Superstition: breaking the loop

[MartinT]

[Martin Taylor 2014.04.15.15.04]

Suppose (and I don't think this is too far-fetched) a perceptual

function for “being Hindu” has at least some of its inputs “anded”
together in the logical sense that if one input is “no” the
perceptual function outputs a value “no”. Suppose one of these
“anded” inputs is the perception of self as having made offering to
Shiva, and other also are perceptions of self as having performed
various rituals and of not having eaten beef, and so forth. The
“wrong” value from any of these perceptions would result in a “no”
value for the perception of self as a good Hindu. And there would be
big error if the reference value was “yes”. Big error means reorganization, and the only reorganization that
would work to return the perception of self as good Hindu to “yes”
would be to perceive self as having made offerings to Shiva, the
very action that fails in its overt aim of controlling for a
perception of whatever it is that Shiva is supposed to put right.
Does the above scenario fit with your idea?
Martin

···

Another passing thought…

[Rupert Young 2014.04.14.19.00]

  (Martin Taylor 2014.0[4.13.12.35](http://4.13.12.35))



  ...

  [RY] So this is my suggestion (hypothesis). This particular

superstitious belief (control) system (SBS) exists only within the
context of a whole gamut of other religious beliefs and is
dependant upon them, in that they are higher level (dominant?)
systems, and is defined by them. This SBS is subservient in that
it could not exist in isolation; it would get reorganised.

  However, the SBS also effects these other systems. So

reorganisation of the SBS would result in error in all the these
other (dominant) systems, which would mean that they would
reorganise back to where they were, and back to where the SBS was,
maintaining the status quo of reorganisational stability despite
there being continual error in one of the systems. You said it
yourself “if I am controlling for perceiving myself to be a good
Hindu, failure to make the offering would increase the error in
that perception”.

  Perhaps there is a reorganisational principle here, that

reorganisation of high level systems overrides that of
lower-level, dependant systems.

[rupert]

[Rupert Young 2014.04.17.19.30]

(Martin Taylor 2014.04.15.15.04)

MT: Another passing thought…

Suppose (and I don’t think this is too far-fetched) a perceptual function for “being Hindu” has at least some of its inputs “anded” together in the logical sense that if one input is “no” the perceptual function outputs a value “no”. Suppose one of these “anded” inputs is the perception of self as having made offering to Shiva, and other also are perceptions of self as having performed various rituals and of not having eaten beef, and so forth. The “wrong” value from any of these perceptions would result in a “no” value for the perception of self as a good Hindu. And there would be big error if the reference value was “yes”.

Big error means reorganization, and the only reorganization that would work to return the perception of self as good Hindu to “yes” would be to perceive self as having made offerings to Shiva, the very action that fails in its overt aim of controlling for a perception of whatever it is that Shiva is supposed to put right.

Does the above scenario fit with your idea?

RY: Very much so. I envisage these systems locked together as if in a lattice and changing this one (or any) would upset the whole apple cart. And your function sounds very probable, there’s all sorts of things, I presume, that go towards one’s identity of being a Hindu; tradition, rituals, dogma etc.

Regards
Rupert

···

–
Sent from my Android phone with K-9 Mail. Please excuse my brevity.

[rupert]

[Rupert Young 2014.04.16.23.00]

(Martin Taylor 2014.04.15.13.22)

MT:Again as I understand it, Rupert proposed that the interactions among the various control systems supporting a higher-level system, one of which is the hypothetical perception X system, can serve to stabilize the control structure so as to revert a reorganization that would turn the “non-control” system X into an actual control system X. …

RY: Yep, that sums it up pretty well.

MT: I think it’s an interesting question. At this level of analysis and of my limited understanding, I don’t think there’s an intuitively obvious answer. After all, every one of the control systems supporting the high-level complex is non-linear. All or most of them probably support other high-level control systems, which means that the action that fails to influence perception X may be essential in controlling other high-level perceptions. Quite possibly, substituting another action that would influence perception X might set up hard-to-resolve conflicts in controlling other perceptions, setting up a “reorganization barrier”.

RY: Yes, exactly, particularly with regards to being essential for controlling other perceptions. And “reorganization barrier” is a good way of seeing it.

MT: (Incidentally, it’s exactly the kind of question for which ECACS – Exploration of Complex Adaptive Control Systems – was designed. It’s about a complex control structure, and the proposal might hang in the air for years before someone comes up with a fresh take on it and continues the discussion from where it left off.

RY: Yes it does need to be modelled and simulated. Unfortunately I won’t be able to do it any time soon so it may need to be left for a student in the year 2525, at a time when all universities only do PCT research and all the obvious PhD topics have been done and she is dredging the obtuse archives, from the days before they migrated to a well-organised forum, to find an obscure and novel subject for her thesis, I’ll even provide the title, “The reorganisational stability of open loop control units in a constrained framework of belief control systems”; a cinch for the William T. Powers galactic Nobel award!

Regards
Rupert

···

    Hi Rupert, yep that is what Method of Levels is based on.

Because the higher level systems govern the references for the
lower level systems, you need to bring awareness to those higher
levels to reorganise for long-lasting change…

Warren

    Sent from my iPhone

    On 14 Apr 2014, at 14:36, Rupert Young <rupert@moonsit.co.uk        >

wrote:

[Rupert Young 2014.04.14.19.00]

      (Martin Taylor 2014.0[4.13.12.35](http://4.13.12.35))



      MT: You assert, without evidence, that offering rice and beans

to Shiva result in no reduction in the error of whatever
perceptions are being controlled by that action. OK, we can
take that as a hypothetical situation, though not a situation
that necessarily corresponds to the facts on the ground.

