The Behavioural Illusion and modelling

MartinT · September 3, 2016, 4:34pm

[Martin Taylor 2016.09.02.16.15]

I doubt that, given what you say above. In the larger paragraph, I

see no conceptual connection between the first sentence and the
second. Could you explain where you see a connection?
If I am allowed to reinterpret my own writing, I intended “According
to PCT” to mean the same as various conditionals I considered using,
such as “If one accepts the mantra of PCT that all behaviour is the
control of perception”, and “Considering just those actions that are
intended and are therefore for the control of perception”, but I
figured that in this group the shorter form would be taken as
equivalent to the others.
However, even supposing that PCT were averred by some omniscient
being to be absolutely correct, I would still not see the connection
between that and "

···

On 2016/09/2 3:51 PM, Alex Gomez-Marin
wrote:

      Martin,
I also like all these analogies and images, which are great
for didactic presentations, etc.

        The
point is that if "* According to PCT, the output behaviour
is always action to influence some controlled variable(s)
toward its/their reference value(s)* " then there is
nothing else to say… Namely, if BY CONSTRUCTION OF
INTERPRETATION (and I agree there is truth in that
interpretation, but not absolute truth!), ** if output is
always illusion, then, of course, the power-law is an
illusion** (namely, it is indeed output…). If you all
prefer to use the word ILLUSION to refer to OUTPUT, alright
— you could have chosen something even more condescendeent to
the rest of the non-PCT word, something like ** behavioral
OUTPUT = behavioral RUBBISH.**

        I
think I am finally getting it…

    Namely,

if BY CONSTRUCTION OF INTERPRETATION (and I agree there is truth
in that interpretation, but not absolute truth!), ** if output
is always illusion…".** The premise of this is supposed
(by your use of “Namely” to follow from the assumption that PCT
holds. Why? Output is an observable. How can it be intrinsically
an illusion? I grant that stage magicians can produce illusions
by means of their output, but that’s a far cry from saying their
output IS an illusion – even for magicians.

    There is, I guess, a way in which one could say that output is

an illusion, but it involves the assertion that everything we
perceive in the outer world is only an illusion. Because it is
unfalsifiable that proposition is not scientifically viable, so
although it could theoretically be true, we act as though it is
false.

    Did you read my two initial postings on the behavioural

illusion? Did they give you the impression that output is an
illusion? If they did, they were very poorly written. I tried to
demonstrate three things. (1) What you observe is all you can
rely on when you want to know how an organism works – control
being only a hypothesis, and (2) It is only the failure of
control that allows you to say anything useful about how an
organism works. (3) The “behavioural illusion” refers only to a
perception in the minds of people who interpret their
observations of input and output in a specific way. It has
nothing whatever to do with the analysis of observations, though
it might well influence how some (actually, quite a few) people
go about interpreting observations.

    By the way, in another post under the curvature subject line

posted just before this one, you refer several times to “PCTers”
in the plural. I think it should be in the singular. In that
message you say “* Plus, the question does
not need to be EITHER OR, namely, the power law relation (as a
FACT) does not have to be either 100% illusion (what PCTers
seem to call environment property) nor 100% true (what PCTers
seem to call organism property). It can be, and most likely
is, a MIXTURE of both! Why, because for sure the animal is
trying to control for someting AND at the same time the
properties of the substrate (friction, viscossity, etc) have
an influence.”*

    What you say here is central to PCT and to the original

explanation of the behavioural illusion, which I suspect you
have been misinterpreting.

    Martin

      On Fri, Sep 2, 2016 at 8:31 PM, Martin
Taylor mmt-csg@mmtaylor.net
wrote:

[Martin Taylor 2016.09.01.16.32

[From Rick Marken (2016.09.01.1110)]

                  cc: Henry Yin, because he
understands the importance of the behavioral
illusion and I’d like to hear what he thinks of
this post.
                        Martin Taylor
(2016.08.30.13.12)–

                      RM: This is a nice effort to explain the
behavioral illusion but I’d like to give my
own explanation. …

          Fred Nickols liked this post, and so do I (most of it). It
complements mine very nicely. I had thought of adding
similar references to optical illusions and mirages, but
wanted to keep it short.
                      RM: So the "behavioral illusion" refers to
the fact that when you observe the behavior of
a closed loop control system – living or
artificial – what you see is not necessarily
what is actually happening.Â In the case of
the stimulus-response illusion, the actual
causal connection from Â stimulus to response
is “masked” by the fact that it occurs as part
of a closed loop control process.

           I agree with Fred here. What you see is the
closest you can get to what is happening in a perceptual
world. All you have is your perception, and as Bill said
often enough, it’s the only truth you can truly rely on.
What you perceive is what you perceive, without question.
What is hidden and must be imagined is the reason why you
perceive what you perceive. If you don’t know about
control, you think that the internal processing causes
what you see in a apparent stimulus-response situation. If
control is very good, that’s an illusion. If the
“response” cannot influence the “stimulus” it isn’t
illusory. And if control is imperfect, it’s partly
illusory. You have to model the situation to figure out
what’s going on. There’s no one-size-fits-all
black-and-whit dress to fit every situation.
          According to PCT, the output behaviour is always action to
influence some controlled variable(s) toward its/their
reference value(s), but there are lots of conditions in
which an uncontrolled or uncontrollable perception affects
the choice of action to control that/those perception(s).
When you are about to go out of the house for a walk and
you see the sky blue, you don’t take an umbrella, but if
the clouds are dark and getting darker, you probably will.
You can’t control your perception of the sky colour but
you can use it to control your (imagined) perception of
being wet or dry later in your walk.
          Taking the umbrella isn't a stimulus-response action to a
perception of dark clouds. If you were simply going out to
check the mailbox, you wouldn’t be likely to take an
umbrella unless it was actively raining. It all depends on
what is being controlled at a higher level. Will you go
out for a long walk or will you just pop out and go back
in? The action to implement those controlled perceptions
depends on the sky colour, a perception that is
uncontrolled.
              Martin

MartinT · September 3, 2016, 5:24pm

[Martin Taylor 2016.09.03.13.22]

[From Rick Marken (2016.09.03.0930)]

Of course. Why state the obvious?

The answer to that is in the message to which you are responding,

immediately following the bit you quoted.

As I said. Glad you agree.

Martin

···

Martin Taylor (2016.09.01.16.32)–

            MT;  If you don't know about control, you think that the
internal processing causes what you see in a apparent
stimulus-response situation. If control is very good,
that’s an illusion. If the “response” cannot influence
the “stimulus” it isn’t illusory.

          RM: The "response" (output) of a control system never

has an effect on the “stimulus” (disturbance). The
“response” affects the same sensory variable that is
affected by the “stimulus”.

            MT: Taking the umbrella isn't a
stimulus-response action to a perception of dark clouds.

          RM: Right. But to the extent that you see it that way,

it’s an example of a behavioral illusion. Can you think
of the variable that is disturbed by the sight of dark
clouds and corrected by taking an umbrella?

            MT: If you were simply going out to
check the mailbox, you wouldn’t be likely to take an
umbrella unless it was actively raining. It all depends
on what is being controlled at a higher level.

          RM: No, the observed relationship between dark clouds

and taking an umbrella depends on the perception that is
the disturbed by the sight of dark closed and brought to
the reference by taking the umbrella.

amatic · September 3, 2016, 5:25pm

Good points, Adam! Some of Bill's analytical derivations, because they are mathematically carried out for ideal control systems (to have an explicit analytical solution, they only work in ideal systems) seem to imply that, about the super complexity of nerve-muscle-tendon-bone-world interactions, one only needs to care and estimate the value of a linear constant (like in the rubber band case, where the whole universe ends up in the coupling constant "K"...).

Yeah, it is interesting that all the complexities can be hidden in very simple functions. In target tracking models, it seems that lower levels in interaction with the environment (bone, muscle, gravity, friction...) sum up to approximate just a linear function. Effectively, the higher control system can just have a linear output. But to answer and demonstrate the 'how does this happen' question, a whole complex simulation is needed (and not necessarily with linear elements - numerical approximations can also be used for non-linear elements).

···

On Sat, Sep 3, 2016 at 4:08 PM, Alex Gomez-Marin <<mailto:agomezmarin@gmail.com>agomezmarin@gmail.com> wrote:

Good points, Adam! Some of Bill's analytical derivations, because they are mathematically carried out for ideal control systems (to have an explicit analytical solution, they only work in ideal systems) seem to imply that, about the super complexity of nerve-muscle-tendon-bone-world interactions, one only needs to care and estimate the value of a linear constant (like in the rubber band case, where the whole universe ends up in the coupling constant "K"...). If one includes reorganization, then one needs to estimate the integration time and the leaking constant, but not much more. So, there is something deep there about dimensionality because from the "outside" there are so many parameters to potentially take into account, whereas from the animal perspective, perhaps in some (but not all) cases, all the the animal needs to know from the world is just how to tune the constant that represents the linear approximation in the U and V functions.
On Sat, Sep 3, 2016 at 3:52 PM, Adam Matic <<mailto:adam.matic@gmail.com>adam.matic@gmail.com> wrote:

and, second, environment is not mere contingency, but "the house" of the organism.. why insisting in not wanting to learn anything about that in the process? i suspect that pct fails to appreciate the importance, value and interest of the brain-body-world confluence by over-stressing the organism's references. it is like the usual from on pole to the other dynamics in science. time to see our own biasses!

Modeling the environment with more details might produce an interesting simulation. Technically, the environment of the nervous system (in a model of a tracking task) *is* present even in a simple control system with a leaky integral - it just happens to be a very simple model. The nervous system loop that is doing visual tracking is a relatively high-level loop, there are muscle-control loops on levels below and muscle dynamics in the output of that loop, but they seem to produce a very linear response when combined, so they don't always need to be modeled in detail.
On the other hand, the are also models of arm movement that include the lower levels and muscle dynamics and gravitational force and stimuli in the environment (the Little Man, that is an older demo). Maybe also friction or density of the medium can be simulated. There might be some unexpected, non-obvious constraints on curved motion when accurate physics is combined with particular control schemes. There are some difficulties with that approach, the simulation could get quite complex, depending on the desired level of precision, for example what specific muscle model should be used, maybe each tendon needs to be modeled separately, how anatomically accurate does the model-hand need to be, and so on. Similar with other animals like fly larvae - should there be an anatomically accurate muscle-system model, does the perception of skin-pressure need to modeled?

Alex_Gomez-Marin · September 3, 2016, 5:48pm

And so finding non-linearities implies that it is not only about discovering what perception is controlled and at what value. There is much more to do and to know. And so, the default position that “everything that is not IN and BY the organism” is illusory is also an illusory position.

···

On Sat, Sep 3, 2016 at 7:25 PM, Adam Matic adam.matic@gmail.com wrote:

Good points, Adam! Some of Bill’s analytical derivations, because they are mathematically carried out for ideal control systems (to have an explicit analytical solution, they only work in ideal systems) seem to imply that, about the super complexity of nerve-muscle-tendon-bone-world interactions, one only needs to care and estimate the value of a linear constant (like in the rubber band case, where the whole universe ends up in the coupling constant “K”…).

Yeah, it is interesting that all the complexities can be hidden in very simple functions. In target tracking models, it seems that lower levels in interaction with the environment (bone, muscle, gravity, friction…) sum up to approximate just a linear function. Effectively, the higher control system can just have a linear output. But to answer and demonstrate the ‘how does this happen’ question, a whole complex simulation is needed (and not necessarily with linear elements - numerical approximations can also be used for non-linear elements).

On Sat, Sep 3, 2016 at 4:08 PM, Alex Gomez-Marin agomezmarin@gmail.com wrote:

Good points, Adam! Some of Bill’s analytical derivations, because they are mathematically carried out for ideal control systems (to have an explicit analytical solution, they only work in ideal systems) seem to imply that, about the super complexity of nerve-muscle-tendon-bone-world interactions, one only needs to care and estimate the value of a linear constant (like in the rubber band case, where the whole universe ends up in the coupling constant “K”…). If one includes reorganization, then one needs to estimate the integration time and the leaking constant, but not much more. So, there is something deep there about dimensionality because from the “outside” there are so many parameters to potentially take into account, whereas from the animal perspective, perhaps in some (but not all) cases, all the the animal needs to know from the world is just how to tune the constant that represents the linear approximation in the U and V functions.

