The Nature of PCT

[From Bruce Gregory (2001.0418.1157)]

Rather than engaging in unsupported speculations on the motives of those
who post on CSGnet, I will simply point out that students have a great deal
of difficulty understanding physics because words are used in that science
that are only vaguely related to their everyday use, e.g., work is the
product of force and distance--no work is done no mater how hard you push
if the object does not move. Similar problems arise when you try to
translate everyday concepts such as coercion into control language.

I, for one, am unwilling to agree that psychological barriers prevent
people from understanding PCT. PCT is, by almost any standard, an
exceedingly simple model of control (that is its great virtue). If you
cannot understand how a thermostat regulates the temperature in a room, you
will be unable to understand PCT. Otherwise you will have few difficulties.
PCT is ignored by most psychologists because they do not conceive of
themselves as studying control. This is short-sighted in many cases, but it
is difficult to see how to rectify the situation.

Problems arise only if you claim that _all_ human experience can be
modelled as a form of control. In an earlier discussion, the claim was made
that we would become upset if the sun rose in the west because we have
established a reference level for the sun rising in the east. As far as I
can tell, this is simply verbal gymnastics. We have absolutely no reason to
believe that the path of the sun is a controlled perception. Therefore
there is no reason to talk about a reference value for the position of the
sunrise. We have an _expectation_ that the sun will rise in the east, but
as far as I know, PCT says nothing about expectations since they are not
controlled perceptions. Nor does PCT say anything about memory,
imagination, planning, or learning (other than learning how to control a
perception). This is not a criticism of PCT, unless one is persuaded that
all these experiences involve control. If you are so persuaded, it behooves
you to present a model and data to support that claim. That is, if you want
to maintain that you are doing science.

BG

[From Bruce Gregory (2001.0418.1510)]

Consider the following situation. I tell you to continue down the road
until you reach a stop sign, then turn left. Following my instructions can
be interpreted as controlling a sequence. Clearly driving down the road is
a control process, as is turning left. A PCT model is clearly appropriate
for these two processes. But what about recognizing the stop sign? If this
is a control process, what perceptions are you controlling? How are you
controlling them?

BG

[From Dick Robertson, 2001.0419.0400CDT]

It is 4 am. I haven't been able to get back to sleep for a couple of hours.
I have so many error signals floating through my consciousness pertaining to
posts on CSGnet from the last few days that I guess I better get them out of my
head on to the keyboard.

I have been feeling increasingly sad, over the last couple of years actually,
about what has seemed to me to be a kind of occupation of the net by verbal
duels that, although they usually began with some attempt to refine genuinely
interesting points, would often deteriorate into ad hominem attacks that seemed
more like grade school "king of the hill" contests than anything else. I admit
that at first I found many of these interchanges somewhat amusing, and since I
wasn't going to put myself in the line of fire, I could indulge myself in the
myth that of course nobody would take it personally. My clinical judgment
refuted this but I usually couldn't think of anything useful to encourage
greater objectivity. I did attempt that now and then.

But as I reflect on it all now I realize a couple of things I didn't clarify
for myself earlier. I was lurking for two kinds of intellectual treasures
(besides the occasional entertainment I noted above): first, the experiments
and demos from Bill and Rick Marken and earlier on from Tom Bourbon and his
students and a few others--you know who they are. Second the excited and
exciting ventures into applications by David Goldstein, Tim Carey, the various
theses and experimental ventures: Thalhammer, Christensen, Jeff (sorry, last
name eludes me for the moment) and many more too numerous for my old brain to
recall quickly. But, I realize only now that -- unless you were specializing
in the same topic as the contributor, and thus a cooperating competitor, in the
form typical of modern science specialization -- I could only give a momentary
comment and appreciation before going back to my own interests. I hope all
of you who are tuned into this are continuing what you were doing, and that you
bring the rest of us up to date from time to time.

But, in any case I continue to hold my view that there is something about email
that conduces to playing "king of the hill" in the 5 to 10 minutes that it
takes to dash off a post more readily than to the lengthier and more thought
out discussion that one would do in the older forms of scientific
communication.

I am now going to proceed with my reply to Bruce Gregory in what I hope is a
more thoughtout comment -- and hopefully not engage in playing king of the
hill.

Bruce Gregory wrote:

[From Bruce Gregory (2001.0418.1157) & (2001.0418.1510)]

Rather than engaging in unsupported speculations on the motives of those
who post on CSGnet,...

