RKC-PROGRAM CONTROL

[Robert_K_Clark1]

<Bob Clark (940614.2205 EDT)>

Rick Marken (940602.0850) Subject: Program level -- control of
PERCEPTION

Your demonstration of controlling programs by simply pressing buttons
was neat!

But several questions are not addressed. You note:

In PCT, a program is a PERCEPTION that is NOT necessarily controlled
by the production of a program of outputs. ... I had a subject
(me) control a program by simply pressing a button.

That is, YOU (not some modelled version of you), pushed a button to
select the program to be displayed.

The program was a conditional sequence of numbers on the computer
screen ... while the sequence of numbers on the screen was
perceived as following this program, the subject did nothing. When
the program was "disturbed" ... the subject could restore the
program by pressing the mouse button.

It seems to me that YOU monitored (observed) the perceptions
composing the displayed sequence of numbers. YOU compared these
perceptions to the perceptions as YOU imagined them. These imagined
perceptions are taken from YOUR memory of the selected program. This
process could be described as: "a comparison of this [sequence of
numbers]" with a remembered (imagined) preselected [sequence of
numbers]. If YOU perceive an exact match, zero error, hence no
"disturbance," YOU do nothing. If YOU perceive a mismatch, there is
an error, YOU perceive a "disturbance," and YOU initiate the
button-pushing sequence used to "restore" the programmed sequence of
numbers.

So I was able to control a program without generating a "program of
output" myself. I just pushed the button or not. ... a program is
a controlled perception -- not a controlled output.

YOU appear to have controlled your perception of a sequence of
numbers by "generating a program (sequence of perceptions) of outputs
used to push the button."

How could YOU manage to "push a button" without generating a "program
of [button-pushing] outputs?" Which of YOUR own systems were in
operation in this process? Is this YOUR own Program Level at work?

Another question; How did YOU create the program YOU used for this
display.

I expect that YOU considered several possible programs for this
demonstration, and made YOUR selection on some combination of
criteria. Having planned this "program-creating" action in YOUR
imagination, YOU seem to have used YOUR lower level systems (selected
as needed) to create the display of that specifically selected
sequence of events.

Clearly, not surprisingly, YOU have these capabilities. But I am
puzzled: where among the systems YOU used for these purposes, is YOUR
program level? Is it the level used to create the program(s)? Is it
the level that monitors the "conditional sequence of numbers" as they
are presented? Or does it include both? Or is it somewhere else?

YOUR demonstration includes the demonstration of YOUR own
independence. Although certainly subject to assorted limitations and
restrictions, YOU appear to be capable of some minimum of independent
actions.

Where do you put all this within HPCT? And how do YOU account for
YOUR independence?

Regards, Bob Clark

[Tom_BOURBON3]

Tom Bourbon [940616.1640]

I am butting in on a conversation, but I have some thoughts, programs and
models that are relevant to the discussion about program control.

<Bob Clark (940614.2205 EDT)>

Rick Marken (940602.0850) Subject: Program level -- control of
PERCEPTION

Rick:

So I was able to control a program without generating a "program of
output" myself. I just pushed the button or not. ... a program is
a controlled perception -- not a controlled output.

Bob:

YOU appear to have controlled your perception of a sequence of
numbers by "generating a program (sequence of perceptions) of outputs
used to push the button."

Rick replied to that comment by Bob:

···

====================================
[From Rick Marken (940615.0900)]

Not at all. I have controlled the perception of a _program_ of numbers
by generating outputs that are opposed to a disturbance that changes the
program. There is no program of button press outputs; my outputs, o, simply
mirror the disturbance variable, d, so that o = -d. The relationship between
o and d is not a program (though it could be _described_ as one --ie.
"if o then -d"); but the relationship between o and d is really just a
functional relationship that results from the operation of a negative
feedback perceptual control loop.

Back to Bob:

How could YOU manage to "push a button" without generating a "program
of [button-pushing] outputs?" Which of YOUR own systems were in
operation in this process? Is this YOUR own Program Level at work?

Again Rick replied:

Here is a model of what's going on:

S----> |f| -- > p -->|c|<--r

                    >
<-------------o<-----|

d

(Rick followed this diagram with another discussion about how there was no
program for his actions, even though his actions controlled a program of
sequences.)

Bob, I don't know if you saw my earlier post about program-level control --

     Tom Bourbon [940603.1108]: Program, sequence, relationship.

In it, I described a demonstration in which I (Tom the controller, not Tom
the modeler) adopted a plan to create a sequence of four different
relationships between the cursor and target during a single one-minute run
of a pursuit tracking tracking task. That's at least three different levels
of control in the same run. I decided that a change from one controlled
relationship to the next should occur every 15 seconds. I (the programmer)
modified the computer program for the task so that it would display the
elapsed time in the run and produce a "beep" (Martin might call it an
"alerting signal" ;-)) every 15 seconds.

