Statistics in Psychology

[From David Goldstein (2008.12.22.16:41 EDT)]
[About Mike Acree (2008.12.22.2008.0958 PST0]

As you can tell, the members of CSG like your idea of
using individual cases to study what is going on in persons.

That is why I was supprised about your reaction to Q Methodology.
The fact that you call it Q Technique, tells me that you might have
encountered it very early in its development. Stephenson actually
wanted it to be used for the study of individual cases.

I am sending you a published study in which I did this. I would be
interestsed in your comments. It generates the items for the study
from a PCT conceptual framework.

David

Goldstein & Goldstein 2005.pdf (109 KB)

[From Bill Powers (2008.12.22.1441 MST)]

Mike Acree (2008.12.22.1234 PST)]

I think some of my previous audiences have found the paper entertaining,
but I'm totally unaccustomed to having anyone find any of my writing
persuasive. To my own eyes, in fact, the present paper seems glib in
the extreme, with practically every sentence begging for elaboration or
justification; I wouldn't have undertaken such a drastic condensation
except for a strictly time-limited oral presentation. So I'm sure prior
agreement had something to do with its reception in this case.

You'd better get used to being a first-rate writer and thinker. Don't bother being diffident about your talent; that will just get in your way. Your self-criticism is to be expected; you can detect errors smaller than other people are likely to notice, which explains why you take the time to eliminate them.

... I had imagined that the subject was too esoteric for a popular
magazine--though I have certainly shared your appreciation of many of
the scientific articles in _The New Yorker_. And maybe the obstacles
there are the less formidable.

Well, hang in there a bit because I have sent off a query which may or may not get us anywhere. In the meantime, think about how you could work all those references into the text -- though it's a very interesting list of writers spanning half a millenium. I wouldn't presume to guess how the New Yorker editors would want it adjusted, but I assume you'd be happy to work with them.

Best,

Bill P.

[From Bruce Abbott (2008.12.22.1740 EDT)]

Mike Acree (2008.12.21.1740 PST) --

Meanwhile, I gave a talk a couple of years ago summarizing the content,
"Why the Concept of Statistical Inference Is Incoherent, and Why We
Still Love It." Although I didn't read the paper, I wrote it out, in
an informal style for oral delivery rather than publication. It was
also designed for a general, nontechnical audience. You may recognize
a paragraph of two from my unplanned remarks at the 1994 PCT conference
in Durango. The current draft of the book is about 20 times as long,
so, if there are points where you would like more elaboration, I can
probably supply it. But this paper would be the place to start; it's a
good overview of what I think. And comments of any kind are most
welcome.

Wonderful paper, Mike! Over a decade ago during a spell of temporary
insanity I began work on a statistics textbook for undergraduate psychology
students and in preparation for that task read Stephen M. Stigler's book
"The History of Statistics: The Measurement of Uncertainty Before 1900." It
was a good introduction, but your presentation brought in aspects that
history of which I was unaware. For example, I had thought that R. A. Fisher
had basically pulled p = .05 as a useful cutoff out of the air (perhaps
based on his experience with agricultural plots), but I learned in your
paper that this number came originally from astronomy.

As you know, my own background is in the experimental analysis of behavior,
the approach developed by B. F. Skinner that focuses on the behavior of
individuals and replaces inferential statistics with actual replication.
Because of this exposure I have been less enthusiastic than many of my
colleagues in psychology about group-based methodology and the inferential
statistical analysis of group differences. That PCT, like EAB, focuses on
individual behavior and avoids inferential statistics is one reason among
many why I found PCT so congenial. Murray Sidman, in his "Tactics of
Scientific Research," (an EAB research methods book) noted the same
criticism of group-based data that you raise, that curves based on group
averages may fail to resemble any of the curves produced by the individuals
whose data contributed to the average.

I wonder if you could elaborate a bit on your criticism of Fisher's
reference to a theoretical population of which the experimental groups are
samples. In the typical group-based experiment, subjects are assigned at
random to the various groups. It is true that these subjects never (or
almost never) constitute random samples from some previously specified
population. In my own department, they are students taking Elementary
Psychology at our campus during a given semester, and include only those
students who complete a research participation requirement and do not elect
to satisfy that requirement by writing a brief review of a research paper.
They are not a random sample of our students, much less of students in
general. But whatever population they may be said to represent, random
assignment to groups makes the groups random samples from it. If the
treatment is without effect, then they are still random samples from the
same population and any differences in performance are the result of chance
differences arising during random assignment. And if the treatment does
have an effect in performance, then the treated sample can be viewed, it
seems to me, as random sample from a new population, a population of treated
individuals. I don't see any logical or practical problems in referring to
such theoretical populations. Am I missing something?

Of course, one can ask whether there is any use in inferring a probability
of the data, given the null hypothesis, when what one wants is the
probability of the null hypothesis, given the data. (But I've had reviewers
tell me that this problem can be addressed with a Bayesian analysis.) Where
I do see a serious problem (one that my colleagues in the field simply
ignore) is that the results of the analysis are treated as if they
generalize to some broad population, from which their groups are definitely
NOT random samples. It's as if they believe that random assignment to
groups and random sampling from a population accomplish the same thing.

Bruce A.

[From Mike Acree (2008.12.22.1552 PST)]

Bill Powers (2008.12.22.1441 MST)--

You'd better get used to being a first-rate writer and thinker.

Naturally I'm fairly used to that in my own mind. It's other people's
perceptions that will take some getting used to. But I can surely
manage.

Well, hang in there a bit because I have sent off a query which may or

may not get us anywhere.

Thank you _very_ much, whatever may come of your effort.

Mike

[From Mike Acree (2008.12.22.1553 PST)]

Bruce Abbott (2008.12.22.1740 EDT)--

Thanks, Bruce. I actually used Bordens and Abbott for a Research
Methods course about 20 years ago.

I'm sorry I'm having some trouble understanding your question about
random assignment. When you say, in your last sentence,

It's as if they believe that random assignment to groups and random

sampling from a population accomplish the same thing.

I agree that they do not. But your preceding paragraph seems to say the
opposite:

They are not a random sample of our students, much less of students in

general. But whatever population >they may be said to represent, random
assignment to groups makes the groups random samples from it.