On Sat, Sep 3, 2016 at 3:52 PM, Adam Matic adam.matic@gmail.com wrote:

and, second, environment is not mere contingency, but “the house” of the organism… why insisting in not wanting to learn anything about that in the process? i suspect that pct fails to appreciate the importance, value and interest of the brain-body-world confluence by over-stressing the organism’s references. it is like the usual from on pole to the other dynamics in science. time to see our own biasses!

Modeling the environment with more details might produce an interesting simulation. Technically, the environment of the nervous system (in a model of a tracking task) is present even in a simple control system with a leaky integral - it just happens to be a very simple model. The nervous system loop that is doing visual tracking is a relatively high-level loop, there are muscle-control loops on levels below and muscle dynamics in the output of that loop, but they seem to produce a very linear response when combined, so they don’t always need to be modeled in detail.

On the other hand, the are also models of arm movement that include the lower levels and muscle dynamics and gravitational force and stimuli in the environment (the Little Man, that is an older demo). Maybe also friction or density of the medium can be simulated. There might be some unexpected, non-obvious constraints on curved motion when accurate physics is combined with particular control schemes. There are some difficulties with that approach, the simulation could get quite complex, depending on the desired level of precision, for example what specific muscle model should be used, maybe each tendon needs to be modeled separately, how anatomically accurate does the model-hand need to be, and so on. Similar with other animals like fly larvae - should there be an anatomically accurate muscle-system model, does the perception of skin-pressure need to modeled?

DagArchive · September 3, 2016, 9:54am

Good points, Adam! Some of Bill’s analytical derivations, because they are mathematically carried out for ideal control systems (to have an explicit analytical solution, they only work in ideal systems) seem to imply that, about the super complexity of nerve-muscle-tendon-bone-world interactions, one only needs to care and estimate the value of a linear constant (like in the rubber band case, where the whole universe ends up in the coupling constant “K”…).
[From Dag Forssell (2016.09.03.10:50 PDT)]

Adam, as a rather long-time CSGnet participant you know better than to post without even “On Sat, Sep 3, 2016 at 4:08 PM, Alex Gomez-Marin agomezmarin@gmail.com wrote:” at the head of your post. As CSGnet archivist, I would encourage yourself and all others to observe the CSGnet date markers, such as approx

[From Adam Matic (2016.09.03.01:25 CET)]

This convention has applied from the very beginning and is very helpful.

Best, Dag

···

At 10:25 AM 9/3/2016, you wrote:

Yeah, it is interesting that all the complexities can be hidden in very simple functions. In target tracking models, it seems that lower levels in interaction with the environment (bone, muscle, gravity, friction…) sum up to approximate just a linear function. Effectively, the higher control system can just have a linear output. But to answer Â and demonstrate the ‘how does this happen’ question, a whole complex simulation is needed (and notÂ necessarilyÂ with linear elements - numerical approximations can also be used for non-linear elements).Â

On Sat, Sep 3, 2016 at 4:08 PM, Alex Gomez-Marin agomezmarin@gmail.com wrote:
Good points, Adam! Some of Bill’s analytical derivations, because they are mathematically carried out for ideal control systems (to have an explicit analytical solution, they only work in ideal systems) seem to imply that, about the super complexity of nerve-muscle-tendon-bone-world interactions, one only needs to care and estimate the value of a linear constant (like in the rubber band case, where the whole universe ends up in the coupling constant “K”…). If one includes reorganization, then one needs to estimate the integration time and the leaking constant, but not much more. So, there is something deep there about dimensionality because from the “outside” there are so many parameters to potentially take into account, whereas from the animal perspective, perhaps in some (but not all) cases, all the the animal needs to know from the world is just how to tune the constant that represents the linear approximation in the U and V functions.

On Sat, Sep 3, 2016 at 3:52 PM, Adam Matic adam.matic@gmail.com wrote:

and, second, environment is not mere contingency, but “the house” of the organism… why insisting in not wanting to learnÂ anything about that in the process? i suspect that pct fails to appreciate the importance, value and interest of theÂ brain-body-world confluence by over-stressing the organism’s references. it is like the usual from on pole to the other dynamics in science. time to see our own biasses!

Modeling the environment with more details might produce an interesting simulation. Technically, the environment of the nervous system (in a model of a tracking task) is present even in a simple control system with a leaky integral - it just happens to be a very simple model. The nervous system loop that is doing visual tracking is a relatively high-level loop, there are muscle-control loops on levels below and muscle dynamics in the output of that loop, but they seem to produce a very linear response when combined, so they don’t always need to be modeled in detail.Â

On the other hand, the are also models of arm movement that include the lower levels and muscle dynamics and gravitational force and stimuli in the environment (the Little Man, that is an older demo). Maybe also friction or density of the medium can be simulated. There might be some unexpected, non-obvious constraints on curved motion when accurate physics is combined with particular control schemes. There are some difficulties with that approach, the simulation could get quite complex, depending on the desired level of precision, for example what specific muscle model should be used, maybe each tendon needs to be modeled separately,Â how anatomically accurate does the model-hand need to be, and so on. Similar with other animals like fly larvae - should there be an anatomically accurate muscle-system model, does the perception of skin-pressure need to modeled?Â

DagArchive · September 3, 2016, 5:54pm

[From Dag Forssell (2016.09.03.10:50 PDT)]

Adam, as a rather long-time CSGnet participant you know better than to post without even "On Sat, Sep 3, 2016 at 4:08 PM, Alex Gomez-Marin <<mailto:agomezmarin@gmail.com>agomezmarin@gmail.com> wrote:" at the head of your post. As CSGnet archivist, I would encourage yourself and all others to observe the CSGnet date markers, such as approx

[From Adam Matic (2016.09.03.01:25 CET)]

This convention has applied from the very beginning and is very helpful.

Best, Dag

···

At 10:25 AM 9/3/2016, you wrote:

> Good points, Adam! Some of Bill's analytical derivations, because they are mathematically carried out for ideal control systems (to have an explicit analytical solution, they only work in ideal systems) seem to imply that, about the super complexity of nerve-muscle-tendon-bone-world interactions, one only needs to care and estimate the value of a linear constant (like in the rubber band case, where the whole universe ends up in the coupling constant "K"...).

Yeah, it is interesting that all the complexities can be hidden in very simple functions. In target tracking models, it seems that lower levels in interaction with the environment (bone, muscle, gravity, friction...) sum up to approximate just a linear function. Effectively, the higher control system can just have a linear output. But to answer ï¿½ and demonstrate the 'how does this happen' question, a whole complex simulation is needed (and notï¿½ necessarilyï¿½ with linear elements - numerical approximations can also be used for non-linear elements).ï¿½

On Sat, Sep 3, 2016 at 4:08 PM, Alex Gomez-Marin ><<mailto:agomezmarin@gmail.com>agomezmarin@gmail.com> wrote:
Good points, Adam! Some of Bill's analytical derivations, because they are mathematically carried out for ideal control systems (to have an explicit analytical solution, they only work in ideal systems) seem to imply that, about the super complexity of nerve-muscle-tendon-bone-world interactions, one only needs to care and estimate the value of a linear constant (like in the rubber band case, where the whole universe ends up in the coupling constant "K"...). If one includes reorganization, then one needs to estimate the integration time and the leaking constant, but not much more. So, there is something deep there about dimensionality because from the "outside" there are so many parameters to potentially take into account, whereas from the animal perspective, perhaps in some (but not all) cases, all the the animal needs to know from the world is just how to tune the constant that represents the linear approximation in the U and V functions.

On Sat, Sep 3, 2016 at 3:52 PM, Adam Matic ><<mailto:adam.matic@gmail.com>adam.matic@gmail.com> wrote:

and, second, environment is not mere contingency, but "the house" of the organism.. why insisting in not wanting to learnï¿½ anything about that in the process? i suspect that pct fails to appreciate the importance, value and interest of theï¿½ brain-body-world confluence by over-stressing the organism's references. it is like the usual from on pole to the other dynamics in science. time to see our own biasses!

Modeling the environment with more details might produce an interesting simulation. Technically, the environment of the nervous system (in a model of a tracking task) *is* present even in a simple control system with a leaky integral - it just happens to be a very simple model. The nervous system loop that is doing visual tracking is a relatively high-level loop, there are muscle-control loops on levels below and muscle dynamics in the output of that loop, but they seem to produce a very linear response when combined, so they don't always need to be modeled in detail.ï¿½

On the other hand, the are also models of arm movement that include the lower levels and muscle dynamics and gravitational force and stimuli in the environment (the Little Man, that is an older demo). Maybe also friction or density of the medium can be simulated. There might be some unexpected, non-obvious constraints on curved motion when accurate physics is combined with particular control schemes. There are some difficulties with that approach, the simulation could get quite complex, depending on the desired level of precision, for example what specific muscle model should be used, maybe each tendon needs to be modeled separately,ï¿½ how anatomically accurate does the model-hand need to be, and so on. Similar with other animals like fly larvae - should there be an anatomically accurate muscle-system model, does the perception of skin-pressure need to modeled?ï¿½

rsmarken · September 3, 2016, 6:11pm

[From Rick Marken (2016.09.03.1110)]

···

On Fri, Sep 2, 2016 at 12:36 PM, Alex Gomez-Marin agomezmarin@gmail.com wrote:

AGM: So, your answer is like one of the Ten Commandments: “you shall regard all observed and interpreted output as illusion”.

RM: Not quite. It’s more like “When you are observing the behavior of a living system, you shall regard all observations of stimuli apparently causing responses, reinforcements selecting responses or responses being generated by internal motor commands (and constrained by the environment) as likely side effects of control”.Â

AGM: Two more questions, then:

AGM: 1. Is a living organism still “a closed loop system” even when the experimenter tries hard “to break the loop” so as to apply the stimulus-response strategy?

RM: Yes. Â

AGM: 2. Why can’t then the experimenter be able to learn some aspects of the organism function, specially when the system is not an ideal system in terms of Bill’s classification?

RM: Once you know that you are dealing with control behavior the most important thing to know about the organism function is the perceptual variable that the organism is controlling.Â Once you know this you can learn how closely the system approaches ideal without breaking the loop. Indeed, you wouldn’t even know how to “break the loop” until you knew what variable was under control by the organism. And if you do manage to figure out a way to 'break the loop", the system, because it is still closed loop relative to other variables, will still be controlling those other variables. So it’s doubtful that “breaking the loop” research – trying to turn closed loop into open loop systems – will tell you much about the controlling done by living systems.Â

BestÂ

Rick

Â

–
Richard S. MarkenÂ

“The childhood of the human race is far from over. We
have a long way to go before most people will understand that what they do for
others is just as important to their well-being as what they do for
themselves.” – William T. Powers

On Fri, Sep 2, 2016 at 6:32 PM, Richard Marken rsmarken@gmail.com wrote:

[From Rick Marken (2016.09.02.0930)]

On Thu, Sep 1, 2016 at 3:24 PM, Alex Gomez-Marin agomezmarin@gmail.com wrote:

AGM: Beautiful analogies, Rick. Now, does this mean that one does not need to prove the behavioral illusion in each particular case because, by construction of argument, one already knows that it must be a behavioral illusion?

RM: A very good question. I think the question is answered in Bill’s 1978 Psych Review paper (“Quantitative Analysis of Purposive Systems”, reprinted in LCS I) but I’ll try to give a quick summary specifically related to your question.Â

RM: I think another way of asking your question would be this: Do we need to prove (in the sense of “test” since we don’t prove propositions in science in the same way as we do in mathematics) in each particular case that the appearance of behavior as caused, selected or planned output is an illusion? If the behavior is that of a living system the answer would be a cautious “no”.