My plan was to keep the cursor aligned with the target for the first 15
seconds; about a centimeter above the target during the next 15 seconds;
motionless at the center of the screen for the next 15 seconds; and moving
twice as far as the target, in the opposite direction from the target,
during the final 15 seconds. (There was nothing special aobut that
sequence or those relationships; I could have adopted any other imaginable
sequence of relationships.)

The run began, the "signals" occurred, and I produced the sequence of four,
15-second long relationships between the cursor and target.

I do not believe I used a "program" of movements. Instead, I used a program
of time-dependent changes in my intended perceptions of reklationships
between curaor and target. To confirm that my intentions were for perceived
relationships, not for movements, I did a second run, in which a random
disturbance, never before encountered by me, also affected the position of
the cursor. The experimental situation was like the one in Rick's diagram
above. The run began, the signals occurred, and I produced the same sequence
of four, 15-second long relationships between the cursor and target that I
produced during the first (undisturbed) run; but my _movements_ were
profoundly different from those in the first run. During the second run,
the effects of my movements combined with the disturbance to create the
same time-dependent sequence of perceived relationships.

Back on June 3rd, I described the PCT model that dupicated my performance
for both runs of this task -- I won't repeat it here, but I'll summarize a
few of its key features. I used the elemental single-level, single-loop
PCT model, with the following additions: there was a list of four different
reference signals, each of which would allow the model to control for one of
the four perceptions I controlled in my runs; the model "watched" the time
and when each "signal" occurred, it switched to the next program-specified
reference signal. That's it -- no further changes. That model duplicated
the results from both of my runs; both times, it created the same sequence
of relationships between cursor and target, but it did not create the same
sequence of simulated movements for the control handle-- it also eliminated
the effects of the disturbance during the sewcond run.

As different as my program-sequence control task was from Rick's, it
demonstrated the same fact: there is no need to postulate programmed actions
(movements, outputs) when a person (or as in my demonstration, a rudimentary
PCT model) controls program-level perceptions. The movements of the person,
and those of the PCT model of the person, simply "happen" as outputs from a
system that is part of a high-gain negative feedback loop that has its
higher-level references set to perceive programmed sequences.

Later,

Tom

[Robert_K_Clark1]

<Bob Clark (940621.1012 EDT)>

RKC-RICK'S DECISIONS

In the following I am pointing out where YOU have made various
DECISIONS. I am using caps to indicate places where I think YOU have
ARBITRARILY DECIDED to take the indicated action(s). In some cases,
perhaps, these may result from the operation of pre-programmed
choice-points. But, as an external observer, I have no way to know
which. Thus I DECIDE to proceed:

Rick Marken (940615.0900) Subject: Re: Program Control

In response to [Bob Clark (940614.2205)Subject: RKC-PROGRAM CONTROL],
YOU have DECIDED to add several items.

First, YOU DECIDED to quote my suggestions:

YOU (not some modelled version of you), pushed a button to select
the program to be displayed.

...

YOU monitored (observed) the perceptions composing the displayed
sequence of numbers.

...

YOU compared these perceptions to the perceptions as YOU imagined
them.

Then YOU DECIDED to say "yes" to each suggestion and then to comment:

I would say that I compared these perceptions to a reference for
what I wanted them to be -- at least, that's what the model says I
was doing; I was only aware of keeping the program (perception)
happening. ... I might have been imagining _something_ but it sure
wasn't programs;-).

Are the various "I's" that "would say," that "compared perceptions,"
that "wanted them to be," that "was only aware," that "might have
been imagining" each identical to the other? It seems to me that YOU
are jumping quickly from one level (set of perceptions) to another.

Otherwise I have no trouble with this -- except for wondering what
"model" it is that "says I was doing;" Up to this point YOU have
DECIDED not to specify a "model" -- much less one that "says" things.

Next, YOU DECIDED to quote me further:

This process could be described as: "a comparison of this [sequence
of numbers]" with a remembered (imagined) preselected [sequence of
numbers].

YOU DECIDED to remark:

Yes. Except that in both cases it is neural signals (not actual
sequences) that are compared and the perceptual signal does not
represent a particular sequence; it represents a _program_.

After accepting my description ("yes"), YOU DECIDED to emphasize
"neural signals." Of course this is not a problem -- the "numbers"
are also "neural signals" whether from current inputs, or from
imagined inputs.