I would disagree that random assignment creates random samples, for the
same reason that you said: that random sampling and random assignment
are different processes. If we accept Fisher's concept of the
hypothetical infinite population, then whatever students we have on hand
are a random sample, by definition, prior to any random assignment. The
random assignment doesn't make them a random sample. (I obviously don't
think Fisher's act of imagination does, either.) What random assignment
would license is a randomization test of the treatment effect, comparing
the observed mean difference with those under all possible assignments
of the same people to groups. Any generalization to a larger population
then has to be done on extrastatistical grounds, however. Here I
disagree with Fisher, who introduced randomization tests, in 1936, with
the example of testing the difference in heights between British and
French men--as though you could take a "man without a country," randomly
assign him a nationality "treatment," and observe the effect on his
height. I don't think randomization tests are valid in the absence of
random assignment.

So I think I must have misread you in some way.

Mike

[From Bruce Abbott (2008.12.22.1930 EST)]

From Mike Acree (2008.12.22.1553 PST) --

Bruce Abbott (2008.12.22.1740 EST)--

Thanks, Bruce. I actually used Bordens and Abbott for a Research
Methods course about 20 years ago.

Well, I thought we had at least one adopter, and this confirms it! (I hope
it worked well for your students.)

I'm sorry I'm having some trouble understanding your question about
random assignment. When you say, in your last sentence,

>It's as if they believe that random assignment to groups and random
sampling from a population accomplish the same thing.

I agree that they do not. But your preceding paragraph seems to say
the
opposite:

>They are not a random sample of our students, much less of students in
general. But whatever population >they may be said to represent,
random assignment to groups makes the groups random samples from it.

I would disagree that random assignment creates random samples, for the
same reason that you said: that random sampling and random assignment
are different processes. If we accept Fisher's concept of the
hypothetical infinite population, then whatever students we have on
hand are a random sample, by definition, prior to any random
assignment. The random assignment doesn't make them a random sample.
(I obviously don't think Fisher's act of imagination does, either.)

I didn't mean to imply that random assignment makes them random samples;
obviously it doesn't. I guess that I was agreeing with Fisher that they
could be considered random samples from some (unknown) population.

What random assignment would license is a randomization test of the
treatment effect, comparing the observed mean difference with those
under all possible assignments of the same people to groups. Any
generalization to a larger population then has to be done on
extrastatistical grounds, however. Here I disagree with Fisher, who
introduced randomization tests, in 1936, with the example of testing
the difference in heights between British and French men--as though you
could take a "man without a country," randomly assign him a nationality
"treatment," and observe the effect on his height. I don't think
randomization tests are valid in the absence of random assignment.

Excellent point. Not too long ago there was quite a bit of interest in
computerized randomization tests; a colleague of mine in the department
actually wrote a few for his own use. I recall reading somewhere that Fisher
introduced his tables because with large data sets he thought that
randomization tests were too cumbersome. The widespread availability of
personal computers has erased that problem, but for some reason (cultural
inertia?) most published research still reports the results of traditional
(parametric) significance testing.

So I think I must have misread you in some way.

No, the confusion came from error on my part. But I think we're getting
closer to the problem I'm trying to resolve. You disagree that the two
samples of randomly assigned students can be considered random selections
from some (unknown) population. Wouldn't that imply that traditional
significance testing and randomization tests on the same data would yield
different results in the long run? If so, that would seem to be an
empirical question.

Bruce A.

[From Mike Acree (2008.12.22.2011 PST)]

Bruce Abbott (2008.12.22.1930 EST)--

Well, I thought we had at least one adopter, and this confirms it! (I

hope

it worked well for your students.)

Better for them, probably, than for me. It was more elementary that I
would have preferred for a graduate level course--I would have preferred
not to use a textbook--but that's why the students liked it.

I didn't mean to imply that random assignment makes them random

samples;

obviously it doesn't. I guess that I was agreeing with Fisher that they
could be considered random samples from some (unknown) population.

. . . You disagree that the two
samples of randomly assigned students can be considered random

selections

from some (unknown) population. Wouldn't that imply that traditional
significance testing and randomization tests on the same data would

yield

different results in the long run? If so, that would seem to be an
empirical question.

I think at least some of the confusion came from my wording, Bill's
compliments notwithstanding. Fisher's hypothetical population is just
that: explicitly hypothetical, fictitious. You are speaking, if I
understand you, of a real, if unknown, population. The question, I
suppose, is what it gets us. My point in the paper was that, if the
population is defined, following Fisher, as that aggregate of which our
data would be a random sample if we had taken a random sample, then
using our data to infer characteristics of the population is circular.
So, yes, your data could be considered random samples of "some (unknown)
population," but only in this sense, which seems to me pretty fruitless.

And I don't follow the implication about randomization tests. They are
not constrained to duplicate the results of parametric sampling tests;
the closeness of the results depends on the distribution of the data,
and is indeed an empirical question.

Hope we're converging here!

Mike

[From Mike Acree (2008.12.22.2029 PST)]

David Goldstein (2008.12.22.16:41 EDT)--

Thanks for your paper. While I think the study of individuals is
essential to a scientific psychology, I don't regard it as sufficient.
You are right that I haven't followed recent developments in Q
Methodology, but I'm still not impressed. I'm not a fan of factor
analysis, either. That said, I agree that almost anything can provide a
useful ground for psychological exploration--a Rorschach, a palm
reading, even a factor analysis. The last case seems a bit of a
stretch, but I can see that it might be interesting to figure out what
was in common among divorce, bike riding, and being the opposite of your
mother, as in your third factor.

If I were looking for a formal technique for this kind of exploration, I
might be more drawn to the Repertory Grid Technique, from "the other
PCT," Personal Construct Theory. Your Contrast dimension does something
similar, I think. But that's not a method I'm very familiar with,
either.

Mike

[From Bruce Abbott (2008.12.23.10:30 EST)]

Mike Acree (2008.12.22.2011 PST) --

> Bruce Abbott (2008.12.22.1930 EST) --

>. . . You disagree that the two
>samples of randomly assigned students can be considered random selections
>from some (unknown) population. Wouldn't that imply that traditional
>significance testing and randomization tests on the same data would yield
>different results in the long run? If so, that would seem to be an
>empirical question.

I think at least some of the confusion came from my wording, Bill's
compliments notwithstanding. Fisher's hypothetical population is just
that: explicitly hypothetical, fictitious. You are speaking, if I
understand you, of a real, if unknown, population. The question, I
suppose, is what it gets us. My point in the paper was that, if the
population is defined, following Fisher, as that aggregate of which our
data would be a random sample if we had taken a random sample, then
using our data to infer characteristics of the population is circular.
So, yes, your data could be considered random samples of "some
(unknown) population," but only in this sense, which seems to me pretty
fruitless.