RM: Â In his 1978 Psych Review paper Bill showed that living systems are very likely to be closed loop systems.Â We know that sensory inputs cause behavioral outputs via the nervous systems; and we can see that, at the same time, these behavioral outputs affect those same sensory inputs via the environment. And since the behavior of these systems is generally very stable, the feedback in the closed loop must be negative. So living systems are very likely to be negative feedback systems – Bill calls them N systems in the article – and N systems act to control their own inputs.Â

RM: So we can assume that we are looking at the behavior of a control system (rather than that of an open-loop causal system – Bill calls it a Z system in the article) when we are looking at the behavior of a living organism.Â That means when we see a living organism apparently reacting to stimuli, having its behavior “strengthened” by its consequences or producing a programmed set of outputs, we can be pretty sure that those appearances are “illusions”. We know this for the same reason that we know that the pencil doesn’t really bend when we place it in water. With living organisms we know that if they are N-systems these behavioral appearances are “side effects” of control of input; with the pencil we know that the appearance of bending is a “side effect” of differential refraction of light by water and air.Â

RM: But as in the case with the pencil in water, there is always the possibility that what is seen is not an illusion. The pencil might really have bent in water if, for example, one side of the pencil were made of a material that expands in water. And the behavior of an organism that we see might really be an example of caused, reinforced or computed output. But this very unlikely possibility is actually implicitly handled by the PCT approach to studying living control systems.Â

RM: PCT research aims to understand the behavior (controlling) of living organisms in terms of the input variables that are being controlled.Â So when a PCT researcher sees a living organism apparently reacting to stimuli, being manipulated by reinforcement or producing programmed output they try to guess at the aspects of the organisms sensory input around which this behavior might be organized; that is, they try to guess at what input (perceptual) variables might be under control.

RM: The general methodology used to do this kind of research Â is called the Test for the Controlled Variable. An example of such research, using modeling to determine the perceptual variables under control is described in this paper:Â https://www.dropbox.com/s/1ajwvsybrfm6kop/Chasin%27Choppers.pdf?dl=0. In this research the object interception behavior observed could be seen as caused output; the view of the helicopter causes the actions of the pursuer. But this was assumed to be an illusion and, indeed, a model that controls aspects of the optical projection of the helicopter on the retina explains the behavior nearly perfectly.Â

RM: While the TCV is aimed at the discovery of the perceptual aspects of input around which an organism’s behavior is organized, it can also reveal the unlikely possibility that the observed behavior is not mediated by a controlled perception; that the apparently caused, reinforced or programmed output really is what it appears to be; that the behavior is really that of a Z system; that the pencil really is bent!Â

RM: So the bottom line answer to your question is, again, no; you don’t have to explicitly test to see whether every behavior of a living system that you observe is an example of a behavioral illusion. You go in assuming that apparently caused, selected or progreammed behavior is an illusion – that the pencil is not really bent. While you are doing the research aimed at understanding the behavior you see – under the assumption that it is organized around control of some perceptual variables – you might – though it is very unlikely – find that it is not the behavior of an N-system. So you might find that a behavior is actually a non-illusory caused output (the saccade is apparently an example).Â But the default assumption of PCT-based research is that behavior is the control of perceptual input; it is not caused, constrained, selected or programmed output.Â

BestÂ

Rick

–
Richard S. MarkenÂ

“The childhood of the human race is far from over. We
have a long way to go before most people will understand that what they do for
others is just as important to their well-being as what they do for
themselves.” – William T. Powers

On Thu, Sep 1, 2016 at 10:18 PM, Richard Marken rsmarken@gmail.com wrote:

[From Rick Marken (2016.09.01.1320)]

Â Fred Nickols (2016.09.01.1554 ET)]

Â

FN: I really like your post below, Rick.Â

RM: Wow, that is so exciting Fred! Thanks. I think this is the first post of mine in weeks that anyone has liked!Â

Â

FN: I also spotted something that I think might present a problem when explaining PCT to others.Â Hereâ€™s the snippet I pulled from your longer post below:

Â

RM: So the “behavioral illusion” refers to the fact that when you observe the behavior of a closed loop control system – living or artificial – what you see is not necessarily what is actually happening.Â

Â

FN: Itâ€™s the â€œwhat you see is not necessarily what is actually happeningâ€? thatâ€™s giving me pause.Â I think most people, especially some behaviorists I know, would snort or laugh and say something like, â€œDonâ€™t tell me Iâ€™m not seeing what Iâ€™m seeing.â€?Â I think a better way of saying what youâ€™re driving at is to say, â€œHow you explain or account for what you see, especially if you do so in cause-effect or stimulus-response terms, is very different from the way those same observations are explained by control theory.Â

RM: Yes! Much better Â (and more correct) way of saying it!Â Thanks again Fred!

BestÂ

Rick

Â

More important, in light of control theory, those stimulus-response explanations are very misleading.Â In control theory, especially perceptual control theory (PCT), those misleading explanations are referred to as â€œthe behavioral illusion.â€?

Â

Â

FN: At least thatâ€™s the way it seems to me, Rick.

Â

FN: Anyway, thanks again for this post.Â I like it – a lot./p>

Â

Regards,

Â

Fred Nickols, Consultant

My Objective is to Help You Achieve Yours

DISTANCE CONSULTING LLC

â€œAssistance at a Distanceâ€?^SM

Â

From: Richard Marken [mailto:rsmarken@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, September 01, 2016 2:09 PM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Cc: Henry Yin
Subject: Re: The Behavioural Illusion and modelling

Â

[From Rick Marken (2016.09.01.1110)]

Â

cc: Henry Yin, because he understands the importance of the behavioral illusion and I’d like to hear what he thinks of this post.

Â

Martin Taylor (2016.08.30.13.12)–

Â

RM: This is a nice effort to explain the behavioral illusion but I’d like to give my own explanation.Â I’ll start by defining an illusion as an observation that is not what it appears to be. For example, here is an example of an optical illusion:

Â

RM: What you observe are two parallel vertical lines that bulge out in the middle. This is an illusion because we know, for other reasons (such as from measuring the distance between the lines at the top, middle and bottom) that there is no bulge. Another illusion is the observation of a straight, rigid object, like a pencil, bending when placed in water, like so:Â

Â

RM: Again, this is an illusion because we know, for other reasons (such as feeling along the pencil while it is immersed) that the object is not bent.Â

Â

RM: Behavioral illusions are illusions in the same way these optical illusions are illusions: they are observations that are not what they appear to be. One example of a behavioral illusion is a “reflex”, such as the patellar Â of “knee jerk” reflex:

Â

RM: What you see is a hammer tap below the knee causing the lower leg to kick up. The hammer tap looks like a “stimulus” that is the cause of the knee jerk “response”. It looks like stimulus causes response. The stimulus-response appearance of reflexes was not considered an illusion until it was shown to be, by other mean. The “other means” was PCT.Â

Â

RM: The PCT analysis of the stimulus-response illusion starts by noting that behavior is a closed-loop control process organized around the control of the sensory effects of stimuli: controlled variables. When this loop is analyzed correctly it can be shown (as Powers did in his 1978 Psych Review paper) that the observed causal relationship between stimulus and response is actually the inverse of the causal relationship between the response and the sensory effect of the stimulus; this relationship is called the feedback function and the sensory effect of the stimulus is the controlled variable.Â

Â

RM: So the “behavioral illusion” refers to the fact that when you observe the behavior of a closed loop control system – living or artificial – what you see is not necessarily what is actually happening.Â In the case of the stimulus-response illusion, the actual causal connection from Â stimulus to response is “masked” by the fact that it occurs as part of a closed loop control process.Â

Â

RM: There are actually three versions of the behavioral illusion, which are described in my “Blind Men and the Elephant” paper in “More Mind Readings”. Reflexes, like the patellar, are examples of the stimulus-response illusion; operant behavior is an example of the reinforcement illusion; and the power law is an example of the emitted output illusion (called the cognitive illusion in the paper).Â

Â

RM: How “illusory” any of these behavioral illusions are depends on many factors. For example, the stimulus-response illusion is much more pronounced when the stimulus (disturbance to the controlled variable) is abrupt and strong rather than gradual and weak (see “A Bucket of Beans” in LCS II); the emitted output illusion is more pronounced when there are no obvious disturbances to the controlled variable.Â These illusions are also more pronounced when the system under observation controls well. A system that controls poorly will make only a very weak “response” to a “stimulus”(disturbance) that affects the variable it is controlling. So the stimulus will not give the appearance of causing the response and there will be a very weak stimulus-response illusion.Â

Â

RM: All behavioral illusions result from failure to understand the implications of the fact that one is observing at the behavior of a closed loop control system. It’s like looking at the bent pencil illusion above and not knowing the implications of the fact that the pencil is partly in water.Â This analogy should make it clear why the behavioral illusion is so important.Â A researcher who doesn’t know that the refraction of light is different in water and air will start looking for explanations for why the pencil is bent; a researcher who doesn’t know that a closed loop system acts to control its input will start looking for explanations of why stimuli cause responses, why reinforcement selects responses or how responses are emitted.Â

Â

RM: The behavioral illusion is important because it shows that behavioral scientists have been studying the different flavors of the illusion – taking them for what is actually happening – for over 100 years. Â

Â

Best

Â

Rick

Â

–

Richard S. MarkenÂ

“The childhood of the human race is far from over. We have a long way to go before most people will understand that what they do for others is just as important to their well-being as what they do for themselves.” – William T. Powers

–
Richard S. MarkenÂ

“The childhood of the human race is far from over. We
have a long way to go before most people will understand that what they do for
others is just as important to their well-being as what they do for
themselves.” – William T. Powers

rsmarken · September 3, 2016, 6:27pm

[From Rick Marken (2016.09.03.1125)]

···

On Sat, Sep 3, 2016 at 5:37 AM, Alex Gomez-Marin agomezmarin@gmail.com wrote:
Â

AGM: environment is not mere contingency, but “the house” of the organism… why insisting in not wanting to learnÂ anything about that in the process? i suspect that pct fails to appreciate the importance, value and interest of theÂ brain-body-world confluence by over-stressing the organism’s references. it is like the usual from on pole to the other dynamics in science. time to see our own biasses!

RM: How does PCT “over-stress” the organism’s references? Reference signals are “stressed” only to the extent that they account for the observation that organisms maintain aspects of their environment (what are called perceptual variables) in constant or varying “reference” states, protected from disturbances. So the environment enters the picture as the basis of controlled perceptual variables. It also enters the picture as disturbances to these controlled perceptual variables. What is “under-stressed” in PCT?

BestÂ

Rick

Â

On Friday, 2 September 2016, Huddy, Vyv v.huddy@ucl.ac.uk wrote:

[Vyv Huddy (2130.02.09.2016)]

Â AGM:Â If you all prefer to use the word ILLUSION to refer to OUTPUT, alright — you could have chosen something even more condescendent to the rest of the
non-PCT word, something likeÂ behavioral OUTPUT = behavioral RUBBISH.

VH: For me illusion is the correct termÂ because it descibes someone providingÂ the wrong answer to the question of why a living organism acts following an externalÂ event. The answer stimulus eventÂ causesÂ response eventÂ not only ignores the controlled variable
but it is alsoÂ too restricted. One has to know what the organism is controlling for to understand the action. So on one level the controlled variable might be keepingÂ relationship between one event and another at the reference.Â But for a person that cannot
be the fundamentalÂ purpose as there are many higher levels.Â

VH: Take an example of a participant in an psychÂ experiment pressing a button when a light comes on. In this situation theÂ participant might be controlling their perception ofÂ being a Â good participant
(a priniciple); this isÂ achievedÂ byÂ fulfilling experimental task instructions (a programÂ perception), this is achieved byÂ controlling Â the relationship between one event (e.g. a light) and another
(e.g. a bar pressed) being held trueÂ (see Marken and Mansell, 2013). TheÂ latter relationship, onlyÂ if interpretedÂ as cause and effect, is the illusion. This illusion neglects both the controlled variable andÂ _also_Â theÂ higher purpose
that is the finalÂ cause of the light onÂ - bar pressÂ relationship being held true. I think??Â

From: Alex Gomez-Marin agomezmarin@gmail.com
Sent: 02 September 2016 20:51
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: The Behavioural Illusion and modelling
Â

Martin, I also like all these analogies and images, which are great for didactic presentations, etc.

The point is that if "According to PCT, the output behaviour is always action to influence some controlled variable(s) toward its/their reference value(s) "
then there is nothing else to say… Namely, if BY CONSTRUCTION OF INTERPRETATION (and I agree there is truth in that interpretation, but not absolute truth!),
if output is always illusion, then, of course, the power-law is an illusion (namely, it is indeed output…). If you all prefer to use the word ILLUSION to refer to OUTPUT, alright — you could have chosen sometthing even more condescendent to the rest
of the non-PCT word, something like behavioral OUTPUT = behavioral RUBBISH.

