social reality

[From Rick Marken (2004.05.26.1430)]

Bruce Nevin (05.26.2004 13:36 EDT)]

Economic value cannot exist in the absence of "patterns of coordinated
reference levels".

I think PCT would say that economic value corresponds to an individual's
reference for the goods (perceptions) in question. The cost of these goods,
on the other hand, is determined by the interaction of control systems that
value these different goods differently (have different references for how
much of each good they want). This interaction is called "the market" and
the cost of goods is determined by how much output (labor) different people
are willing to produce in order to get the goods they differentially value.

The references that an individual controls in speaking or writing are to be
modeled as interior to that individual.

Individuals control perceptions, not references.

The language that they speak or
write, however, existed as a social context prior to their birth and will
persist after their death, and must be considered a social reality that is
only fragmentarily and partially captured in talk or modeling of references
in one individual.

I think language can exist only in the brains of individuals. When all the
individuals who speak a language are gone the language is gone, unless it's
written down. The language that exists before an individual's birth is
different than the language that exists after they're gone. Languages are
constantly changing because the language control systems in the individual
users of the language are continuously changing (reorganizing). The "social
reality" of language is captured by PCT in the interaction of individual
controllers, such as the "social realities" (encircling, following in a
line, etc) that are captured by the interaction of individual controllers in
the CROWD program.

The pre-existence of social reality is grossly underestimated in PCT
discussions to date.

I don't know about "pre-existence" but controlled social perceptions have
been part of the PCT model from the start, most specifically in the form of
system concept perceptions ("social realities" like being a Dodger fan, an
Episcopalian or a citizen of the US).

Assuredly, it [social reality] exists only by virtue of the control
actions of control systems interacting in a society.

Exactly. The CROWD program demonstrates this nicely, as did Tom Bourbon's
studies of two-person interactions. "Social realities", from a PCT
perspective, are perceptions of group behavior patterns that result from the
interaction of two or more individual controlling agents.

Best regards

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken
MindReadings.com
Home: 310 474 0313
Cell: 310 729 1400

[From Bruce Nevin (05.26.2004 19:19 EDT)]

Rick Marken (2004.05.26.1430)

> Bruce Nevin (05.26.2004 13:36 EDT)]

> Economic value cannot exist in the absence of "patterns of coordinated
> reference levels".

I think PCT would say that economic value corresponds to an individual's
reference for the goods (perceptions) in question. The cost of these goods,
on the other hand, is determined by the interaction of control systems that
value these different goods differently (have different references for how
much of each good they want). This interaction is called "the market" and
the cost of goods is determined by how much output (labor) different people
are willing to produce in order to get the goods they differentially value.

There can be no market in the absence of "patterns of coordinated reference
levels" which have developed by convergence of reference values in many
successive generations of individuals, and indeed it is of these that a
market is constituted.

> The references that an individual controls in speaking or writing are to be
> modeled as interior to that individual.

Individuals control perceptions, not references.

Good catch. What I intended to say was the references in accord with which
an individual controls. I was careless.

> The language that they speak or
> write, however, existed as a social context prior to their birth and will
> persist after their death, and must be considered a social reality that is
> only fragmentarily and partially captured in talk or modeling of references
> in one individual.

I think language can exist only in the brains of individuals. When all the
individuals who speak a language are gone the language is gone,

Of course. But for any individual, the language exists as an observable
social phenomenon. And that is so for each individual. It is a perception
(or system of perceptions), but it is also a perception of something, and
that something pre-exists in the environment when a child is born or a
foreigner arrives and learns the language, and continues to exist in the
environment when an individual departs or dies.

unless it's written down.

No, if only written records of it remain, the language is gone as a social
reality. Ugaritic is no longer a social reality.

The language that exists before an individual's birth is
different than the language that exists after they're gone.

And the tree that you look at at this moment is different from the tree
that you looked at a moment ago, the person that you talk to is different,
and so on. It is a convenient, probably necessary, fiction to refer to any
specimen as the same from one time to another. Panda rhei. None of which
has any relevance to the point at hand.

Languages are
constantly changing because the language control systems in the individual
users of the language are continuously changing (reorganizing).

If this were all that is involved, then each individual would soon speak
and understand only his or her own solipsistic "language". The factors in
language change are actually quite a bit more interesting than that.

The "social
reality" of language is captured by PCT in the interaction of individual
controllers, such as the "social realities" (encircling, following in a
line, etc) that are captured by the interaction of individual controllers in
the CROWD program.

The controllers in the CROIWD program do not have reference values for
forming circles and arcs, following in a line, etc. Language users do have
reference values for many aspects of language. I surveyed some of them last
summer, and demonstrated methods for identifying some of them at a prior
meeting. The CROWD program does not demonstrate the convergence of
reference values such as is required for individuals to produce and
understand what they (quite properly) perceive to be utterances in the same
language.

> The pre-existence of social reality is grossly underestimated in PCT
> discussions to date.

I don't know about "pre-existence"

Then you haven't thought about it.

but controlled social perceptions have
been part of the PCT model from the start, most specifically in the form of
system concept perceptions ("social realities" like being a Dodger fan, an
Episcopalian or a citizen of the US).

Yes. And now specifically in the form of economic value.

> Assuredly, it [social reality] exists only by virtue of the control
> actions of control systems interacting in a society.

Exactly. The CROWD program demonstrates this nicely,

In small part.

as did Tom Bourbon's studies of two-person interactions. "Social
realities", from a PCT
perspective, are perceptions of group behavior patterns that result from the
interaction of two or more individual controlling agents.

If in this definition you mean the perceptions of the observer, you might
mean no more than the patterns formed by controllers in the CROWD program.
If you mean the perceptions of the controller, then PCT so far has said
very little about them other than that perceptions of group affiliation
merely exist (such as "being a Dodger fan, an Episcopalian, or a citizen of
the US"). Martin extended the PCT account at the 1993 meeting with his
sketch of "convergence", but that has gone nowhere since then. And there is
a long way to go.

But this is not your interest or competence, Rick, so there is no criticism
intended or implied, nor any expectation.

         /Bruce Nevin

···

At 02:34 PM 5/26/2004 -0700, Richard Marken wrote:

[From Rick Marken (2004.05.26.2030)]

Bruce Nevin (05.26.2004 19:19 EDT)--

The CROWD program does not demonstrate the convergence of
reference values such as is required for individuals to produce and
understand what they (quite properly) perceive to be utterances in the
same
language.

What is this convergence of reference values? Is it just when people
control the same perceptual variables relative to the same references?
If so, this happens in more than just language. It happens in music
(different people controlling for the same pitches when they play
ensemble), driving (different people controlling for the same image of
the car relative to the lane marker), even in tracking (different
people controlling the same cursor and target relative to a reference
of zero distance between them), and so on.

"Social realities", from a PCT
perspective, are perceptions of group behavior patterns that result
from the
interaction of two or more individual controlling agents.

If in this definition you mean the perceptions of the observer, you
might
mean no more than the patterns formed by controllers in the CROWD
program.

Exactly.

If you mean the perceptions of the controller, then PCT so far has said
very little about them other than that perceptions of group affiliation
merely exist (such as "being a Dodger fan, an Episcopalian, or a
citizen of
the US").