Ah, O.K.

And I don't follow the implication about randomization tests. They are
not constrained to duplicate the results of parametric sampling tests;
the closeness of the results depends on the distribution of the data,
and is indeed an empirical question.

My fuzzy thinking again. A randomization test will give you the exact
p-value for a given set of data; I was thinking of the parametric test as
providing an estimate of the same value, assuming a given sampling
distribution.

Hope we're converging here!

Yes. Obviously, unlike you, I'm not a professional statistician (I just play
one on TV . . .). Thanks for the clarification.

By the way, out here in Indiana we just spent from Friday morning through
noon Sunday without power due to a massive ice storm that was followed by
outside temperatures of around 0 degrees F. The ice on the power lines
never had a chance to melt away, and now they're forecasting the possibility
of more freezing rain this afternoon. So if there are any further posts I
might be expected to respond to and I don't, I've probably lost power again.

Or maybe I'm just off sulking somewhere . . .

Happy Holidays!

Bruce A.

[From Mike Acree (2008.12.23.0951 PST)]

Bruce Abbott (2008.12.23.10:30 EST)--

A randomization test will give you the exact p-value for a given set of

data; I was thinking of the >parametric test as providing an estimate of
the same value, assuming a given sampling distribution.

I expect that you got this idea from Fisher. He argued, in the paper
introducing randomization tests, that randomization provided a logical
basis for sampling-theory tests, so that the conclusions in, say, a
conventional _t_ test "have no justification beyond the fact that they
agree with those which could have been arrived at by this elementary
method." If the assumptions for both tests are met--i.e., both random
sampling and random assignment were done, and the data are normally
distributed--then Fisher's claim might be justified, and the empirical
results should be similar. But to my mind the logical warrants from
these two operations, sampling and assignment, are rather different; in
particular, as I said, I don't see randomization tests as applicable to
something like gender differences.

By the way, out here in Indiana we just spent from Friday morning

through noon Sunday without power due to >a massive ice storm that was
followed by outside temperatures of around 0 degrees F.

I know a little about Indiana winters, having spent my first 7 years in
Bedford. I remember one morning when my sister and I woke up to an inch
of ice on our bedroom floor. The snow on the roof had leaked through
and frozen on the floor; the heating in that house, like the roof, was
somewhat less than adequate. The chamber pot was frozen stuck to the
floor, and we had to chip it loose with an icepick. I thought it was
sort of neat to have our bedroom turned into an ice rink, and was
puzzled by my parents' distress.

I hope your holiday is warm and dry and cheerful, if disconnected.

Mike

[From Bill Powers (2008.12.23.1220 MST)]

Rick Marken (2008.12.23.0840)--

My point is that this is not a prediction or description issue. It's a
model testing issue.

As far as psychologists are concerned, yes. But it is a prediction issue: we test models by using them to generate a predicted behavior and adjust them until the prediction is as close as possible.

Best,

Bill P.

[From Rick Marken (2008.12.23.1930)]

Martin Taylor (2008.12.23.17.09) --

I'm not sure how you would apply this to a paper in a recent Science (12 Dec
2008, 322, 1681-4, Keizer et al., The Spreading of Disorder).

Did they report r or eta squared values? If so, what were they?

Forget what they said about why they got the results they did, and ask only
about the results. What models are they testing

If they evaluated the results using an F or t test they are testing
the general linear model (GLM). Also, if they reported F or t values
along with the df I can calculate the eta squared from that.

But there is evidence that in at least some people the evidence of prior
disorderliness increases the likelihood that they will be disorderly.

I guess I am very suspicious of the dea that behavior is
probabilistic, for reasons given by PhiL Runkel in his book "People as
Living Things". The idea that behavior is probabilistic is one
assumptions of the GLM; if this assumption is accepted then about 70%
of the variance in the behavior studies in conventional psychology
experiments is the result of random error. My bias is to think of this
as an indication that it's the GLM that is in error, not behavior.

I wouldn't be dismissing these pretty strong, but statistical, results as
just "IV-DV" psychology

Neither would I. All research (including PCT research) is IV-DV. It's
how the observed relationship between IV and DV is handled that makes
the difference. When you analyze the relationship between IV and DV
using conventional statistics you are testing for a causal
relationship between these variables; the DV (orderly/disorderly
behavior in this case) is assumed to be causally dependent on the IV
(orderly/disorderly environment in this case). That's what the GLM
says. If, the fit of this model to the data is not very good (and it's
not unless the r2 value is up near .99) then I would reject the model.
PCT would suggest that, in there is any relationship between this IV
and DV it's because there is a controlled variable (CV) that is being
protected from disturbance (IV) by action (DV). Some people may
control such a CV, others may not. That's what we would be interested
in finding out with PCT research, I think.

Rather than dismissing these results as "old fashioned psychology"

I wouldn't dismiss the results. I would only dismiss the assumption
that there is a causal connection between IV and DV if there is no
evidence of such a connection. No evidence of a connection for me is a
low r2 value. So what is the r or eta squared value for the results?

Best

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken PhD
rsmarken@gmail.com

[Martin Taylor 2008.12.23.23.02]

[From Rick Marken (2008.12.23.1930)]
Martin Taylor (2008.12.23.17.09) --

I'm not sure how you would apply this to a paper in a recent Science (12 Dec
2008, 322, 1681-4, Keizer et al., The Spreading of Disorder).
Did they report r or eta squared values? If so, what were they?

No. They reported the proportions of people who did one or other action
(littered or didn’t litter, for example) in one or the other
environment (clean or "disorderly – e.g. with a nearby graffitied
wall, or with the sound of illegal fireworks). They did report
“significance levels”, which to my mind is always pretty pointless.


Forget what they said about why they got the results they did, and ask only
about the results. What models are they testing
If they evaluated the results using an F or t test they are testing
the general linear model (GLM). Also, if they reported F or t values
along with the df I can calculate the eta squared from that.