I, for one, am unwilling to agree that psychological barriers prevent
people from understanding PCT. PCT is, by almost any standard, an
exceedingly simple model of control (that is its great virtue). If you
cannot understand how a thermostat regulates the temperature in a room, you
will be unable to understand PCT. Otherwise you will have few difficulties.
PCT is ignored by most psychologists because they do not conceive of
themselves as studying control. This is short-sighted in many cases, but it
is difficult to see how to rectify the situation.

I like those first two paragraphs, but I want to comment on what you said next,
Bruce,

Problems arise only if you claim that _all_ human experience can be
modelled as a form of control. In an earlier discussion, the claim was made
that we would become upset if the sun rose in the west because we have
established a reference level for the sun rising in the east. As far as I
can tell, this is simply verbal gymnastics. We have absolutely no reason to
believe that the path of the sun is a controlled perception.

In regard to that last sentence, I have to say, "In my mind it depends on what
you mean." First of all I want to make clear that I could never make that
statement, any more than I could make the statement, "I believe the path of the
sun IS a controlled perception."

I can accept the whole of your statement as saying something that is important
to you, but I am putting my own thoughts on the matter on to the net only
because I could not tolerate that any observer would take my silence to mean
that I agree with its tendency. First, let me say that I will use "PCT" as
shorthand for referring to everything that embraces MY understanding of B:CP,
the various experiments and demos, etc.

When I think about how it might come about that I would remark to myself
(wordlessly or not), "that is a sunset" I think about Powers's proposal about
how the particular set of light signals transduced by the retina into neural
signals as part of the "booming, buzzing confusion" of my infantile experience
gradually were transformed by repeated reorganizations of my brain circuitry
into the various components and finally complex perception that I could call a
"sunset." During this process many reference signals developed out of
previously recorded perceptual signals as random actions were organized by my
various efforts to "do something" (many somethings in fact). This is all a
just-so story as far as the science of PCT is concerned, as I think you
correctly point out, on many occasions. However, this just-so story is to my
mind so superior to any other proposals (all of them much less complete besides
being cognitively inferior) for a framework for thinking about experience that
I resort to it almost continually in my daily life. There are dangers of
falling into taking a proposed conceptual scheme as "the facts of reality,"
something that Bruce Abbot and you, especially, have often pointed out. And
you are right. All I can say is keep those warnings coming. But, I am not
going to let them have the effect, on me, of dispensing with the best way of
thinking about my experience that I have until a better one comes along, if it
does.

Therefore there is no reason to talk about a reference value for the position
of the
sunrise. We have an _expectation_ that the sun will rise in the east, but
as far as I know, PCT says nothing about expectations since they are not
controlled perceptions. Nor does PCT say anything about memory,
imagination, planning, or learning (other than learning how to control a
perception). This is not a criticism of PCT, unless one is persuaded that
all these experiences involve control.

So, in what I have said above other observers might conclude that you and I
have rather different conceptions of PCT as conceptual scheme. That is all
right as long as you allow me to take some exception to the last sentence
above. If I take it literally, I would read you to be saying that you
criticise My conception of PCT, because I Am persuaded (tentatively) that all
these experiences involve control -- in the sense I described above. But I
think I can see that that is not the sense you intended to imply.

If you are so persuaded, it behooves you to present a model and data to
support that claim. That is, if you want to maintain that you are doing
science.

Well, that is too big an order for me in one chunk, but I do make a small
claim to all the experiments and demos that have come along so far, in the
sense of saying I subscribe to what their authors have added to the substance
that PCT stands for. In my mind a good many of them are examples of
superlative science. But admittedly, the job you seem to be asking for is far
from accomplished.

