasonable. That doesn't make you in fact
responsible. A terrorist may say that if his comrades are not released
from prison, the terrorist will set off a bomb in an airplane. And then
he may say "So the consequences are up to you: if you don't release the
prisoners, you will be responsible for the deaths of a planeload of
innocent people." This in no way changes the fact that if the people
die, it will be the terrorist who caused them, intentionally, to die.
Simply holding someone responsible doesn't make that person
automatically responsible for any effect in the world. We are
responsible only for those effects we control. No other reading of the
word makes sense.

I had some doubts about Ed Ford's use of the term responsibility for
just this reason. A school administrator may set up a rule that a
certain kind of behavior is forbidden, and that infractions are to be
followed by certain consequences for the student. So far, so good: rules
are needed. But when a student does break the rule, adminstrators tend
to say "Well, you knew the rule, so the consequences are your
responsibility, not mine." That is dishonesty, because whatever happens
to the student is not intentionally done by the student; it is
intentionally done by the administrator, just as setting off the bomb is
intentionally done by the terrorist, who could have chosen to do
otherwise. The administrator is obeying his or her own rule, which he or
she voluntarily proclaimed and is therefore responsible for -- including
its application. Merely holding another person responsible for an
outcome does not make that person in fact responsible.

I think the only honest way to deal with responsibility is to recognize
at all times who is actually responsible. The administrator does not
need to shift responsibility onto the student. It would be perfectly
reasonable to say "I told you what I would do if you committed that act,
and now I am going to do it." This doesn't create the pretense that the
administrator is out of the picture, and that some abstract rule is
somehow enforcing itself. In fact, it makes perfectly clear the fact
that the student would do well to believe the administrator when told
that the administrator will take certain actions if certain behaviors
are carried out. This actually gives the student control, because the
environment is now predictable and the student is free, as always, to
decide whether a consequence of behavior is wanted or not.

This is what Hugh Gibbons calls "respect for the will of others." When
we take responsibility for what we ourselves control, and recognize that
others are equally responsible for what they control, and that we all
have the right to control our own lives, the door is opened for good-
faith negotiation. If a teacher says to a student "I am going to protect
my right to teach without interference," the student can learn to
respect that right if the teacher also respects the right of the student
to be in control. If neither one tries to lay off responsibilities onto
the other, a practical arrangement can be worked out that respects the
will of both parties. The process of working it out will teach the
student about a way of dealing with others that will be valuable for a
lifetime.

Responsibility can be taken, but not given away.

···

----------------------------------------------------------------------
Best,

Bill P.

From Bruce Buchanan (950204.1245 EST)

Bill Powers (950203.0930 MST)] writes:

From the PCT standpoint, responsibility is a fuzzy term that doesn't
stand up very well to analysis. Rick comes about as close as possible to
a good definition in saying that people are responsible for what they
intentionally cause to happen.

Well, PCTers like everybody else live in society, or more to the point live
in families, and in work and legal relationships, where responsibilies are
not fuzzy, and not only a matter of analysis, but are important matters of
agreement and mutual expectations.

A lot of confusion arises because the word responsibility also carries a
connotation of a social obligation. If you select your own social
obligations and act to satisfy them, then we're back to the idea of
intentional cause. But the big problem, PCT-wise, arises when people try
to decide what another person's responsibilities are. . . .

We are all raised in families, where our survival and prosperity depends
greatly on whether we live within the rules we are given there. As adults
we have more freedom of choice about the responsibilities we accept and
make our own. Why should it be a problem to PCT if my higher level
reference criteria for certain sorts of responsibilities are set to accord
with those of my wife, say, or others? There can be sufficient quid pro
quos that I need not harbour feelings of being imposed upon. Both normal
social life and the activities of scientists have in common that
individuals accept a consensus with respect to perceptual reference
criteria also as their own.

. . .[If] you don't choose to assume that
responsibility as your own goal, then I must try to control you into
taking up the responsibility. This brings reward and punishment into the
picture . . .

Certainly this circumstance is common enough. But I do not see why it must
be the case in principle. It seems to me that an assumption that the
individual is opposed to the acceptance of social responsibility is neither
logically required nor the most common experience. The fact is that most
people are very keen to be accepted and often only want to know what is
expected of them to include this among their own reference variables.

