# Test of variable under conflict

**URL:** <http://discourse.iapct.org/t/test-of-variable-under-conflict/11137>\
**Category:** CSG2000\
**Created:** [October 15, 2000, 5:39am UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/test-of-variable-under-conflict/11137 "2000-10-15T05:39:07Z")\
**Posts on this page:** 20\
**Page:** 3

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Richard\_Marken2](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/r/edb3f5/32.png) [@Richard\_Marken2](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Richard_Marken2)\
**Post date:** [October 26, 2000, 9:35pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/test-of-variable-under-conflict/11137/41 "2000-10-26T21:35:13Z")

</div>

[From Rick Marken (2000.10.26.1420)]

Me:

> the car negotiation between the IA and Tom started with  
> just one perception in dispute: money

Bruce Nevin (2000.10.26.1516 EDT)--

> In this, you are wrong. They started out controlling a  
> different set of variables. They came to control the same set  
> of variables. See above.

You seem to believe that there is, in principal, a "win win"  
(zero error for both parties) solution to all interpersonal  
conflicts and that such a solution can be achieved when the  
parties to the conflict stop controlling the perceptions that  
are producing the conflict ("different set of variables") and  
start controlling perceptions that allow solution of the  
conflict ("the same set of variables").

I've tried my best to disabuse you of this belief, going so far  
as to provide numerical examples, but it's now clear to me that  
I have as much chance of succeeding as I have of disabusing you  
of your belief in the non-coerciveness of "giving a child a  
choice". So, while I remain totally unconvinced by your  
arguments, in the spirit of "win win"-ism, I hereby declare  
both of us the winner of this debate.

Best

Rick

> **···**
>
> --  
> Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313  
> MindReadings.com mailto: marken@mindreadings.com  
> www.mindreadings.com

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![bnhpct](http://discourse.iapct.org/user_avatar/discourse.iapct.org/bnhpct/32/34_2.png) [@bnhpct](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/bnhpct)\
**Post date:** [October 26, 2000, 10:18pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/test-of-variable-under-conflict/11137/42 "2000-10-26T22:18:19Z")

</div>

[From Bruce Nevin (2000.10.26.1516 EDT)]

> [From Rick Marken (2000.10.23.1050)]
> 
> negotiation [is] an attempt to find settings for a  
> set of perceptions, p1..pn, that solve a set of simultaneous  
> equations, each equation representing total error as a  
> function of the references and perceptions for each party  
> to the negotiation. The equations are "solved" when the total  
> error produced by each is acceptably low for each equation  
> (party to the negotiation).
> 
> If there are settings for all perceptions, p1..pn, that result  
> in zero error (a "win") for all parties then I think it would  
> be better to call the process of finding this set a perceptual  
> values a \_problem solving\_ session rather than a \_negotiation\_  
> since there is really nothing to be negotiated; everyone can, in  
> fact, get exactly what they want and no one needs to give up  
> anything, in the sense of accepting a non-reference value of a  
> perception.
> 
> Does this make sense?

This is close to Fisher & Ury. One difference is that they tell you \*how\* to do it. They describe a few principles and how to control them so that the interaction is a "principled negotiation" rather than a conflict ("arguing from positions") whose best possible outcome is a lose-lose compromise.

Another difference is that one or more parties may start out controlling one set of perceptions and change to another set. For example, the Insurance Adjuster started out something like this:

&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;I go by the book.  
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Here's the range of values in the book for that year and model car.  
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Haggle.

"Haggle" goes something like this:

&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;I offer him the low end of the range.  
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;He's going to try to argue for more.  
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;My job is to resist and hold the disbursement down.

I think it's a reasonable guess that he offered the low end of the range and expected to resist Tom's haggling.

But then Tom didn't haggle. He said "I'm not asking for $4,000, or $3,000 or $5,000, but for fair compensation. Do you agree that it's only fair I get enough to replace the car?" Then he asked "How does the company figure that [amount]?" and he asked him to "state objectively why that amount is what I'm entitled to."

In the course of a principled negotiation, the Insurance Adjuster changed to something like this:

&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;The purpose is to replace his car.  
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;OK, here's an ad for that model and year, and the price is in the range.

And then this:

&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;What, specifically, are we replacing here?  
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;25,000 miles instead of 49,000 -- the book says add $150.  
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Plus a radio -- the book says add $125.  
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Plus air conditioning -- the book says ...

What did he change?

He still controls "I go by the book" and he's still in the range of values that the book specifies.

He already successfully controlled his low-ball starting point for haggling. That's history.

"He's going to try to argue for more and my job is to resist" turned out to be hard to control. This is what Fisher and Ury call "jujitsu". Tom wasn't standing in the position he expected; he pushed and Tom wasn't there. "Tom's not looking for a specific amount. He wants me to tell him how I know this is enough to replace the car."

He starts controlling "replace the car" so that he can answer that question. He wasn't controlling "replace the car" when he started. He was controlling "haggle," and the "haggle" control loop set the reference for "payment" to "the minimum the book allows". Now the control loop "replace the car" varies the reference for "payment". The range of variation for "payment" is still determined by his book -- the "objective reference" -- so he is still controlling "go by the book" with no error.

