[spam] Re: Perception vs Interpretation

[From Bill Powers (2007.02.14.0750 MST)]

Richard Kennaway (2007.02.13) --

Surely science is the path that avoids both naive realism and solipsism?

Naive realism doesn't work, because it's very easy to demonstrate that however things work, they do not work the way we might naively take them to.

Which is only to say that what our formal observations, theories, and models tell us about how things "really" work does not conform to what our unaided senses and informal reasoning tell us (unfortunately, we have to use our unaided senses to know what the instruments are telling us, and our informal brains to think about them, so we still don't know what the instruments are really telling us).

Visual illusions show that we cannot take what we see to be reality itself.

That is, unless the crossbars of Ts really do get shorter and longer as the T is turned, and there really is an alternate universe for each of us so each sees a different reality (see quantum physics fantasies).

The demonstration in which one puts one hand in cold water, one in hot, and then both in tepid, whereupon the tepid water feels simultaneously hot and cold, shows that our sense of temperature is not directly telling us something about the objects we touch.

Only under the assumption that the same thing can't be both hot and cold. I'm happy to make that assumption, but that's all it is. Nobody can force me to make it.

Naive realism has to be discarded as soon as one tries to find out how things work.

On the contrary, finding out how things work means making models under the assumption that naive realism should be dropped and reality is not exactly and only what we experience. The cart comes _after_ the horse.

Our perceptions turn out to be physical phenomena with no intrinsic meaning. They are sometimes closely but sometimes distantly related to the things we naively took them to be giving us direct access to.

This isn't doing it for me. I remain too conscious that all you are saying is the product of a human brain -- or rather, that if I were saying it, it would still be a product of my (presumed) brain, and uncheckable. When you speak of what "our perceptions turn out to be", are you saying "what our perceptions _really are_?" Really? Tell me how you know that, and this discussion will be finished.

Solipsism fails to account for the fact that we find ourselves having sensations that we cannot predict. To say that nothing but myself exists is just redefines the word "me" as meaning all of existence. It leaves unanswered the question of why we have the sensations we do. So does the speculation that we're all living in a simulation.

I think that there is excellent indirect evidence that there is something external to me. Overwhelming, incessant waves of evidence. But that's all it is, evidence, meaning perceptions. It is not the thing itself. So all still depends on my own human perception and reasoning. If I convince myself that I know there is a reality, I can't forget that I had to convince myself -- reality did not thrust itself on my awareness in the same way perceptions do. I can't become unaware that I wanted to know reality, and that to satisfy that want, I found premises and a train of reasoning that would end with that desired conclusion. That is not discovery, it's invention.

As you've often pointed out, we can't get outside of ourselves and all we have to work with is our perceptions. Science works better than anything else at making sense of them. What more is needed?

Nothing -- if you just want to drop this problem and get on with life. I wouldn't blame anyone for doing that. Of course then you would have to forget that you dropped the problem and that it remains unsolved. Don't think about that white elephant in the dining room.

Now, maybe we are as if shut up in a dark cell, our feeble senses and actions like to tapping on the pipes and hearing noises come back, and all the while there are vast, unknowable realms of reality outside and forever beyond our grasp, but to me that's just a speculation that it's entertaining to weave some purple prose around. Given the vastness of just the universe we know of and the minuteness of our presence in it, it could even be true.

Well, perhaps you have just explained why you would prefer to drop the problem. If you suspect that those rather chilly thoughts might be the truth, I can see why you might not want to forge ahead and find out that you are right. But what if you are wrong?

I have difficulty saying what I am looking for here. I think it may be a form of _reductio ad absurdum_, a way of showing that the idea of an unknown and unknownable reality contradicts itself and is therefore false. This would put an end to the cycle of "Yes, but that, too is only a thought." I would't be going on endlessly about this if I didn't have a feeling somewhere way in the background that there is a way to deal with this. Don't credit me with knowing what the solution looks like. I just think that ruling out self-contradiction may provide the key. You're the mathematician, not I. You're more likely to find the proof than I am. In a respectable tradition, I simply provide the conjecture. The margins are much wider than needed to hold any proof I could think of.