They did chi-square tests, if that’s any help. To me it seems
superfluous, when you have proportion differences such as 33% vs 69% of
77 people in each condition (littering/graffiti wall), 27% v 82% (going
through prohibited open gate with bicycles not locked or locked to the
chain-link fence), 30% v 58% (leaving shopping cart in parking area
when there are not/are four carts left there beforehand), 52% v 80%
(littering without and with firework noise), 13% v 27% (stealing a 5
Euro note from a clean/graffitied mailbox) or v 25% (when the ground
near the mailbox was littered). You probably can get the article if you
want more detail. For me, these results satisfy what Ward Edwards
around 1958 in Psych Bulletin (I think) called the “Interocular
Traumatic Test” (he called it the only legitimate statistical test, if
I remember correctly).


But there is evidence that in at least some people the evidence of prior
disorderliness increases the likelihood that they will be disorderly.
I guess I am very suspicious of the dea that behavior is
probabilistic, for reasons given by PhiL Runkel in his book "People as
Living Things".

I don’t think there’s any evidence here that behaviour within a person
is probabilistic at any given moment. The result for a particular
person may well be different tomorrow from today – perhaps he ran out
of coffee for breakfast or had to run for a train. So observed from the
outside, any sufficiently high-level control behaviour is likely to be
seen as probabilistic. As I said in a message to Bill P not long ago,
most “noise” (i.e. “random variation”) is simply effects due to causes
you either can’t see or don’t care about.

The idea that behavior is probabilistic is one
assumptions of the GLM;

I’ve been keeping out of this discussion, though I do have ideas on the
topics discussed. On this particular point, I would say that the
assumption is not that behaviour is probabilistic (though some
practitioners may make that assumption). It is that the behaviour
observed is influenced by factors the experimenter cannot determine,
and that therefore the observations (not the behaviour) must be treated
as probabilistic.

I wouldn't be dismissing these pretty strong, but statistical, results as
just "IV-DV" psychology
Neither would I. All research (including PCT research) is IV-DV. It's
how the observed relationship between IV and DV is handled that makes
the difference. When you analyze the relationship between IV and DV
using conventional statistics you are testing for a causal
relationship between these variables; the DV (orderly/disorderly
behavior in this case) is assumed to be causally dependent on the IV
(orderly/disorderly environment in this case).

I wouldn’t say that it is causally dependent, and neither do the
authors. They say orderly/disorderly behaviour is influenced by the
environment, and so it demonstrably is. No causation is suggested or
inferred, though some possible causative possibilities are dismissed as
implausible.

That's what the GLM
says. If, the fit of this model to the data is not very good (and it's
not unless the r2 value is up near .99)

Actually, in this experiment, r2 is in each case 1.00 (it has to be,
when there are only two point on the line).

then I would reject the model.
PCT would suggest that, in there is any relationship between this IV
and DV it's because there is a controlled variable (CV) that is being
protected from disturbance (IV) by action (DV). Some people may
control such a CV, others may not. That's what we would be interested
in finding out with PCT research, I think.

Yes. The observations seem to me to be solid. The reasons, in terms of
what people might be controlling for, are quite uncertain. If the
authors had known about PCT, the way they talk about what people might
have wanted or not wanted (the causations they dismiss as incompatible
with the data) might have been cast differently, but I don’t think the
intent would have been much different.

The reason I brought this paper into the discussion is that it seemed
to me to be an example of a statistical result that seemed to be quite
clear, to be done in a real live normal situation, and to provide an
observation that warrants consideration from a PCT viewpoint. From the
data at hand, one can only speculate about the controlled variables.
Dick R showed us long ago how dangerous that can be. He suggested [From
Dick Robertson(2008.12.23.1915CDT)] that it might be useful to test
whether they might be controlling for “Do as the Romans do”, but I
think the actual experimental conditions make that unlikely. For
example, there’s no real “doing as the Romans do” about whether one
drops a card that had been tied to one’s bike and one’s proximity to a
clean or a graffitied wall. Still less is there such a relation between
the same kind of littering and hearing fireworks set off illegally, or
between going through an open gate marked “no entry” and whether the
bikes leaning against the fence are locked to the fence under a “no
locking bikes here” sign or are just resting against the fence.

My own speculation is that there is a conflict between control system
with a reference such as “See myself as social-minded” and some other
control system that in the absence of the conflict would take the easy
environmental feedback path (e.g. going through the gate rather than
walking 200m extra to get to the car). The “disorderly” act was in each
case the easier way to solve a problem (get rid of the card, get to the
car, dispose of the shopping cart). Something affects which control
system wins any conflict, and anything that biases the balance one way
or the other is likely to show up in such a study as a probabilistic
observation, whether done repeatedly on the same individual or on many
different individuals.

None of which means behaviour is probabilistic (though it may be if you
go into enough detail). All it means is that observations of behaviour
are likely to be probabilistic, at least in situations of
nearly-balanced conflict.

Anyway, as I said, my only reason for introducing this study was to
suggest that there exist situations in which influences of something on
something are clearly evident and that nevertheless are almost
necessarily studied statistically with the statistics being across
people rather than within individuals. It may be that different models
would fit different people, and that is something studies like these
cannot assess. But it’s not clear to me how it would be possible to get
at this kind of influence in a within-individual study.

Martin

[From Bill Powers (2008.12.24.1045 MST)]

Rick Marken (2008.12.24.0940) --

These proportions look far less impressive when they are reported as
r2 values (proportion of variance in the DV accounted for by the IV)
or (the way Bill did it in [Bill Powers (2008.12.24.2142 MST)] ) as
the probability of being wrong when guessing how a person will behave
based on knowing what IV condition they are in (wrong 64% of the time,
in this case).

I think the key fact about this research is that it is population research done from the standpoint of a social psychologist. Imagine that you're in the Mayor's office explaining why the police department needs more personnel to clean up the environment. "Look," you say, "the presence of graffiti and other signs of disorder DOUBLED the antisocial behavior we suffer from." And it surely did, in one experiment, from 13% to 27%. The Mayor is probably not going to ask who did the littering, which is good because you couldn't tell him.

This is all good casting-nets stuff; the Mayor cares only about the population statistics.