So in the course of \*communication\* the two sets of controlled variables come into congruence. The two parties start out with different net error values:

(1) (r11-p1)+(r12-p2)...(r1i-pi)(r1j-pj)...(r1m-pm)(r1n-pn)

(2) (r21-p1)+(r22-p2)...(r2i-pi)(r2k-pk)...(r2m-pm)

And they end up with net error values that are much closer to each other:

(1) (r11-p1)+(r12-p2)...(r1j-pj)(r1k-pk)...(r1n-pn)

(2) (r21-p1)+(r22-p2)...(r2j-pj)(r2k-pk)...(r2n-pn)

But this way of presenting "net error" misses an important point. It omits the hierarchy. It flattens all the reference signals out on one level. It doesn't show where the different reference values come from. Error (r1n-pn) sets the reference value r12, and error (r2n-pn) sets the reference value r22. In the course of \*communication\* ("principled negotiation") controller 2 has gone "up a level" to control pn ("Replace Tom's car"). Controller 2 has stopped controlling pi ("haggle"), so that error (r2i-pi) no longer sets the reference value r22 ("payment"). Notice that Controller 1 was also controlling pi, but as something to avoid as a matter of principled negotiation.

The course of principled negotiation is a form of MOL. For obvious reasons, this form is more firmly directed than the general form that Bill has pioneered. Instead of asking "what's behind that" etc., the principled negotiator asks "By what criteria do you determine that", etc.

That's one of the principles, "Insist on using objective criteria." Another is "Don't bargain over positions." When negotiators bargain over positions "Each side takes a position, argues for it, and makes concessions to reach a compromise" (Fisher & Ury, p. 3). The best outcome is that "both parties end up with an acceptable level of net [error]" (Rick Marken 2000.10.21.1830). Much more often one or more of the parties ends up with an unacceptable "net error".

The first principle Fisher & Ury mention is "Don't bargain over positions" because (p. 5) "As more attention is paid to positions, less attention is devoted to meeting the underlying concerns of the parties." The resulting agreements are unwise, that is, they are not "carefully crafted to meet the legitimate interests of the parties." Arguing over positions is inefficient and time consuming, and it endangers an ongoing relationship. Bargaining over positions makes it difficult to go up a level. Any thoughts about what is behind the position are resisted as distractions from the position.

Some of the other principles are:

\* Separate the people from the problem. We've talked about insults and ad hominem arguments a fair amount here. I think that's a lot of what is avoided when people say they are avoiding conflict. But this does not mean to avoid personal issues. It means to distinguish them from the substantive issues, and to deal with each separately on its own terms.

\* Invent options for mutual gain. This is an obvious contributor to win-win solutions. This is also a specific way in which principled negotiation is more directed than MOL. Options for mutual gain are usually "up a level" from issues in contention.

\* If they are more powerful, develop your best alternative to a negotiated agreement (BATNA).

Most of the functions of the BATNA have nothing to do with threat. The BATNA gives you an escape route; knowing it, you can negotiate more confidently. It gives a standard against which to measure any proposed agreement. They describe other benefits of developing your BATNA. You do not disclose it to the other person if it is worse for you than they think your alternatives to negotiation are. Usually disclosing the BATNA does not amount to threat, beyond the mere threat of breaking off negotiations.

These are not descriptions that apply to every negotiation. They are prescriptions for making negotiations more beneficial for all participants, and they propose an account of why many negotiations fail in this.

Rick Marken (2000.10.23.1050)--

> I think it would  
> be better to call the process of finding this set a perceptual  
> values a \_problem solving\_ session rather than a \_negotiation\_

Every negotiation is a problem-solving session. Some are more skillful than others.

Rick Marken (2000.10.26.0930)--

> the car  
> negotiation between the IA and Tom started with just one perception  
> in dispute: money

In this, you are wrong. They started out controlling a different set of variables. They came to control the same set of variables. See above.

"Reframing" was not Fisher and Ury's term. I introduced it to this discussion. And I also respectfully disagree with you, Dick, that it is necessarily "emotionally neutral", though this may be an especially useful form of it in clinical settings with emotionally disturbed people. In those settings there may be some cousin relationship to "spin" and I am specifically not referring to that kind of reframing. "what is really going on" for one person is not necessarily the same as "what is really going on" for the other. The success of a negotiation depends in part upon the degree that the parties find out "what is really going on" for each other in respect to whatever is in dispute. Thus, controlling pn and pi in the schematic "net error" example.

&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Bruce Nevin

> **···**
>
> At 11:05 AM 10/23/2000 -0700, Richard S. Marken wrote:

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Bill\_Curry1](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/b/9d8465/32.png) [@Bill\_Curry1](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Bill_Curry1)\
**Post date:** [October 27, 2000, 12:04am UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/test-of-variable-under-conflict/11137/43 "2000-10-27T00:04:18Z")

</div>

[Bill Curry (2000.10.26.00.1935 EDT)]

> Rick Marken (2000.10.26.1420)--
> 
> \> the car negotiation between the IA and Tom started with  
> \> just one perception in dispute: money
> 
> Bruce Nevin (2000.10.26.1516 EDT)
> 
> \> In this, you are wrong. They started out controlling a  
> \> different set of variables. They came to control the same set  
> \> of variables. See above.
> 
> You seem to believe that there is, in principal, a "win win"  
> (zero error for both parties) solution to all interpersonal  
> conflicts and that such a solution can be achieved when the  
> parties to the conflict stop controlling the perceptions that  
> are producing the conflict ("different set of variables") and  
> start controlling perceptions that allow solution of the  
> conflict ("the same set of variables").

Where did Bruce imply such a broad conclusion? My read is that he has  
been discussing a \_particular type\_ of negotiation (principled  
negotiation as in the Fisher & Ury approach). You collapsed the example  
down to a single disputed variable (money) which set the situation up as  
a "lose-lose" positional negotiation that supports your analysis. Why  
don't you back up and take another shot at it Rick -- using the data  
provided? 😉

> I've tried my best to disabuse you of this belief...

