Theory of Mind?

CSGnet Archive CSG2011
21

(gavin Ritz 2011.11.21.13.45NZT)

[From Rick Marken
(2011.11.20.1450)]

Gavin Ritz (2011.11.21.11.6NZT)

RM: Ah, there’s your problem. PCT says we control
perceptions which

are functions of sensory input. We do not
control our sensory

inputs; we control perceptual functions of those
inputs.

GR: can you please explain to me how functions
are variables, this is what

you are saying, from my understanding of this
sentence?

RM: No, I’m saying that perceptions are variables
(scalar variables,

pacem Martin Taylor) that are
functions of sensory input variables

(that are typically arrays of scalar variables):

p = f(s1,s2,…sN)

This mathematical statement
says to me: Variables s (or elements of a set S) are transformed by a function
f into a variable (or element) p of set P. This is my understanding conceptually
below using sets and functions. Basically a map f transforms variables s into a
variable p.

Can someone please explain
Rick’s statement above “variables
are functions of variables?” How it specifically relates to the
mathematical statement shown.

And what is the elements
s1, s2, Sn (identity).

Attractors.jpg

22

(JohnK 2011.11.21.16.05 NZT)

Rick, you’ve probably already come across some of Danny Kahnaman’s little puzzles, where intuition fails. Here’s a small modification on one of these as follows:

“A bat and a ball costs $1.12 and the bat costs a buck more than the ball. How much is the ball?”
The answer is not 12c.

Here’s an intro to his work, the Nobel lecture entitled “Maps of bounded rationality”:

http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/2002/kahneman-lecture.html
or the text only version, as attached

enjoy

JohnK

kahneman nobel lecture.pdf (178 KB)

···

On Mon, Nov 21, 2011 at 2:21 PM, Gavin Ritz garritz@xtra.co.nz wrote:

(gavin Ritz 2011.11.21.13.45NZT)

[From Rick Marken
(2011.11.20.1450)]

Gavin Ritz (2011.11.21.11.6NZT)

RM: Ah, there’s your problem. PCT says we control
perceptions which

are functions of sensory input. We do not
control our sensory

inputs; we control perceptual functions of those
inputs.

GR: can you please explain to me how functions
are variables, this is what

you are saying, from my understanding of this
sentence?

RM: No, I’m saying that perceptions are variables
(scalar variables,

pacem Martin Taylor) that are
functions of sensory input variables

(that are typically arrays of scalar variables):

p = f(s1,s2,…sN)

This mathematical statement
says to me: Variables s (or elements of a set S) are transformed by a function
f into a variable (or element) p of set P. This is my understanding conceptually
below using sets and functions. Basically a map f transforms variables s into a
variable p.

Can someone please explain
Rick’s statement above “variables
are functions of variables?” How it specifically relates to the
mathematical statement shown.

And what is the elements
s1, s2, Sn (identity).

23

(gavin Ritz
2011.11.21.20.04NZT)

(JohnK
2011.11.21.16.05 NZT)

Rick, you’ve probably already come across some of Danny Kahnaman’s little
puzzles, where intuition fails. Here’s a small modification on one of
these as follows:
“A bat and a ball costs $1.12 and the bat costs a buck more than the
ball. How much is the ball?”
The answer is not 12c.

Interesting
question. John

If one
uses logic then this is how it should be solved. Bat multiplied (“and”
in logic is totally analogous to multiply) by ball equals 1.12, then let ball
equal x then bat equals x plus 1. So we have a quadratic equation. x2
+x=1.12 therefore x equals 0.67.

Is this
correct?

Regards

Gavin

Here’s an intro to his work, the Nobel lecture entitled
“Maps of bounded rationality”:
http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/2002/kahneman-lecture.html
or the text only version, as attached

enjoy

JohnK

(gavin Ritz 2011.11.21.13.45NZT)

[From Rick Marken (2011.11.20.1450)]

Gavin Ritz
(2011.11.21.11.6NZT)

RM: Ah, there’s your
problem. PCT says we control perceptions which

are functions of
sensory input. We do not control our sensory

inputs; we control
perceptual functions of those inputs.

GR: can you please
explain to me how functions are variables, this is what

you are saying, from my
understanding of this sentence?

RM: No, I’m saying that
perceptions are variables (scalar variables,

pacem Martin Taylor) that are functions of sensory input variables

(that are typically arrays
of scalar variables):

p = f(s1,s2,…sN)

This
mathematical statement says to me: Variables s (or elements of a set S) are
transformed by a function f into a variable (or element) p of set P. This is my
understanding conceptually below using sets and functions. Basically a map f
transforms variables s into a variable p.