But when a psychologist uses the outcome of an experiment like this to start drawing conclusions about "people," that's another horse being described with the wrong color. In fact, the results show that the littering or stealing behavior of most people is not influenced by the degree of orderliness in the environment. It's only the few who (apparently) are influenced who constitute a problem. When you say that "people" cause the problem, you forget that the measures you use to combat the problem are going to affect a lot of people who are innocent of any wrongdoing. Is it worth raising the taxes on 100% of the people so that 14% of the people will litter less if your methods are 100% effective? Wouldn't it be cheaper to identify the 14% and nail them? When you put it that way, the proposition changes. It changes even more when you ask how many of the people who littered did it for the same reason. Studies like this are so loose and sloppy and the conclusions ignore so many other possible explanations that they are next to useless. Actually to do the study implied by the article would require ten times the resources, time, and expense -- and intelligence -- that was put into this simple-minded little experiment. The authors barely scratched the surface of the issues they thought they were studying. This is not grown-up science, it's superficial dabbling.

Best,

Bill P.

[From Rick Marken (2008.12.25.1200)]

Martin Taylor (2008.12.24.16.57)

Rick Marken (2008.12.24.0940)--

However, if you accept that I do have a
pretty good understanding of PCT, you might ask yourself why I think some
studies done in the "conventional" way could have something to tell us about
the way people might work

I think you have not yet grasped (or you just don't buy) the
implications of PCT for conventional experimental psychology, as
articulated (and demonstrated) so clearly in Bill's 1978 "Spadework"
paper in _Psychological Review_.

I thought you took r2 as the square of the correlation (which is, of course
1.0). Since you don't mean this, I'm not sure what you do mean.

The correlation in this study is not 1.0. Your way of computing the
correlation in this study would lead to the conclusion that the
correlation (and r2) for every 2 level experiment is 1.0. You are
saying that the correlation is 1.0 because there are two X values (the
orderly and disorderly conditions) associated with two Y values (the
proportion littering in each condition). The correlation between these
variables is indeed 1.0, as it would be in any two level experiment
where the X variable is the two conditions (X1, X2) and the Y variable
is the average response in each condition (Y1, Y2). The correct way
to calculate the correlation (and r2) for this experiment is to look
at the relationship between the X and Y values for each subject. In
this case, each subject's X value is the condition they are in (0 =
orderly and 1 = disorderly) and their Y value is their behavior (0 =
no litter, 1 = litter). Since the variable values are binary we would
compute a point biserial correlation, which gives a result that is
very close to r. Since I didn't know the number of subjects, only the
proportion who littered in each condition, I assumed that an equal
number of subjects was in each condition and calculated the
correlation assuming a total of 20 or 100 subjects with the
appropriate proportions of litterers and non-litterers in each
condition. It turns out that the correlation value was nearly the same
despite the change in total number of subjects -- ~.33. So the r2 was
.11.

I would say that the assumption
is not that behaviour is probabilistic (though some practitioners may make
that assumption). It is that the behaviour observed is influenced by factors
the experimenter cannot determine, and that therefore the observations (not
the behaviour) must be treated as probabilistic.

I know that. But scientific psychologists have been saying this for
nearly 100 years and still they are only able to account for, on
average, about 30% of the variance in behavior in any particular
experiment. The factors that are causing the other 70% of the variance
should have been discovered by now

Here, I think, is where we diverge, not conceptually, but numerically. You
talk about THE controlled variable

I'm very well aware of the fact that people are assumed to control
many more than one CV at a time, according to PCT. My point was that
in conventional psychology researchers have never been able to explain
much more than 30% of the variance in the behavior they study,
indicating that the entire enterprise, which is based on the general
linear model of behavior, is a failure. And that is because research
based on the GLM completely misses the existence of controlled
variable. The fact that you believe that much of the variance in
behavior can be explained by identifying controlled variables doesn't
make the conventional approach suddenly informative.

There are other reasons for probabilistic output, which should be apparent
to you: "many means to the same end" might trigger one line of thought.

I would rather say it this way: according to PCT there are several
reasons why we would expect the _appearance_ of behavior in
conventional experiments to be probabilistic. I take this to mean that
the whole conventional research enterprise in psychology is based on
an illusion. You seem to take it to mean that we can now learn things
about individual behavior from conventional research that we could not
before PCT. I think we disagree on this point (the merits of
conventional research) even more deeply than we disagree about the
merits of information theory.

Another thought, again based on not expecting to be able to do The Test in
such a way as to be able to tease out all the controlled variables:

You don't have to be able to test for all controlled variables a
person is controlling in order for the Test to be successful. The goal
of the Test is to figure out what variable(s) a person is controlling
when carrying out a particular behavior. I presented my research on
catching baseballs to show how this would work in a realistic
(non-tracking) behavioral situation. People control a lot more than 2
variables when they catch balls. But once you know that they are
controlling vertical optical velocity and lateral optical displacement
you can understand about 98% of the variance in their behavior (their
movements on the field). Conventional research could never get you
there, as I explained in my 2005 JEP:HPP comment (Marken, R. S. (2005)
Optical Trajectories and the Informational Basis of Fly Ball Catching,
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception & Performance, 31
(3), 630 - 634).

No causation is suggested or inferred, though some
possible causative possibilities are dismissed as implausible.

Then why do it as an experiment?

My guess is that they wanted to see whether a long-time speculation would
have the predicted influence on the behaviour of people. Various cities have
followed New York's example of going after minor issues such as graffiti and
littering, in the hope that some major problems might be reduced if people
behaved differently when the environment was tidy, but (the authors say)
nobody had done an experiment to see whether such an influence might exist.
"Influence" is not "causation" in my language, and they were looking to see
whether there was an influence. There is.

I agree with this if we are dealing with this research as sociology.
At the population level fewer people litter in an orderly than in a
disorderly environment. The fact of the matter, however, is that this
exact kind of research is used by psychologists as a way of
determining the causes of individual behavior. They do this in
multi-subject experiments just like this where the goal is to
determine whether the IV has an effect on the DV. When they do this
they are testing the general linear model, which is simply that DV =
a+b1*IV1+b2*IV2...+bn*IVn+e for each individual subject. They test
several subjects and look at the relationship between the IVs and the
average DV under the assumption that e (error) is random and will,
thus, be canceled out by the averaging. So the average results for
many subjects is supposed to show something close to the "true" causal
relationship between IV and DV for each individual. Causality can
presumably be inferred if all variables other than the IVs have been
controlled (held constant at all levels of the IVs).