Do I understand you to believe that there can \_never\_ be a "win-win"  
outcome to a negotiation (where win means an outcome equal or  
\_equivalent to\_ the parties' initial controlled perceptions)?

Finally, your brief response did not comment on Bruce's hierarchical  
reference setting analysis in a principled negotiation. What do you  
think of his proposal?

Regards,

Bill C.

> **···**
>
> --  
> William J. Curry  
> Capticom, Inc.  
> capticom@landmarknet.net

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Richard\_Marken2](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/r/edb3f5/32.png) [@Richard\_Marken2](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Richard_Marken2)\
**Post date:** [October 27, 2000, 5:55am UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/test-of-variable-under-conflict/11137/44 "2000-10-27T05:55:17Z")

</div>

[From Rick Marken (2000.10.26.2150)]

Bill Curry (2000.10.26.00.1935 EDT)

> Where did Bruce imply such a broad conclusion? My read is  
> that he has been discussing a \_particular type\_ of negotiation  
> (principled negotiation as in the Fisher & Ury approach). You  
> collapsed the example down to a single disputed variable (money)  
> which set the situation up as a "lose-lose" positional negotiation  
> that supports your analysis. Why don't you back up and take  
> another shot at it Rick -- using the data provided? 😉

I think I have already taken my best "shot". The "data" are  
completely consistent with the quantitative analysis I provided  
this morning [Rick Marken (2000.10.26.0930)]. I think it would now  
be best if you and Bruce used your knowledge of PCT to demonstrate  
quantitatively the nature of negotiated conflict resolution to  
yourselves. There's nothing more I can do to convince you that  
"lose-lose" is the only possible way to solve real conflicts.

> Do I understand you to believe that there can \_never\_ be a  
> "win-win" outcome to a negotiation (where win means an outcome  
> equal or \_equivalent to\_ the parties' initial controlled  
> perceptions)?

This makes no sense. You must mean that a "win" is an outcome  
(controlled perception) that is equivalent to one party's initial  
\_reference\_ for the state of that outcome (that is, a "win" is, as  
I said, zero error in a control system). Assuming that that's  
what you mean then: yes, I not only believe, I \_know\_ that there  
can \_never\_ be a "win-win" outcome to a negotiation where there  
is a \_real\_ conflict between the parties (a real conflict exists  
when there are one or more outcomes that all parties want in  
different reference states). If you think otherwise, I'd sure  
like to see a quantitative demonstration of how you think "win-  
win" works.

> Finally, your brief response did not comment on Bruce's  
> hierarchical reference setting analysis in a principled  
> negotiation. What do you think of his proposal?

The best I can say about it is that I didn't understand how this  
hierarchical analysis would eliminate the need to compromise.  
It seemed to me that Bruce was saying that the conflict goes  
away when the parties to the conflict stop controlling the lower  
level variables that are in dispute and start controlling a  
higher level variable that is not. This sounds to me a lot like "and  
then a miracle occurs". There is no mechanism in the hierarchical  
control model that abandons control of certain variables in favor  
of control of some higher level variable. I would need to see  
a model of the process that Bruce has in mind before I could say  
anything about it.

But the proposal makes very little sense in terms of my own experience  
anyway. I don't stop controlling lower level perceptions just because  
I am able to see those perceptions as the means of controlling  
higher level perceptions. I don't stop controlling how much money  
I have, for example, just because I can see that the money can be  
used to achieve a higher level goal, like replacing a person's  
damaged car.

I gave a verbal description of another scenario based on Bruce's  
verbal description of the "up a level" process [Rick Marken  
(2000.10.19.1530)] and Bruce thought it was a satire. I think  
this reveals the actual merits of this "up a level" process when  
approached without preconceptions about how it should work out.

Why not just be honest about the fact that a negotiated settlement  
to a conflict requires compromise? It seems to me that parties  
to a negotiation should know that they are not going to walk out  
with exactly what they wanted coming into the negotiation; if they  
think otherwie they may never compromise.

The result of a successful negotiation is that all the parties  
get \_almost\_ what they want; the parties should certainly be  
better off after the negotiation (in terms of the closeness of  
their controlled perceptions to their references) than before it.  
In this sense, the parties to a successful negotiation all win;  
all parties have \_less\_ error after the negotiation than before  
it. I can't see it helping a negotiation, however, if all the  
parties go in thinking that they are going to get everything they  
want -- that they won't have to compromise-- when that can't  
possibly be the result of the negotiation.

Best

Rick

> **···**
>
> --  
> Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313  
> Life Learning Associates e-mail: marken@mindreadings.com  
> mindreadings.com

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Bill\_Curry1](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/b/9d8465/32.png) [@Bill\_Curry1](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Bill_Curry1)\
**Post date:** [October 27, 2000, 4:58pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/test-of-variable-under-conflict/11137/45 "2000-10-27T16:58:55Z")

</div>

Bruce,

> Bruce Nevin (2000.10.28.0047 EDT)]
> 
> We have been talking about two different phenomena.
> 
> This is my understanding of your position. Negotiation is a process in  
> which none of the parties is permitted to go up a level. To resolve their  
> conflict, one or more of them must accept some error in their control of  
> the contested variable. On this definition, your model of negotiation seems  
> perfectly reasonable.
> 
> What Fisher and Ury call "principled negotiation" is not negotiation at  
> all. It is a form of problem solving in which the parties are permitted to  
> go up a level.
> 
> The Insurance Adjuster expected a conflict in which Tom would negotiate  
> (haggle) over the payment variable. Tom insisted on problem-solving, making  
> it clear that he was controlling to replace his car.
> 
> The Insurance Agent stopped his efforts to negotiate (haggle) when he  
> joined Tom in problem solving.
> 
> I'm glad that we are in agreement about what a model of negotiation or  
> haggling might look like. I am interested in talking about problem solving.