I think I am finally getting it…

–
Richard S. MarkenÂ

“The childhood of the human race is far from over. We
have a long way to go before most people will understand that what they do for
others is just as important to their well-being as what they do for
themselves.” – William T. Powers

On Fri, Sep 2, 2016 at 8:31 PM, Martin Taylor
mmt-csg@mmtaylor.net wrote:

[Martin Taylor 2016.09.01.16.32

[From Rick Marken (2016.09.01.1110)]

cc: Henry Yin, because he understands the importance of the behavioral illusion and I’d like to hear what he thinks of this post.

Fred Nickols liked this post, and so do I (most of it). It complements mine very nicely. I had thought of adding similar references to optical illusions and mirages, but wanted to keep it short.

I agree with Fred here. What you see is the closest you can get to what is happening in a perceptual world. All you have is your perception, and as Bill said often enough, it’s the only truth you can truly rely on. What you perceive is what you perceive,
without question. What is hidden and must be imagined is the reason why you perceive what you perceive. If you don’t know about control, you think that the internal processing causes what you see in a apparent stimulus-response situation. If control is very
good, that’s an illusion. If the “response” cannot influence the “stimulus” it isn’t illusory. And if control is imperfect, it’s partly illusory. You have to model the situation to figure out what’s going on. There’s no one-size-fits-all black-and-whit dress
to fit every situation.

According to PCT, the output behaviour is always action to influence some controlled variable(s) toward its/their reference value(s), but there are lots of conditions in which an uncontrolled or uncontrollable perception affects the choice of action to control
that/those perception(s). When you are about to go out of the house for a walk and you see the sky blue, you don’t take an umbrella, but if the clouds are dark and getting darker, you probably will. You can’t control your perception of the sky colour but you
can use it to control your (imagined) perception of being wet or dry later in your walk.

Taking the umbrella isn’t a stimulus-response action to a perception of dark clouds. If you were simply going out to check the mailbox, you wouldn’t be likely to take an umbrella unless it was actively raining. It all depends on what is being controlled at
a higher level. Will you go out for a long walk or will you just pop out and go back in? The action to implement those controlled perceptions depends on the sky colour, a perception that is uncontrolled.

Martin

Martin Taylor (2016.08.30.13.12)–

RM: This is a nice effort to explain the behavioral illusion but I’d like to give my own explanation. …

RM: So the “behavioral illusion” refers to the fact that when you observe the behavior of a closed loop control system – living or artificial – what you see is not necessarily what is actually happening.Â In the case of the stimulus-response illusion,
the actual causal connection from Â stimulus to response is “masked” by the fact that it occurs as part of a closed loop control process.

rsmarken · September 3, 2016, 7:06pm

[From Rick Marken (2016.09.03.1205)]

···

Martin Taylor (2016.09.03.13.22)–

MT: Of course. Why state the obvious?

RM: I’m sorry. I thought you were still talking about a control system. But I can now see that what you were talking about was an open-loop causal system. Yes, if you see a “stimulus” causing a “response” and the system is actually open loop then the S-R appearance is not a behavioral illusion.

MT: The answer to that is in the message to which you are responding,
immediately following the bit you quoted.

RM: Ah, yes. It must be this:

MT: You can’t control your perception of the sky colour but you can use it to control your (imagined) perception of being wet or dry later in your walk.

RM: I would say that , rather than an imagined perception, you are controlling a current “real” perception of “being prepared for rain”, keeping it at the reference value “prepared”. When the sky is clear you need do nothing to keep this perception in the state “prepared”; when the sky is dark you bring an umbrella to keep perceiving yourself being “prepared”.

RM: I think it’s a good exercise to try to think of the present time perceptions people might be controlling that would explain their behavior. Your “bring an umbrella” example is a good one because it shows that the perceptions people control can be rather complex “(preparedness” could be thought of as a principle level perception in Powers’ hierarchical control model) and they must be variable; there are degrees of “preparedness” so the perception of “preparedness” can vary from “completely prepared” to “completely unprepared”, and a control system can maintain that perceptual variable at any of those levels.

RM: I don’t care for the “imagined perception” explanation of bringing an umbrella when the sky is dark in terms of control of imagined perceptions because I think we only do things – like bring an umbrella along – to control present time “real” perceptual variables; not imagined perceptions. I know that we can, and often do, imagine the consequences of bringing or not bringing an umbrella if it rains. But I think we only go and actually get the umbrella (when the sky is dark) if we are controlling a present time perception of something like “being prepared”.

Best regards

Rick

As I said. Glad you agree.
Martin

–

            MT;  If control is very good,
that’s an illusion. If the “response” cannot influence
the “stimulus” it isn’t illusory.

          RM: The "response" (output) of a control system never

has an effect on the “stimulus” (disturbance). The
“response” affects the same sensory variable that is
affected by the “stimulus”.

            MT: Taking the umbrella isn't a
stimulus-response action to a perception of dark clouds.

          RM: Right. But to the extent that you see it that way,

it’s an example of a behavioral illusion. Can you think
of the variable that is disturbed by the sight of dark
clouds and corrected by taking an umbrella?

            MT: If you were simply going out to
check the mailbox, you wouldn’t be likely to take an
umbrella unless it was actively raining. It all depends
on what is being controlled at a higher level.

          RM: No, the observed relationship between dark clouds

and taking an umbrella depends on the perception that is
the disturbed by the sight of dark closed and brought to
the reference by taking the umbrella.

Richard S. Marken

“The childhood of the human race is far from over. We
have a long way to go before most people will understand that what they do for
others is just as important to their well-being as what they do for
themselves.” – William T. Powers

_Boris_Hartman · September 11, 2016, 2:09am

[From Rick Marken (2016.09.03.0930)]

Martin Taylor (2016.09.01.16.32)–

MT; If you don’t know about control, you think that the internal processing causes what you see in a apparent stimulus-response situation. If control is very good, that’s an illusion. If the “response” cannot influence the “stimulus” it isn’t illusory.

RM: The “response” (output) of a control system never has an effect on the “stimulus” (disturbance).

HB : What is this ??? Are you saying that that Â»responseÂ« (output) doesn’t affect Â»stimulusÂ« (disturbance) in Bill’s diagram but goes separatelly into input function ???. Explain how than Â»effects are addedÂ« before they enter the input function ??? Do you want to say that Â»responsÂ« (output) and Â»stimulusÂ« disturbance affect Â»input functionÂ« in perfectly separate way ? Show how this works in Bill’s diagram ? And show how this look like in perceptual signal. Of course you can help yourself with Bill’s books. I 'd advise you to use B:CP. You’ll have rto read sooner or later to understand PCT….

RM : The “response” affects the same sensory variable that is affected by the “stimulus”.

HB :

Are you halucinating again that everything in the control loop happens Â»at the same timeÂ« ? Could you prove this on driving a car. If I understand right you are saying that in the same moment when your perception as a driver is affected by Â»stimulusÂ« (wind blow) you will Â»respondÂ« to the exactly the same Â»stimulusÂ« with output that is Â»matchingÂ« the Â»stimulusÂ« in compensatory sence or as you said that “response” affects the same sensory variable???

Kent, Adam. Fred, David, Earling, Barb, Alice, Gary,and others …. do you beleive Rick ???

<

If what Rick says is true then this also means that perception of a wind blow affects comparator at the same time and Â»errorÂ« signal affects Â»responsÂ« (output) so that output (Â»responsÂ«) can Â»catchÂ« the SAME SENSORY VARIABLE that is afeected by the Â»stimulusÂ« (wind blow). This is what you geti f the “response” affects the same sensory variable…

Rick, are you reading what nonsence you are writing ??? Show me how all this Â»stuffÂ« works in Bill’s diagram ?

Best,

Boris

MT: And if control is imperfect, it’s partly illusory.

RM: The S-R illusion exists regardless of how good control is. The illusion is just more compelling when control is good. When control is poor you see only a statistical relationship between S and R. Sound familiar?

MT: You have to model the situation to figure out what’s going on. There’s no one-size-fits-all black-and-whit dress to fit every situation.

RM: This is what PCT research is about. Since you know that living systems are closed-loop, when you see apparent S-R, reinforcement or output generation behavior you start looking for the variable that is under control. In the unlikely event that you find that there is no controlled variable around whch the behavior is organized then you are not seeing the behavior of a control system; you are dealing with behavior that is described by physics (such as the saccade) rather than by control theory.

HB : Where do you start looking for the Â»variable that is under controlÂ«. In outer environment ? In outer environment there are variables that are Â»under controlÂ«. By what ??? Behavior ???Â There are many behaviors which doesn’t affect anything in outer environment that is under control of organism but still behavior exist. Explain sleeping with your RCT theory ? We are not seeing sleeping of a control system because there is no Â»controlled variableÂ« in outer environment that could be estableshed by TCV ???

I don’t understand how people on CSGnet can persist Â»listeningÂ« to your nonsence.

MT: Taking the umbrella isn’t a stimulus-response action to a perception of dark clouds.

RM: Right. But to the extent that you see it that way, it’s an example of a behavioral illusion. Can you think of the variable that is disturbed by the sight of dark clouds and corrected by taking an umbrella?

MT: If you were simply going out to check the mailbox, you wouldn’t be likely to take an umbrella unless it was actively raining. It all depends on what is being controlled at a higher level.

RM: No, the observed relationship between dark clouds and taking an umbrella depends on the perception that is the disturbed by the sight of dark closed and brought to the reference by taking the umbrella.

HB : And how the references for taking umbrella is formed, and where by your oppinion is formed ???

And the whole realtionship is happennig in imagination and higher levels where you imagine the effects of rain on organism. And also references for taking the umbrella are formed in imagination, because it’s about wanted perceptions which tells you not to be wet.

Best

Rick

···

From: Richard Marken [mailto:rsmarken@gmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, September 03, 2016 6:29 PM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: The Behavioural Illusion and modelling

Will you go out for a long walk or will you just pop out and go back in? The action to implement those controlled perceptions depends on the sky colour, a perception that is uncontrolled.

Martin

–

Richard S. Marken

“The childhood of the human race is far from over. We have a long way to go before most people will understand that what they do for others is just as important to their well-being as what they do for themselves.” – William T. Powers

_Boris_Hartman · September 11, 2016, 2:09am

RM : We know that sensory inputs cause behavioral outputs via the nervous systems;

HB : that’s what probably knows all inhabitants of the World.

RM : ….and we can see that, at the same time, these behavioral outputs aaffect those same sensory inputs via the environment.

HB : This is something that knows ONLY YOU. How do you know that Â»at the same time, these behavioral outputs affect those same sensory inputs via the environmentÂ«.You probably think that everything in the loop is happening atb the same time ??? Do you understand how Â»Control loop worksÂ«.

It seems that our Ricky is again on it’s princing misson where everything happens at the same time ???

RM : While the TCV is aimed at the discovery of the perceptual aspects of input around which an organism’s behavior is organized, it can also reveal the unlikely possibility that the observed behavior is not mediated by a controlled perception;

HB . What is this ??? What is for you Â»controlled perceptionÂ« ??? Â»Observed behaviorÂ« is mediated by what ???

RM : While you are doing the research aimed at understanding the behavior you see – under the assumption that it is organized around control of some perceptual variables – you might – though it is very unlikely – find that it is not the behavior of an N-system.

HBÂ : Can you explain more preciselly what do you mean by this one ?

Best,

Boris

···

From: Richard Marken [mailto:rsmarken@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, September 02, 2016 6:32 PM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: The Behavioural Illusion and modelling

[From Rick Marken (2016.09.02.0930)]

On Thu, Sep 1, 2016 at 3:24 PM, Alex Gomez-Marin agomezmarin@gmail.com wrote:

AGM: Beautiful analogies, Rick. Now, does this mean that one does not need to prove the behavioral illusion in each particular case because, by construction of argument, one already knows that it must be a behavioral illusion?

RM: A very good question. I think the question is answered in Bill’s 1978 Psych Review paper (“Quantitative Analysis of Purposive Systems”, reprinted in LCS I) but I’ll try to give a quick summary specifically related to your question.

RM: I think another way of asking your question would be this: Do we need to prove (in the sense of “test” since we don’t prove propositions in science in the same way as we do in mathematics) in each particular case that the appearance of behavior as caused, selected or planned output is an illusion? If the behavior is that of a living system the answer would be a cautious “no”.