Obviously, a person who voluntarily assumes a responsibility doesn't
need to be rewarded or punished in order to do so.

Right. It is also reasonable to suppose that the expectations underlying
their voluntary choice must be met or else some other accommodation may be
required.

So we have the two senses of responsibility: the causal sense, in which
you are simply the agent of changes in the world that you create on
purpose, and the social sense, in which other people's preferences
create consequences of your acts which would be different if the other
people had different preferences. Under the first sense of the term,
responsibility is simply control of what you can affect. Under the
second sense, responsibility boils down to other people wanting to
control your behavior.

This description obviously is intended to reflect the PCT framework.
However when it comes to a discussion of the moral and legal implications
of responsibility, this framework is not very useful. For it seems to me
that the term responsibility for most people includes notions of commitment
and accountability, which puts its meaning in terms of higher levels of
language and more abstract and selective criteria to be applied to lower
level events. While these criteria for responsible behavior certainly
depend upon lower level causal mechanisms they are in fact value-driven by
previous choices. Unless a person is emotionally arrested at a stage of
unreconciled adolescent rebellion he or she will not feel that everyone
else is always trying to impose upon them!

When people tell you that you have responsibilities, they are trying to
make you behave in a way that suits their reference levels. But to avoid
assuming responsibility themselves, they tell you that this is a
_social_ responsibility, that it is _right_ for you to assume the
responsibility and that they're only informing you about what good
social behavior is. Responsibility is often spoken of as if it existed
independently of any person. And the reason for doing this,
paradoxically, is to let the speaker pretend that his or her own goals
are not his or her own reponsibility.

I think this is a fair statement of a situation that is common. However I
also think that most adults would see this in effect as a possible con, an
argument from authority which requires one to be wary and look for
explanations.

In another post (950203.1450 MST)

replying to Joel Judd (950203)-- Bill says:

  . . .we must be intentionally controlling
a consequence if we're to be said to be responsible for it. . . .

Simply holding someone responsible doesn't make that person
automatically responsible for any effect in the world. We are
responsible only for those effects we control. . . .

. . . we are responsible only for the intended
perceptions, and their external counterparts.

While I would agree with this (although noting that intentions are not
always necessarily conscious), I would also note that the consequence may
well be something we have made our own by a promise or agreement to
perform, perhaps for some other benefit we expect to receive. As I see it,
this need not be precluded by PCT.

. . . rules are needed. But when a student does break the rule, adminstrators
tend to say "Well, you knew the rule, so the consequences are your
responsibility, not mine." That is dishonesty, because whatever happens
to the student is not intentionally done by the student; it is
intentionally done by the administrator . . . Merely holding another person

responsible for an outcome does not make that person in fact responsible.

Why is this neccesarily dishonest? The fact is that the student knows that
acceptance of the rules is a condition for attending the school. The
commonest reason for disobedience is probably an attempt to test the rules,
and to obtain some special advantage over those who accept the rules. It
would seem to me important for the administrator to apply the rules
impartially, i.e. on behalf of the organization of which both the student
and the administrator are members.

A theoretical position which serves to rationalize the opposition of
students to administrative rules seems to me mistaken, as well as sending
all the wrong messages to anyone who whishes to exploit such
misunderstandings. If one disagrees with rules one can argue the case, as
in court, or one can not attend or be a member of the organization. But it
seems irresponsible to argue that one might be justified in ignoring rules
at any time because one has not given one's personal assent. This would not
really be defensible in any organization, not least one devoted to
education.

So what am I missing? Where have I got it wrong?

Bill continues:

the student would do well to believe the administrator when told
that the administrator will take certain actions if certain behaviors
are carried out. This actually gives the student control, because the
environment is now predictable and the student is free, as always, to
decide whether a consequence of behavior is wanted or not.

This is what Hugh Gibbons calls "respect for the will of others."

Is it really? As described, it seems more like a mindless _acceptance_ of
constraints imposed upon the situation by others. This is what I understand
the Mafia mean by respect! This might be necessary for the very young and
inexperienced but is scarcely desirable in principle.