Excellent up-a-level "problem-solving"! Rather imagine that Rick is striving  
mightily about now to avoid your dastardly win-win solution 😉

Bill C.

> **···**
>
> --  
> William J. Curry  
> Capticom, Inc.  
> capticom@landmarknet.net

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![bnhpct](http://discourse.iapct.org/user_avatar/discourse.iapct.org/bnhpct/32/34_2.png) [@bnhpct](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/bnhpct)\
**Post date:** [October 27, 2000, 5:25pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/test-of-variable-under-conflict/11137/46 "2000-10-27T17:25:13Z")

</div>

[From Bruce Nevin (2000.10.28.0047 EDT)]

We have been talking about two different phenomena.

This is my understanding of your position. Negotiation is a process in which none of the parties is permitted to go up a level. To resolve their conflict, one or more of them must accept some error in their control of the contested variable. On this definition, your model of negotiation seems perfectly reasonable.

What Fisher and Ury call "principled negotiation" is not negotiation at all. It is a form of problem solving in which the parties are permitted to go up a level.

The Insurance Adjuster expected a conflict in which Tom would negotiate (haggle) over the payment variable. Tom insisted on problem-solving, making it clear that he was controlling to replace his car.

The Insurance Agent stopped his efforts to negotiate (haggle) when he joined Tom in problem solving.

I'm glad that we are in agreement about what a model of negotiation or haggling might look like. I am interested in talking about problem solving.

&nbsp;&nbsp;Bruce Nevin

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Richard\_Marken2](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/r/edb3f5/32.png) [@Richard\_Marken2](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Richard_Marken2)\
**Post date:** [October 27, 2000, 5:50pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/test-of-variable-under-conflict/11137/47 "2000-10-27T17:50:08Z")

</div>

[From Rick Marken (2000.10.27.1030)]

Bruce Nevin (2000.10.28.0047 EDT)

> This is my understanding of your position. Negotiation is a  
> process in which none of the parties is permitted to go up a level.

Not my position at all.

> To resolve their conflict, one or more of them must accept some  
> error in their control of the contested variable.

Correct. That's my position. Going up a level does not remove  
the need to resolve the existing conflict.

> What Fisher and Ury call "principled negotiation" is not  
> negotiation at all. It is a form of problem solving in which  
> the parties are permitted to go up a level.

You have not shown me how "going up a level" eliminates the  
need to resolve the lower level conflict by compromise. Perhaps  
you don't understand what "up a level" means. Going up a level  
is a consciousness phenomenon. When a person goes "up a level"  
and discovers that they have conflicting goals within themselves,  
the conflict doesn't just "go away". The person who goes "up a  
level" becomes aware of the fact that they are trying to achieve  
conflicting goals. Then (maybe) the person figures out ways to  
\_deal with\_ this intrapersonal conflict.

The way people deal with intrapersonal conflict after becoming aware  
of such conflict by going up a level, often involves \_compromise\_.  
Both goals cannot be achieved at the same time, for example,  
so the compromise is to achieve one goal and then the other.  
The systems involved don't (and can't) get exactly what they want  
(perceptions X and Y right now); so the solution is a compromise.

The same is true in the solution of interpersonal conflict. The  
fact that people have entered into negotiations \_at all\_ is  
evidence that the parties have gone "up a level", recognized  
that they are \_in conflict\_ and are now prepared to work on  
methods for resolving the conflict.

\_Up a level\_ does not mean becoming aware of a higher level  
perception that can be controlled without conflict so that  
control of the lower level perceptions in conflict can be  
dropped. This is an invention, apparently aimed at making the  
Fisher/Ury approach to negotiation seem consistent with PCT.  
It's not.

> I'm glad that we are in agreement about what a model of  
> negotiation or haggling might look like. I am interested in  
> talking about problem solving.

"Problem solving" rather than "negotiation" occurs in a conflict  
situation when it turns out that there \_is\_ a solution (values for  
p1..pn) to the simultaneous equations that define the conflict  
domain such that the total error for each party to the negotiation  
equals zero. There may be such a solution but this typically can't  
be known in advance. But I would guess that in most negotiations there  
is no such solution. The best that can be expected is that the total  
error for each party \_after\_ the negotiation will be less (given  
the changed settings of p1...pn) than it was before the negotiation.

Best

Rick

> **···**
>
> --  
> Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313  
> MindReadings.com mailto: marken@mindreadings.com  
> www.mindreadings.com

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Bill\_Curry1](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/b/9d8465/32.png) [@Bill\_Curry1](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Bill_Curry1)\
**Post date:** [October 27, 2000, 6:16pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/test-of-variable-under-conflict/11137/48 "2000-10-27T18:16:04Z")

</div>

Bruce,

By adopting Rick's definition of negotiation, and by further describing  
the F&U principled negotiation example as a problem-solving exercise, it  
appeared to me that you went up a level and resolved your conflict with  
Rick in a manner that created a win-win solution. Presumably, you both  
would be satisfied with such an outcome. On several occasions in this  
thread, Rick has asserted that win-win conflict negotiations are not  
possible, and therefore, I imagined that he might find it problematic to  
be a party to this one.

Apparently I imputed more cleverness to your post than you intended.  
Ahh...the vagaries of perception!

Bill C.