Best,

Bill P.

[From Richard Kennaway (2007.02.14.1715 GMT)]

[From Bill Powers (2007.02.14.0750 MST)]

The demonstration in which one puts one hand in cold water, one in hot, and then both in tepid, whereupon the tepid water feels simultaneously hot and cold, shows that our sense of temperature is not directly telling us something about the objects we touch.

Only under the assumption that the same thing can't be both hot and cold. I'm happy to make that assumption, but that's all it is. Nobody can force me to make it.

It's naive realism that predicts that we will not perceive a bowl of water to be simultaneously hot and cold. When we obtain that perception, which naive realism says cannot happen, naive realism is thereby refuted. The argument does not require any extra-sensory knowledge of how things really work in order to refute the naive realist account. Its failure to predict our perceptions is sufficient grounds to discard it.

Now, maybe we are as if shut up in a dark cell, our feeble senses and actions like to tapping on the pipes and hearing noises come back, and all the while there are vast, unknowable realms of reality outside and forever beyond our grasp, but to me that's just a speculation that it's entertaining to weave some purple prose around. Given the vastness of just the universe we know of and the minuteness of our presence in it, it could even be true.

Well, perhaps you have just explained why you would prefer to drop the problem. If you suspect that those rather chilly thoughts might be the truth, I can see why you might not want to forge ahead and find out that you are right. But what if you are wrong?

By definition, as you've set up the question, I can never find out. Speculations that things are not what they seem only matter if they make a difference to what we would perceive.

You raise a moral issue: the supposed comfort of ignoring an awkward problem. But there is a moral issue on the other side as well. Denying reality is an easy escape, especially from painful things. Some do it with drink and drugs; others do it with philosophy.

There are plenty of philosophers who have indeed asserted that reality is absolutely unknowable, and even that there is no reason to believe in any external reality at all. Phenomenalism, they call it. Not much in favour these days, but in philosophy there is no progress, only fashion. Phenomenalism takes a very intelligent person without much to do -- an academic philosopher -- to manage to believe it all day in the office and then not get run over on the way home.

The postmodernists go further and say there is no truth. In practice it's just another self-serving doctrine. Phenomenology lets one deny inconvenient realities; postmodernism lets one deny inconvenient truths.

If there is in fact a reality, if there are in fact other people out there whose lives matter, things to do and places to go, then speculating that we're all under the control of Venusian mind-controlling octopuses, that we're all sleeping in pods in the Matrix, or that there's nothing out there at all, is just an excuse for not getting out of bed in the morning.

And there's not much scope for not knowing one way or the other. One's actions deal with the issue one way or the other, whatever one's speculations. A person's actions say what they really believe, in the only way that matters.

I have difficulty saying what I am looking for here. I think it may be a form of _reductio ad absurdum_, a way of showing that the idea of an unknown and unknownable reality contradicts itself and is therefore false.

Our perceptions observably behave as if they are caused by a knowable reality that we know quite a lot about. This hypothesis works better than any other alternative that anyone has ever come up with. How's that?

ยทยทยท

--
Richard Kennaway, jrk@cmp.uea.ac.uk, Richard Kennaway
School of Computing Sciences,
University of East Anglia, Norwich NR4 7TJ, U.K.

[From Bill Powers (2006.02.16.1645 MST)]

Richard Kennaway (2007.02.16.1732 GMT) --

I agree with Rick that you have an admirable way of bringing order into this cluttered subject.

We can accept anything we haven't yet falsified, but know how to obtain observations that might falsify it.

All right, I assert that there is a one-inch cube of Cheddar cheese in the exact center of the crater Tsiolkovski on the other side of the moon. To falsify it, we simply send an expedition to the moon and search around the center of that crater. Now that we know how to obtain observations that would falsify it, do we have to accept that assertion? Must we accept it until the falsification actually occurs, or doesn't?

  This is Popper's view: theories are never proven true, they merely survive experiments that might have refuted them, depending on how they turned out.