Since the research on the effect of the environment on littering was
done by psychologists I presume the main aim was to tell us something
about the cause of littering in individual people. And you have been
trying to tell me that this research should be taken as useful by
those of us trying to understand individual behavior. So I assume that
you yourself think that this research is telling us something about
individuals. I think Bill's point (and mine) is that it doesn't. But
both of us have said that this research could certainly be useful to
policymakers (like city mayors) who deal with populations. It looks
like littering goes down in orderly environments. And this is
presumably a "causal" relationship in the sense that, if properly
done, this research rules out other possibly confounding variables
(like the type of people in the two environments) as explanations of
the result. So the mayor can be relatively confident that littering
will be reduced if there is investment in increasing the orderliness
of neighborhoods.

The whole idea of doing an experiment
in the context of the GLM is so that one can infer that any observed

>relationship between the IV and DV is causal.

I might ask on what PCT foundation you infer that this is a controlled
variable in all "conventional" psychological experimenters?

PCT has nothing to do with it. Read any text on Research Methods in
Psychology (mine is particularly good but I hear Bruce Abbott has one
that sells well;-)) and you will see that the reason for doing an
experiment (manipulating an IV under controlled conditions and
measuring the DV in each condition) is to determine a causal
relationship between IV and DV. Since all experiments in psychology
are analyzed used ANOVA or t test then they are all being done in the
context of the GLM (see equation above).

Incidentally, I see in this study no dependence on a model of any kind,
linear or nonlinear.

The model on which this experiment is based is the GLM: DV = f(IV)

The analysis, it is true, used a chi-square, but that
is necessary only to satisfy journal editors. The IOT (InterOcular
Traumatic) test suffices in this case.

What you are testing with the IOT is the match of the observed results
to what you would expect if DV = f(IV), that is, what you would expect
if the GLM were true.

The reason I brought this paper into the discussion is that it seemed to me
to be an example of a statistical result that seemed to be quite clear

It's not the "clarity" of the result that is at issue; it's what the
results say about human nature. The results do clearly show that there
is less littering in orderly as compared to disorderly environments.
What they don't show is that the orderliness of the environment has
any effect (or influence) on the behavior of individuals. Bill makes
this point by showing that, based on these results, you would be wrong
more often than you are right in predicting an individual's littering
behavior based on the orderliness of the environment in which the
individual is found. I make the point by showing that, as a model of
individual behavior, the GLM, which says that littering =
f(orderliness of environment) accounts for only about 11% of the
variance in the littering behavior of individuals, which means that
nearly 80% the variation across individuals in terms of their
littering behavior (given the GLM model) is in the e (error) term of
the GLM rather than the IV. This shows either that littering is mainly
a function of other variables besides the orderliness of the
environment (this is the preferred "other variables" explanation of
the noisy results of psychological experiments) or that the GLM is
wrong (my preferred explanation since there is simply no case I know
of where psychologists have been able to add other variables to the
GLM prediction and increase the amount of behavioral variance
accounted for much more than a few percent, like going from 30% to
33%).

No. I disagree. What I agree about (and I said this in my initial posting)
is that you can't use the results to say much about any individual

Good. Then you agree that it's useless to a control theorist
interested in understanding individual behavior. It's good information
for the mayor, though.

You can, however, use the results as a
starting point to look for what may be a quite generic effect of an
apparently irrelevant environmental variable when different control systems
in an individual are in conflict.

I agree that it can be a starting point for control research; but you
could have gotten that starting point just from the title of the
research; you could start testing to see whether a person is
controlling for keeping certain aspects of the environment at the
status quo or tryng to make it cleaner, etc. But the data from this
study is basically irrelevant to a control theorist.

Best regards

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken PhD
rsmarken@gmail.com

[From Rick Marken (2008.12.25.1645)]

Kenny Kitzke (2008.12.25)--

Rick Marken (2008.12.24.1720)--

Kenny Kitzke (2008.12.24)--

Bill Powers -

>>When you
>> say that "people" cause the problem, you forget that the measures you
>> use to combat the problem are going to affect a lot of people who are
>> innocent of any wrongdoing.
>
> >This is precisely how the airport passenger terrorism prevention system
>> works.

It's how all policy decisions work.

All policy decisions? That is certainly not true.

What I was referring to was the fact, mentioned by Bill, that policy
decisions involve measures that inconvenience a lot of people who are
"innocent". Seat belts inconvenience all those who don't get in
accidents. Airport searches inconvenience all the people who are not
trying to brng contraband onto the plane. Medicare payments
inconvenience all those who will never require medical care. I don't
think there is any way to avoid this "problem"; the problem being that
rules that demonstrably make things better for the group are bound to
inconvenience or even hurt some members of the group (I know of two
cases where people were killed in car accidents because they _were_
wearing seatbelts).

Best

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken PhD
rsmarken@gmail.com

[Martin Taylor 2008.12.26.00.01]

(I didn’t want to write on Xmas Day :slight_smile:
This is to Bill and Rick. It consists mainly of simple quotes from my
earlier messages in this thread.

···

from the message in which I introduced the Keizer et al. paper in
Science [Martin Taylor 2008.12.23.17.09]

“There’s no way of knowing whether there is anything
different between those who overtly acted “disorderly” and those who
did not, other than the degree of bias toward acting “orderly”. But
there is evidence that in at least some people the evidence of prior
disorderliness increases the likelihood that they will be disorderly.
… And then if the phenomenon did turn out to generalize, I
might look to see whether I could do studies on individuals – which
might be rather difficult to do, since it would seem to require the
omission of “informed consent” to avoid counter-control.”

My next message, in reply to Rick [Martin Taylor 2008.12.23.23.02]

“Anyway, as I said, my only reason for introducing this study was to
suggest that there exist situations in which influences of something on
something are clearly evident and that nevertheless are almost
necessarily studied statistically with the statistics being across
people rather than within individuals. It may be that different models
would fit different people, and that is something studies like these
cannot assess. But it’s not clear to me how it would be possible to get
at this kind of influence in a within-individual study.”

And my next [Martin Taylor 2008.12.24.16.57]

"What I agree about (and I said this in my initial
posting) is that you can’t use the results to say much about any
individual, or even whether all individuals are affected similarly
(knowing quite a few Dutch people, I suspect they are not :-). You
can, however, use the results as a starting point to look for what may
be a quite generic effect of an apparently irrelevant environmental
variable when different control systems in an individual are in
conflict. "

and

“The experiment provides an observation that should be kept in mind
when
thinking about follow-on experiments that might give valid results for
individuals. Why does an irrelevant component of the environment bias
the action output of conflicted control systems at least sometimes in
at least some individuals?”