> **···**
>
> --  
> William J. Curry  
> Capticom, Inc.  
> [capticom@landmarknet.net](mailto:capticom@landmarknet.net)

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Bill\_Curry1](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/b/9d8465/32.png) [@Bill\_Curry1](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Bill_Curry1)\
**Post date:** [October 27, 2000, 7:44pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/test-of-variable-under-conflict/11137/49 "2000-10-27T19:44:47Z")

</div>

Bruce Nevin wrote:

> Ah. You're assuming that he acknowledges that it is a win-win solution.

Alas, a vain hope, though I was confident that he wouldn't do it publicly

> I doubt he will do that.

Right you are.

> My question still is why. What disturbance is he  
> resisting? What variable is he keeping in what preferred state by this  
> resistance?

IMO, Rick is controlling for his perceptions of PCT correctness. Through  
this prism he sees other people cloaking their preconceptions in PCT garb to  
justify them even if the clothes don't fit. This is why he keeps picking at  
the old choice scab...he sees the issue from only one perspective, that of  
the enforced pseudo-choice, and he is positively galled by any other PCT  
interpretations.

Bill

> **···**
>
> --  
> William J. Curry  
> Capticom, Inc.  
> capticom@landmarknet.net

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Bill\_Powers1](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/b/8e7dd6/32.png) [@Bill\_Powers1](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Bill_Powers1)\
**Post date:** [October 27, 2000, 9:52pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/test-of-variable-under-conflict/11137/50 "2000-10-27T21:52:07Z")

</div>

[From Bill Powers (2000.10.27.1528 MDT)]

Rick Marken (2000.10.26.2150)

> This makes no sense. You must mean that a "win" is an outcome  
> (controlled perception) that is equivalent to one party's initial  
> \_reference\_ for the state of that outcome (that is, a "win" is, as  
> I said, zero error in a control system). Assuming that that's  
> what you mean then: yes, I not only believe, I \_know\_ that there  
> can \_never\_ be a "win-win" outcome to a negotiation where there  
> is a \_real\_ conflict between the parties (a real conflict exists  
> when there are one or more outcomes that all parties want in  
> different reference states). If you think otherwise, I'd sure  
> like to see a quantitative demonstration of how you think "win-  
> win" works.

Obviously, to a disinterested and possibly uninterested bystander, the  
conditions you assume are not those that Bruce (or Bill or whoever)  
assumes. If they agreed with your assumptions, they would agree with your  
conclusions, since they are just as smart as you are. The initial reference  
conditions are \_not\_ assumed to be retained; new reference conditions are  
substituted, often by going up a level and redefining the problem both  
people are having with the situation. The concept of "win-win" does not  
mean that one of the original reference conditions prevails over the other.  
It means that both parties can agree, afterward, that what they \_really\_  
wanted (as opposed to the lower level goals which were only means to an  
end) has been satisfied.

> The best I can say about it is that I didn't understand how this  
> hierarchical analysis would eliminate the need to compromise.

That's because you are not considering the possibility that a higher goal  
is more important to the negotiating parties than either of the original  
lower-level positions. King Solomon's solution of the conflict between two  
women each of whom claimed the same infant as her child is a perfect example.  
By proposing that the child be cut in two and shared between the women,  
Solomon reminded everyone of the higher goals involved, beyond mere  
possession of the child.

> There is no mechanism in the hierarchical  
> control model that abandons control of certain variables in favor  
> of control of some higher level variable.

Should read "... in favor of some \_other\_ lower variables such that both  
higher-level variables can be controlled at the same time." This is  
equivalent to rewriting the equations with which you represented the  
original situation. If you change the situation, you change the conflict.

> But the proposal makes very little sense in terms of my own experience  
> anyway. I don't stop controlling lower level perceptions just because  
> I am able to see those perceptions as the means of controlling  
> higher level perceptions.

It would be interesting to see what you do when, driving to work by your  
usual route, you encounter a Detour sign.

> Why not just be honest about the fact that a negotiated settlement  
> to a conflict requires compromise?

OK, There is one ice cream cone and Joe and Sally both want it. Can you  
think of a solution that resolves this conflict without requiring any  
compromise at all? I can. All you have to do is change one (unspoken)  
condition. It's always the unspoken conditions that prevent resolution of  
conflicts. Like for example, does someone have to win this argument about  
resolving conflicts?

Best,

Bill P.

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![bnhpct](http://discourse.iapct.org/user_avatar/discourse.iapct.org/bnhpct/32/34_2.png) [@bnhpct](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/bnhpct)\
**Post date:** [October 27, 2000, 10:09pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/test-of-variable-under-conflict/11137/51 "2000-10-27T22:09:28Z")

</div>

Ah. You're assuming that he acknowledges that it is a win-win solution. I doubt he will do that. My question still is why. What disturbance is he resisting? What variable is he keeping in what preferred state by this resistance?

&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Bruce

> **···**
>
> At 02:16 PM 10/27/2000 -0400, Bill Curry wrote:
> 
> > Bruce,
> > 
> > By adopting Rick's definition of negotiation, and by further describing  
> > the F&U principled negotiation example as a problem-solving exercise, it  
> > appeared to me that you went up a level and resolved your conflict with  
> > Rick in a manner that created a win-win solution. Presumably, you both  
> > would be satisfied with such an outcome. On several occasions in this  
> > thread, Rick has asserted that win-win conflict negotiations are not  
> > possible, and therefore, I imagined that he might find it problematic to  
> > be a party to this one.
> > 
> > Apparently I imputed more cleverness to your post than you intended.  
> > Ahh...the vagaries of perception!
> > 
> > Bill C.  
> > --  
> > William J. Curry  
> > Capticom, Inc.  
> > capticom@landmarknet.net