When we take responsibility for what we ourselves control, and recognize
that others are equally responsible for what they control, and that we all
have the right to control our own lives, the door is opened for good-
faith negotiation.

Right! Assuming that we not only have the right and obligation to control
our own lives but that we cannot do much else, and that nobody else can
really do it for us, this is a good place to start. Unfortunately, and I
think this is reflected in the PCT position and some of the points made
above, this realization tends to come not at the beginning but towards the
end of an educational process for many people.

Responsibility can be taken, but not given away.

And perhaps the PCT framework would also accommodate the view that
responsibility can be assigned after it is understood and accepted, i.e.
incorporated in one's own reference criteria?

Cheers!

Bruce B.

<[Bill Leach 950210.00:01 EST(EDT)]

Bruce Buchanan (950204.1245 EST)

Bruce;

I probably should refrain from trying to comment on much of the
discussion that was taking place while I was "out of touch" (nearly 200
e-mail messages alone) but it appears that my reference level is set for
"being involved". :slight_smile:

You appear to be suffering from the same plight that I suppose that every
person that "gets involved" with PCT enough to understand it experiences.
PCT is morally NEUTRAL.

It has absolutely nothing to say about what your "responsibility" IS or
SHOULD be.

AFTER a moral code has been established THEN PCT could be useful in
determining just what "internal standards" have to exist within every
particular individual for the "system" to succeed. Even then however,
PCT still "maintains" that there is no way to force those standards to be
"internalized" by even one individual much less millions...

I think that I sorta "know where you are coming from". I believe Rick
(in particular) must have almost been at "wits end" trying to get through
to me. I just KNEW that somehow PCT simply MUST support my person
beliefs as to such matters as justice, fair play, contracts, honesty,
governmental forms and the like.

Initially, I was almost "crushed" to learn that PCT absolutely WOULD NOT
support my own moral code. Then I began to realize that if it had do so
then it could not have been any better than any of the conflicting
philosophies with which I am acquainted. Instead, it is "better" than
any philosophy in that it is potentially a very real and honest tool
with which one can analyze any philosophy, any behaviour.

-bill

<[Bill Leach 950209.21:37 EST(EDT)]

[Bill Powers (950203.1450 MST)]

I had some doubts about Ed Ford's use of the term responsibility for
just this reason. A school administrator may set up a rule that a
certain kind of behavior is forbidden, and that infractions are to be
followed by certain consequences for the student. So far, so good: rules
are needed. But when a student does break the rule, adminstrators tend
to say "Well, you knew the rule, so the consequences are your
responsibility, not mine." That is dishonesty, because whatever ...

I must be reading Ed a bit differently than you... except that you say
"administrators tend to say".

People do attempt to control their own environments (rightly or wrongly)
and that includes those that "run" schools. While the student has little
choice about attending school or not (from a legal standpoint that is),
in my opinion what Ed has attempted to do is to establish a "system"
where a student may actually learn something about "consequences of
actions" as opposed to "just being dumped upon".

While in the purest sense (and essentially turning around your terrorism
example), if the Fed throws me into jail for refusing to pay taxes to
what I perceive as a "corrupt" government, it is not really a case of
"Well, you knew the rule, so the consequences are your responsibility,
not mine." However, I do know the rules (at least in a general enough
fashion to know that I must pay the taxes that the government claims that
I owe or suffer the consequences).

To deny or especially to teach that one does not have to be concerned at
all about the perceptions that others form concerning one's own actions
would be irresponsible at best. The "gap" between a PCT understanding of
the world and the "common" understanding is hugh but I believe that the
work of Ed Ford will help to reduce the difference.

I think the only honest way to deal with responsibility is to recognize
at all times who is actually responsible. The administrator does not
need to shift responsibility onto the student. It would be perfectly
reasonable to say "I told you what I would do if you committed that act,
and now I am going to do it." This doesn't create the pretense that the
administrator is out of the picture, and that some abstract rule is
somehow enforcing itself. In fact, it makes perfectly clear the fact
that the student would do well to believe the administrator when told
that the administrator will take certain actions if certain behaviors
are carried out. This actually gives the student control, because the
environment is now predictable and the student is free, as always, to
decide whether a consequence of behavior is wanted or not.