RM: In his 1978 Psych Review paper Bill showed that living systems are very likely to be closed loop systems. We know that sensory inputs cause behavioral outputs via the nervous systems; and we can see that, at the same time, these behavioral outputs affect those same sensory inputs via the environment. And since the behavior of these systems is generally very stable, the feedback in the closed loop must be negative. So living systems are very likely to be negative feedback systems – Bill calls them N systems in the article – and N systems act to control their own inputs.

RM: So we can assume that we are looking at the behavior of a control system (rather than that of an open-loop causal system – Bill calls it a Z system in the article) when we are looking at the behavior of a living organism. That means when we see a living organism apparently reacting to stimuli, having its behavior “strengthened” by its consequences or producing a programmed set of outputs, we can be pretty sure that those appearances are “illusions”. We know this for the same reason that we know that the pencil doesn’t really bend when we place it in water. With living organisms we know that if they are N-systems these behavioral appearances are “side effects” of control of input; with the pencil we know that the appearance of bending is a “side effect” of differential refraction of light by water and air.

RM: But as in the case with the pencil in water, there is always the possibility that what is seen is not an illusion. The pencil might really have bent in water if, for example, one side of the pencil were made of a material that expands in water. And the behavior of an organism that we see might really be an example of caused, reinforced or computed output. But this very unlikely possibility is actually implicitly handled by the PCT approach to studying living control systems.

RM: PCT research aims to understand the behavior (controlling) of living organisms in terms of the input variables that are being controlled. So when a PCT researcher sees a living organism apparently reacting to stimuli, being manipulated by reinforcement or producing programmed output they try to guess at the aspects of the organisms sensory input around which this behavior might be organized; that is, they try to guess at what input (perceptual) variables might be under control.

RM: The general methodology used to do this kind of research is called the Test for the Controlled Variable. An example of such research, using modeling to determine the perceptual variables under control is described in this paper: https://www.dropbox.com/s/1ajwvsybrfm6kop/Chasin%27Choppers.pdf?dl=0. In this research the object interception behavior observed could be seen as caused output; the view of the helicopter causes the actions of the pursuer. But this was assumed to be an illusion and, indeed, a model that controls aspects of the optical projection of the helicopter on the retina explains the behavior nearly perfectly.

RM: While the TCV is aimed at the discovery of the perceptual aspects of input around which an organism’s behavior is organized, it can also reveal the unlikely possibility that the observed behavior is not mediated by a controlled perception; that the apparently caused, reinforced or programmed output really is what it appears to be; that the behavior is really that of a Z system; that the pencil really is bent!

RM: So the bottom line answer to your question is, again, no; you don’t have to explicitly test to see whether every behavior of a living system that you observe is an example of a behavioral illusion. You go in assuming that apparently caused, selected or progreammed behavior is an illusion – that the pencil is not really bent. While you are doing the research aimed at understanding the behavior you see – under the assumption that it is organized around control of some perceptual variables – you might – though it is very unlikely – find that it is not the behavior of an N-system. So you might find that a behavior is actually a non-illusory caused output (the saccade is apparently an example). But the default assumption of PCT-based research is that behavior is the control of perceptual input; it is not caused, constrained, selected or programmed output.

Best

Rick

On Thu, Sep 1, 2016 at 10:18 PM, Richard Marken rsmarken@gmail.com wrote:

[From Rick Marken (2016.09.01.1320)]

Fred Nickols (2016.09.01.1554 ET)]

FN: I really like your post below, Rick.

RM: Wow, that is so exciting Fred! Thanks. I think this is the first post of mine in weeks that anyone has liked!

FN: I also spotted something that I think might present a problem when explaining PCT to others. Hereâ€™s the snippet I pulled from your longer post below:

RM: So the “behavioral illusion” refers to the fact that when you observe the behavior of a closed loop control system – living or artificial – what you see is not necessarily what is actually happening.

FN: Itâ€™s the â€œwhat you see is not necessarily what is actually happeningâ€? thatâ€™s giving me pause. I think most people, especially some behaviorists I know, would snort or laugh and say something like, â€œDonâ€™t tell me Iâ€™m not seeing what Iâ€™m seeing.â€? I think a better way of saying what youâ€™re driving at is to say, â€œHow you explain or account for what you see, especially if you do so in cause-effect or stimulus-response terms, is very different from the way those same observations are explained by control theory.

RM: Yes! Much better (and more correct) way of saying it! Thanks again Fred!

Best

Rick

More important, in light of control theory, those stimulus-response explanations are very misleading. In control theory, especially perceptual control theory (PCT), those misleading explanations are referred to as â€œthe behavioral illusion.â€?

FN: At least thatâ€™s the way it seems to me, Rick.

FN: Anyway, thanks again for this post. I like it – a lot.

Regards,

Fred Nickols, Consultant

My Objective is to Help You Achieve Yours

DISTANCE CONSULTING LLC

â€œAssistance at a Distanceâ€?^SM

From: Richard Marken [mailto:rsmarken@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, September 01, 2016 2:09 PM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Cc: Henry Yin
Subject: Re: The Behavioural Illusion and modelling

[From Rick Marken (2016.09.01.1110)]

cc: Henry Yin, because he understands the importance of the behavioral illusion and I’d like to hear what he thinks of this post.

Martin Taylor (2016.08.30.13.12)–

RM: This is a nice effort to explain the behavioral illusion but I’d like to give my own explanation. I’ll start by defining an illusion as an observation that is not what it appears to be. For example, here is an example of an optical illusion:

RM: What you observe are two parallel vertical lines that bulge out in the middle. This is an illusion because we know, for other reasons (such as from measuring the distance between the lines at the top, middle and bottom) that there is no bulge. Another illusion is the observation of a straight, rigid object, like a pencil, bending when placed in water, like so:

RM: Again, this is an illusion because we know, for other reasons (such as feeling along the pencil while it is immersed) that the object is not bent.

RM: Behavioral illusions are illusions in the same way these optical illusions are illusions: they are observations that are not what they appear to be. One example of a behavioral illusion is a “reflex”, such as the patellar of “knee jerk” reflex:

RM: What you see is a hammer tap below the knee causing the lower leg to kick up. The hammer tap looks like a “stimulus” that is the cause of the knee jerk “response”. It looks like stimulus causes response. The stimulus-response appearance of reflexes was not considered an illusion until it was shown to be, by other mean. The “other means” was PCT.

RM: The PCT analysis of the stimulus-response illusion starts by noting that behavior is a closed-loop control process organized around the control of the sensory effects of stimuli: controlled variables. When this loop is analyzed correctly it can be shown (as Powers did in his 1978 Psych Review paper) that the observed causal relationship between stimulus and response is actually the inverse of the causal relationship between the response and the sensory effect of the stimulus; this relationship is called the feedback function and the sensory effect of the stimulus is the controlled variable.

RM: So the “behavioral illusion” refers to the fact that when you observe the behavior of a closed loop control system – living or artificial – what you see is not necessarily what is actually happening. In the case of the stimulus-response illusion, the actual causal connection from stimulus to response is “masked” by the fact that it occurs as part of a closed loop control process.

RM: There are actually three versions of the behavioral illusion, which are described in my “Blind Men and the Elephant” paper in “More Mind Readings”. Reflexes, like the patellar, are examples of the stimulus-response illusion; operant behavior is an example of the reinforcement illusion; and the power law is an example of the emitted output illusion (called the cognitive illusion in the paper).

RM: How “illusory” any of these behavioral illusions are depends on many factors. For example, the stimulus-response illusion is much more pronounced when the stimulus (disturbance to the controlled variable) is abrupt and strong rather than gradual and weak (see “A Bucket of Beans” in LCS II); the emitted output illusion is more pronounced when there are no obvious disturbances to the controlled variable. These illusions are also more pronounced when the system under observation controls well. A system that controls poorly will make only a very weak “response” to a “stimulus”(disturbance) that affects the variable it is controlling. So the stimulus will not give the appearance of causing the response and there will be a very weak stimulus-response illusion.

RM: All behavioral illusions result from failure to understand the implications of the fact that one is observing at the behavior of a closed loop control system. It’s like looking at the bent pencil illusion above and not knowing the implications of the fact that the pencil is partly in water. This analogy should make it clear why the behavioral illusion is so important. A researcher who doesn’t know that the refraction of light is different in water and air will start looking for explanations for why the pencil is bent; a researcher who doesn’t know that a closed loop system acts to control its input will start looking for explanations of why stimuli cause responses, why reinforcement selects responses or how responses are emitted.

RM: The behavioral illusion is important because it shows that behavioral scientists have been studying the different flavors of the illusion – taking them for what is actually happening – for over 100 years.

Best

Rick

–

Richard S. Marken

“The childhood of the human race is far from over. We have a long way to go before most people will understand that what they do for others is just as important to their well-being as what they do for themselves.” – William T. Powers

–

Richard S. Marken

“The childhood of the human race is far from over. We have a long way to go before most people will understand that what they do for others is just as important to their well-being as what they do for themselves.” – William T. Powers

–

Richard S. Marken

“The childhood of the human race is far from over. We have a long way to go before most people will understand that what they do for others is just as important to their well-being as what they do for themselves.” – William T. Powers

_Boris_Hartman · September 11, 2016, 2:11am

In the text bellow……

···

From: Richard Marken [mailto:rsmarken@gmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, September 03, 2016 8:11 PM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: The Behavioural Illusion and modelling

[From Rick Marken (2016.09.03.1110)]

On Fri, Sep 2, 2016 at 12:36 PM, Alex Gomez-Marin agomezmarin@gmail.com wrote:

AGM: So, your answer is like one of the Ten Commandments: “you shall regard all observed and interpreted output as illusion”.

RM: Not quite. It’s more like “When you are observing the behavior of a living system, you shall regard all observations of stimuli apparently causing responses, reinforcements selecting responses or responses being generated by internal motor commands (and constrained by the environment) as likely side effects of control”.

AGM: Two more questions, then:

AGM: 1. Is a living organism still “a closed loop system” even when the experimenter tries hard “to break the loop” so as to apply the stimulus-response strategy?

RM: Yes.

AGM: 2. Why can’t then the experimenter be able to learn some aspects of the organism function, specially when the system is not an ideal system in terms of Bill’s classification?

RM: Once you know that you are dealing with control behavior

HB : What is this ? What is Â»once dealing with control behaviorÂ« ???

RM : ….the most important thing to know about the organism function is the perceptual variable that the organism is controlling.

HB : Right !!!

RM : Once you know this you can learn how closely the system approaches ideal without breaking the loop. Indeed, you wouldn’t even know how to “break the loop” until you knew what variable was under control by the organism.

HB : Â»Breaking which loopÂ« ??? What variables should be under control ? In many countries of the world you can still find this sort of bad practice specially in patriarchal countries.Â If wifeÂ and husband are quarreling and husband hit wife, he probably Â»break the loopÂ« of wife’s control. Does it matter to hm what wife was controlling for ? Maybe. But I think that It only matters to him that her control disturbed his control and he will try to Â»break the looprÂ« that is source of disturbances.Â He can just Â»break her loopsÂ« without knowing what she was controlling for. How could husband Â»breakÂ« actual wife’s loop if he didn’t know which variable was under control by wife ?

If husband really didn’t know how to break the loop because he didn’t know what variable wife has under control, how could he Â»breakÂ« the wifes actual loop ?

It would be nice if husband would care about what wife was controlling ? The problem is that usually he carred only about what he controls (specially in some countries of the World). By my oppinion there should be more communication to find out what husband and wife are controlling for. For better relation. That could mean better understanding and less Â»breaked loopsÂ« without knowing what people are controlling for.

Using wrong interpersonal control to reduce perceptual difference to somebodies references is probably the case when somebody doesn’t care what other person is controlling for. In the case when somebody is killed and all his loops are Â»brokenÂ«, the proffesional killer (hired) by your oppinion always find out which variables the victimÂ is controlling for so that he can do what he do ???

RM : And if you do manage to figure out a way to 'break the loop", the system, because it is still closed loop relative to other variables,

HB : Relative to which variables ??? Can you give some examples ???

RM : ….will still be controlling tthose other variables.

HB : Controlling which other variables ???