I saw a letter to a psychological journal in which the author claimed, citing Popper, that only theories which had actually been falsified could be accepted. This was an argument against accepting theories that predict too well. If they can't be falsified they must be wrong; ergo, if they are falsified they are right.

I don't agree with Popper except to exclude the idea that theories can be proven true without doubt: the logical "true." Theories make predictions which match observation to various degrees (Martin Taylor has been saying this for a long time). It is certainly possible to rank theories by their ability to predict, with those that predict the best being treated as having a higher truth-value on a continuous scale from 0 to 0.999... It is not the case that all theories which have escaped being falsified are equally true. I think Popper was just making excuses for the poor quality of theories in psychology.

The postmodernists go further and say there is no truth. In practice it's just another self-serving doctrine.

I'd call it a self-defeating doctrine, because if it's true, it's false.

But if it's true, there's no such thing as true and false

So it's just a statement which we can ignore as we wish. Are post-modernists satisfied with being ignored?

, so it doesn't matter if it's false. Barking mad, yes, but once you adopt that outlook, nothing can prove to you that it's wrong, because nothing can prove anything to you. It's a philosophical black hole.

Yes, that's the sort of thing I'm looking for. I have a feeling you're getting close. The black hole idea says that there is an intellectual trap which you can get into but not out of. God is one of those traps. If you once seriously entertain the idea that God knows what you're really thinking and will burn you in hell forever if you don't think right, it's inevitable that you end up on your knees pleading desperately with God to "help me in mine unbelief." You dare not disbelieve.

By the way, that's the _sort_ of argument I'm searching for. I'm looking, in effect, for a way of showing that if we say there is no external reality, there has to be an external reality. I don't see how to get there from here.

Well, positively denying the existence of any external reality is another black hole.

I'm not that far down the slippery slope, or that close to the event horizon. I am quite satisfied with the evidence that there is _something_ on the other side of my sense organs. I just don't know what it is, or even whether it has some vague resemblance to the models we propose to put in its place.

A person's actions say what they really believe, in the only way that matters.

"Really" believe? I can hardly be mistaken about what I really believe, since that is part of the only reality I can know directly and infallibly.

I don't think people have an infallible knowledge of their own inner lives.

I shouldn't have echoed your word "believe." What I meant was that we can't doubt what we are experiencing. We can doubt anything we say or believe about it (except the fact that we experience ourselves saying or believing), but not the experience itself that comes before we say anything about it.

As soon as I attend to an experience, I'm having perceptions of perceptions -- not only having the experience, but perceiving that I am. But perceptions that seem to be of my inner life are just as problematic (or not) as perceptions that seem to be of things outside me. When what I find myself doing contradicts my introspection, so much the worse for my introspection. People have a great capacity for rationalisation.

Yes, of course, but if they think "Reality is really unreal," at least they can be quite certain that that thought is taking place even if it's nonsense in terms of the content of other thoughts. I can think "My name is not Bill Powers" ((I just did) and you can't tell me I didn't think it.

In ordinary life, it can take quite a lot of work to get at one's real reasons for doing things. That's what most forms of psychotherapy, including MOL, try to do.

I'm not talking about reasons. I'm talking about experiences. If I'm seeing a pink thing that looks like an elephant, that's what I'm seeing, whatever you tell me it really is.

To me, it only makes a difference if it makes a difference. Speculations about The Matrix are only interesting if there is a red pill to widen one's perceptions, at least into a bigger control room. "The Matrix" without the red pill would just be a film of a slice of American life, with the idea "this is all a simulation" tacked onto it but making no difference.

I think this drifts away from the main point. That control room isn't a metaphor. It's pretty close to a deduction. The simplest things we know about the human body tell us that what we experience is on the inside of the sensory envelope. We have no way of knowing what is outside that envelope with the same atheoretical immediacy that we experience what is inside it. We have to guess. We can test our guesses for internal consistency, but not for consistency across the envelope.

The only foundation is a fallible one, our physical existence, which has evolved to only work well enough to survive. The widespread belief in various sorts of magic is evidence enough that we are not creatures of pure thought obscured by physical bodies.

It's physical existence I want to know about. And I know I don't.

Best,

Bill P.