Can someone
please explain Rick’s statement above
“variables are functions of variables?” How it specifically
relates to the mathematical statement shown.

And what is
the elements s1, s2, Sn (identity).

···

On Mon, Nov 21, 2011 at 2:21 PM, Gavin Ritz garritz@xtra.co.nz wrote:

24

ttp://www.w3.org/TR/html4/strict.dtd">

···

----- Reply message -----
From: “Richard Marken” rsmarken@GMAIL.COM
To: CSGNET@LISTSERV.ILLINOIS.EDU
Subject: Theory of Mind?
Date: Sun, Nov 20, 2011 20:17


[From Rick Marken (2011.11.20.1220)]
On Sun, Nov 20, 2011 at 8:51 AM, Oliver <oliver.s@telia.com> wrote:
>OS: Interesting stuff. It perhaps shod be mentioned that not everyone prescribes
> to the concept 'theory of mind'. I think PCT does away with much of it. If we
> are controlling percwptions, why on earth .... would we attempt
> to control.something that is not a perception? I think another persons
> behavior either affects something we control or it does not. Why do we need
> to theorize about anything? Wittgenstein did quite nicely away with this
> with speech acts. Oliver
RM: Hi Oliver. I put your post together for you but I still don't
think I understand it. I know that not everyone "prescribes" (I think
you must mean something more like "accepts") the concept of "theory of
mind". But it's not it's popularity that intrigues me but rather (as I
said) the fact that it is about the fact that people tend to perceive
certain behavior as intentional (and other behavior as accidental).
People clearly do see certain behaviors as involving purpose or
intention (as per the Heider-Simmel demo:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sZBKer6PMtM) . In fact, modern science
is based on showing that some behavior -- that of physical matter --
be explained rather well without including intention. Objects don't
fall to earth because they intend to get there.
Theory of mind is not really a theory so much as a description of the
fact that we do perceive behavior as intentional, the implication
being that at least some behavior -- the behavior of living things
like people -- _is_ intentional (or purposeful). Either that or theory
of mind is about the fact that we mistakenly see behavior as
purposeful because, as per the basic model of behavior in psychology,
it's just cause-effect like everything else.
So that's really the heart of my interest in theory of mind; it's a
theory that says we perceive behavior as intentional (purposeful) --
which we clearly do -- without any explanation of what intentional
behavior is. Indeed, its a theory that says we perceive something
(intentionality) whose existence many of those proposing the theory
would deny.
I don't think PCT does away with "theory of mind"; it seems to me that
PCT helps theory of mind by showing what intentional behavior is
(control of perception) and how to tell whether or not a particular
behavior is intentional and, if so, what intention is being carried
out (using the test for the controlled variable).
Have you tried the demo? (at
http://www.mindreadings.com/ControlDemo/FindMind.html). If so, what do
you think?
Best
Rick
-- Richard S. Marken PhD
rsmarken@gmail.com
www.mindreadings.com

OS: hi, I will be looking at that demo as soon as I have proper non mobile phone internet (hence the spelling). Unless you have created an app for it.... Anyhow, I think o.e reason. I am not making sense might be that I use the term ToM in slightly more narrower sense. When a child is said to develop ToM it is when they understand that other people have minds and that they do not necessarily see what they see. I do not think this concept is what you are talking about in which case I agree with you. If I understand you correctly, there would be certain kinds of perceptions of behavior that to us would indicate a controlling system (like the ones on the YouTube clip). We seems to wrong here rather often though. Perhaps from an evolutionary point of view it is better to assume that something is controlling? Say you raise your hand at baseball game to cheer and happen to catch the ball? People would tend to automatically think that was intentional because you seemed to be controlling.

Oliver
25

[From Adam Matic 2011.11.21.14.20 CET]
@Gavin

I'll try to give an example. Let's say there is a temperature sensor
connected to a heating/cooling effector; as in air conditioning system
or human temperature control system. What is being controlled is the
value on the sensor. The value depends on outside forces and energies,
in this case on the amount of heat surrounding the sensor. The heat
can come from various sources - the Sun, a fire, a heating fan..
These sources combined are the total amount of heat on the sensor.
Let's call them Qi.
Qi = f (Sun, fire, fan,...).
This function is external, it's not in the control system, but in the
environment.