Since the last of these, and in direct response to it, we have [From
Bill Powers (2008.12.24.1908 MST)]

“If you were
given the results from this experiment and used it to predict the
results
of an entire replication experiment, your prediction would be highly
likely to be correct with a small error. But if you used the result of
the first experiment to predict the individual behaviors in studies 5
and
6, you would be wrong most of the time.”

and [From Rick Marken (2008.12.25.1200)]

"I presume the main aim was to tell us something
about the cause of littering in individual people. And you have been
trying to tell me that this research should be taken as useful by
those of us trying to understand individual behavior. So I assume that
you yourself think that this research is telling us something about
individuals."

Does anyone else think there’s some disconnect here?

Martin

[From Bill Powers (2008.12.26.1002 MST)]

Martin Taylor 2008.12.26.00.01 –

I’ll try to understand what the “disconnect” is – hope
you will do the same.

From the message in which I
introduced the Keizer et al. paper in Science [Martin Taylor
2008.12.23.17.09]

“… there is evidence that in at least some people the evidence of
prior disorderliness increases the likelihood that they will be
disorderly. … And then if the phenomenon did turn out to generalize, I
might look to see whether I could do studies on individuals – which
might be rather difficult to do, since it would seem to require the
omission of “informed consent” to avoid
counter-control.”

There are some parts of this paragraph that raise cautionary flags for
me. You say “evidence that in at least some people …” the
relationship will be seen. Where does that “at least” come
from? The data concern the observed behavior of specific sets of people;
anything else you say about the data comes from imagination, including
the idea that similar findings might be observed in another group of
people. Is the idea that if one group of people is seen to behave in
certain ways and in certain percentages under similar or
similarly-changed conditions, that any group of people must behave the
same ways in the same percentages under the same conditions?

And why are the experimental conditions seen to vary in the dimension of
“orderliness?” Who thinks that a wall of graffiti is
disorderly? That is certainly something perceived by some people, but
what evidence is there that the people in this study were all perceiving
orderliness – or that any of them were? Is the idea that orderliness
exists in the environment, rather than the eye of the beholder?

I don’t think that studies on individuals would be very hard to do – for
example, why would it be hard to find out if orderliness is important to
a person, or if there is a conflict between doing what is easier (walking
through a gate marked “no trespassing”) or what is harder
(lawfully walking 200 meters farther to get to one’s car)? What good is
it to vary experimental conditions if you don’t know what those changes
mean to the people involved? It seems to me that you’re entirely too
compliant with the multitude of premises that this study demands, as if
their truth or reasonableness were beyond question. That’s a big
disconnect for me.

My next message, in reply to
Rick [Martin Taylor 2008.12.23.23.02]

“Anyway, as I said, my only reason for introducing this study was to
suggest that there exist situations in which influences of something on
something are clearly evident and that nevertheless are almost
necessarily studied statistically with the statistics being across people
rather than within individuals. It may be that different models would fit
different people, and that is something studies like these cannot assess.
But it’s not clear to me how it would be possible to get at this kind of
influence in a within-individual study.”

This is another disconnect. To suggest that this study shows
“influences” of a disorderly environment on things like
littering and stealing is to assert the input-output model of behavior
before even starting the study. How do we know that this influence is
acting on these behaviors? Couldn’t it be that the influences are acting
on something other than the behavior? For example, I might suggest that
they act on perceptual variables that the people are controlling, and
that the changes in their behavior that are observed are various attempts
to counteract that influence. At least one could explore this possibility
by doing appropriate experiments, or by interviewing the people after
their part in the experiment is finished. Simply to assume a direct
relationship between what an experimenter perceives as
“disorder” and what the same experimenter sees as
norm-violating behavior makes the whole experiment much too subjective
and egocentric to have much general value.

I know that the main point of your comment was not about
“influences”, but about group versus individual phebnomena. But
that is one of my main objections – sneaking a premise in by the back
door while ostensibly talking about something else. I don’t admit that
any influences were established. I don’t even admit that the manipulated
variable is correctly described.

And my next [Martin Taylor
2008.12.24.16.57]

"What I agree about (and I said this in my initial posting) is that
you can’t use the results to say much about any individual, or even
whether all individuals are affected similarly (knowing quite a few Dutch
people, I suspect they are not :-). You can, however, use the
results as a starting point to look for what may be a quite generic
effect of an apparently irrelevant environmental variable when different
control systems in an individual are in conflict.
"

I don’t see it as a starting point, but simply as an attempt to test a
causal hypothesis, that there is something about disorderliness that
makes “people” behave in culturally-unacceptable ways. Or
“fosters” or “influences” such behavior. Why just
make random guesses about why people behave that way and then set up
elaborate time-consuming studies in which no person is ever asked for any
information? Why assume that everybody you see doing the same thing is
doing it for the same reason? Is everyone who gets on a train every
weekday morning getting on it for the same reason?

and

"The experiment provides an observation that should be kept in mind
when thinking about follow-on experiments that might give valid results
for individuals.

How can you expect to get valid results for individuals without doing
independent experiments with individuals, and without even knowing or
caring which individual behaved in one way rather than another, and why?
Some people evidently expect that, but they shouldn’t.

Why does an irrelevant component
of the environment bias the action output of conflicted control systems
at least sometimes in at least some individuals?"

How do you know there is any conflict in any of those people, and how do
you know that the so-called disorderliness in the environment is an
irrelevant component of the environment for any of those people?
Irrelevant how? Isn’t it assumed to be highly relevant to their behavior?
You can’t know those things unless you study them explicitly. Are these
things important to those doing the behaving, or only to the experimenter
or analyst? There’s a kind of innocent naivete in these experiments that
I would not expect to see in a competent social science study.

Or maybe I would.

Since the last of these, and in
direct response to it, we have [From Bill Powers (2008.12.24.1908
MST)]

“If you were given the results from this experiment and used it to
predict the results of an entire replication experiment, your prediction
would be highly likely to be correct with a small error. But if you used
the result of the first experiment to predict the individual behaviors in
studies 5 and 6, you would be wrong most of the time.”

and [From Rick Marken (2008.12.25.1200)]

"I presume the main aim was to tell us something
about the cause of littering in individual people. And you have been
trying to tell me that this research should be taken as useful by
those of us trying to understand individual behavior. So I assume that
you yourself think that this research is telling us something about
individuals."

Does anyone else think there’s some disconnect here?