I have some idea from my own experience just how hard it is to nail down more
than a little chunk with even a lot of effort. I tried to model, with Bill's
help, a higher order process--program level, I thought--during the years 1990
and 1993. I repeatedly gave an intro psych course, based wholly on IMP, that I
did my best to make into a demonstration of what it intended to convey. I told
students the concept of controlled variable as the first topic and proposed
that they see the whole couse as an instance of controlling their own grade. I
wrote multiple alternative 20-item tests for each chapter, imposed a rule of
having to pass each chapter at at least 60% before testing for the next; had
students submit their reference grade in terms of percent at the beginning of
the course and review it and modify/or not after each test; compute their own
error signal and comment on their intentions for the next test; graded each
test immediately after completion by assistants, etc. It could take a whole
book to enumerate all the details both of design and execution. I have
reported on it in more detail on the net in the past. Well, after all this
effort and with generous help from Bill -- the project failed. It demonstrated
Bill's caution, repeated here on CSGnet numerous times, that you have to have a
consistent phenomenon and be able to operationalize every aspect of it before
you can construct a model. I did learn some interesting facts informally. Some
of my students assiduosly persued the goal and reported varying their output in
terms of study time, in accord with magnitude of error. Others discovered
(some to both themselves and me, others only to me, I think) that their
reference value for grade in this course was under the control of a Principle
(or several) having to do with valuing this particular course in terms of study
time allocations in their life as a whole -- and consequently varied RS rather
than output to reduce error. Was this a wasted effort? It depends on how you
evaluate it in the context of all PCT developments going on. As compared with
moonlanders crashed on Mars I think enought might have been learned to say
yes. I would love to see some one eventually make a better attempt, but I
myself am too old. I retired from the university in '93.

Look at how much it took me just to comment on a couple of your sentences,
Bruce. And you don't know how much I edited and revised. If you spend as much
time on your posts I think I can see how discussions on the net could easily
consume large chunks of one's time and increase the temptation to toss off a
comment from the top of one's head in the few minutes one can assign to posting
on the net.

Best, Dick R.

[From Bruce Gregory (2001.0419.0930)]

Dick Robertson, 2001.0419.0400CDT

When I think about how it might come about that I would remark to myself
(wordlessly or not), "that is a sunset" I think about Powers's proposal about
how the particular set of light signals transduced by the retina into neural
signals as part of the "booming, buzzing confusion" of my infantile experience
gradually were transformed by repeated reorganizations of my brain circuitry
into the various components and finally complex perception that I could call a
"sunset."

Fine.

During this process many reference signals developed out of
previously recorded perceptual signals as random actions were organized by my
various efforts to "do something" (many somethings in fact). This is all a
just-so story as far as the science of PCT is concerned, as I think you
correctly point out, on many occasions. However, this just-so story is to my
mind so superior to any other proposals (all of them much less complete
besides
being cognitively inferior) for a framework for thinking about experience that
I resort to it almost continually in my daily life.

That's fine. But I am unable to identify the control circuits involved in
identifying a sunset. They may well be there, but despite considerable
effort, I can't find them. I can simply postulate that they exist, but I
don't know what that gains me. It makes sense that we create perceptual
input functions, and I doubt that anyone would argue the case. But as Bill
seem to agree, there is no reason to assert that these perceptions wind up
as reference levels in control systems. This is really the only point I was
trying to make.

So, in what I have said above other observers might conclude that you and I
have rather different conceptions of PCT as conceptual scheme. That is all
right as long as you allow me to take some exception to the last sentence
above. If I take it literally, I would read you to be saying that you
criticise My conception of PCT, because I Am persuaded (tentatively) that all
these experiences involve control -- in the sense I described above.

In fact, I would encourage you to take the position that all experiences
involve control. I tried to adopt this position and found that wasn't very
useful. I'm quite willing to be shown that in fact it is useful. I like
simplicity as much as anyone.

I have some idea from my own experience just how hard it is to nail down more
than a little chunk with even a lot of effort. I tried to model, with Bill's
help, a higher order process--program level, I thought--during the years 1990
and 1993. I repeatedly gave an intro psych course, based wholly on IMP,
that I
did my best to make into a demonstration of what it intended to convey. I
told
students the concept of controlled variable as the first topic and proposed
that they see the whole couse as an instance of controlling their own
grade. I
wrote multiple alternative 20-item tests for each chapter, imposed a rule of
having to pass each chapter at at least 60% before testing for the next; had
students submit their reference grade in terms of percent at the beginning of
the course and review it and modify/or not after each test; compute their own
error signal and comment on their intentions for the next test; graded each
test immediately after completion by assistants, etc. It could take a whole
book to enumerate all the details both of design and execution. I have
reported on it in more detail on the net in the past. Well, after all this
effort and with generous help from Bill -- the project failed.

I think the project simply demonstrated how difficult it is to control a
grade! Another approach is that taken by the so-called Keller plan. This is
a self-paced course design based on the mastery of individual units. (Where
mastery implies scores more like 90-100 percent than 60%. The problem is
that 60% actually demonstrates a high level of "cluelessness" rather than
understanding.) Students determine their grade by the number of units they
elect to complete. (Say 7 units for a C, 10 units for a B, and 12 units for
an A. Fewer than 7 units and you get no credit for the course. Nobody fails
in this setup.)