      RY: Well, if we're going to need evidence for every discussion

here we may as well shut down csgnet and go home

      Besides this is a hypothetical discussion; a thought

experiment, so we should be able to move forwards on the
grounds of premises being, seemingly, physically and
reasonably possible. You have agreed on the latter, and to me
it seems quite reasonable, looking at real world beliefs and
behaviour, that one, people do things that are ineffectual,
and two, that the relevant perceptions do not change as they
expect (and people are aware they do not change), and three,
people continue to act in this ineffectual manner.

      Your objection appears to be that reorganisation will

reorganise this behaviour out of existence. A quite reasonable
position consistent with PCT.

      If I can overcome this objection, and still be consistent with

PCT, perhaps you will be more amenable to my scenario?

      So this is my suggestion (hypothesis). This particular

superstitious belief (control) system (SBS) exists only within
the context of a whole gamut of other religious beliefs and is
dependant upon them, in that they are higher level (dominant?)
systems, and is defined by them. This SBS is subservient in
that it could not exist in isolation; it would get
reorganised.

      However, the SBS also effects these other systems. So

reorganisation of the SBS would result in error in all the
these other (dominant) systems, which would mean that they
would reorganise back to where they were, and back to where
the SBS was, maintaining the status quo of reorganisational
stability despite there being continual error in one of the
systems. You said it yourself “if I am controlling for
perceiving myself to be a good Hindu, failure to make the
offering would increase the error in that perception”.

      Perhaps there is a reorganisational principle here, that

reorganisation of high level systems overrides that of
lower-level, dependant systems.

      That's it. No evidence, just an idea



      Rupert








        On 13 April 2014 22:37:18 GMT+05:30,

Martin Taylor <mmt-csg@mmtaylor.net >
wrote:

          I thought I was sending this to the

list, but I wasn’t. Rupert, I’m sorry you get it twice

      --

      Sent from my Android phone with K-9 Mail. Please excuse my

brevity.

            Martin

            -------- Original Message --------

[Martin Taylor 2014.04.13.12.35]
You assert, without evidence, that offering rice and
beans to Shiva result in no reduction in the error of
whatever perceptions are being controlled by that
action. OK, we can take that as a hypothetical
situation, though not a situation that necessarily
corresponds to the facts on the ground.
Sorry, I was not dealing with your hypothetical
situation in which this does not happen.
No, I’m not saying that your hypothestical situation is
physically impossible. I’m saying that if maturation
does involve reorganization, whether it’s Bill’s e-coli
method or any other, a behaviour that takes time and
effort to perform but that does not influence any
controlled perception is unlikely to stick around very
long when it might conflict with other behaviours that
do influence controlled behaviours.
In your hypothetical system, that is true by definition.
Statistically, it could occur fleetingly in a real
system. But is it likely to be observed as a pervasive
and long-lasting phenomenon in the real world?
Martin

Subject:
Re: Superstition: breaking the loop
Date:
Sun, 13 Apr 2014 12:43:05 -0400
From:
Martin Taylor
To:
mmt-csg@mmtaylor.netrupert@moonsit.co.ukrupert@moonsit.co.uk

              On 2014/04/13 11:28 AM, wrote:

rupert@moonsit.co.uk

[Rupert young (2014.04.13 21.00)]

                > On 12 April 2014 at 17:20 Martin Taylor wrote: > > The question I see is not the question you see.

You take it for granted > that offering rice and beans to Shiva results
in no reduction in the > error of whatever perceptions are being
controlled by that action.

                It's not a matter of taking it for granted it is

how I am defining the scenario.

mmt-csg@mmtaylor.net

                > For example, using "I" as teh

                > worshipper, if "I" am controlling for

perceiving myself to be a good

                > Hindu, failure to make the offering would

increase the error in that

                > perception

                Yes, though that is in a different control

system within you, as a Hindu, and this is probably
key to the “reorganizationally stablility”.

                > as would also be the case if I didn't

believe the offering

                > would induce Shiva to send me money to feed my

kids, but nevertheless

                > controlled for perceiving that other people

with whom I interact would

                > see me as being a good Hindu (and perhaps

therefore being inclined to

                > lend me money if I couldn't otherwise feed my

kids). In that case,

                > feeding Shiva does directly reduce error in a

perception of "kids (not)

                > being hungry".

                That's a different scenario and changes the

subject to a different discussion.

                > To my understanding (no longer being a

hypothetical Hindu), you are

                > assuming that some particular perception is

being controlled by a

                > mechanism that cannot influence that

perception, and are asking how this

                > particular set of connections can be

“reorganizationally stable”

yes, that is the question I am looking at.

I am looking at it from the

                > opposite side, seeing a behaviour that appears

to be pretty stable and

                > asking what kind of perception it might control

so that the loop can be

                > reorganizationally stable.

Ok, but that is a different question.

                But perhaps you are saying that my scenario if

physically impossible, in which case I’d be
interested in your reasons for that.

                > Do we ever know that there's no reorganization

going on?

                I am not actually saying reorganization isn't

going on necessarily just that it is not working, in
reorganizing the system.