Merely?

But this is not your interest or competence, Rick

Actually, it is my interest. I don't know if anything is my competence.

You talk as though you have some special insight into "social
realities" you suggest that "the pre-existence of social reality is
grossly underestimated in PCT discussions to date". I think this is
just begging the question. PCT doesn't estimate the pre-existence of
any reality. If assumes the physics model as the cause of our
perceptual experience. It assumes a perceptual model that constructs
perceptions of "social realities" such as "economic value" and
"language". It assumes a model of control that acts to brings
constructed perceptual variables to intended states. The control model
is used to explain purposeful human activities such as consuming
particular goods and carrying on conversations. If you think PCT is
missing something about "social realities" could you please say what it
is.

Best

Rick

···

---
Richard S. Marken
marken@mindreadings.com
Home 310 474-0313
Cell 310 729-1400

From[Bill Williams 26 May 2004 11:40 PM CST]

[From Rick Marken (2004.05.26.2030)]

> Bruce Nevin (05.26.2004 19:19 EDT)--
>

Rick Marken says,

What is this convergence of reference values? Is it just when people
control the same perceptual variables relative to the same references?
If so, this happens in more than just language.

It is, at least for now, a physiological impossiblity for two people to
control their "perceptual variables relative to the same references."
As I was careful to point out, reference levels can not be shared. Making
sure that we adhere to a control theory conception in this regard is
crucial.

No two people can have "the same references." There are proceedures
for people coming to an agreement but what is involved always involves
something other than people having "the same references."

All of us can be expected to make mistakes in regard to nominclature,
especially when the habitual associations with earlier and, in my
opinion mistaken, conceptions, such as that we can "share" or use the
"same" reference level are as strong as they obviously are.

To continue, when Rick says that when

>driving (different people controlling for the same image of

the car relative to the lane marker),

This is not possible. People in different care are not, controlling for
"the same image." Different people can not have the "same image."
So, this part of Rick's post expresses a mistaken argument. And, it
is an argument that will completely confuse the discussion concerning
applying control theory in a social context rather than a context of
physics.

>> "Social realities", from a PCT
>> perspective, are perceptions of group behavior patterns that result
>> from the
>> interaction of two or more individual controlling agents.

Whatever you want to say about PCT, a competent use of control theory
applied to social theory rules out the usual notion of "individuals" and
also
just as much rules out the usual conception of "social."

>
> If in this definition you mean the perceptions of the observer, you
> might
> mean no more than the patterns formed by controllers in the CROWD
> program.

Exactly.

And, you would be wrong.

> If you mean the perceptions of the controller, then PCT so far has said
> very little about them other than that perceptions of group affiliation
> merely exist (such as "being a Dodger fan, an Episcopalian, or a
> citizen of
> the US").

Merely?

> But this is not your interest or competence, Rick

Actually, it is my interest. I don't know if anything is my competence.

I am pretty sure that this is not you competence. Not based you understand
on any _a priori_ assumption but rather upon extensive demonstrations.

You talk as though you have some special insight into "social
realities"

It isn't neccesarily special, but Bruce's insight is somewhat unfamiliar,
or at least it appears to be unfamiliar to you. Not withstanding that he
has presented this view a number of times in the past, and sometimes
at great length.

> you suggest that "the pre-existence of social reality is

grossly underestimated in PCT discussions to date". I think this is
just begging the question.

This depends upon who, determines which question to pay attention to and
what criteria to apply in considering the question.

PCT doesn't estimate the pre-existence of any reality.

[It] assumes the physics model as the cause of our
perceptual experience.

Again, whatever you want to say about PCT, a competent use of control theory
in examining social issues does not assume that economics is physics.

It assumes a perceptual model that constructs

perceptions of "social realities" such as "economic value" and
"language".

PCT has a doctrine on economic value? If PCT has a construct regarding
"economic value" it is one of more-or-less constant equvocation..

This preconception _is_ the issue that I, and I am assuming Bruce Nevin as
well, are
disputing. Saying that PCT assumes this this is either not an answer in
this
dispute, or it is an inadaquate and dogmatic answer.

If your version of PCT has a doctrine on economic value? If PCT has a
construct
regarding "economic value" it is one of more-or-less constant equvocation..

As I have said, economics is not physics. Neither, I am assuming is
linguistics physics. And, I at least am aware of having a cognitive aspect
to
my experience as well as a perceptual experience. The question, here, as
I view it is a matter of the adaquacy of various cognitive models. The
question
of adaquacy is, in my view, one that is best assessed in terms of the
consequences in gross experience of the various cognitive assumptions.

It assumes a model of control that acts to brings

constructed perceptual variables to intended states. The control model
is used to explain purposeful human activities such as consuming
particular goods and carrying on conversations. If you think PCT is
missing something about "social realities" could you please say what it
is.

Rick, your asking this question is a demonstration of "bad faith." Bruce
has
presented these arguments many times, and sometimes at great length in the
past. I sometimes think that you must have been the one who ate Lana
Turner.

Bill Williams

[From Rick Marken (2004.05.27.0920)]

Bill Williams (26 May 2004 11:40 PM CST]

No two people can have "the same references."

This is certainly true if by "references" you mean the efferent neurons that
presumably carry reference signals. Different people have different efferent
neurons because they have separate nervous systems. I was using the term
"references" to refer to the _values_ of the reference signals that are
carried by these neurons. Obviously, different people can have the same
reference signal value just as different electronic circuits can carry the
same current. This happens all the time in a tracking task, for example.
Different people are regularly able to keep the same perceptual variable
(distance between cursor and target) in the same reference state (zero
distance). According to PCT, this happens because these different people
have the same reference (value) for the same perceptual variable
(cursor-target distance).

PCT has a doctrine on economic value?

PCT has an _explanation_ for the fact that people differentially value goods
and services. Goods and services are perceptual variables that are valued to
the extent that people have a reference for them. A perception that is
highly valued is one for which there is a large reference. A perception that
is not valued much or at all is one with a low or zero reference.

If PCT has a construct regarding
"economic value" it is one of more-or-less constant equvocation.

No. It's pretty much always the same. The greater the reference for a
perception the greater the "value" of that perception.

Regards

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken
MindReadings.com
Home: 310 474 0313
Cell: 310 729 1400

From [Marc Abrams (2004.05.27.1252)]

[From Rick Marken (2004.05.27.0920)]

This is certainly true if by "references" you mean the
efferent neurons that presumably carry reference signals.
Different people have different efferent neurons because they
have separate nervous systems. I was using the term
"references" to refer to the _values_ of the reference
signals that are carried by these neurons. Obviously,
different people can have the same reference signal value
just as different electronic circuits can carry the same
current. This happens all the time in a tracking task, for
example. Different people are regularly able to keep the same
perceptual variable (distance between cursor and target) in
the same reference state (zero distance). According to PCT,
this happens because these different people have the same
reference (value) for the same perceptual variable
(cursor-target distance).

And you want to know why people don't take PCT seriously? 'Efferent'
neurons? Are you really serious about this? Do you really believe our
nervous systems are no more than electronic circuits? Do you really
think a 'reference signal' travels around the brain like electricity
through a wire?