Look at how much it took me just to comment on a couple of your sentences,
Bruce. And you don't know how much I edited and revised. If you spend as
much
time on your posts I think I can see how discussions on the net could easily
consume large chunks of one's time and increase the temptation to toss off a
comment from the top of one's head in the few minutes one can assign to
posting
on the net.

I tend to be excessively pithy, but I am always willing to elaborate if
asked. Rarely am I asked. Thanks for your post.

BG

[From Bruce Gregory (2001.0419.1116)]

[Chuck Tucker (2001.0419.0918)]

One could not accomplish the instructions if she could not recognize a "stop
sign." ... BTW, the perception is called
a "configuration."

I agree that a stop sign is a perceptual configuration. But where is
control of this perception involved? How do you control the perception
"stop sign"?

If you don't think that the "sunset" is a perception I invited you to go to
Mallory Square in Key West FloriDA any day at the time of the "sunset" and
join in the celebration with at least 300 hundred other people. Attached is
one among about 500 photos that were taken on 2001.0217:

I do indeed think that sunset is a perception. I don't see how it is a
controlled perception.

BG

[Dan Miller (010419)]

Sunsets and stop signs aren't controlled perceptions as I understand it.
They are reference signals (instructions/projected futures) from which we
control the perceptions of "Wow" and stopping.

Dan Miller
Department of Sociology
University of Dayton
Dayton, Ohio 45469-1442
937.229.2138
Dan.Miller@notes.udayton.edu

In a message dated 4/19/2001 11:17:01 AM Eastern Daylight Time,
bgregory@CFA.HARVARD.EDU writes:

<< I agree that a stop sign is a perceptual configuration. But where is
control of this perception involved? How do you control the perception
"stop sign"?

I control the perception of a "stop sign" by moving my foot from the
accelerator to the brake pedal about 200 feet before the "stop sign" (more
distance, if I am driving at a higher speed) and pushing down on my brake
pedal until the automobile come almost to a stop (I say 'almost' because I
rarely come to a complete stop thus violating the law everyday), My house is
at the end of a street which has a "stop sign" essentially at the end of my
driveway; I rarely come to a complete stop at that sign.

  >If you don't think that the "sunset" is a perception I invited you to go to
>Mallory Square in Key West FloriDA any day at the time of the "sunset" and
>join in the celebration with at least 300 hundred other people. Attached is
>one among about 500 photos that were taken on 2001.0217:

I do indeed think that sunset is a perception. I don't see how it is a
controlled perception.>>

At Mallory Square most of the people (even the few nonsober ones) control the
"sunset" by taking pictures of it and cheering and clapping when the sun
disappears over the horizon at the southern most point in the USA. A few note
that it was the earth's rotation the made the sun disappear.

Regards,
               Chuck

[From Bruce Gregory (2001.0419.1400)]

Chuck Tucker wrote:

I control the perception of a "stop sign" by moving my foot from the
accelerator to the brake pedal about 200 feet before the "stop sign" (more
distance, if I am driving at a higher speed) and pushing down on my brake
pedal until the automobile come almost to a stop (I say 'almost' because I
rarely come to a complete stop thus violating the law everyday), My house is
at the end of a street which has a "stop sign" essentially at the end of my
driveway; I rarely come to a complete stop at that sign.

I would say that you are controlling your perception of your distance to
the stop sign. In order to do this you must identify the configuration
"stop sign." My question is, is the identification of this configuration a
control process?

At Mallory Square most of the people (even the few nonsober ones) control the
"sunset" by taking pictures of it and cheering and clapping when the sun
disappears over the horizon at the southern most point in the USA. A few note
that it was the earth's rotation the made the sun disappear.

As I understand the meaning of control, it means bringing a perception to a
reference state and maintaining it there against disturbances. In the
examples you give, people are no doubt controlling their perceptions of
"taking a picture of the sunset" or "applauding the sunset" or even
"commenting on the cause of the sunset". My question is, is the
identification of the configuration "sunset" an example of control?

BG

BG

In a message dated 4/19/2001 2:05:09 PM Eastern Daylight Time,
bgregory@CFA.HARVARD.EDU writes:

<< My question is, is the identification of this configuration a control
process?>>

It may just be a matter of identification as Dan Miller (010419) points out
that "stop signs" and "sunset" are reference signals by which we control our
perceptions. But the answer to your question is still, yes! It is a control
process. Do you propose that it is an instinctive or S-R process?