The value on the sensor depends on Qi in some way. We can write p = f
(Qi). This is an internal function. In human sensors, p is represented
as a frequency of discharge, a firing rate, impulses per second. In
artificial sensors it can be voltage, frequency, phase or a digital
value or some other variable. There is always an internal source of
energy for the loop. The energy is not controlled, only used to
represent variables.

If we go up a level, sensors do not get input from the outside, but
get copies of p's from lower levels. Px(level2) = f (p1(level1),
p2(level1), p3 (level1))...

@Rick

On my computer, the squares seem to be moving very fast and 'jumpy'.
By the way, is this 'theory of mind' used to explain the perceived
intentional movement of stars and planets in ancient cultures?

Best, Adam

26

Hi, Jannim --

···

At 05:56 PM 11/20/2011 -0500, jannim@comcast.net wrote:

Sent from my LG phone Gavin Ritz <garritz@XTRA.CO.NZ> wrote: > > >(Gavin Ritz 2011.11.21.9.55NZT) > >[From Rick Marken (2011.11.20.1220)] > > > > > > > >I don't think PCT does away with "theory of mind"; > > > > > >GR: PCT kills the theory of mind totally. There is no hope of >reconciliation, why would one want to mix a steam engine with a jet. > > > >it seems to me that > >PCT helps theory of mind by showing what intentional > > > >GR: Intension is just a qualitative take on in-tensions, what >electromagnetic forces are all about (makes no (difference if it's inside >your body, your nervous system). > > > >PCT has already proved that with the control system model. > > > >behavior is > >(control of perception) and how to tell whether or not a particular > >behavior is intentional and, if so, what intention is being carried > >out (using the test for the controlled variable). > > > >GR: all the controlled variable is that which is being controlled for >(electromagnetic forces). > >You are just opaque-d by your own field which is psychology. Matter to >matter communication is described by science by the four fundamental forces. > > > > >Any other forces are voodoo. Unless you've solved for the GUT. > > > >I don't get what you are trying to achieve, what proposition are you trying >to prove. > > > >Gavin > > > > >

This is what you sent to CSGnet. I can't find any message from you in it -- is "jannim" another name for Gavin? If you want your messages read, I recommend that you wait until you can send from a regular computer.

Bill P.

27

[From Bill Powers (2011.11.21.0820 MST)]

(JohnK 2011.11.21.16.05 NZT)

Rick, you've probably already come across some of Danny Kahnaman's little puzzles, where intuition fails. Here's a small modification on one of these as follows:
"A bat and a ball costs $1.12 and the bat costs a buck more than the ball. How much is the ball?"
The answer is not 12c.

Horning in: If the question means "The cost of a bat added to the cost of a ball is $1.12 and the cost of the bat is the cost of the ball plus $1" then the cost of the ball is certainly $0.12. To get any other result you would have to define the terms differently.

Of course other verbal tricks could be involved. The intended interpretation might be "A bat costs $1.12 and a ball costs $1.12" and so on, but then there would be a contradiction: the bat doesn't cost more than the ball. Or "buck" might not mean $1 in the language of origin of the speaker. Or "Cost" might mean manufacturing cost and "how much" could refer to the purchase price. I trust that the point isn't dependent on a verbal trick. Can you explain?

Best,

Bill P.

28

[From Bill Powers (2011.11.21.0835 MST)]

(gavin Ritz
2011.11.21.13.45NZT)

