Rick on Choice and deceit

[From Bruce Nevin (2000.01.19.1616 EST)]

Rick Marken (2000.01.19.0950)]

I believe Bruce Nevin started things off by asking if there
were any situation in which a person could truthfully say
"I see you have chosen...".

No. This thread started with your reference to the story found at
http://www.latimes.com/news/politics/natpol/20000104/t000000973.html
about which you said

apparently Bill (and I) are not the only ones who object to
forcing people to do things and then strongly implying (by calling
it a "choice") that they were not forced to do anything.

My reply was

The two choices here were determined unilaterally, and the restriction to
just two choices as well. If that is true in RTP schools, then this story
is relevant. But that is an empirical question.

You (2000.01.04.2000) agreed, and said

my idea of what a bilaterally determined choice is:
you give me the choice of staying and behaving or going to
the RTC and I give you the choice of having me accept these
alternatives or rejecting them (and continuing my disruption).

This is a description of two distinct unilaterally determined choices. A
choice that is not unilaterally imposed is one that is agreed upon beforehand.

It was only after Bill (2000.01.08.1015 MDT) asked Hank Folson "Is your
point that it's OK to lie to children if you do something else that's good
to make up for it?" that I asked the question that you thought of as the
start of this thread, "Can you conceive of any context in which the
statement 'I see that you have chosen to do x (instead of y)' is both true
and valid?" Bill said "yes" and eventually (2000.01.10.1850 EST) agreed
more or less with my (2000.01.10.1850 EST) guess at what he might have in mind:

What I imagine is a situation where, by test, you know that
the person is controlling a choice between x and y and (as
yet another test) you assert that you see that they are
controlling x.

That thread continues.

It was at this point that you (2000.01.10.2030) mentioned your "mind
reading" demo. I didn't follow that up because I was concentrating on the
conversation with Bill, and, frankly, my available time is very sparse.
Your (2000.01.10.2030) summary says that if you can legitimately identify a
person's intention and say "I see that you are controlling x" and then on a
different occasion "I see that you are controlling y" that you are
warranted by PCT to say "I see that you have chosen to control x" and
(later) "I see that you have chosen to control y." Therefore, if you can
see the child going to the RTC despite all the disturbances that are
inevitably present in the environment, you are warranted in the same way to
say "I see that you have chosen to go to the RTC". You might want to add
some gentle disturbance. Having the teacher block the path is not a gentle
disturbance. See Bill Powers (2000.01.17.1913 MDT) for discussion.

Nice demo. Thanks.

        Bruce Nevin

···

At 09:50 AM 01/19/2000 -0800, Richard Marken wrote:

[From Rick Marken (2000.01.19.1410)]

Me:

my idea of what a bilaterally determined choice is:
you give me the choice of staying and behaving or going to
the RTC and I give you the choice of having me accept these
alternatives or rejecting them (and continuing my disruption).

Bruce Nevin (2000.01.19.1616 EST)

This is a description of two distinct unilaterally determined
choices. A choice that is not unilaterally imposed is one that
is agreed upon beforehand.

Where's the "bi" in that laterality? Does it exist in the fact
that those kids who don't agree to the choice ("stay and behave
or go to the RTC") beforehand are not choosing to go to the
RTC when they disrupt? If so, does Ed teach the teacher to
_not_ say "I see you have chosen..." to those kids who have
not agreed to the choice beforehand?

Best

Rick

···

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Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313
Life Learning Associates mailto: rmarken@earthlink.net
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