<< As I understand the meaning of control, it means bringing a perception to
a
reference state and maintaining it there against disturbances. In the
examples you give, people are no doubt controlling their perceptions of
"taking a picture of the sunset" or "applauding the sunset" or even
"commenting on the cause of the sunset". My question is, is the
identification of the configuration "sunset" an example of control?>>

Again, as noted in B:CP (115-128) it is the third level of HPCT. A
disturbance for the "sunset" would be that the ''sun" would not disappear
thus not "setting" while a disturbance for the "stop sign" would having it
replaced by no sign at all. Or maybe I don't understand your questions.

Regards,
                Chuck

[From Bruce Gregory (2001.0420.0955)]

Charles Tucker wrote:

It may just be a matter of identification as Dan Miller (010419) points out
that "stop signs" and "sunset" are reference signals by which we control our
perceptions. But the answer to your question is still, yes! It is a control
process. Do you propose that it is an instinctive or S-R process?

I don't see how we can rule that out. After all, identification doesn't
seem to be purposeful in the way that actions are.

Again, as noted in B:CP (115-128) it is the third level of HPCT. A
disturbance for the "sunset" would be that the ''sun" would not disappear
thus not "setting" while a disturbance for the "stop sign" would having it
replaced by no sign at all.

True, but we are not in a position to counter such disturbances. I can't
think of a disturbance that we would be able to counter. Perhaps the key is
that the sunset is not part of the environmental portion of any control
loop. We can't impact in any way. We can impact the stop sign, but normally
we don't. Instead we simply note its presence and then control other
perceptions.

Or maybe I don't understand your questions.

Perhaps not. I'm trying to be clear, but I don't seem to very successful!

BG

[From Bill Powers (2001.04.20.0849 MDT)]

Bruce Gregory (2001.0419.1116)--

How do you control the perception "stop sign"

The simplest way: look away from it to avoid seeing it: zero stop sign.
Look at it in order to see it: stop sign.

I do indeed think that sunset is a perception. I don't see how it is a
controlled perception.

Look at it in order to see it. Some people like to look at sunsets; others
don't care one way or another.

It seems to me that answers to questions like this can be worked out
without much effort. You certainly don't need me to answer them. Of course
you have to be willing to try.

Bill P.

[From Bill Curry (2001.0418.1240 DST)]

Bruce Gregory (2001.0418.1157)]

.... In an earlier discussion, the claim was made
that we would become upset if the sun rose in the west because we have
established a reference level for the sun rising in the east. As far as I
can tell, this is simply verbal gymnastics. We have absolutely no reason to
believe that the path of the sun is a controlled perception. Therefore
there is no reason to talk about a reference value for the position of the
sunrise. We have an _expectation_ that the sun will rise in the east, but
as far as I know, PCT says nothing about expectations since they are not
controlled perceptions.

Ah . . . guru :slight_smile: -- but what is this word "expectation" if not a verbalized
reference value for an imagined, but nevertheless controlled, perceptual
variable (as distinguished from a controlled environmental variable)? I can
imagine an infinite number of solar paths but I control for that set I have
observed for lo, these many years. My control of this perceptual variable
would be highly disturbed by the sun rising in the North (echoing the
distraught confusion of aborigines during an solar eclipse).

Similarly, I control, in imagination, the perceptual variable of "stop sign"
in executing the sequence you proposed. As I am driving down the road (a
control process), I am also controlling for an imagined and remembered
reference configuration/category of "stop sign" since it's a fundamental
element of the controlled sequence. The outputs of this control system
include a constant scanning of the right roadside particularly at
intersections. When I finally discover (recognize) a stop sign perception in
the environment matching my imagined reference configuration/category
template, error goes to zero, and I proceed with the next step of the
sequence. If you tell me to drive two miles and turn at a stop sign, and I do
not encounter such a perception in the environment, my control will become
progressively disturbed with each passing mile until the error in this control
system causes me to turn around and retrace my path.

Help me to better understand your view on this. Are you saying that the
so-called imagination and memory control modes are scientifically unproven,
just-so stories and therefore, not a part of "hard PCT"?

BTW I don't believe _all_ human experience can be modelled as a form of
control. For example, I experience a continual stream of uncontrolled
perceptions. I suggest, however, that control is automatically asserted at
primitive lower levels whenever we attempt to identify any one of these
perceptions in our imagination.

Regards,

Bill C.