Marc

Considering how often throughout history even intelligent people have
been proved to be wrong, it is amazing that there are still people who
are convinced that the only reason anyone could possibly say something
different from what they believe is stupidity or dishonesty.

Being smart is what keeps some people from being intelligent.

Thomas Sowell

Don't argue with an idiot; people watching may not be able to tell the
difference.

Anon

I don't approve of political jokes. I've seen too many of them get
elected

Anon

From[Rick Marken 27 May 2004 11:30 AM CST]

The constant equivocation goes on. This isn't really a discussion, but
sometimes Rick says stuff that is wrong in such an appealing way that I
enjoy to commenting on what he has said and updating Rick's score card.

[From Rick Marken (2004.05.27.0920)]

> Bill Williams (26 May 2004 11:40 PM CST]
>
> No two people can have "the same references."

This is certainly true if by "references" you mean the efferent neurons

that

presumably carry reference signals.

I am not so sure about "certainly" and I am inclined to doubt that what
"really" happens is adaquately captured by Bill Powers notion of neural
current-- and this is a very long, long way from "all we know is what we
perceive." But, as a model it works well enough for my purposes.

Different people have different efferent

neurons because they have separate nervous systems.

Of, course.

I was using the term

"references" to refer to the _values_ of the reference signals that are
carried by these neurons.

You are still wrong.

Obviously, different people can have the same

reference signal value just as different electronic circuits can carry the
same current.

No. score minus one.

What your "obviously" proves is that you have never actually work with real
physical systems-- such as an electrical powers system in an aircraft.
Since I am not a PCT person, and instead a control theory person, I know
that, however, carefully you adjust two voltage regulators, their "reference
signals" are never actually "carrying the same currrent." A number of
engineers that have listened to you talk have told me that your conception
of control theory ( or PCT ) in your case does not appear to be informed by
the experience of actually working with physical control systems. So, the
"obviously" as you use it has a different meaning than you might suppose.
You literally do not know, from out of your own experience, what you are
talking about. When you say, "different electronmic circuits can carry the
same current." the answer is obviously--

No they can not. This is a sheer impossiblity.

This happens all the time in a tracking task.

No, it does not. minus 1. Cummulative - 2

You are repeating your original mistake in a different context.

for example.

Different people are regularly able to keep the same perceptual variable
(distance between cursor and target) in the same reference state (zero
distance).

This is not what actually happens when you are talking about real systems
( I know it is really just all Perception ) but bear with me, I am not a PCT
person, so I never bought the cracker barrel sophistry. But, back to the
real systems. Two real systems are two different systems and real systems
always have reall differences.
The engineers seem to be right, you are not thinking in terms of real
systems.

score - 1, cummulative - 3

According to PCT,

I my view PCT is cracker barrell sophistry added to control theory. So, I
never went all the way down the deceptivively plausible garden path.

this happens because these different people

have the same reference (value) for the same perceptual variable
(cursor-target distance).

Real systems are always different. No two systems are ever actually
identical, and no one system is ever precisely the same from moment to
moment.

Score - 1 cummulative - 4

> PCT has a doctrine on economic value?

PCT has an _explanation_ for the fact that people differentially value

goods

and services. Goods and services are perceptual variables that are valued

to

the extent that people have a reference for them. A perception that is
highly valued is one for which there is a large reference. A perception

that

is not valued much or at all is one with a low or zero reference.

> If PCT has a construct regarding
> "economic value" it is one of more-or-less constant equvocation.

No.

It would be too tigeious for me to go back and document this but, the PCT
discussion of economics has be so uninformed that the defintions for terms
_has_ been in a more or less constant process of equvocation.

score - 1 cum - 5

t's pretty much always the same.

Check the way you and Bill Powers have defined income. Perhaps the reason
that you _think_ that it has always been the same has its source in your not
knowing what the terms mean, so whatever you say they mean, that is what
they mean. As a result you don't expereince the error when you equvocate.

score - 1 cum - 6

The geater the reference for a
perception the greater the "value" of that perception.

I think in the immediately above we have an inclusive explanation for Rick
Marken. In my world view "value" of a perception has a connection to the
meaningfulness of that perception in a wider world. My conception of value
theory is a non- solipsistic conception of value theory. The value of
something accordingly is not to be evaluated in terms of a magnitude of the
reference for the perception as carried by the specimen. The specimen is a
part of a population. I am a Darwinian, and Darwinians think about things
in terms of a population. Here I think is a point that illustrates as well
as anything where PCT and the rest of world take different paths. At least
the part of the world that I chose to credit thinks about the life process
in terms of populations. At least some of those who have adopted PCT think
in terms of a sometimes misleading slogan-- that it is "all perception."

score - 1 cum - 7

The result a consistent adherence to the slogan-- that "it is all
perception" is that there are no "facts." Because, it is all just
perception.

Rick and Bill are slowly teaching me how to do philosophy by providing me
with some much practice correcting cracker barrel sophistry. Powers version
is much more challenging, but Rick 's version is more fun, I get to relax
and polish my exposition. Where Bill Powers stuff takes a while to find
where the spider is attempting to lead me.

Bill Williams

[From Rick Marken (2004.05.27.1100)]

Marc Abrams (2004.05.27.1252)--

Rick Marken (2004.05.27.0920)]

This is certainly true if by "references" you mean the
efferent neurons that presumably carry reference signals.

And you want to know why people don't take PCT seriously? 'Efferent'
neurons? Are you really serious about this?

Sure. Efferents carry signals "outward" from CNS (brain, spinal cord) to PNS
(spinal ganglia, muscles and glands). This is what reference neurons are
presumed to do; carry signals from systems that are more central (higher
level) to systems that are lower level (peripheral). I do think what have
been called efferent neurons function as reference neurons.

Do you really believe our
nervous systems are no more than electronic circuits?

No. But I think the neurons carrying electrical potentials are the
functional basis of much of the purposeful behavior we deal with in PCT.

Do you really think a 'reference signal' travels around the brain
like electricity through a wire?

Not at all. Wires carry electron flow (current). Neurons carry traveling
electrical potential differences (voltage). The rate at which these
potential differences (spikes) are regenerated determines the neural signal
magnitude.

Regards

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken
MindReadings.com
Home: 310 474 0313
Cell: 310 729 1400

From [Marc Abrams (2004.05.27.1424)]

[From Rick Marken (2004.05.27.1100)]

Sure. Efferents carry signals "outward" from CNS (brain,
spinal cord) to PNS (spinal ganglia, muscles and glands).
This is what reference neurons are presumed to do; carry
signals from systems that are more central (higher
level) to systems that are lower level (peripheral). I do
think what have been called efferent neurons function as
reference neurons.

I'm a bit confused here Rick. You seem to be defining 'levels' by how
'central' they are too something. Central to what? And what does it mean
to be on the 'peripheral'? Are you talking about the evolutionary
development of the nervous systems here? And peripheral being the PNS?
If so, how does this hierarchy reflect the levels in PCT? You do know
that all sensory data does not travel up through the spinal cord and
back down again, right?

Where and how do the 'efferent' signals get 'compared'? And too what?
How is an 'error' signal different than a reference signal? I'm not
asking for details here Rick. Just a general description will do

We know that insulin is a controlled substance in our bodies. Please
outline (no details necessary) how this process might work if PCT was to
be the explaining process?

