# Terminological Exercise

**URL:** <http://discourse.iapct.org/t/terminological-exercise/11114>\
**Category:** CSG1993\
**Created:** [September 26, 1993, 9:33pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/terminological-exercise/11114 "1993-09-26T21:33:33Z")\
**Posts on this page:** 1\
**Page:** 1

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**Author:** ![Human\_Factors\_Lab](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/h/b3f665/32.png) [@Human\_Factors\_Lab](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Human_Factors_Lab)\
**Post date:** [September 26, 1993, 9:33pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/terminological-exercise/11114/1 "1993-09-26T21:33:33Z")

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[From Rick Marken (930926.1400)]

Ken Hacker (930926) asks for input on some terminology. Here we go.  
And a one and a two and a ...

> a) Some human behavior is intentional; some is not. Intentionality  
> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;involves design and planning, plans of action which are deliberated.

If "behavior" means "any result of human action" then, yes, some  
human behavior is intentional and some is not. An intention (in PCT)  
is the setting of a reference signal; this setting specifies a  
particular (perceptual) result of action. So some results (those  
that correspond to intended perceptions) are intentional -- others  
are not. A concrete example: a person might intend to produce the  
perception of cold water being swallowed -- but not the annoying  
"glurking" sounds that accompany the production of that perception;  
perception of cold water is an intended result of "drinking" actions;  
perception of glurking sounds (also a result of drinking actions)  
is not.

Intention involves "design" -- the reference signal is the "design"  
for the intended perception -- but not necessarily "planning" (though  
it could, as in fixing a lawnmower using imagination of possible  
results of actions). "Plans of action" (in the sense in which PCT  
uses the term "action" -- as an influence on a behavioral result)  
are definitely NOT involved in intention; there is no way to con-  
sisently produce an intended result by planning the actions that  
will produce it (due to the presense of unpredictable and  
undetectable disturbances that also influence the result).

> b) All human behavior is purposive. Purposes are hierarchical and must  
> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;exist at all levels of human systems. They are neurophysiological  
> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;and as Hawkins argues, most powerful, when are not aware of them.

Purposive behavior is an intentionally produced result of action.  
Not all human behavior is purposive; in fact, many of the results  
of human action are NOT purposive.

Purposes do seem to be hierarchically related; purposes (intended  
results) are achieved in order to achieve other purposes.  
Purposes are neurophysiological (they are the firing rates of  
perceptual (afferent) and reference (efferent) neurons). I am not  
sure in what sense one purpose can be more "powerful" than  
another. But I don't believe that awareness does anything to a  
purpose other than, perhaps, start or increase the rate of the  
process of reorganizing the control system that is carrying out  
that purpose (at least according to PCT). I think there is some  
evidence that awareness leads to reorganization; just concentrate  
(focus conscious awareness) on the means by which you achieve some  
common purpose (such as turning a key in a lock) and see what  
happens (there should be some loss of control).

> c) Goals are purposes made intentional. The person attempts to intervene  
> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;with automatic control processes.

A goal is a purpose is an intention, from the point of view of PCT. All  
three words refer to the same thing (I think) -- the setting of a  
reference signal. My goal is to pick up the pen; so I have a reference  
signal that species a particular relationship between the pen and  
the table. My purpose is to pick the pen up; again, it seems that I  
am referring to a reference specification for a perception (of a  
relationship between pen and table). My intention is to pick up the  
pen; again referring to the reference state of a perceptual variable.  
When the pen is picked up, I will have carried out an intention or  
a purpose and achieved the goal. The words "purpose", "intention" and  
"goal" are ambiguous, however, because they can refer to the reference  
state of the controlled perceptual variable as well. My purpose,  
intention or goal in picking up the pen could refer to the perception  
that actually results when I successfully pick up the pen.

PCT terminology helps remove some of the lack of precision that comes  
from using words like purpose, intention and goal to describe control.  
But I suppose it will be impossible to get people to give up the lay  
terminology. So we'll just have to live with the ambiguities, which, I  
suppose, are not all that bad. The nouns purpose, intention and goal  
refer to both the reference signals and the state of the perceptions  
that corresponds to those reference signals. The verbs purpose and intend  
refer to the process (control) by which perceptual variables are brought  
to and maintained at a NEAR match with reference signals.

Best

Rick