You didn’t say the things that I said. It may seem to you that what Rick
and I said (or its opposite) is implicit in, or at least hinted at by, a
few sentences in your posts, but in a discussion you have to make it
explicit. We aren’t mind-readers, despite the titles of two of Rick’s
books.

With regard to what I see as my most important conclusion, did you say
somewhere in the material you cite in this post that predicting
individual behaviors from the conclusions would be wrong more often than
right? (Actually, more than 80% of the time in studies 5 and 6). It seems
to me that you are rather actively avoiding talking about this. You may
admit that “you can’t use the results to say much about any
individual”, but where do you say that what you say is likely to be
WRONG about MOST of them? You seem to be trying to leave the door open
for a little validity of statenments about individuals to leak through,
but what I’m saying is that there is NONE in this study. There is none in
any study in which the main finding applies to less than 50% of the
people, and not much even for much higher percentages. Unless, of course,
you are ONLY interested in the population statistics, not the
individuals, or don’t care whether your predictions about individuals are
right or wrong.

Bill

[From Bill Powers (2008.12.28.1435 MST)]

Martin Taylor 2008.12.28.10.06 –

In this instance, I don’t know
whether environmental contextual effects have been addressed in the PCT
literature (I can’t remember the issue ever having been raised on CSGnet,
and I haven’t read LCS III yet – sorry Bill).

No, they’re not addressed.

Here are a few comments on things that bother me about this kind of
research.

By an environmental contextual
effect I mean something perceptible in the environment that is not
obviously either part of the environmental feedback path of a perceptual
control loop nor a disturbance to the controlled
perception.

I would like to reword this sentence so as to make clear what is being
assumed.

By [a contextual variable that
has] an environmental contextual effect I mean something that

(1) the subject does perceive.

(2) is not part of the feedback path to a variable the subject is
controlling

(3) is not a disturbance related to something the subject is
controlling.

I am not willing to accept that any of these conditions is satisfied
without some demonstration, some way of establishing them beside what I
believe or someone else believes. I had written a lot of words about
these and other places in your post where things are simply assumed to be
“obvious” when it seemed to me that there were no indications
of that. It got so wordy that I deleted it all. You can see those places
without needing me to pick every nit.

I just don’t like this way of doing science. To me it looks sloppy and
needlessly prone to error, and full of apparently unconscious biases. I’m
not in that much of a hurry to reach conclusions, and anyway it’s
embarrassing to have to retract a conclusion because of having assumed
something important that happened not to be true. If I assume something I
like to know it has a reasonable chance of being true. It’s hard for me
to understand how the peiople who do this kind of research can care so
little about that.

That’s really how this style of research looks to me. It looks like
people rushing to get some jazzy or world-shaking results before someone
else does, and cutting corners and letting wishes replace facts because
it just takes too much time and effort to be sure of what you’re doing. I
know that there are good excuses for doing things this way, but I’d
rather not do them at all if this is all we can do.

I had a look at your Bayesian calculations, but know so little about that
subject that I didn’t get much from them. When I can’t verify things like
this for myself, my best course is to keep my mouth shut.

Best,

Bill P.

[From Bill Powers (2008.12.29.0503 MST)]

Martin Taylor 2008.12.29,00,56]

I would like to reword this
sentence so as to make clear what is being assumed.

By [a contextual variable that
has] an environmental contextual effect I mean something that

(1) the subject does perceive.

(2) is not part of the feedback path to a variable the subject is
controlling

(3) is not a disturbance related to something the subject is
controlling.

I’m afraid I don’t like this rewording. It doesn’t convey the sense I
intended. Let me try another in the same style:

By a contextual variable that has an environmental contextual effect on
the actions associated with a control of a specific perception, I mean
something that

(1) the subject does perceive

(2) is apparently not part of the environmental feedback path of that
particular controlled perception

(3) is not apparently a disturbance to that particular controlled
perception

All right, this is indeed different. How can there be an
“environmental contextual effect” on the actions that is
perceived but not controlled and is neither a disturbance nor a feedback
effect relative to any controlled variable? Consider the graffiti, which
are a variable that changes from the first condition to the second. The
assumption is that this variable is perceived and has a contextual effect
on the person’s behavior relative to a flyer attached to a bicycle. If
this variable doesn’t affect the behavior by disturbing any controlled
variable, and it doesn’t alter the feedback path for controlling any
other variable, how does it act to alter the actions of the person? I
don’t see what your hypothesis is. Please try to clarify.

I am not willing to accept that
any of these conditions is satisfied without some demonstration, some way
of establishing them beside what I believe or someone else
believes.

I agree entirely. All we have in this study is set of conditions that
very plausibly (and most probably) fulfil these conditions, not a
demonstration that they do. That’s why I am arguing that studies like
these are guides to places where experiments on individuals might prove
profitable, not results applicable to individuals.

We part company there. “Very plausibly” is in the willingness
of the beholder to be convinced. Why go through all the work of doing an
elaborate, expensive, time-consuming series of studies, and publishing
the results, when it remains possible that next week you will find that a
crucial mistaken assumption invalidates everything? It seems to me that
this is a great way to make an investment in something that you will then
be tempted to defend, most likely by attacking the invalidation and
wasting still more time and effort. Why create “sunk costs?”
Wouldn’t it make more sense to try to invalidate the assumption right
away instead of just assuming it will work out and going ahead with the
experiment? The strategy you propose seems most undesirable from several
standpoints. The experimenters didn’t even try to test these guesses.
Have they never made mistakes (that they had to admit to themselves)
before? Do they have some magical route to truth that doesn’t depend on
evidence?

However, I would argue that the
conditions of the study very probably do NOT fulfil conditions 2 and 3
that you proposed as a rewording of my statement. I think you can see
that if you look at the speculation that I proposed as a generic
mechanism for the strong effects (which you say don’t exist) found in the
study.

Wait a minute. Where did I say the strong effects don’t exist? They most
certainly do exist. In Study 5, for example, we can show by simple
reasoning that 9 out of 60 people behaved in a way that would clearly not
be expected if there were no effect. I consider that an effect, though
how you’d measure its “strength” is another question. We can’t
know, because of the way the expertiment was designed, who those people
were, so we can’t find out what is different about them, but at least we
know something. The same study shows that 51 out of the 60 people
behaved in the way that is to be expected if there were no effect; there
is no evidence that they were affected. How do you get out of that a
statement that I say the effects don’t exist?

Best,

Bill P.