[From Bruce Nevin (960502.1645)]
(Rick Marken (960502.1100) ) >
Actually, I (whoever _that_ is) experience two levels of consciousness (two
I's) in this situation (where I willfully wave my own hand in fromt of my
face). There is the "I" that is aware of and willing the arbitrary change in
hand position; and there is another I (farther "back") that is aware of this
awareness/willing. This second "I" is the one that is aware of consciousness
as a phenomenon and seems to allow me to talk about consciousness as an
"observed" phenmenon. I'm not sure whether this second "I" is really a
different consciousness (a meta-consciousness) or just part of the same
consciousness that is willing the changes in the perception of which I am
aware.
It seems that for this to happen I have to be concurrently aware of two
levels of control. I have to go up a level in order to be aware of
consciousness as an observed thing at the next lower level.
As I read my email and write this, I can be concurrently aware of
evaluating whether I should do this now or check for some higher priority
task. I am aware on level n (at which I am reading email) and on level n+1
(at which I chose to read email and can choose to do something else). As I
identify with the evaluating and choosing of tasks, I can be aware of my
email reading as an exercise of consciousness.
Does it have to be up a level? Can't it be "sideways"? I can be aware of
potential distractions, like the conversations down the hall, or the sound
of the fans on my computers; and, yes, I can be aware (I think) of these as
"consciousness" while I write this. (This is kind of tricky, Rick. What is
it (a) to be `aware of consciousness as a phenomenon' and (b) to be able
`to talk about consciousness as an "observed" phenmenon'? Is it merely
being aware of being aware? Noticing that you're perceiving x while your
attention is mostly focused on controlling perceptions y?)
I can become aware of controlling my posture without interrupting my
reading or writing. There seems to be a kind of shifting of the
preponderance of attention from one to the other, rather like foveal vs.
peripheral vision (and there's another example), and whichever has the
preponderance, whichever I identify with--call this "foveal awareness," to
conscript the term brutally-- becomes the point of reference from which I
can be aware of the other as an exercise of consciousness.
However, it doesn't seem possible to be aware of one's "foveal awareness"
as being itself an exercise of consciousness.
BTW, I think this suffices for what John Burch's 50ms memory loop was
supposed to do (his post of Wed, 1 May). The immediate sense of "me" arises
in peripheral awareness perceived as "consciousness" from the perspective
of my "foveal" awareness. Longer term, it seems to be autobiographical
memory--stories perhaps, or likely they only become stories for the sake of
thinking about them or communicating them as such, answering "who are
you?". In either case, it is made coherent by ignoring most of my
perceptions.
Attentively,
Bruce Nevin