Hasn't the neural signal that "represents a _program_" been derived
from lower order neural signals representing numbers, sequences of
numbers and their combinations (omitting some of the details at this
and still lower level)?

Here YOU have DECIDED to restrict your discussion strictly to the
level at which the neural signal that "represents a _program_" can be
found -- together with the neural signals serving as reference
signals at this same level. OK, if that's what YOU have DECIDED to
use for the purposes YOU have DECIDED to use for the present.

Again YOU DECIDED to quote me:

If YOU perceive an exact match, zero error, hence no "disturbance."

and:

If YOU perceive a mismatch, there is an error, YOU perceive a
"disturbance."

At this point YOU RECOGNIZED Martin's Mistake and YOU DECIDED to
remark:

You are making Martin's Mistake.

~r
And YOU DECIDED to continue:

What I perceive is the state of the (program) perception; if that
state is not at the intended level then it's not; but the system
controlling the program perception doesn't know why the perception
is not at the intended level; it could be due to the effects of the
disturbing variable -- etc etc

Since YOU have DECIDED to restrict your attention to this level, YOU
have DECIDED to limit your perception to the "state of the (program)
perception." And of course the system controlling this perception
"doesn't know why." No neural signal "knows" anything. Anywhere.
Anytime.

In addition, since YOU have now DECIDED to include your own internal
systems as a portion of the demonstration, control is accomplished by
using those specialized systems YOU have ARBITRARILY DESIGNED for
control of this specific perception.

After YOU DECIDED to accuse me of "Martin's Mistake," and to include
the comment discussed above, YOU then SELECTED another quote from me:

How could YOU manage to "push a button" without generating a
"program of [button-pushing] outputs?"

YOU DECIDED to DESIGN and PRESENT a diagram together with a
description of its operation. This description includes:

When the program perception, p, doesn't match the reference signal
there is an output -- ie. a button press.

This implies that the [button-pushing] output has been included
within the program, and is merely waiting for the higher level signal
to put it to work. No arbitrary decision is needed for this -- the
choice-point is already prepared!

[Aside. In many discussions, neural signals are treated as
continuously variable. In this case the signals are binary. This
doesn't quite fit other discussions of analog outputs oppose analog
disturbances. The situation YOU DECIDED to present seems unusual in
using binary, but I don't think it is a problem. End of Aside.]

This presentation of the Program Level includes neither where and how
the inputs are generated, nor where and how the reference levels are
generated. Perhaps other equally fixed systems can be described for
these purposes -- especially those involving the lower ordeR{s.

As described, this Program is an unchanging structure of signals and
functions. It does what it does -- and when no relevant signals
exist, it does nothing. This is a purely mechanical system, its
operation is automatic and fully determined by the combination of is
structure and the condition of its environment. There is NO provision
for any ARBITRARY DECISIONS.

My original post included one more question, that YOU DECIDED to
leave out of your discussion:

*How did YOU create the program YOU used for this display.

Let me add the further question:

"How did YOU DECIDED to write up these responses to my questions?"

A final note, repeating what I have suggested elsewhere:

I do not assert that conscious decisions are always needed. Many
choices (perhaps having the appearance of "decisions) are
pre-determined within the structure of learned systems.

A Decision Making Entity, acting consciously and arbitrarily, is
needed only when existing systems cannot handle (control) the
situation.

Regards, Bob Clark

PS:

I had asked:

And how do YOU account for YOUR independence?

God just made me that way

Or did Martin Taylor serve as God's helper? ! !

[Tom_BOURBON3]

From Tom Bourbon [940621.0943]

<Bob Clark (940621.1012 EDT)>

RKC-RICK'S DECISIONS

Bob, in your exchanges with Rick, it seems pretty clear that you are
pressing for him to say something about who or what is behind his words like
"I" and "me" and "mine," when he talks about "making decisions." Do _you_
really believe he will answer you by saying his DME made him do it?

I know your discussion of program control is focused on a possible role for
your Decision Making Entity, but program control deserves attention on its
own. Twice, I've tried to attract your attention on that subject, but you
seem devoted to pursuing Rick. Maybe I should use one of Martin's
"alerting stimuli" on you. That would force you to pay attention, wouldn't
it? ;-))

If you have time while the big guns and I are in Wales, could you look over
my two posts on program-level control of a sequence of relationships and
let me know what you think of the demonstration I described. I'm working
on a set of programs for tasks in which people and PCT models alter their
own intentions (reference signals) and their own gains and signs of the
feedback fubction. Program-level control is a big part of that work and
I'd like your thoughts on what I've briefly described so far.

My posts on the subject were:

Tom Bourbon [940603.1108] and Tom Bourbon [940616.1640].

See you when I return from Wales.

Tom