Are all 'efferent' neurons 'reference' neurons? If not, what do the
other 'efferent' neurons do?

Marc

Considering how often throughout history even intelligent people have
been proved to be wrong, it is amazing that there are still people who
are convinced that the only reason anyone could possibly say something
different from what they believe is stupidity or dishonesty.

Being smart is what keeps some people from being intelligent.

Thomas Sowell

Don't argue with an idiot; people watching may not be able to tell the
difference.

Anon

I don't approve of political jokes. I've seen too many of them get
elected

Anon

···

-----Original Message-----
From: Control Systems Group Network (CSGnet)
[mailto:CSGNET@listserv.uiuc.edu] On Behalf Of Richard Marken
Sent: Thursday, May 27, 2004 2:04 PM
To: CSGNET@listserv.uiuc.edu
Subject: Re: social reality

>Marc Abrams (2004.05.27.1252)--

>> Rick Marken (2004.05.27.0920)]
>
>> This is certainly true if by "references" you mean the efferent
>> neurons that presumably carry reference signals.
>
> And you want to know why people don't take PCT seriously?
'Efferent'
> neurons? Are you really serious about this?

> Do you really believe our
> nervous systems are no more than electronic circuits?

No. But I think the neurons carrying electrical potentials
are the functional basis of much of the purposeful behavior
we deal with in PCT.

> Do you really think a 'reference signal' travels around the brain
> like electricity through a wire?

Not at all. Wires carry electron flow (current). Neurons
carry traveling electrical potential differences (voltage).
The rate at which these potential differences (spikes) are
regenerated determines the neural signal magnitude.

Regards

Rick
--
Richard S. Marken
MindReadings.com
Home: 310 474 0313
Cell: 310 729 1400

[From Rick Marken (2004.05.27.1340)]

Marc Abrams (2004.05.27.1424)]

I'm a bit confused here Rick. You seem to be defining 'levels' by how
'central' they are too something. Central to what?

To the outside of the body, I suppose. The "central-peripheral" distinction
is used by neurologists to distinguish the brain and spinal code (Central
NS) from the sensory and motor neurons (Peripheral NS) that connect the CNS
to receptors and effectors that tend to be located near the body surface,
peripheral to the brain and spinal cord.

how does this hierarchy reflect the levels in PCT?

Rather directly. See Figure 9.1, p. 117 of B:CP.

You do know that all sensory data does not travel up through the
spinal cord and back down again, right?

Right. I don't think any sensory data goes "back down again". Sensory data
from the eyes, ears, nose and mouth do not get relayed through the spinal
cord.

Where and how do the 'efferent' signals get 'compared'?

At the cells bodies of neurons (collections of which are called ganglia)
via inhibitory and excitatory synaptic connections.

And too what?

They are compared to afferent signals that synapse on the same cell body.
See Figure 7.1, p. 83 of B:CP.

How is an 'error' signal different than a reference signal?

There may be no difference at all, though a reference signal may be
amplified (by op amp like internal feedback loops) before entering a
comparator process. An error signal is a reference signal if it is the
input to a comparator that also has an afferent input.

We know that insulin is a controlled substance in our bodies. Please
outline (no details necessary) how this process might work if PCT was to
be the explaining process?

You should be able to do this yourself by now.

Are all 'efferent' neurons 'reference' neurons?

No.

If not, what do the other 'efferent' neurons do?

What neurologists always thought they did: cause efferent action in
proportion to the firing rate of the efferent signal.

Regards

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken
MindReadings.com
Home: 310 474 0313
Cell: 310 729 1400

From [Marc Abrams (2004.05.27.1709)]

[From Rick Marken (2004.05.27.1340)]

You should be able to do this yourself by now.

Actually Rick I can answer all of these questions now by myself. I was
really interested in how you perceived them. Lets just say I won't be
asking you for any human physiology lessons anytime soon :-)and I won't
be using B:CP as my neural physiology text book either. I would strongly
suggest you do the same.

Btw, this in no way invalidates PCT. Although Bill puts much emphasis on
the hierarchy I think the beauty of PCT is quite nice and separate from
all the extraneous hierarchy and physiology stuff.

I think you would do yourself and PCT a favor by staying away from
physiology and sticking with control theory & behavior. Once you cross
the line your fair game and your physiology model will not hold up to
any neuroscientist. I think an answer of "We're not really quite sure
how all this is actually wired but..." is a much better approach.

I would ask all to read _A Look Ahead_ pgs. 78-80 in B:CP and I would
ask the painful question. What happened Bill?

Marc

Considering how often throughout history even intelligent people have
been proved to be wrong, it is amazing that there are still people who
are convinced that the only reason anyone could possibly say something
different from what they believe is stupidity or dishonesty.

Being smart is what keeps some people from being intelligent.

Thomas Sowell

Don't argue with an idiot; people watching may not be able to tell the
difference.

Anon

I don't approve of political jokes. I've seen too many of them get
elected

Anon

[From Rick Marken (2004.05.27.1615)]

Marc Abrams (2004.05.27.1709)

Rick Marken (2004.05.27.1340)

You should be able to do this yourself by now.

Actually Rick I can answer all of these questions now by myself.

Good for you, Marc.

I was really interested in how you perceived them. Lets just
say I won't be asking you for any human physiology lessons
anytime soon :slight_smile:

Sounds sensible. I don't suppose you would be willing to share what you
think are the right answers with us?

Regards

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken
MindReadings.com
Home: 310 474 0313
Cell: 310 729 1400

From [Marc Abrams (2004.05.27.2013)]

[From Rick Marken (2004.05.27.1615)]

Sounds sensible. I don't suppose you would be willing to
share what you think are the right answers with us?

Sure would Rick, and I'm glad you asked, but I already answered this in
my last post, but I'll repeat it for your benefit with a bit of an
explanation.

I said;

"I think you would do yourself and PCT a favor by staying away from

physiology and sticking with control theory &

behavior. Once you cross the line your fair game and your physiology

model will not hold up to any neuroscientist. I think >an answer of
"We're not really quite sure how all this is actually wired but..." is a
much better approach."

I then followed that up with a few pages in B:CP I thought worthwhile;

"I would ask all to read _A Look Ahead_ pgs. 78-80 in B:CP and I would
ask the painful question. What happened Bill?"

You see Rick, I had this silly illusion that CSGnet was all about what
Bill wrote about in B:CP between the pages of 78 -80. I was actually
hoping CSGnet would be part of the answer but that never materialized.
Instead of opening up PCT to new ideas, Bill developed the Maginot line
against all comers real or imagined over the years so the 'vision' Bill
had for PCT just never came off.

No one has the definitive answers yet, but you can't get them without a
bunch of hard questions. One problem is that perceptual research doesn't
get a lot of play in either Science or Nature, so if your not plugged
into other sources you will have a difficult time keeping up with the
current research and the PCT hierarchy is not close to being able to
properly construct perceptions. But hey, what do I know. I forgot that
the PCT definition of 'perception' is different than everyone else's, so
I guess you have a big training job ahead of you before you can 'teach'
PCT. First you have to tell everyone why your definition of perceptions
is different than theirs and why yours is the correct way of defining
it. Good luck. You think you have a tough time 'selling' PCT?