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![bnhpct](http://discourse.iapct.org/user_avatar/discourse.iapct.org/bnhpct/32/34_2.png) [@bnhpct](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/bnhpct)\
**Post date:** [October 28, 2000, 7:15am UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/test-of-variable-under-conflict/11137/52 "2000-10-28T07:15:12Z")

</div>

[From Bruce Nevin (2000.10.29.0014 EDT)]

Rick Marken (2000.10.27.1030)

> **···**
>
> At 10:50 AM 10/27/2000 -0700, Richard S. Marken wrote:
> 
> > \> This is my understanding of your position. Negotiation is a  
> > \> process in which none of the parties is permitted to go up a level.
> > 
> > Not my position at all.
> 
> If one of the parties goes up a level, then we are no longer talking about negotiation as you define it. Therefore, in order to talk about negotiation as you define it -- conflict, such that one or more of them must accept some error in their control of the contested variable -- none of the parties is permitted to go up a level.
> 
> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Bruce Nevin

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Bruce\_Gregory8](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/b/5f8ce5/32.png) [@Bruce\_Gregory8](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Bruce_Gregory8)\
**Post date:** [October 28, 2000, 2:55pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/test-of-variable-under-conflict/11137/53 "2000-10-28T14:55:25Z")

</div>

[From Bruce Gregory (2000.1028.1055)]

> Bruce Nevin (2000.10.29.0014 EDT)
> 
> Rick Marken (2000.10.27.1030)
> 
> > \> This is my understanding of your position. Negotiation is a  
> > \> process in which none of the parties is permitted to go up a level.
> > 
> > Not my position at all.
> 
> If one of the parties goes up a level, then we are no longer talking about  
> negotiation as you define it. Therefore, in order to talk about negotiation  
> as you define it -- conflict, such that one or more of them must accept  
> some error in their control of the contested variable -- none of the  
> parties is permitted to go up a level.

If I understand "going up a level" (a big "if") it involves moving one's  
attention to a higher level in the control hierarchy. As such, it says  
nothing about altering outcomes or lower level reference levels. Perhaps  
someone can correct this misunderstanding, if it is one.

BG

> **···**
>
> > At 10:50 AM 10/27/2000 -0700, Richard S. Marken wrote:

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Richard\_Marken2](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/r/edb3f5/32.png) [@Richard\_Marken2](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Richard_Marken2)\
**Post date:** [October 28, 2000, 5:34pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/test-of-variable-under-conflict/11137/54 "2000-10-28T17:34:30Z")

</div>

[From Rick Marken (2000.10.28.0930)]

Bill Powers (2000.10.27.1519 MDT)

> I would say that a "conflict between theories or paradigms"  
> (a scientific conflict) is an intrapersonal conflict.

Yes. I agree. In the lab, it's an intrapersonal conflict. In  
the "streets" it sometimes becomes an interpersonal conflict.

Bill Powers (2000.10.27.1528 MDT)--

> The concept of "win-win" does not mean that one of the original  
> reference conditions prevails over the other. It means that both  
> parties can agree, afterward, that what they \_really\_ wanted (as  
> opposed to the lower level goals which were only means to an  
> end) has been satisfied.

Yes. But doesn't this require that the parties \_really\_ wanted  
higher level goals that could be satisfied by finding commonly  
acceptable (and acheivable) settings of the lower level  
references?

> By proposing that the child be cut in two and shared between  
> the women, Solomon reminded everyone of the higher goals  
> involved, beyond mere possession of the child.

I don't see this as a "win win" solution. The true mother  
did go up a level and was willing to give up the baby to  
save it's life. So the true mother compromised big time.  
Solomon made this compromise pay off for the true mother by  
returning the baby to her; so there was no high level or low  
level error for the true mother.

The false would have won the conflict (by having seeing the  
true mother deprived of the baby) but she was forced to experience  
the error of being deprived of the baby. So the result of this  
"up a level negotation" was "win" (for the true mother) and  
"lose" for the false one. If Solomon had not intervened the  
result would have been the opposite: "win" for the false mother  
and "lose" for the true one.

Me:

> But the proposal makes very little sense in terms of my own  
> experience anyway. I don't stop controlling lower level  
> erceptions just because I am able to see those perceptions as  
> the means of controlling higher level perceptions.

Bill:

> It would be interesting to see what you do when, driving to  
> work by your usual route, you encounter a Detour sign.

It just happened yesterday morning. But I wouldn;t say that  
I \_stopped\_ controlling lower level perceptions, like "direction";  
I just changed the references for these perceptions (from "toward  
left lane" to "toward offramp", for example) to compensate for the  
disturbance to the higher level perception I was controlling  
("arriving at work").

Me:

> Why not just be honest about the fact that a negotiated settlement  
> to a conflict requires compromise?

Bill:

> OK, There is one ice cream cone and Joe and Sally both want it.  
> Can you think of a solution that resolves this conflict without  
> requiring any compromise at all?

Actually, I can't.

> I can.

There has never been any question in my mind that you are  
smarter than me;-)

> All you have to do is change one (unspoken) condition.

Is it the unspoken condition that it must be the \_same\_ ice  
cream cone? If this is true, then there was no real conflict,  
in my opinion, just ignorance of the fact that there was more  
ice cream to be had from behind the counter.

Another unsoken assumption may be that it has to be the \_whole\_  
ice cream cone. But what if Joe and Sally really do want a nice,  
whole ice cream cone (rather than a messy, cut in half one or  
the remnants of one that Joe or Sally have been licking); then  
getting part of the ice cream cone involves compromise, no?