RM : So it’s doubtful that “breaking the loop” research – trying to turn closed loop into open loop systems – will tell you much about the controlling done by living systems.

HB : Right !!!

Best

Rick

On Fri, Sep 2, 2016 at 6:32 PM, Richard Marken rsmarken@gmail.com wrote:

[From Rick Marken (2016.09.02.0930)]

On Thu, Sep 1, 2016 at 3:24 PM, Alex Gomez-Marin agomezmarin@gmail.com wrote:

AGM: Beautiful analogies, Rick. Now, does this mean that one does not need to prove the behavioral illusion in each particular case because, by construction of argument, one already knows that it must be a behavioral illusion?

RM: A very good question. I think the question is answered in Bill’s 1978 Psych Review paper (“Quantitative Analysis of Purposive Systems”, reprinted in LCS I) but I’ll try to give a quick summary specifically related to your question.

RM: I think another way of asking your question would be this: Do we need to prove (in the sense of “test” since we don’t prove propositions in science in the same way as we do in mathematics) in each particular case that the appearance of behavior as caused, selected or planned output is an illusion? If the behavior is that of a living system the answer would be a cautious “no”.

RM: In his 1978 Psych Review paper Bill showed that living systems are very likely to be closed loop systems. We know that sensory inputs cause behavioral outputs via the nervous systems; and we can see that, at the same time, these behavioral outputs affect those same sensory inputs via the environment. And since the behavior of these systems is generally very stable, the feedback in the closed loop must be negative. So living systems are very likely to be negative feedback systems – Bill calls them N systems in the article – and N systems act to control their own inputs.

RM: So we can assume that we are looking at the behavior of a control system (rather than that of an open-loop causal system – Bill calls it a Z system in the article) when we are looking at the behavior of a living organism. That means when we see a living organism apparently reacting to stimuli, having its behavior “strengthened” by its consequences or producing a programmed set of outputs, we can be pretty sure that those appearances are “illusions”. We know this for the same reason that we know that the pencil doesn’t really bend when we place it in water. With living organisms we know that if they are N-systems these behavioral appearances are “side effects” of control of input; with the pencil we know that the appearance of bending is a “side effect” of differential refraction of light by water and air.

RM: But as in the case with the pencil in water, there is always the possibility that what is seen is not an illusion. The pencil might really have bent in water if, for example, one side of the pencil were made of a material that expands in water. And the behavior of an organism that we see might really be an example of caused, reinforced or computed output. But this very unlikely possibility is actually implicitly handled by the PCT approach to studying living control systems.

RM: PCT research aims to understand the behavior (controlling) of living organisms in terms of the input variables that are being controlled. So when a PCT researcher sees a living organism apparently reacting to stimuli, being manipulated by reinforcement or producing programmed output they try to guess at the aspects of the organisms sensory input around which this behavior might be organized; that is, they try to guess at what input (perceptual) variables might be under control.

RM: The general methodology used to do this kind of research is called the Test for the Controlled Variable. An example of such research, using modeling to determine the perceptual variables under control is described in this paper: https://www.dropbox.com/s/1ajwvsybrfm6kop/Chasin%27Choppers.pdf?dl=0. In this research the object interception behavior observed could be seen as caused output; the view of the helicopter causes the actions of the pursuer. But this was assumed to be an illusion and, indeed, a model that controls aspects of the optical projection of the helicopter on the retina explains the behavior nearly perfectly.

RM: While the TCV is aimed at the discovery of the perceptual aspects of input around which an organism’s behavior is organized, it can also reveal the unlikely possibility that the observed behavior is not mediated by a controlled perception; that the apparently caused, reinforced or programmed output really is what it appears to be; that the behavior is really that of a Z system; that the pencil really is bent!

RM: So the bottom line answer to your question is, again, no; you don’t have to explicitly test to see whether every behavior of a living system that you observe is an example of a behavioral illusion. You go in assuming that apparently caused, selected or progreammed behavior is an illusion – that the pencil is not really bent. While you are doing the research aimed at understanding the behavior you see – under the assumption that it is organized around control of some perceptual variables – you might – though it is very unlikely – find that it is not the behavior of an N-system. So you might find that a behavior is actually a non-illusory caused output (the saccade is apparently an example). But the default assumption of PCT-based research is that behavior is the control of perceptual input; it is not caused, constrained, selected or programmed output.

Best

Rick

On Thu, Sep 1, 2016 at 10:18 PM, Richard Marken rsmarken@gmail.com wrote:

[From Rick Marken (2016.09.01.1320)]

Fred Nickols (2016.09.01.1554 ET)]

FN: I really like your post below, Rick.

RM: Wow, that is so exciting Fred! Thanks. I think this is the first post of mine in weeks that anyone has liked!

FN: I also spotted something that I think might present a problem when explaining PCT to others. Hereâ€™s the snippet I pulled from your longer post below:

RM: So the “behavioral illusion” refers to the fact that when you observe the behavior of a closed loop control system – living or artificial – what you see is not necessarily what is actually happening.

FN: Itâ€™s the â€œwhat you see is not necessarily what is actually happeningâ€? thatâ€™s giving me pause. I think most people, especially some behaviorists I know, would snort or laugh and say something like, â€œDonâ€™t tell me Iâ€™m not seeing what Iâ€™m seeing.â€? I think a better way of saying what youâ€™re driving at is to say, â€œHow you explain or account for what you see, especially if you do so in cause-effect or stimulus-response terms, is very different from the way those same observations are explained by control theory.

RM: Yes! Much better (and more correct) way of saying it! Thanks again Fred!

Best

Rick

More important, in light of control theory, those stimulus-response explanations are very misleading. In control theory, especially perceptual control theory (PCT), those misleading explanations are referred to as â€œthe behavioral illusion.â€?

FN: At least thatâ€™s the way it seems to me, Rick.

FN: Anyway, thanks again for this post. I like it – a lot.

Regards,

Fred Nickols, Consultant

My Objective is to Help You Achieve Yours

DISTANCE CONSULTING LLC

â€œAssistance at a Distanceâ€?^SM

From: Richard Marken [mailto:rsmarken@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, September 01, 2016 2:09 PM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Cc: Henry Yin
Subject: Re: The Behavioural Illusion and modelling

[From Rick Marken (2016.09.01.1110)]

cc: Henry Yin, because he understands the importance of the behavioral illusion and I’d like to hear what he thinks of this post.

Martin Taylor (2016.08.30.13.12)–

RM: This is a nice effort to explain the behavioral illusion but I’d like to give my own explanation. I’ll start by defining an illusion as an observation that is not what it appears to be. For example, here is an example of an optical illusion:

RM: What you observe are two parallel vertical lines that bulge out in the middle. This is an illusion because we know, for other reasons (such as from measuring the distance between the lines at the top, middle and bottom) that there is no bulge. Another illusion is the observation of a straight, rigid object, like a pencil, bending when placed in water, like so:

RM: Again, this is an illusion because we know, for other reasons (such as feeling along the pencil while it is immersed) that the object is not bent.

RM: Behavioral illusions are illusions in the same way these optical illusions are illusions: they are observations that are not what they appear to be. One example of a behavioral illusion is a “reflex”, such as the patellar of “knee jerk” reflex:

RM: What you see is a hammer tap below the knee causing the lower leg to kick up. The hammer tap looks like a “stimulus” that is the cause of the knee jerk “response”. It looks like stimulus causes response. The stimulus-response appearance of reflexes was not considered an illusion until it was shown to be, by other mean. The “other means” was PCT.

RM: The PCT analysis of the stimulus-response illusion starts by noting that behavior is a closed-loop control process organized around the control of the sensory effects of stimuli: controlled variables. When this loop is analyzed correctly it can be shown (as Powers did in his 1978 Psych Review paper) that the observed causal relationship between stimulus and response is actually the inverse of the causal relationship between the response and the sensory effect of the stimulus; this relationship is called the feedback function and the sensory effect of the stimulus is the controlled variable.

RM: So the “behavioral illusion” refers to the fact that when you observe the behavior of a closed loop control system – living or artificial – what you see is not necessarily what is actually happening. In the case of the stimulus-response illusion, the actual causal connection from stimulus to response is “masked” by the fact that it occurs as part of a closed loop control process.

RM: There are actually three versions of the behavioral illusion, which are described in my “Blind Men and the Elephant” paper in “More Mind Readings”. Reflexes, like the patellar, are examples of the stimulus-response illusion; operant behavior is an example of the reinforcement illusion; and the power law is an example of the emitted output illusion (called the cognitive illusion in the paper).

RM: How “illusory” any of these behavioral illusions are depends on many factors. For example, the stimulus-response illusion is much more pronounced when the stimulus (disturbance to the controlled variable) is abrupt and strong rather than gradual and weak (see “A Bucket of Beans” in LCS II); the emitted output illusion is more pronounced when there are no obvious disturbances to the controlled variable. These illusions are also more pronounced when the system under observation controls well. A system that controls poorly will make only a very weak “response” to a “stimulus”(disturbance) that affects the variable it is controlling. So the stimulus will not give the appearance of causing the response and there will be a very weak stimulus-response illusion.

RM: All behavioral illusions result from failure to understand the implications of the fact that one is observing at the behavior of a closed loop control system. It’s like looking at the bent pencil illusion above and not knowing the implications of the fact that the pencil is partly in water. This analogy should make it clear why the behavioral illusion is so important. A researcher who doesn’t know that the refraction of light is different in water and air will start looking for explanations for why the pencil is bent; a researcher who doesn’t know that a closed loop system acts to control its input will start looking for explanations of why stimuli cause responses, why reinforcement selects responses or how responses are emitted.

RM: The behavioral illusion is important because it shows that behavioral scientists have been studying the different flavors of the illusion – taking them for what is actually happening – for over 100 years.

Best

Rick

–

Richard S. Marken

“The childhood of the human race is far from over. We have a long way to go before most people will understand that what they do for others is just as important to their well-being as what they do for themselves.” – William T. Powers

–

Richard S. Marken

“The childhood of the human race is far from over. We have a long way to go before most people will understand that what they do for others is just as important to their well-being as what they do for themselves.” – William T. Powers

–

Richard S. Marken

“The childhood of the human race is far from over. We have a long way to go before most people will understand that what they do for others is just as important to their well-being as what they do for themselves.” – William T. Powers

–

Richard S. Marken

“The childhood of the human race is far from over. We have a long way to go before most people will understand that what they do for others is just as important to their well-being as what they do for themselves.” – William T. Powers

_Boris_Hartman · September 11, 2016, 2:12am

[From Rick Marken (2016.09.03.1125)]

AGM: environment is not mere contingency, but “the house” of the organism… why insisting in not wanting to learn anything about that in the process? i suspect that pct fails to appreciate the importance, value and interest of the brain-body-world confluence by over-stressing the organism’s references. it is like the usual from on pole to the other dynamics in science. time to see our own biasses!

RM: How does PCT “over-stress” the organism’s references? Reference signals are “stressed” only to the extent that they account for the observation that organisms maintain aspects of their environment (what are called perceptual variables) in constant or varying “reference” states, protected from disturbances.

HB : Rick when will you learn that there is no Â»referenceÂ« states in environment and that PCT in not Â»protecting theoryÂ« ???

RM :Â So the environment enters the picture as the basis of controlled perceptual variables.

HB : What is Â»controlled perceptual variableÂ« ? Are you saying again that control enters to organism through Â»perceptionÂ« and physical variables in environment ???Â How this happens ? Could you be more specific. You are again promoting RCT and you are all the time Â»stupidingÂ« people arround.

RM : It also enters the picture as disturbances to these controlled perceptual variables. What is “under-stressed” in PCT?

HB : What are disturbances to Â»controlled paercetual variableÂ« ? Could you describe more specificllay how disturbances Â»entersÂ« these Â»controlled perceptual variablesÂ« ??? You can help yourself of course with Bill’s diagramâ€¦. And his literature…

Best,

Boris

Best

Rick

···

From: Richard Marken [mailto:rsmarken@gmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, September 03, 2016 8:28 PM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: The Behavioural Illusion and modelling

On Sat, Sep 3, 2016 at 5:37 AM, Alex Gomez-Marin agomezmarin@gmail.com wrote:

On Friday, 2 September 2016, Huddy, Vyv v.huddy@ucl.ac.uk wrote:

[Vyv Huddy (2130.02.09.2016)]

AGM: If you all prefer to use the word ILLUSION to refer to OUTPUT, alright — you could have chosen something eeven more condescendent to the rest of the non-PCT word, something like behavioral OUTPUT = behavioral RUBBISH.