Getting the neuro anatomy right is a great deal different than getting
the physiology right. Keep in mind that Bill was unaware of the ANS as
late as this past January. Anatomy doesn't change much over the
relatively short haul, our understanding of physiology changes by the
week, or so it seems. Bill's figure on the anatomy is fine. His
description of what actually happens is just not accurate. I'll leave it
up to you to figure out what is wrong with the picture. You can use the
exercise.

There have been major advances in three very important areas of
neuroscience, all affecting PCT. Memory, Emotions, & Perceptions. If
you're locked into the physiological descriptions in B:CP you have no
room to move. You see Rick the key here is how perceptions are
constructed and exactly what they are constructed with.

You really should read those pages in B:CP Rick and see what kind of
vision Bill had for his theory and than come back and tell me what you
think went wrong. It's never to late to change and make things right.

Marc

Considering how often throughout history even intelligent people have
been proved to be wrong, it is amazing that there are still people who
are convinced that the only reason anyone could possibly say something
different from what they believe is stupidity or dishonesty.

Being smart is what keeps some people from being intelligent.

Thomas Sowell

Don't argue with an idiot; people watching may not be able to tell the
difference.

Anon

I don't approve of political jokes. I've seen too many of them get
elected

Anon

[From Rick Marken (2004.05.27.2045)]

Marc Abrams (2004.05.27.2013)--

Rick Marken (2004.05.27.1615)]

I don't suppose you would be willing to
share what you think are the right answers with us?

Sure would Rick, and I'm glad you asked...

It was a little hard to find any answers in this post. Perhaps they were hidden in the polemic. In case you forgot, your questions were:

You seem to be defining 'levels' by how 'central' they are too something.
Central to what?

how does this hierarchy reflect the levels in PCT?

Where and how do the 'efferent' signals get 'compared'?

And too [sic] what?

How is an 'error' signal different than a reference signal?

Are all 'efferent' neurons 'reference' neurons?

If not, what do the other 'efferent' neurons do?

You didn't seem to think much of my answers. What are yours?

Regards

Rick

···

---
Richard S. Marken
marken@mindreadings.com
Home 310 474-0313
Cell 310 729-1400

Message
From [Marc Abrams (2004.05.28.0621)]

[From Rick Marken (2004.05.27.2045)]

You didn’t seem to think much of my answers. What are yours?

I hope and believe that this is a sincere attempt at some dialogue and as such I appreciate the reaching out. I’ve carped enough about the lack of effort with regard to this and I want to acknowledge this good faith attempt as a very positive leap in the right direction. :slight_smile: plus one for Rick. :slight_smile:

It was a little hard to find any answers in this post. Perhaps they were hidden in the polemic. In case you forgot, >your questions were…

Rick there are no definitive answers yet as to how the physiology of control, especially the cognitive aspects of it operate and this is precisely my point. I am not arguing for a specific point of view. I am arguing for a discussion of several possible points of view. Lets get this stuff out on the table. Lets get people involved and lets talk about the possibilities.

How can we ever possibly understand the physiological mechanisms behind the control model if we don’t try cut through the muck and glut of BS that is currently going on in the various fields relevant to PCT if we refuse to acknowledge that the model needs work, which Bill freely admits the model needs in B:CP, but seems to have retreated on since, how can you hope to entice physiologists, who already have a tremendous amount of understanding and respect for the concept of negative feedback to take PCT seriously if they think you already have all the answers and the answers you have are not quite right.

Let me reiterate a few important points here. I believe there is a difference between PCT and HPCT. The PCT model is a block diagram and you have it right on the cover of your book Mind Readings. This is PCT. HPCT is an attempt by Bill to expand and explain how PCT actually works.

Bills attempt at ‘expanding’ PCT was a valiant one, and given the state of knowledge and mind set at the time in neuroscience and psychology a bold move. But something happened Rick. Bill thought that people would take the model as a starting point and do the necessary research to find the ‘real’ definitive answers, but what actually happened was that Bill felt he was forced to defend his position and as such, instead of embracing the vision he extolled in B:CP dug a very deep defensive moat to protect himself from what he perceived to be people out to ‘get him’. The truth of the matter is that some people were in fact probably out to ‘get him’. But he played into their hands by becoming defensive and tentative.

Rick, I am living proof that it is never to late for anything. :slight_smile: Amazing as it seems I am rapping up my second semester of calculus and will be moving on to differential equations next semester and I’m loving it. Amazing.

:slight_smile: The emphasis in my education now is in mathematical modeling and human neurophysiology/ biophysics. I bet you can’t guess where I am going with this stuff. :slight_smile: The point that I’m trying to make here is that the fortunes of PCT can change, but only if the people who support it want to change.

I am a firm believer in PCT and as such, with rare exceptions, I believe that things are the way they are because that is how the people want them to be.

Finally, let me give you the answer I have for my questions

1)You seem to be defining ‘levels’ by how ‘central’ they are too something. Central to what?

I
asked this question because I find the PCT hierarchy ambiguous. It purports to represent location (central, peripheral) and functionality (relationships, systems, etc.) So again, I ask you, which is it? But it really doesn’t matter. Perceptions, as defined by current neuroscientific standards are not constructed as they are purported to in the HPCT hierarchy. The problem here is not simply a matter of organization and structure. It’s a matter of a basic foundational flaw in HPCT about the conceptualization of how our nervous system operates. I believe memory and emotions affect and are affected by every function in the model and most importantly our perceptions and reference levels.

I think a hierarchy might be useful as a metaphor for understanding the construction of cognits (ideas, thoughts, etc.) but I think a network might be a more appropriate infrastructure. We’ll see how this plays out. :slight_smile:

  1. how does this hierarchy reflect the levels in PCT?

Good question. I don’t have a clue what you have in mind. Could you elaborate on how ‘centrality’ has anything to do with ‘relationships’ or ‘configurations’?

I don’t think it has anything to do with it.

  1. Where and how do the ‘efferent’ signals get ‘compared’? And too [sic] what?

Again, I don’t have a clue as to what you’re talking about here. There are over 50 different types of neurons and there is some question now as to how much info is communicated ‘chemically’ vs. ‘electronically’. Neuronal electronic communication is over very, very short distances. ‘Signals’ as envisioned in B:CP just don’t exist in our nervous system.

But PLEASE Rick, do not take this a condemnation of PCT. It’s not intended that way. The intention here is: “Ok, Bill made a valiant stab at it, lets take a closer look at this and get it right. There might be two or three possibilities here so lets keep our eyes and ears open for developments that might convince us to pay more attention to one or another”.

Bill’s notion of signaling in B:CP is called ‘labeled lines’, and is outdated and has been largely discredited by the neuroscientific community but there still might be a few advocates of this position around. It seems the frequencies change as they travel from neuron to neuron, or cluster to cluster. When Bill wrote B:CP he lamented the fact that they did not record the frequencies of the brain when they used electrodes. Well, they have since, and have done so for the last 25 years.