···

--
William J. Curry 941-395.0088
Capticom, Inc. capticom@olsusa.com

[From Bruce Gregory (2001.0420.1107)]

Bill Curry (2001.0418.1240 DST)

Ah . . . guru :slight_smile: -- but what is this word "expectation" if not a verbalized
reference value for an imagined, but nevertheless controlled, perceptual
variable (as distinguished from a controlled environmental variable)? I can
imagine an infinite number of solar paths but I control for that set I have
observed for lo, these many years.

Tell me more about how you do this. If you can it explain the process, it
will help me a great deal.

My control of this perceptual variable
would be highly disturbed by the sun rising in the North (echoing the
distraught confusion of aborigines during an solar eclipse).

How would you counter the disturbance? Or would your control simply break
down? And exactly what would that mean?

Similarly, I control, in imagination, the perceptual variable of "stop sign"
in executing the sequence you proposed.

Yes, you can certainly imagine a stop sign. But I assume this is quite a
different experience that seeing one.

As I am driving down the road (a
control process), I am also controlling for an imagined and remembered
reference configuration/category of "stop sign" since it's a fundamental
element of the controlled sequence.

That's what I don't understand. You control your perception of driving by
moving the steering wheel and stepping on the throttle/brakes. How do you
control your perception of the stop sign? What you seem to be saying is
that "looking for a stop sign" is a controlled process. I agree. It's
"seeing a stop sign" that I don't see as a controlled perception.

The outputs of this control system
include a constant scanning of the right roadside particularly at
intersections.

O.K. I agree.

When I finally discover (recognize) a stop sign perception in
the environment matching my imagined reference configuration/category
template, error goes to zero, and I proceed with the next step of the
sequence.

Again I agree. What I've been trying to discover is whether discovering
(recognizing) a stop sign perception can be represented as a control
process--if it can be represented with a typical PCT diagram.

If you tell me to drive two miles and turn at a stop sign, and I do
not encounter such a perception in the environment, my control will become
progressively disturbed with each passing mile until the error in this control
system causes me to turn around and retrace my path.

Yes, I agree.

Help me to better understand your view on this. Are you saying that the
so-called imagination and memory control modes are scientifically unproven,
just-so stories and therefore, not a part of "hard PCT"?

No. I just don't know how to model them using PCT.

BTW I don't believe _all_ human experience can be modelled as a form of
control. For example, I experience a continual stream of uncontrolled
perceptions. I suggest, however, that control is automatically asserted at
primitive lower levels whenever we attempt to identify any one of these
perceptions in our imagination.

O.K. Can you provide a simple diagram of the process? There is obviously
something I am missing. For example, I can recognize a stop sign even when
I not expecting one. Do you envision a process in which perceptions are
continuously compared with representations in memory in order to identify
what we are seeing?

BG

In a message dated 4/19/2001 3:50:45 PM Eastern Daylight Time,
Dan.Miller@NOTES.UDAYTON.EDU writes:

<< They are reference signals (instructions/projected futures) from which we
control the perceptions of "Wow" and stopping. >>

The language was altered in Power's MSB (1998) what was called "reference
signal" before is referred to as: reference perception(9), reference
condition(9), reference state(9) or reference image (11). The confusion
occurs when the term 'perception' is used for both 'reference perception' and
'perception.' 'Perception' tells one the current state of what your are
trying to control while the 'reference perception' is what one is controlling
(or 'controlling for'). A "sunset" is a "visual picture of a certain
configuration" (not unlike the picture in the windshield that one attempts to
control for while driving a car which might better be called a 'reference
image') while a 'perception' is what one is seeing at the moment that might
correspond to that image. Thus it a controlling process.

[From Bruce Gregory (2001.0420.1115)]

Bill Powers (2001.04.20.0849 MDT)

Bruce Gregory (2001.0419.1116)--

> How do you control the perception "stop sign"

The simplest way: look away from it to avoid seeing it: zero stop sign.
Look at it in order to see it: stop sign.

I would call that controlling the perception "seeing a stop sign when one
is present". I agree that this is simple, but it's not exactly what I had
in mind. I was thing more of "recognizing the stop sign". We live in a
world filled with familiar perceptual "objects". I am trying to understand
how we recognize these objects and if the process is one involving control.

>I do indeed think that sunset is a perception. I don't see how it is a
>controlled perception.

Look at it in order to see it. Some people like to look at sunsets; others
don't care one way or another.