Another unspoken assumption may be that what is really wanted  
is "a treat". So you might let Sally have the cone and let  
Joe have a Cookie. This \_would\_ be a "win win" solution if  
cones and cookies are fungible for Joe and if neither party  
is jealous of the other getting the ice cream cone.

Anyway, I would like to hear your solution to the ice cream cone  
conflict that requires no compromise at all.

Best

Rick

> **···**
>
> --  
> Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313  
> Life Learning Associates e-mail: marken@mindreadings.com  
> mindreadings.com

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Bruce\_Gregory8](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/b/5f8ce5/32.png) [@Bruce\_Gregory8](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Bruce_Gregory8)\
**Post date:** [October 28, 2000, 6:29pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/test-of-variable-under-conflict/11137/55 "2000-10-28T18:29:50Z")

</div>

[From Bruce Gregory (2000.1028.1430)]

> Bruce Nevin (2000.10.28.1235 EDT)
> 
> Up a level from there is where those non-conflicting references are set.  
> Going up to this third level enables "something to happen" as a result of  
> which the references just below are re-set. For example, one might start a  
> sequence of alternating tasks. This particular change happens quickly and  
> without pause so I suspect that it is a familiar multi-purpose perception  
> that is used e.g. for alternating eating and talking, drinking and  
> breathing, and so on.

I guess I don't understand why it is necessary to "go up a level" if this  
portion of the hierarchy is already in place. Why doesn't it perform its  
alternation without the need for attention?

BG

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![bnhpct](http://discourse.iapct.org/user_avatar/discourse.iapct.org/bnhpct/32/34_2.png) [@bnhpct](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/bnhpct)\
**Post date:** [October 28, 2000, 7:36pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/test-of-variable-under-conflict/11137/56 "2000-10-28T19:36:06Z")

</div>

[From Bruce Nevin (2000.10.28.1235 EDT)]

> Bruce Gregory (2000.1028.1055)  
> "going up a level" (a big "if") ... involves moving one's  
> attention to a higher level in the control hierarchy. As such, it says  
> nothing about altering outcomes or lower level reference levels.

\<type type sardonic type type snarl type type type ironic type type\>  
\<Ice cream is set beside keyboard.\>  
\<Look at ice cream.\>  
\<Look at keyboard.\>  
\<Type rest of sentence.\>  
\<Look at ice cream.\>  
\<Take bite of ice cream.  
\<type type type type type\>  
\<Take bite of ice cream.  
\<type typetypetype type typetype typetypetype\>  
\<Take bite of ice cream.  
\<typetypetypetype typety 🙂 typety typetypetypetype snigger type\>  
.  
\<Take bite of ice cream.  
"Is there any more?"

I don't understand the specific process that happens once attention is focussed at the higher level. It seems to be "do something that will make this conflict go away." The "something" may be familiar and reached without pause, or it may be reached with reorganization, or one may fall back on the most primitive default, avoidance (flight).

There is the level at which the conflict occurs (use hands to type; use one hand to eat ice cream). With conflict, attention first goes down to this level.

Back up a level from there is where the conflicting references are set (answer so-and-so's note; enjoy flavor, texture, good feelings associated with elevated blood sugar, and besides it's going to melt). Going back to this level is not sufficient for resolution.

Up a level from there is where those non-conflicting references are set. Going up to this third level enables "something to happen" as a result of which the references just below are re-set. For example, one might start a sequence of alternating tasks. This particular change happens quickly and without pause so I suspect that it is a familiar multi-purpose perception that is used e.g. for alternating eating and talking, drinking and breathing, and so on.

&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Bruce Nevin

> **···**
>
> At 10:55 AM 10/28/2000 -0400, Bruce Gregory wrote:

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![bnhpct](http://discourse.iapct.org/user_avatar/discourse.iapct.org/bnhpct/32/34_2.png) [@bnhpct](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/bnhpct)\
**Post date:** [October 29, 2000, 3:12am UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/test-of-variable-under-conflict/11137/57 "2000-10-29T03:12:06Z")

</div>

[From Bruce Nevin (2000.10.28.2011 EDT)]

Bruce Gregory (2000.1028.1430)--

> I guess I don't understand why it is necessary to "go up a level" if this portion of the hierarchy is already in place. Why doesn't it perform its  
> alternation without the need for attention?

In this case, maybe it does.

But why is there a moment of hesitation? Why doesn't the sequence begin without pause the moment the ice cream arrives? Is it possible that the pause, and the looking at both places where you want your hand to be, is evidence of going up a level?

The pause is slight. This may be evidence that for eating and typing, the solution to the conflict is so familiar as to be obvious. For a different conflict the hesitation may be longer -- maybe an example is get out of the way of the fire truck vs. wait for the red light.

Of course, in a slightly different situation the sequence {eat-type-eat ...} would begin without pause. Interesting question: what are those differences? I would say there is no pause if you are expecting the ice cream and you are anticipating eating it while typing. I think what that means specifically is that you are controlling the alternating sequence of eating and typing in imagination before the ice cream arrives, and then after it is set down you control actual inputs instead of imagined ones. How would you test that? You might compare the times to start the alternation with three different "set" conditions: the ice cream is unexpected, it is expected, and the person is asked to consciously imagine the alternation beforehand. In all cases there is some urgency to complete the typing (so the person doesn't stop and eat it all, then resume typing), but the understanding that it's ok to eat while typing. The setting should be naturalistic and un-lablike, I should think. I don't know if this would be an adequate test. Do you?

Interesting question: how does a "general-purpose" function get the perceptual input signals for a specific purpose? If we say that its input is a category perception, the inputs to the alternation posited here would be an extremely broad category. But perhaps there are sequence perceptions specialized for alternating uses of the hands. If so, that could be tested by using some means other than the hands. One would expect alternating use of some other instrumentality to require a longer hesitation.