  1. How is an ‘error’ signal different than a reference signal?

I
think this is a very important question and one that needs to be answered empirically by finding and understanding how control mechanisms work in the body. I have studied a couple of physiological control systems and neither one adhered to the concept of the PCT perception, reference, comparator, error. In the two case I’ve studied both had hard wired ‘reference levels’ but had different modes and mechanisms of operation. One system had the characteristics of ‘bistabilty’. That is, the ‘reference level’ could and did switch between a finite number of levels all seemingly dependent on what was perceived. The other system had a seemingly simple on/off switch. If the perceived gradient of a chemical in the environment was at a certain level a chain reaction would ensue and a process would take place. If not it wouldn’t.

5)Are all ‘efferent’ neurons ‘reference’ neurons? If not, what do the other ‘efferent’ neurons do?

I think this whole notion needs to be reconsidered.

``

I hope this post helped clear up a few things.

``

Marc

/smaller>

Considering how often throughout history even intelligent people have been proved to be wrong, it is amazing that there are still people who are convinced that the only reason anyone could possibly say something different from what they believe is stupidity or dishonesty.

Being smart is what keeps some people from being intelligent.

Thomas Sowell

Don’t argue with an idiot; people watching may not be able to tell the difference.

Anon

I don’t approve of political jokes. I’ve seen too many of them get elected

Anon

···

-----Original Message-----
From: Control Systems Group Network (CSGnet) [mailto:CSGNET@listserv.uiuc.edu] ** On Behalf Of** Rick Marken
Sent: Thursday, May 27, 2004 11:47 PM
To:
CSGNET@listserv.uiuc.edu
Subject: Re: social reality

[From Rick Marken (2004.05.27.2045)]

Marc Abrams (2004.05.27.2013)–

Rick Marken (2004.05.27.1615)]

I don’t suppose you would be willing to
share what you think are the right answers with us?

Sure would Rick, and I'm glad you asked...

It was a little hard to find any answers in this post. Perhaps they were hidden in the polemic. In case you forgot, your questions were: /smaller>/fontfamily>

You seem to be defining 'levels' by how 'central' they are too something.

Central to what?

how does this hierarchy reflect the levels in PCT?

Where and how do the 'efferent' signals get 'compared'?

And too [sic] what?

How is an 'error' signal different than a reference signal?

Are all 'efferent' neurons 'reference' neurons?

If not, what do the other 'efferent' neurons do?`

/smaller>/fontfamily>`

You didn’t seem to think much of my answers. What are yours?

Regards

Rick
/smaller>/fontfamily> Richard S. Marken
marken@mindreadings.com
Home 310 474-0313
Cell 310 729-1400

[From Rick Marken (2004.05.278.1200)]

Marc Abrams (2004.05.28.0621)]

Rick there are no definitive answers yet as to how the physiology of control

Of course not. I'm guessing about what _might_ be the physiological basis of
control based on what I know about control and physiology. The idea that
efferent neurons above the spinal-motor level function as references for
afferent input is a hypothesis, but I think, a reasonable one based on what
we know about the functional components of a control system and the
functional components of the nervous system. I would like to see research to
test this hypothesis. If it turns out that the hypothesis is wrong then we'd
have to come up with another hypothesis regarding the physiological basis of
control. I can't imagine what that would be right now but we don't know that
we need an alternative yet. But if you already have alternative, then that's
great. I'd like to hear what it is. Neuroscientists could then do research
on both hypotheses in parallel.

I am not arguing for a specific point of view. I am arguing for a
discussion of several possible points of view.

Maybe this is one of our problems. I'm not interested in alternative "points
of view" about the physiological basis of control. I'm interested in
alternative hypotheses (in the form of models) about the physiological
architecture underlying control. Bill Powers, in B:CP, proposed what I think
is a very reasonable hypothesis about the physiological basis of control. He
described this hypothesis in some detail in terms of well known features of
the anatomy (organization of neurons) and physiology (neural firing rates)
of the nervous system. If you have an alternative hypothesis regarding the
physiological basis of control I would very much like to see it. But I would
like to see it described in terms of anatomical and physiological diagrams
so I can compare it to Bill's model.

Lets get this stuff out on the table.

Let's indeed. What I would like to see placed on the table are hypotheses
about the physiological basis of control that are described at _at least_
the level of detail as the hypothesis described in B:CP.

How can we ever possibly understand the physiological mechanisms behind the
control model if we don't try cut through the muck and glut of BS that is
currently going on in the various fields relevant to PCT if we refuse to
acknowledge that the model needs work

We all assume that the physiological model of control proposed in B:CP is
tentative: it needs work!! But we can't know what work it needs until the
model is tested. That means physiological tests to see, for example, whether
variations in the firing rates of particular efferent neural signals result
in concomitant changes in the firing rates of corresponding afferent signals
(in an intact organism that can act to control the perception represented by
the afferent signal). Perhaps there are such studies and they show that this
kind of efferent/afferent signal matching doesn't occur. It would be
interesting to find such studies.

Bill thought that people would take the
model as a starting point and do the necessary research to find the 'real'
definitive answers, but what actually happened was that Bill felt he was
forced to defend his position and as such, instead of embracing the vision he
extolled in B:CP dug a very deep defensive moat to protect himself from what
he perceived to be people out to 'get him'.

I don't see this at all. I think Bill has been defending a correct
understanding of his theory and demanding only that it be evaluated using
the methods of science. This kind of defense has been necessary because
most criticisms of the theory have been nothing more than opinions based on
ignorance and prior agendas. Bill encourages proper tests of the theory and
if these tests produce results that require revision of the theory Bill will
revise it (as he did when I presented data long ago showing that a transport
lag had to be added to the control loop in order to account for tracking
data in which the disturbance was created by an active agent rather than by
a passive process - the "Marken effect", which I really should write a paper
on) rather than defend it.

I am a firm believer in PCT

Like Bill Powers, I am not a big fan of belief. I would be much happier if
you were a skeptic regarding PCT and that you knew how to put your
skepticism to work by _testing_ PCT to see if it is worth believing in at
all.

Finally, let me give you the answer I have for my questions

Great.

1)You seem to be defining 'levels' by how 'central' they are too something.
Central to what?
I asked this question because I find the PCT hierarchy ambiguous. It purports
to represent location (central, peripheral) _and_ functionality
(relationships, systems, etc.) So again, I ask you, which is it?

The functional hierarchy (such as the one implemented in my spreadsheet)
says nothing about the spatial organization of the systems involved. The
anatomy and functionality of the nervous system suggests that, if the NS is
a hierarchy of control systems, it is almos certainly arranged anatomically
with the highest levels in the cerebral cortex, lower levels in the thalamus
and celebellum, still lower levels in the medulla and spinal ganglia and the
lowest level connecting to peripheral sensory and motor organs.

But it really doesn't matter.

Rats. I wasted a whole paragraph on something that doesn't matter anyway;-)

Perceptions, as defined by current neuroscientific standards
are not constructed as they are purported to in the HPCT hierarchy.

PCT doesn't say much about _how_ perceptions are constructed other than that
this construction is probably carried out by a neural network that
transforms multiple sensory inputs into a scalar variable that is the
perceptual variable. This general conception of the process is consistent
with the functional and neurophysiological models of perception with which I
am familiar, such as the Hubel-Weisel receptive field model of "feature"
perception, lateral inhibition models of edge perception, perceptron-type
models of optical character recognition, etc. I think the main difference
between the PCT model of perception and these others is that the perceptual
signal in PCT is continuous rather than logical (yes/no).