Now I ask you to help me... If the preceding IS NOT the gist of what Ed
has been teaching, then I have been misunderstand Ed and I suppose that I
need some help seeing how I missed it...

-bill

From Bruce Buchanan (951210.23:55 EST)

Bill Leach (950210.00:01 EST) writes:

You appear to be suffering from the same plight that I suppose that every
person that "gets involved" with PCT enough to understand it experiences.
PCT is morally NEUTRAL.

I understand that every science, insofar as it is faithful to its premises
and methology as a science, is and must be morally neutral, i.e. clearly
distinguish between (1) the world of fact i.e what _is_, and (2) the world
of value, i.e. what (somebody may think) _ought_ to be.

I also think that it is an option for a scientific thinker to select the
level of aggregation or system complexity which he wishes to consider. In
doing this he will necessarily base his decision upon some criteria, e.g.
usefulness in relation to a problem of interest, isolating elements to
examine relationships, establishing rational criteria for truth, etc.

In dealing with human behavior one can restrict attention to control loops
at the level of primary sensation and perception. However there are also
higher derivative control loops, and more complex reference variables which
derive from previous perceptions and experiences. Any socialized individual
carries considerable freight in this regard, which is part of any real
given situation.

AFTER a moral code has been established THEN PCT could be useful in
determining just what "internal standards" have to exist within every
particular individual for the "system" to succeed.

This would seem to me to be highly problematical AFTER a code is established.
I would think PCT might be more useful in clarifying the relation of
controlling variables - e.g. value criteria at the higher levels - to
their grounding in human emotion, perception and experience. In other words
the focus might be on process and development, in an organism-environment
relationship in context, rather than relatively more hypothetical and
static "standards"

Even then however,
PCT still "maintains" that there is no way to force those standards to be
"internalized" by even one individual much less millions...

Agreed!

I think that I sorta "know where you are coming from". . . .
I just KNEW that somehow PCT simply MUST support my person
beliefs as to such matters as justice, fair play, contracts, honesty,
governmental forms and the like.

Well, this has really never been my assumption or expectation.

It has been my view that human perception is embodied in a framework that
includes physiological/bodily and environmental factors, that perception
can be studied conceptually and experimentally in relative isolation (as by
PCT), but that at some point PCT might usefully relate to other aspects of
human life also e.g. the role of emotion, feelings and perception in
maintaining human relationships. It remains difficult for me to
understand or believe that PCT has no implications whatsoever for any kind
of responsibility in any situation of mutual interaction or dependency no
matter how defined (if indeed that perception of PCT doctrine is accurate).

Added note re Positive Feedback -
I understand by positive feedback the retroaction, in a continuing cycle of
activity, of effects which increase those effects rather than dampen them
(which would be stabilizing negative feedback). This may be expressed
more elegantly and technically in mathematical symbols, as Bill and others
have shown. Yet I still have the view that many processes in biology can
also be usefully described in a general way in these terms. An example
might be sexual attraction and activity. It does appear, for many species,
that an attentive and aggressive male is likely to interest and arouse the
female (if inititally at all receptive), and the aroused female is likely
to further activate the male, leading through the steps of a mating ritual
perhaps to a small explosion as it were, with multilevel consequences. Is
this not positive feedback, involving behavioral mechanisms, which plays an
important role?

But maybe I still "don"t get it"! :wink:

Cheers!

Bruce B.

<[Bill Leach 950212.17:53 EST(EDT)]

Bruce Buchanan (951210.23:55 EST)

"ought"

I agree that while PCT is a science in the purest sense of the term most
(if not all of us) consider that its use is vital to both understanding
and "improving" the human condition. However, it is confusing to be
using PCT to discuss a specific standard or set of standards WHEN it is
not made absolutely clear that said standard(s) is to be taken as a
"given" for purposes of the discussion.

This would seem to me to be highly problematical AFTER a code is
established.