VH: For me illusion is the correct term because it descibes someone providing the wrong answer to the question of why a living organism acts following an external event. The answer stimulus event causes response event not only ignores the controlled variable but it is also too restricted. One has to know what the organism is controlling for to understand the action. So on one level the controlled variable might be keeping relationship between one event and another at the reference. But for a person that cannot be the fundamental purpose as there are many higher levels.

VH: Take an example of a participant in an psych experiment pressing a button when a light comes on. In this situation the participant might be controlling their perception of being a good participant (a priniciple); this is achieved by fulfilling experimental task instructions (a program perception), this is achieved by controlling the relationship between one event (e.g. a light) and another (e.g. a bar pressed) being held true (see Marken and Mansell, 2013). The latter relationship, only if interpreted as cause and effect, is the illusion. This illusion neglects both the controlled variable and also the higher purpose that is the final cause of the light on - bar press relationship being held true. I think??

From: Alex Gomez-Marin agomezmarin@gmail.com
Sent: 02 September 2016 20:51
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: The Behavioural Illusion and modelling

Martin, I also like all these analogies and images, which are great for didactic presentations, etc.

The point is that if “According to PCT, the output behaviour is always action to influence some controlled variable(s) toward its/their reference value(s)” then there is nothing else to say… Namely, if BY CONSTRUCTION OF INTERPRETATION (and I agree there is truth in that interpretation, but not absolute truth!), if output is always illusion, then, of course, the power-law is an illusion (namely, it is indeed output…). If you all prefer to use the word ILLUSION to refer to OUTPUT, alright — you could have chosen something even more condescendent to the rest of the non-PCT word, something like behavioral OUTPUT = behavioral RUBBISH.

I think I am finally getting it…

On Fri, Sep 2, 2016 at 8:31 PM, Martin Taylor mmt-csg@mmtaylor.net wrote:

[Martin Taylor 2016.09.01.16.32

[From Rick Marken (2016.09.01.1110)]

cc: Henry Yin, because he understands the importance of the behavioral illusion and I’d like to hear what he thinks of this post.

Martin Taylor (2016.08.30.13.12)–

RM: This is a nice effort to explain the behavioral illusion but I’d like to give my own explanation. …

Fred Nickols liked this post, and so do I (most of it). It complements mine very nicely. I had thought of adding similar references to optical illusions and mirages, but wanted to keep it short.

RM: So the “behavioral illusion” refers to the fact that when you observe the behavior of a closed loop control system – living or artificial – what you see is not necessarily what is actually happening. In the case of the stimulus-response illusion, the actual causal connection from stimulus to response is “masked” by the fact that it occurs as part of a closed loop control process.

I agree with Fred here. What you see is the closest you can get to what is happening in a perceptual world. All you have is your perception, and as Bill said often enough, it’s the only truth you can truly rely on. What you perceive is what you perceive, without question. What is hidden and must be imagined is the reason why you perceive what you perceive. If you don’t know about control, you think that the internal processing causes what you see in a apparent stimulus-response situation. If control is very good, that’s an illusion. If the “response” cannot influence the “stimulus” it isn’t illusory. And if control is imperfect, it’s partly illusory. You have to model the situation to figure out what’s going on. There’s no one-size-fits-all black-and-whit dress to fit every situation.

According to PCT, the output behaviour is always action to influence some controlled variable(s) toward its/their reference value(s), but there are lots of conditions in which an uncontrolled or uncontrollable perception affects the choice of action to control that/those perception(s). When you are about to go out of the house for a walk and you see the sky blue, you don’t take an umbrella, but if the clouds are dark and getting darker, you probably will. You can’t control your perception of the sky colour but you can use it to control your (imagined) perception of being wet or dry later in your walk.

Taking the umbrella isn’t a stimulus-response action to a perception of dark clouds. If you were simply going out to check the mailbox, you wouldn’t be likely to take an umbrella unless it was actively raining. It all depends on what is being controlled at a higher level. Will you go out for a long walk or will you just pop out and go back in? The action to implement those controlled perceptions depends on the sky colour, a perception that is uncontrolled.

Martin

–

Richard S. Marken

“The childhood of the human race is far from over. We have a long way to go before most people will understand that what they do for others is just as important to their well-being as what they do for themselves.” – William T. Powers

FredNickols · September 11, 2016, 10:48am

[Fred Nickols (2016.09.11.0634 ET)]

···

From: Boris Hartman [mailto:boris.hartman@masicom.net]
Sent: Saturday, September 10, 2016 10:09 PM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: RE: The Behavioural Illusion and modelling

RM : The “response” affects the same sensory variable that is affected by the “stimulus”.

HB :

Are you halucinating again that everything in the control loop happens Â»at the same timeÂ« ? Could you prove this on driving a car. If I understand right you are saying that in the same moment when your perception as a driver is affected by Â»stimulusÂ« (wind blow) you will Â»respondÂ« to the exactly the same Â»stimulusÂ« with output that is Â»matchingÂ« the Â»stimulusÂ« in compensatory sence or as you said that “response” affects the same sensory variable ???

[Fred Nickols] I think it’s useful to specify whatever you’re referring to with the term Â»sensory variableÂ«.Â Let’s suppose I’m driving my car to town.Â One of the many variables I’m trying to control is the position of my car in its lane on the road.Â If there is a steady wind blowing crosswise across the road my steering adjusts accordingly and compensates for any effects the wind might otherwise have on my car’s position.Â I’m compensating for those effects – probably without even thinking aboout the wind.Â Now suppose the wind starts gusting strongly.Â Chances are, according to my experience, the car’s position will alter a bit before I can correct for it.Â I detect a difference between where the car is in its lane and where I want it to be.Â And so I correct for it in a conscious, deliberate way ( and, if experience is any guide, I might even overcorrect a bit).Â My responses (i.e., adjustments in my steering behaviors) have no effect whatsoever on the wind; just on the perceived position of the car in its lane.

So we have to be clear about Â»the stimulusÂ«.Â If it’s the wind, that’s one thing.Â If it’s the perceived position of the car, that’s something else.Â As for ‘the same moment,’ I’m not of the view that adjustments for the effects of a disturbance happen at exactly the same moment as the disturbance itself.Â I do agree that the entire loop is active all the time but I think it takes time for differences in signals to make their way around the loop, even if that movement is at the speed of light which is mighty fast but not in fact instantaneous.Â In electronics, if memory serves, signals to move at close to the speed of light but people aren’t electronic mechanism and I suspect the speed with which signals make their way around the loop and actuate various effectors and effects falls far short of the speed of light.

Have a nice day, Boris et al

Fred Nickols

_Boris_Hartman · September 13, 2016, 7:46am

Fred,

I understand your answer as support to my understanding that Control events don’t happen at the same time as Rick proposed. This is also Bill standpoint as you will see in the further text.Â The problem is that everything in the loop by Ricks’ vision is happening at the same time. This is nonsense.

RM earlier : The “response” affects the same sensory variable that is affected by the “stimulus”.

HB earlier :

Are you halucinating again that everything in the control loop happens Â»at the same timeÂ« ? Could you prove this on driving a car. If I understand right you are saying that in the same moment when your perception as a driver is affected by Â»stimulusÂ« (wind blow) you will Â»respondÂ« to the exactly the same Â»stimulusÂ« with output that is Â»matchingÂ« the Â»stimulusÂ« in compensatory sence or as you said that “response” affects the same sensory variable???

[Fred Nickols] I think it’s useful to specify whatever you’re referring to with the term Â»sensory variableÂ«.

Bill P : The signal emitted by the input function of a system; an internal analog of some aspect of the environment.

HB : This is what I’m refering to with the term Â»sensory variableÂ«. Everything is perception in PCT and is part of the same problem. So you can’t appart Â»windÂ« and perception of the car on the road because the wind is cause for perception of car in the lane to deviate from reference. Beside that the Â»CEPÂ« (complex environmental perception) can include your hearing the wind Â»whislingÂ« arround the car or you can even feel it if you have your window of the car open. The wind blow is the cause for your perception of changed course of the car.

Bill P :

If a crosswind springs up, or the road tilts, or you hit the bump, or a front tyre goes soft, the car will tend to veer to one side. But that will cause a difference, an error, between the position of the road that you perceive and the reference picture you carry in your head for how the road should look like. The same little automatic control system, comparing the real perception with the reference perception, will turn the wheel the opposite way, resisiting and in fact correcting the effect of the disturbance, any disturbance, without any instruction to do so.

HB : Maybe this makes it more clear that perception of the front part of the car on the road road and disturbance (wind blow) is the same part of the control problem.

FN : Let’s suppose I’m driving my car to town. One of the many variables I’m trying to control is the position of my car in its lane on the road.

HB :

This is the most important Â»controled variableÂ«. What could be more important If you want to stay alive. But refereing to Bill you are not controlling the position of your car but perception of the position of the car. So you are right. Â» Sensory variableÂ« has to be clearly defined.

FN : If there is a steady wind blowing crosswise across the road my steering adjusts accordingly and compensates for any effects the wind might otherwise have on my car’s position. I’m compensating for those effects – probably without even thinking about the wind.
/o:p>

HB :

This is normal PCT theory. You are adjusting, compensating, etc. what means that compensating actions follow perception of disturbance with some time delay (time needed for processes in afferent, efferent nerves and comparator). Nervous system can not respond exactly at the same time to perception of disturbance which caused the error. So it’s time delay whatever you are doing in the car when you are driving in Â»responsÂ« to perceived disturbances. If you see pedestrian crossing the road, there will be time delay before you’ll step your break (act). The difference maybe 0,25 sec, depends from the person. But it’s time delay.

So whenever we are talking about compensating, correcting, adjustment, etc. it’s always time delay between perception and compensating action. In some of your control unitsÂ an error occur which causses action. It doesn’t matter whether it was your unconscious (some lower level) or conscious (higher level) control unit. It’s important that in any case it was TIME DELAY between perception of the disturbnace and compensating (adjusting) action to that disturbance. It will happen in any control unit in the organism the same. Only time delays will be different on different levels where Â»errorÂ« occurs. That’s what we are talking about. Time delay….!!!

FN : Now suppose the wind starts gusting strongly. Chances are, according to my experience, the car’s position will alter a bit before I can correct for it. I detect a difference between where the car is in its lane and where I want it to be. And so I correct for it in a conscious, deliberate way ( and, if experience is any guide, I might even overcorrect a bit). My responses (i.e., adjustments in my steering behaviors) have no effect whatsoever on the wind; just on the perceived position of the car in its lane.

HB . The wind blow was the cause of your Â»different perception of the position of the carÂ«. Sometimes you can act more quickly if you hear (perceive) the wind Â»whislingÂ« arrond the car. Or if you have your window of the car open what gives you possibility to Â»feelÂ« the wind.

But on the whole your thinking and experiences are the same as mine Fred . As I said above. It doesn’t matter which control unit will experience Â»errorÂ«, there will be always TIME DELAY between perceived disturbance and compensating action on that perceived disturbance, or as you said : Â»according to my experience, the car’s position will alter a bit before I can correct for itÂ«. That’s the whole point and it will happen always in the control loop. It will never happen at the same time. Only maybe accidentally.

Bill P (LCS III)Â : When the states of the variables are expressed as small whole numbers it would seem to work in imagination perfectly and instantly. If the disturbances produces 5 units of effect on the controlled variable, and the controller produces (with a properly time-delay) -5 units of effect it follows that a net effect….etc…

HB : I just wanted to stress that Rick is halucinating about perception of disturbance and compensating action effects being tha part of the same Â»sensoryÂ« variable. They are not and will never be. It’s always TIME DELAY.

FN : I do agree that the entire loop is active all the time but I think it takes time for differences in signals to make their way around the loop, even if that movement is at the speed of light which is mighty fast but not in fact instantaneous.

HB : As I said before Fred . Our oppinions about time delays in control loop are perfectly aligned. Only the problem is continuity of the whole control loop. Sometimes compensating actions are not present, like when you are just observing something, sleeping and so on.