I believe memory and emotions affect and are
affected by every function in the model and most importantly our perceptions
and reference levels.

Beliefs are far less interesting to me than models and data. With a little
effort I can believe that memory and emotions affect perceptions and
reference values. But what do I do now? Go worship at the church of memory
and emotion? My inclination is to test this notion. But in order to test it
I have to know what it means. I have to know how memory and emotion are
defined; how they are measured; how they contribute to the behavior of a
model of control. Once I know this, I can test the model. Bill Powers has
presented a model that shows how memory and emotion can be included in a
model of control. Bill has done some testing of the memory model; no one I
know of has done any testing of the emotion model. Before I start working on
your ideas about memory and emotion I would have to see what your model is
and I would also have to see evidence that shows that the PCT model of
memory and emotion (such as it is) is wrong.

2) how does this hierarchy reflect the levels in PCT?

Good question. I don't have a clue what you have in mind. Could you elaborate
on how 'centrality' has anything to do with 'relationships' or
'configurations'?

I don't think it has anything to do with it.

Forgive me if I find your opinion a tad less convincing that that 5 or so
chapters in B:CP that describe physiological evidence for a relationship
between Bill's proposed levels of perceptual control and anatomical levels
of the nervous system.

3) Where and how do the 'efferent' signals get 'compared'? And too [sic] what?

Again, I don't have a clue as to what you're talking about here. There are
over 50 different types of neurons and there is some question now as to how
much info is communicated 'chemically' vs. 'electronically'. Neuronal
electronic communication is over _very_, very short distances. 'Signals' as
envisioned in B:CP just don't exist in our nervous system.

I find this very hard to believe. Where did these signals go? Last I heard,
single cell recordings of neural firing show that neurons fire at a rate
proportional to stimulation at the cell body. Aren't they finding these
signals anymore? I know they were finding them as late as 2000 when Peter
Cariani reported on them at the Boston CSG meeting. Peter thought it was not
only the rate of firing but the temporal pattern of firing that constituted
the neural signal. If that's true it would require some significant changes
in the physiological model of control. In fact, that might be a nice thing
for you to work on with your new found mathematical skills. Build a control
system that operates based on signals that vary in spectral composition
rather than simply in rate of firing.

But _PLEASE_ Rick, do not take this a condemnation of PCT.

Of course I don't.

Bill's notion of signaling in B:CP is called 'labeled lines', and is outdated
and has been largely discredited by the neuroscientific community

So what do they use instead? What's the correct model?

And discrediting is what is done in politics. Disproving (rejecting by
scientific test) is what is done in science. So if all that has been done in
neuroscience is discrediting of the PCT model of neural signal transmission
than I'm not interested. The idea that behavior is purposeful was (and still
largely is) discredited in psychology but, it turns out, behavior _is_
purposeful. If the PCT model of neural signals has been disproved by
neuroscience then it should be a simple matter to explain the evidence that
disproves it.

It seems the frequencies change as they travel from neuron to neuron, or
cluster to cluster.

That is certainly not inconsistent with the PCT model of neural signals. We
expect signal rate changes as signals travel from error signal nurons to
reference signal neurons to output neurons - and the same would be expected
coming up through the perceptual hierarchy.

4) How is an 'error' signal different than a reference signal?

I think this is a very important question and one that needs to be answered
empirically by finding and understanding how control mechanisms work in the
body. I have studied a couple of physiological control systems and neither one
adhered to the concept of the PCT perception, reference, comparator, error. In
the two case I've studied both had hard wired 'reference levels' but had
different modes and mechanisms of operation. One system had the
characteristics of 'bistabilty'. That is, the 'reference level' could and did
switch between a finite number of levels all seemingly dependent on what was
perceived. The other system had a seemingly simple on/off switch. If the
perceived gradient of a chemical in the environment was at a certain level a
chain reaction would ensue and a process would take place. If not it wouldn't.

Now this is interesting. How about describing the "bistable" system (for
starters) in some detail. What variable is the system controlling? What's
this business about the reference level switching based on perception? How
about a diagram of the system? How did they determine which component of the
system was specifying a reference level? A perception? Was the system
observed under conditions in which it could control successfully? What is
their neural model of the control process?

5)Are all 'efferent' neurons 'reference' neurons? If not, what do the other
'efferent' neurons do?

I think this whole notion needs to be reconsidered.

That's fine. But the question is _why_. What is the evidence that leads you
to reject this notion? Better yet, please describe what you think is the
better notion (using anatomical diagrams and physiological evidence).

Regards

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken
MindReadings.com
Home: 310 474 0313
Cell: 310 729 1400

From [Marc Abrams (2004.05.28.1639)]

[From Rick Marken (2004.05.278.1200)]

You seem to be confusing two important things. Anatomy and Physiology
are not the same thing. Knowing that a certain entity exists is quite a
bit different than knowing what it actually does. Biologists know of the
existence of a great many entitles. Physiologists know a great deal less
about how they actually work and what they actually do

In B:CP Bill focused in on motor control and that was a good thing. We
have known a great deal about the physiology of motor control since the
early 1900's with the work of Gordon Brown & others. Bills figure on pg.
117 is anatomically correct and it even represents _some_ of the known
physiology, but what he didn't know is just as important like the
discontinuity of neuronal communication.

That means physiological
tests to see, for example, whether variations in the firing
rates of particular efferent neural signals result in
concomitant changes in the firing rates of corresponding
afferent signals (in an intact organism that can act to
control the perception represented by the afferent signal).
Perhaps there are such studies and they show that this kind
of efferent/afferent signal matching doesn't occur. It would
be interesting to find such studies.

You also say:

Peter thought it was not only the rate of firing but the temporal
pattern of firing that constituted the neural signal. If
that's true it would require some significant changes in the
physiological model of control. In fact, that might be a nice
thing for you to work on with your new found mathematical
skills. Build a control system that operates based on signals
that vary in spectral composition rather than simply in rate
of firing.

Really? Do you mean this? I posted this to CSGnet on 5/8/04;

http://www.pnas.org/cgi/reprint/100/22/13064.pdf

This paper actually supports some of Bill's ideas. Not all of them, but
some, and refutes some others, but I think, and thought this paper was
worthy of some discussion on CSGnet :slight_smile: Not a peep though from anyone.

You want some research? Here it is. Why don't you refute this paper. I'd
love to hear you do so.

Second, you miss my point entirely. There is no 'right' answer to the
physiological question. Ask John Anderson, he's been trying for 10 years
to try and figure out how PCT actually works and so far he's come up
empty. He said he had some news and would be posting soon so I hope he
actually does.

If your waiting for me to make some presentation to refute B:CP with an
alternative theory I would suggest that you don't hold your breath. I
have no desire to do so and I'm much more interested in knowing and
leaning what is actually going on from a control perspective than I am
in developing a theory of my own. One day, if and when I have sufficient
information I may attempt it. Right now I'm working on developing an
expansion to the PCT model I'm comfortable with and what I'm comfortable
with will be a model that has the things I think are important in it.
PCT has been and will be my base.

I'm ending the post here because this is really a waste of time for both
of us. Read the paper and start adjusting. When your done get back to
me.