I can certainly control the perception "looking at the sunset", but how do
I know that I am seeing a sunset? That is what I have been trying to
discover. Obviously I haven't formulated my question properly. How do I
know I am looking at a sunset and not at a stop sign? Does the process
involve control?

It seems to me that answers to questions like this can be worked out
without much effort. You certainly don't need me to answer them. Of course
you have to be willing to try.

Difficult though it may be to believe, I have been trying, and failing, for
quite some time. I seem to be the only person with this problem, but I am
not sure why!

BG

In a message dated 4/20/2001 9:56:31 AM Eastern Daylight Time,
bgregory@CFA.HARVARD.EDU writes:

<< >Charles Tucker wrote:
>
>It may just be a matter of identification as Dan Miller (010419) points out
>that "stop signs" and "sunset" are reference signals by which we control our
>perceptions. But the answer to your question is still, yes! It is a control
>process. Do you propose that it is an instinctive or S-R process?

<< I don't see how we can rule that out. After all, identification doesn't
seem to be purposeful in the way that actions are.>>

See Power's post (2001.04.20.0849 MDT) for some other disturbances. What I
meant by 'identification' was the name used for 'perception.' (see my post in
answer to Dan Miller on CSGNET 0420). We should identify the 'reference
image' as distinguished from the 'perception.' A "sunset" and "stop sign" are
a 'reference images' just like all other configurations.

>Again, as noted in B:CP (115-128) it is the third level of HPCT. A
>disturbance for the "sunset" would be that the ''sun" would not disappear
>thus not "setting" while a disturbance for the "stop sign" would having it
>replaced by no sign at all.

<< True, but we are not in a position to counter such disturbances. I can't
think of a disturbance that we would be able to counter. Perhaps the key is
that the sunset is not part of the environmental portion of any control
loop.>>

My example of a disturbance to a "sunset" was a poor one because it has only
happens when there is an eclipse but there are other disturbances that I have
experienced regarding my perception of a "sunset": people standing in front
of me blocking my view of the sunset; a building blocking my view; trees
blocking my view; clouds on the horizon blocking my view; and, sailboats and
tanker ships blocking my view. In most of these instances I merely have to
change my location in order to perceive a sunset (in KW there a helicopters
one can take to get closer to the sunset that eliminates most of these
disturbances!)

<<We can't impact in any way.>>

As the above indicates most of the disturbances can be eliminated but I think
I am getting your point of view here. Is it your point, that if a person
cannot affect a disturbance then it is not a control process but perhaps a
"natural" one?

<<We can impact the stop sign, but normally we don't. Instead we simply note
its presence and then control other perceptions.>>

We can't do that unless we perceive the "stop sign" right? We do control
the perception of the "stop sign" as Powers pointed out in (2001.04.20.0849
MDT). Are you making a distinction between 'perceiving' and 'recognizing?'

Regards,
              Chuck

[From Bruce Gregory (2001.0420.1248)]

Chuck Tucker wrote:

As the above indicates most of the disturbances can be eliminated but I think
I am getting your point of view here. Is it your point, that if a person
cannot affect a disturbance then it is not a control process but perhaps a
"natural" one?

Right now I am looking out the window at a cluster of very large pine
trees. Not only do I see them (not only are neural signals present in
pathways of my visual system, but I also recognize the patterns associated
with these signals--I am aware that I am seeing "trees". I am not trying to
control the perception of trees, as far as I am aware. When I turn to look
at the monitor, my awareness of "trees" is not disturbed in a way that I
try to compensate for. Clearly the motion of my head is purposeful and can
therefore be represented by a control process. I am asking if my awareness
of the trees is also purposeful or is it, in your terms, "natural".

<<We can impact the stop sign, but normally we don't. Instead we simply note
its presence and then control other perceptions.>>

We can't do that unless we perceive the "stop sign" right? We do control
the perception of the "stop sign" as Powers pointed out in (2001.04.20.0849
MDT). Are you making a distinction between 'perceiving' and 'recognizing?'

Yes. Perception simply refers to the presence of a neural signal in PCT.
Recognizing involves "analyzing" these neural signals and "deciding" what
they represent. As in the case of the trees I describe above.

BG

[From Bill Powers (2001.04.30.1134 MDT)]

Bruce Gregory (2001.0420.1115)--

I would call that controlling the perception "seeing a stop sign when one
is present". I agree that this is simple, but it's not exactly what I had
in mind. I was thing more of "recognizing the stop sign". We live in a
world filled with familiar perceptual "objects". I am trying to understand
how we recognize these objects and if the process is one involving control.