It seems to me that I made myself rather clear on this matter several
times. While PCT doesn't "set" the standard(s), it does allow one to
determine inconsistancies between "goals" and effects of particular goals
and rules. So yes, it would have to be an iterative process.

... but that at some point PCT might usefully relate to other aspects of
human life also e.g. the role of emotion, feelings and perception in
maintaining human relationships.

PCT is useful with these matters but like most aspects of behaviour
analyzed through PCT, "emotions" and "feelings" are viewed in an entirely
new manner. PCT has a lot to say about human relationships but again,
most is consistent with what the wisest have said for years and
inconsistent with any other theory.

It remains difficult for me to understand or believe that PCT has no
implications whatsoever for any kind of responsibility in any situation
of mutual interaction or dependency no matter how defined (if indeed
that perception of PCT doctrine is accurate).

Bruce; I think that this is indeed a difficult concept to accept but
nonetheless... that is the case. One must first assume some goal before
PCT has anything to say about "right and wrong."

For example, the one thing from Ayn Rand that has "survived unscathed"
for me is: No one has a "right" to initiate the use of force against
another (including coercion).

PCT lets me muse about the usefulness of such a concept and indeed has
encouraged my belief in its' "correctness" but such is still based upon
other beliefs of mine concerning how people _should_ treat each other.
There just isn't any way to side step the idea that PCT can "teach" you
how to be a better scoundrel just as efficiently as to be a "saint."

positive feedback

I suppose that your example can be viewed as such. Positive feedback
exist in large measure in control systems but never as the dominate
feedback mode. That is positive feedback is sometimes present as a
transient condition but for all systems that are not self-destructive
there has to be "a limiting condition" or a net negative feedback
mechanism.

In the example you give, there would be both. In addition, it is very
easy when analyzing a system to pick a variable that is not actually a
controlled variable. In your example, what are the controlled variables?
I realize that may sound like a "smart-assed" question and indeed, I
doubt that anyone is really able to answer such a question factually at
this point (which IS my point).

The philosophical discussions that we have are interesting and I believe
quite useful BECAUSE we are trying to view philosophical issues from a
PCT viewpoint. The danger that is always riding in such discussions is
that we really don't have the ability to do the TEST. Thus, it is
deceptively easy to think that we have "nailed down" some controlled
variable when in fact we are not even close.

-bill

[From Bill Powers (930422.2030 MDT)]

Rick Marken (930422.1400) --

Responsibility is a word most often used in the sense of one
person being responsible to another, or to some objective ideal.
I use it strictly in the sense of causation: I am responsible for
what I cause, as rain is responsible for the ground getting wet.

What you say about an individual control system is fine by me.
However, we are conscious entities who seem to live in some
restricted portion of the whole hierarchy at any given time. At
the level where we live, it seems that higher reference levels
are just given, and that circumstances make us behave as we do.
HPCT encourages us to find higher-level explanations, through
recognizing the goal at the center of any behavior. This amounts
to accepting a higher level of responsibility for our goals.

Complete self-understanding, I think, traces causation back to
the reorganizing system -- to the system that tells us what it is
to be human. This system is ancient and is our link to the whole
evolutionary history of life. It tells us what we will find
pleasing and what will horrify us; what hurts and what feels
good. These are the real givens; they come to us from inside,
through messages from our ancestors, not from the environment we
live in right now. Our real freedom lies in the ability to try on
any organization we please and to judge it in terms of how it
suits the most fundamental requirements of homo sapiens. We lose
our freedom when we lose this ability to change.

Best,

Bill P.

[from i.n.kurtzer (930422.2230)]
more on the responsibility vein:

i don't see how freedom enters into PCT AT ALL, except
to extent that your reference levels aren't determined
externally (exempt if disturbances result in enough error
for reorganization to occur and only a limited number of
alternatives will correct the error--this may be insightful
into "brainwashing techniques" (Symonese Liberation Party
and the hostage who eventually joined them...i forget her
name). but the freedom you seem to be speaking about (Bill P.)
is our ability to choose which is either genetically set or
up to the random whims of reorganization. excuse my hooting,
but in terms of PCT freedom is a misnomer.

p.s. this is good grist!!

i.n.kurtzer