Marc

Considering how often throughout history even intelligent people have
been proved to be wrong, it is amazing that there are still people who
are convinced that the only reason anyone could possibly say something
different from what they believe is stupidity or dishonesty.

Being smart is what keeps some people from being intelligent.

Thomas Sowell

Don't argue with an idiot; people watching may not be able to tell the
difference.

Anon

I don't approve of political jokes. I've seen too many of them get
elected

Anon

From Mary Powers, 2004.05.29

From [Marc Abrams (2004.05.27.2013)]

...I said
>"I think you would do yourself and PCT a favor by staying away from
physiology and sticking with control theory &
>behavior. Once you cross the line your fair game and your physiology
model will not hold up to any neuroscientist. I think >an answer of
"We're not really quite sure how all this is actually wired but..." is a
much better approach."

I think that approach has always been there. The real issue is whether
recent developments in neuroscience actually contradict PCT, and since no
neuroscientist is addressing that issue, we're not going to find out soon.

I then followed that up with a few pages in B:CP I thought worthwhile;

"I would ask all to read _A Look Ahead_ pgs. 78-80 in B:CP and I would
ask the painful question. What happened Bill?"

You see Rick, I had this silly illusion that CSGnet was all about what
Bill wrote about in B:CP between the pages of 78 -80. I was actually
hoping CSGnet would be part of the answer but that never materialized.
Instead of opening up PCT to new ideas, Bill developed the Maginot line
against all comers real or imagined over the years so the 'vision' Bill
had for PCT just never came off.

It is disappointing that CSG has not been a place for people to work on the
model, testing, revising, extending. It has been a place, largely, for
people to ask Bill questions and learn PCT ABC's. Not entirely, but quite a
bit. It has also been a place where people have come and and said "I know
my specialty much better than Bill Powers possibly can - how dare he step
into my territory and analyze it in PCT terms?" This is _resisting_
testing, revising, or extending, and gets PCT nowhere. Bill's so-called
"Maginot Line" has been to maintain the integrity of the control model
against attacks by people defending against a new way of thinking about
their fields. That is why the 'vision' hasn't come off.

No one has the definitive answers yet, but you can't get them without a
bunch of hard questions. One problem is that perceptual research doesn't
get a lot of play in either Science or Nature

Oh, nonsense. There are tons of neuroscience papers in both journals. If
there are few or none on perceptual research it's because there aren't many
that are impressive enough to get in.

so if your not plugged
into other sources you will have a difficult time keeping up with the
current research and the PCT hierarchy is not close to being able to
properly construct perceptions.

Bill has developed the model. The idea is that people better acquainted
with each of the many fields it covers should take it from there. Is he
supposed to keep up with current research in every field to which PCT
applies - or just the one that is your flavor of the month? Is current
physiology closer to being able to properly construct perceptions?
References, please.

But hey, what do I know. I forgot that
the PCT definition of 'perception' is different than everyone else's,

Indeed, if you forgot that, this whole assertion of yours is pointless.

so
I guess you [Rick} have a big training job ahead of you before you can 'teach'
PCT. First you have to tell everyone why your definition of perceptions
is different than theirs and why yours is the correct way of defining
it. Good luck. You think you have a tough time 'selling' PCT?

How clever of you to notice that PCT perception is different. Yes, it is
necessary to get the PCT definition across, and yes, PCTers have noticed
that it is rather hard to to do so.

Getting the neuro anatomy right is a great deal different than getting
the physiology right. Keep in mind that Bill was unaware of the ANS as
late as this past January.

What is this about? Bill knew about the ANS (presumably the autonomic
nervous system) when you were in diapers.

Anatomy doesn't change much over the
relatively short haul, our understanding of physiology changes by the
week, or so it seems. Bill's figure on the anatomy is fine. His
description of what actually happens is just not accurate. I'll leave it
up to you to figure out what is wrong with the picture. You can use the
exercise.

If the understanding of physiology changes by the week, it hardly seems
worthwhile to learn the latest version, since next week it will be obsolete.
Perhaps the wildly fluctuating physiology scene would stabilize if
scientists had a good model. PCT, anyone?

There have been major advances in three very important areas of
neuroscience, all affecting PCT. Memory, Emotions, & Perceptions. If
you're locked into the physiological descriptions in B:CP you have no
room to move. You see Rick the key here is how perceptions are
constructed and exactly what they are constructed with.

That's why Bill proposed a model, as complete and comprehensive as
possible. There has been a lot of mention of feedback in neurosciences
lately. If the scientists involved had a clue that feedback does not exist
in a vacuum, but implies, indeed requires, reference signals, comparators,
and error signals as well as inputs and outputs, then maybe the wild
fluctuations in the physiology scene would settle down a bit while
scientists spent constructive time locating these functions and signals. I
think physiologists are locked into conventional thinking and can't put all
their discoveries together in a way that makes sense - hence the fluctuations.

You really should read those pages in B:CP Rick and see what kind of
vision Bill had for his theory and than come back and tell me what you
think went wrong.

I'm sure Rick appreciated this advice to read BCP.

It's never to late to change and make things right.

Marc

Change what? Make what right?

Mary P.

···

At 07:04 PM 5/27/2004, you wrote:

From [Marc Abrams (2004.05.28.1530)]

Rick, Mary

No comment about the the research paper from the NAS?

I'm very interested in hearing what you folks think about it.

Marc

Considering how often throughout history even intelligent people have
been proved to be wrong, it is amazing that there are still people who
are convinced that the only reason anyone could possibly say something
different from what they believe is stupidity or dishonesty.

Being smart is what keeps some people from being intelligent.

Thomas Sowell

Don't argue with an idiot; people watching may not be able to tell the
difference.

Anon

I don't approve of political jokes. I've seen too many of them get
elected

Anon

···

-----Original Message-----
From: Control Systems Group Network (CSGnet)
[mailto:CSGNET@listserv.uiuc.edu] On Behalf Of Rick Marken
Sent: Thursday, January 01, 1970 12:23 PM
To: CSGNET@listserv.uiuc.edu
Subject: Re: social reality

[From Rick Marken (2004.05.29.1110)]

> Mary Powers (2004.05.29) --
>
>> Marc Abrams (2004.05.27.2013)--
>
>> You really should read those pages in B:CP Rick and see
what kind of
>> vision Bill had for his theory and than come back and tell me what
>> you think went wrong.
>
> I'm sure Rick appreciated this advice to read BCP.

I sure did! I read it and I think it is an absolutely
stupendous piece of work. I recommend it to everyone on this net.

I sure hope the new edition is coming out soon. Mine is quite
dog eared and starting to come apart at the seams.

Love

Rick
---
Richard S. Marken
marken@mindreadings.com
Home 310 474-0313
Cell 310 729-1400

From[Bill Williams 29 May 2004 4:00 PM CST]

From [Marc Abrams (2004.05.28.1530)]

Rick, Mary

No comment about the the research paper from the NAS?

I'm very interested in hearing what you folks think about it.

Marc not too long ago you were deeply involved in a discussion with Bruce Nevin. Bruce went to the trouble of responding to you in a way that I percieved as being more genuine and thoughtful than was justified given how you treat people.

You never responded to Bruce.

You are "very interested" in hearing from Rick and Mary? I very much doubt it.

Bill Williams