Fred, i always like talikngs with you. Your natural thinking is quite aligned with mine. I still hope we’ll drink that little glass of wine together one day…

With all respect,

Boris

···

From: Fred Nickols [mailto:fred@nickols.us]
Sent: Sunday, September 11, 2016 12:48 PM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: RE: The Behavioural Illusion and modelling

[Fred Nickols (2016.09.11.0634 ET)]

From: Boris Hartman [mailto:boris.hartman@masicom.net]
Sent: Saturday, September 10, 2016 10:09 PM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: RE: The Behavioural Illusion and modelling

RM : The “response” affects the same sensory variable that is affected by the “stimulus”.

HB :

Are you halucinating again that everything in the control loop happens Â»at the same timeÂ« ? Could you prove this on driving a car. If I understand right you are saying that in the same moment when your perception as a driver is affected by Â»stimulusÂ« (wind blow) you will Â»respondÂ« to the exactly the same Â»stimulusÂ« with output that is Â»matchingÂ« the Â»stimulusÂ« in compensatory sence or as you said that “response” affects the same sensory variable???

[Fred Nickols] I think it’s useful to specify whatever you’re referring to with the term Â»sensory variableÂ«. Let’s suppose I’m driving my car to town. One of the many variables I’m trying to control is the position of my car in its lane on the road. If there is a steady wind blowing crosswise across the road my steering adjusts accordingly and compensates for any effects the wind might otherwise have on my car’s position. I’m compensating for those effects – probably without even thinking abbout the wind. Now suppose the wind starts gusting strongly. Chances are, according to my experience, the car’s position will alter a bit before I can correct for it. I detect a difference between where the car is in its lane and where I want it to be. And so I correct for it in a conscious, deliberate way ( and, if experience is any guide, I might even overcorrect a bit). My responses (i.e., adjustments in my steering behaviors) have no effect whatsoever on the wind; just on the perceived position of the car in its lane.

So we have to be clear about Â»the stimulusÂ«. If it’s the wind, that’s one thing. If it’s the perceived position of the car, that’s something else. As for ‘the same moment,’ I’m not of the view that adjustments for the effects of a disturbance happen at exactly the same moment as the disturbance itself. I do agree that the entire loop is active all the time but I think it takes time for differences in signals to make their way around the loop, even if that movement is at the speed of light which is mighty fast but not in fact instantaneous. In electronics, if memory serves, signals to move at close to the speed of light but people aren’t electronic mechanism and I suspect the speed with which signals make their way around the loop and actuate various effectors and effects falls far short of the speed of light.

Have a nice day, Boris et al

Fred Nickols

Bob_Hintz · September 13, 2016, 6:57pm

bob hintz (9-13-16 - 13.22)

I just want to thank Boris for sharing Bill’s email.Â In examining the diagram, it seems to me that the learning output of the homeostatic system is imagined to create the control unit that generates output in the environment outside the skin in an effort to bring some facet of the intrinsic state back to it’s reference.Â If the new control unit is effective in this regard, the learning output is transformed into a performance output that is activated by the same error signal in the homeostatic system that generated the initial learning output in the first place.Â When the intrinsic variable is back to reference, the signal is no longer sent and the control unit goes off line until it is needed again.Â Virtually all control in the world outside our skin is episodic.Â My breathing rate depends on my intrinsic need for oxygen, which varies in terms of other activities I might be engaged in.Â The success of my breathing activity depends on the air I breathe.Â Lock me in an enclosed container and after awhile breathing will not work as the oxygen will no longer be available.Â I will need to learn how to get out of the box or I will die. Â

It seems to me that all of my behavior in the external environment is organized to manage variables in my internal environment.Â That is why in the diagram one arrow goes back to the control unit and one arrow goes to the intrinsic state.Â A control unit that doesn’t work to change the intrinsic variable does not turn off learning and does not solve the initial problem.Â A partial success might be good enough even it isn’t optimal.Â This leaves lots of room for variation.Â

bob

···

On Tue, Sep 13, 2016 at 2:46 AM, Boris Hartman boris.hartman@masicom.net wrote:

Fred,

Â

I understand your answer as support to my understanding that Control events don’t happen at the same time as Rick proposed. This is also Bill standpoint as you will see in the further text.Â The problem is that everything in the loop by Ricks’ vision is happening at the same time. This is nonsense.

Â

RM earlier : The “response” affects the same Â sensory variable that is affected by the “stimulus”. Â

Â

HB earlier :

Are you halucinating again that everything in the control loop happens Â»at the same timeÂ« ? Could you prove this on driving a car. If I understand right you are saying that in the same moment when your perception as a driver is affected by Â»stimulusÂ« (wind blow) you will Â»respondÂ« to the exactly the same Â»stimulusÂ« with output that is Â»matchingÂ« the Â»stimulusÂ« in compensatory sence or as you said that “response” affects the same Â sensory variable ???

Â

[Fred Nickols] I think it’s useful to specify whatever you’re referring to with the term Â»sensory variableÂ«.Â

Â

Bill P : The signal emitted by the input function of a system; an internal analog of some aspect of the environment.

Â

HB : This is what I’m refering to with the term Â»sensory variableÂ«. Everything is perception in PCT and is part of the same problem. So you can’t appart Â»windÂ« and perception of the car on the road because the wind is cause for perception of car in the lane to deviate from reference. Beside that the Â»CEPÂ« (complex environmental perception) can include your hearing the wind Â»whislingÂ« arround the car or you can even feel it if you have your window of the car open. The wind blow is the cause for your perception of changed course of the car.

Â

Bill P :

If a crosswind springs up, or the road tilts, or you hit the bump, or a front tyre goes soft, the car will tend to veer to one side. But that will cause a difference, an error, between the position of the road that you perceive and the reference picture you carry in your head for how the road should look like. The same little automatic control system, comparing the real perception with the reference perception, will turn the wheel the opposite way, resisiting and in fact correcting the effect of the disturbance, any disturbance, without any instruction to do so.

Â

HB : Maybe this makes it more clear that perception of the front part of the car on the road road and disturbance (wind blow) is the same part of the control problem.

Â

FN : Let’s suppose I’m driving my car to town.Â One of the many variables I’m trying to control is the position of my car in its lane on the road.Â

Â

HB :

This is the most important Â»controled variableÂ«. What could be more important If you want to stay alive. But refereing to Bill you are not controlling the position of your car but perception of the position of the car. So you are right. Â» Sensory variableÂ« has to be clearly defined.

Â

FN : If there is a steady wind blowing crosswise across the road my steering adjusts accordingly and compensates for any effects the wind might otherwise have on my car’s position.Â I’m compensating for those effects – probably withouut even thinking about the wind.Â

Â

HB :

This is normal PCT theory. You are adjusting, compensating, etc. what means that compensating actions follow perception of disturbance with some time delay (time needed for processes in afferent, efferent nerves and comparator). Nervous system can not respond exactly at the same time to perception of disturbance which caused the error. So it’s time delay whatever you are doing in the car when you are driving in Â»responsÂ« to perceived disturbances. If you see pedestrian crossing the road, there will be time delay before you’ll step your break (act). The difference maybe 0,25 sec, depends from the person. But it’s time delay.

Â

So whenever we are talking about compensating, correcting, adjustment, etc. it’s always time delay between perception and compensating action. In some of your control unitsÂ an error occur which causses action. It doesn’t matter whether it was your unconscious (some lower level) or conscious (higher level) control unit. It’s important that in any case it was TIME DELAY between perception of the disturbnace and compensating (adjusting) action to that disturbance. It will happen in any control unit in the organism the same. Only time delays will be different on different levels where Â»errorÂ« occurs. That’s what we are talking about. Time delay….!!!

Â

FN : Â Now suppose the wind starts gusting strongly.Â Chances are, according to my experience, the car’s position will alter a bit before I can correct for it.Â I detect a difference between where the car is in its lane and where I want it to be.Â And so I correct for it in a conscious, deliberate way ( and, if experience is any guide, I might even overcorrect a bit).Â My responses (i.e., adjustments in my steering behaviors) have no effect whatsoever on the wind; just on the perceived position of the car in its lane.

Â

HB . The wind blow was the cause of your Â»different perception of the position of the carÂ«. Sometimes you can act more quickly if you hear (perceive) the wind Â»whislingÂ« arrond the car. Or if you have your window of the car open what gives you possibility to Â»feelÂ« the wind.

Â

But on the whole your thinking and experiences are the same as mine Fred . As I said above. It doesn’t matter which control unit will experience Â»errorÂ«, there will be always TIME DELAY between perceived disturbance and compensating action on that perceived disturbance, or as you said : Â»according to my experience, the car’s position will alter a bit before I can correct for itÂ«. That’s the whole point and it will happen always in the control loop. It will never happen at the same time. Only maybe accidentally.

Â

Bill P (LCS III)Â : When the states of the variables are expressed as small whole numbers it would seem to work in imagination perfectly and instantly. If the disturbances produces 5 units of effect on the controlled variable, and the controller produces (with a properly time-delay) -5 units of effect it follows that a net effect….etc…

Â

HB : I just wanted to stress that Rick is halucinating about perception of disturbance and compensating action effects being tha part of the same Â»sensoryÂ« variable. They are not and will never be. It’s always TIME DELAY.

Â

FN : I do agree that the entire loop is active all the time but I think it takes time for differences in signals to make their way around the loop, even if that movement is at the speed of light which is mighty fast but not in fact instantaneous.Â

Â

HB : As I said before Fred . Our oppinions about time delays in control loop are perfectly aligned. Only the problem is continuity of the whole control loop. Sometimes compensating actions are not present, like when you are just observing something, sleeping and so on.

Â

Fred, i always like talikngs with you. Your natural thinking is quite aligned with mine. I still hope we’ll drink that little glass of wine together one day…

Â

With all respect,

Â

Boris

Â

From: Fred Nickols [mailto:fred@nickols.us]
Sent: Sunday, September 11, 2016 12:48 PM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: RE: The Behavioural Illusion and modelling

Â

[Fred Nickols (2016.09.11.0634 ET)]

Â

From: Boris Hartman [mailto:boris.hartman@masicom.net]
Sent: Saturday, September 10, 2016 10:09 PM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: RE: The Behavioural Illusion and modelling

Â

RM : The “response” affects the same Â sensory variable that is affected by the “stimulus”. Â

Â

HB :

Are you halucinating again that everything in the control loop happens Â»at the same timeÂ« ? Could you prove this on driving a car. If I understand right you are saying that in the same moment when your perception as a driver is affected by Â»stimulusÂ« (wind blow) you will Â»respondÂ« to the exactly the same Â»stimulusÂ« with output that is Â»matchingÂ« the Â»stimulusÂ« in compensatory sence or as you said that “response” affects the same Â sensory variable ???

***Â ***

[Fred Nickols] I think it’s useful to specify whatever you’re referring to with the term Â»sensory variableÂ«.Â Let’s suppose I’m driving my car to town.Â One of the many variables I’m trying to control is the position of my car in its lane on the road.Â If there is a steady wind blowing crosswise across the road my steering adjusts accordingly and compensates for any effects the wind might otherwise have on my car’s position.Â I’m compensating for those effects – probably without even thinking about the wind.Â Now suppose the wind starts gusting strongly.Â Chances are, according to my experience, the car’s position will alter a bit before I can correct for it.Â I detect a difference between where the car is in its lane and where I want it to be.Â And so I correct for it in a conscious, deliberate way ( and, if experience is any guide, I might even overcorrect a bit).Â My responses (i.e., adjustments in my steering behaviors) have no effect whatsoever on the wind; just on the perceived position of the car in its lane.

Â

So we have to be clear about Â»the stimulusÂ«.Â If it’s the wind, that’s one thing.Â If it’s the perceived position of the car, that’s something else.Â As for ‘the same moment,’ I’m not of the view that adjustments for the effects of a disturbance happen at exactly the same moment as the disturbance itself.Â I do agree that the entire loop is active all the time but I think it takes time for differences in signals to make their way around the loop, even if that movement is at the speed of light which is mighty fast but not in fact instantaneous.Â In electronics, if memory serves, signals to move at close to the speed of light but people aren’t electronic mechanism and I suspect the speed with which signals make their way around the loop and actuate various effectors and effects falls far short of the speed of light.

Â

Have a nice day, Boris et al

Â

Fred Nickols

Â