This depends on what you mean by recognizing. If you just mean experiencing
a stop sign's shape, that is what I mean by third-order perception. If you
mean naming the stop sign, that, too, can just be a perception at a level
higher than configurations. The same would go for appreciating the stop
sign as an artifact, or as part of a traffic regulating (I almost said
control) system, or as an eyesore, or in relation to other perceptions.
These are perceptions that depend on how you are prepared to experience
your world.

_Some_ of these perceptions you care about -- that is, you prefer that they
appear in a certain way, or in a certain place or time or relationship to
other perceptions. That means you have an internal image of how you would
like them to be or how you rely on them to be, which we would refer to as a
reference image. Of those, there are some that you can influence, so you
can, with practice, learn to control them. Your control may be very
limited, as for the moon or sunsets; about the best you can hope for is to
see or not see them, and perhaps to experience them as part of being with
friends of loved ones. Others have many attributes you can influence at
many levels, so you have extensive control over them.

I can certainly control the perception "looking at the sunset", but how do
I know that I am seeing a sunset?

That's a different question. Are you asking how perception works, or how
control works? Perception is the process by which the brain represents some
function of external variables. The old epistemological question, of
course, is how well those representations in the brain correspond to
objective external reality. My own conclusion is that we can speculate
about such an objective reality, but we can't prove there is one. I always
_assume_ there is one, but with the reservation that I don't know much
about its true nature, if anything.

Normally we don't have to settle that question. If you see a stop sign,
then at least you can know you're truly having that experience, even if the
reality is that the image arises from a potful of quantum strings. When you
control your image of the stop sign -- move it up,down, right, or left on
your retina, or remove the image altogether, or shoot a hole in it, or bend
it into the ground with your front bumper -- you're controlling the
perception even if you aren't certain about what you're doing to reality in
the process.

Perhaps the problem here is the difference between controlling "things" and
controlling _variable attributes_ of things. I can't control "a car", but I
can control many of the attributes which, together, make up the experience
I call a car. In fact, if you exhaustively list the attributes of an
object, there is really nothing left out of any object, except higher-level
things such as its relation to other objects and so forth.

That is what I have been trying to
discover. Obviously I haven't formulated my question properly. How do I
know I am looking at a sunset and not at a stop sign? Does the process
involve control?

You're talking about perception, not control. Control is the process of
acting on the world so as to change the degree to which some perception is
present. If you have a perceptual function that represents some aspect of
the world as a signal, you may or may not have a preference or expectation
for the state of that perception, and if you do have such a preference or
expectation, you may or may not be able to act on the world so as to bring
the perception to the preferred state.

Best,

Bill P.

[From Bruce Gregory (2001.0420.1554)]

Bill Powers (2001.04.30.1134 MDT)

>That is what I have been trying to
>discover. Obviously I haven't formulated my question properly. How do I
>know I am looking at a sunset and not at a stop sign? Does the process
>involve control?

You're talking about perception, not control. Control is the process of
acting on the world so as to change the degree to which some perception is
present.

Yes. Looking for the stop sign is a control process.

If you have a perceptual function that represents some aspect of
the world as a signal, you may or may not have a preference or expectation
for the state of that perception, and if you do have such a preference or
expectation, you may or may not be able to act on the world so as to bring
the perception to the preferred state.

Yes. I may never see the stop sign. Or I may see one when I am not looking
for it, or when I would prefer that it not be there.

Good. That's clear. It also suggests, if I am correct, that whatever the
process is by which perceptions are constructed, it is distinct from the
process by which control is developed, although the mechanism
(reorganization) may be similar. Thanks for indulging me.

BG

In a message dated 4/20/2001 12:48:44 PM Eastern Daylight Time,
bgregory@CFA.HARVARD.EDU writes:

<< Right now I am looking out the window at a cluster of very large pine
trees. Not only do I see them (not only are neural signals present in
pathways of my visual system, but I also recognize the patterns associated
with these signals--I am aware that I am seeing "trees". I am not trying to
control the perception of trees, as far as I am aware. When I turn to look
at the monitor, my awareness of "trees" is not disturbed in a way that I
try to compensate for. Clearly the motion of my head is purposeful and can
therefore be represented by a control process. I am asking if my awareness
of the trees is also purposeful or is it, in your terms, "natural". >>

from Alfred North Whitehead:

"When you understand all about the sun
  and all about the atmosphere
  and all about the rotation of the earth,
  you may still miss the radiance of the sunset."