Subjectively, it seems like attention goes to the point of conflict as a kind of  
"What's stopping my hand from moving?"  
"What's stopping my hand from moving in order to { type | feed me }."  
"What's stopping me from { typing | eating }?"  
"Oh: just interrupt for a spoonful now and then. I know how to do that."  
"Without interrupting my train of thought ... which was ... oh, right ... "

&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Bruce Nevin

> **···**
>
> At 02:29 PM 10/28/2000 -0400, Bruce Gregory wrote:

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Richard\_Marken2](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/r/edb3f5/32.png) [@Richard\_Marken2](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Richard_Marken2)\
**Post date:** [October 29, 2000, 3:53am UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/test-of-variable-under-conflict/11137/58 "2000-10-29T03:53:53Z")

</div>

[From Rick Marken (2000.10.28.1950 PDT)]

Bruce Nevin (2000.10.29.0014 EDT)--

> If one of the parties goes up a level, then we are no longer  
> talking about negotiation as you define it...

Bruce Gregory (2000.1028.1055)--

> If I understand "going up a level" (a big "if") it involves  
> moving one's attention to a higher level in the control hierarchy.  
> As such, it says nothing about altering outcomes or lower level  
> reference levels. Perhaps someone can correct this misunderstanding,  
> if it is one.

I think your understanding of "up a level" is perfectly correct;  
even better than Bill Powers', for my money;-)

Best

Rick

> **···**
>
> --  
> Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313  
> Life Learning Associates e-mail: marken@mindreadings.com  
> mindreadings.com

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![bnhpct](http://discourse.iapct.org/user_avatar/discourse.iapct.org/bnhpct/32/34_2.png) [@bnhpct](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/bnhpct)\
**Post date:** [October 29, 2000, 7:17am UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/test-of-variable-under-conflict/11137/59 "2000-10-29T07:17:47Z")

</div>

[From Bruce Nevin (2000.10.29.0017 EDT)]

Rick Marken (2000.10.28.0930)--

> Bill Powers (2000.10.27.1528 MDT)--
> 
> \> The concept of "win-win" does not mean that one of the original  
> \> reference conditions prevails over the other. It means that both  
> \> parties can agree, afterward, that what they \_really\_ wanted (as  
> \> opposed to the lower level goals which were only means to an  
> \> end) has been satisfied.
> 
> Yes. But doesn't this require that the parties \_really\_ wanted  
> higher level goals that could be satisfied by finding commonly  
> acceptable (and acheivable) settings of the lower level  
> references?

Yes. As opposed to other higher level goals that could not be so satisfied. It's a pleasant discovery. Those other higher level goals were the end to which Bill referred:

\> the lower level goals ... were only means to an end)

&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Bruce Nevin

> **···**
>
> At 09:34 AM 10/28/2000 -0800, Rick Marken wrote:

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Bill\_Powers1](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/b/8e7dd6/32.png) [@Bill\_Powers1](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Bill_Powers1)\
**Post date:** [October 29, 2000, 10:35am UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/test-of-variable-under-conflict/11137/60 "2000-10-29T10:35:21Z")

</div>

[From Bill Powers (2000.10.29.0305 MST)]

Bruce Gregory (2000.1028.1430)--

> > Going up to this third level enables "something to happen" as a result of  
> > which the references just below are re-set. ...

> I guess I don't understand why it is necessary to "go up a level" if this  
> portion of the hierarchy is already in place. Why doesn't it perform its  
> alternation without the need for attention?

The principle I have proposed is that reorganization follows awareness. It  
is awareness that "goes up a level." In doing so, it potentially moves the  
locus of reorganization up a level (if there is enough error to produce  
reorganization). The hierarchy is already working at all levels at the same  
time, regardless of where awareness is located. If its operation is keeping  
all errors small, nothing will change when awareness goes up a level  
(except the way the world looks to the Observer). If, however, there is a  
problem, a chronic error, moving the locus of reorganization up a level  
might cause a reorganization that results in the error's being corrected.  
Whether it does depends on whether the new level is the highest one at  
which the problem is being caused.

It's simplest to think in terms of e. coli reorganization, but we should  
remember that there may also be systematic means of changing system  
parameters and connectivity. I'm thinking of "problem-solving," in which we  
try to find out what has gone wrong (in the world or in our way of dealing  
with it) by experimenting with different solutions, each one based on a  
tentative concept of how the system is working -- a provisional model. Why  
won't this bearing-retainer nut come loose even though I'm banging on the  
wrench with a lead mallet as hard as I can? Ahah! Maybe it's a left-hand  
thread and all my banging is doing is tightening it. So bang the other way,  
and voila!

Of course the "ahah" may well represent the outcome of a moment of random  
reorganization, the one that tossed up a new idea worth trying. But I know  
that in electronics and programming there are some principles of  
troubleshooting that increase the likelihood of discovering what is wrong,  
such as looking first at the last thing you changed. At the higher levels,  
the content of thought governs the organization of behavior just as much as  
the brain's wiring does -- reprogramming a computer does not alter the  
physical organization of the computer, yet it effectively makes it into a  
different machine.

The principle of reorganization following awareness still applies even if  
the reorganizing process in question is not random. If that principle is  
correct, it would explain why it is that we have to become conscious of the  
nature of a problem -- and at the right level -- before we can start trying  
to solve it.

Best,

Bill P.

[Previous page](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/test-of-variable-under-conflict/11137.md?page=2)

[Next page](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/test-of-variable-under-conflict/11137.md?page=4)