Marken: p = f(s1,s2,…sN)
GR:This
mathematical statement says to me: Variables s (or elements of a set S)
are transformed by a function f into a variable (or element) p of set P.
This is my understanding conceptually below using sets and functions.
Basically a map f transforms variables s into a variable p.
Can someone please explainRick’s statement
above “variables are functions of variables?” How it specifically
relates to the mathematical statement shown.
And what is the elements s1, s2, Sn (identity).
You’re making this way too complicated, Gavin. Set theory is
irrelevant when you’re talking about the quantitative mathematics of
continuous variables.
If the magnitude of a perception p is computed by adding together the
magnitudes of two stimuli s1 and s2, you get
p = s1 + s2.
In general form, this is p = f(s1,s2) where the form of the function
isn’t specified – you’re just specifying that there is some
function computed from the values of s1 and s2. In the example, the
specific form is s1 + s2, the sum of two continuous variables.
The value of the function is the sum: if s1 = 3.1 and s2 = 7.2, then the
value of the function, which is p, is 10.3. Variations in s1 and s2 will
cause the value of p to vary, unless the changes are related in a
particular way (s1 = p’ - s2, where p’ is some particular value of p
arbtrarily selected). In any case, we say that p, the value of the
function, is a variable.
It’s possible that the context would show that the variables are not
continuous, but, say, logical. In that case the + would conventionally
mean “or” and the variables would have only binary values. If
s1 is 1 and s2 is 1 (now meaning not magnitude but true and false) then
p, or s1 + s2, equals 1, or true. The rules for computing with logical
variables are different from the rules for computing with continuous
variables, and physical devices described by those two kinds of
computation operate in different ways.
On a different topic:
Excessive abstraction gives you statements that are true under all
conditions but, for that very reason, trivial. To jump from the specific
variables controlled by living control systems, such as pressure, flavor,
speed, wetness, and profit to a statement that we control
electromagnetism is to go from the specific to the trivially true.
Everything can be seen, with the right interpretation, as a manifestation
of electromagnetism, even flavor (since chemoreceptors involve chemical
reactions, changes in bonds and electron exchanges and so forth). But
which flavor is controlled at which level is determined by which
specific manifestations you are talking about as well as the
current actual states as well as the laws governing changes in
states. So to say just “electromagnetism” in general is to
say nothing useful. It’s like a weather forecaster predicting that
tomorrow we will have weather.

Best,

Bill P.

29

(JohnK 2011.11.22.0448 NZST)

My apologies Bill, I was being a tad flippant with a slight change of text.

Here's a direct quote from near the bottom of page 451 of that Nobel
acceptance lecture I'd attached:

"Shane Frederick (personal communication, April 2003) has used simple
puzzles to study cognitive self-monitoring, as in the following example: �A bat
and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1 more than the ball. How much
does the ball cost?� Almost everyone reports an initial tendency to answer �10
cents� because the sum $1.10 separates naturally into $1 and 10 cents, and 10
cents is about the right magnitude. Frederick found that many intelligent
people yield to this immediate impulse: 50% (47/93) of Princeton students,
and 56% (164/293) of students at the University of Michigan gave the wrong
answer." Interested readers will find a couple more of these little
teasers in the article.

I altered the total to 1.12 because it is then easier to modify the
question along the lines of, "A bat and two equally priced balls cost
$1.12 in total. The bat costs $1 more than a ball. How much does one
ball cost?" and this can be used as a check. Further, substitute
'three balls' for 'two balls' for an additional check.

Please accept I was simply chipping into Rick's topic by adding some
accessible source material in case anybody's interested.

There are several ways to unpick this little puzzle, either verbally
or by some algebra. If anybody got it wrong that may be a sufficient
disturbance to read the article for further details.

1bt + 1bl = $1.12 (and, so, 1bt = $1.12 - 1bl)
and
1bt = 1bl + $1.00
thus
$1.12 - 1bl = 1bl + $1.00
thus
$0.12 = 2bl
and...

Dammit, why didn't I spot that?

Laters...

JohnK

···

On Tue, Nov 22, 2011 at 4:32 AM, Bill Powers <powers_w@frontier.net> wrote:

[From Bill Powers (2011.11.21.0820 MST)]

(JohnK 2011.11.21.16.05 NZT)

Rick, you've probably already come across some of Danny Kahnaman's little
puzzles, where intuition fails. �Here's a small modification on one of these
as follows:
"A bat and a ball costs $1.12 and the bat costs a buck more than the ball.
�How much is the ball?"
The answer is not 12c.

Horning in: If the question means "The cost of a bat added to the cost of a
ball is $1.12 and the cost of the bat is the cost of the ball plus $1" then
the cost of the ball is certainly $0.12. To get any other result you would
have to define the terms differently.

Of course other verbal tricks could be involved. The intended interpretation
might be "A bat costs $1.12 and a ball costs $1.12" and so on, but then
there would be a contradiction: the bat doesn't cost more than the ball. Or
"buck" might not mean $1 in the language of origin of the speaker. Or "Cost"
might mean manufacturing cost and "how much" could refer to the purchase
price. I trust that the point isn't dependent on a verbal trick. Can you
explain?

Best,

Bill P.

30

[From Rick Marken (2011.11.21.0850)]

(JohnK 2011.11.21.16.05 NZT)

Rick, you’ve probably already come across some of Danny Kahnaman’s little puzzles, where intuition fails. Here’s a small modification on one of these as follows:

“A bat and a ball costs $1.12 and the bat costs a buck more than the ball. How much is the ball?”
The answer is not 12c.

Here’s an intro to his work, the Nobel lecture entitled “Maps of bounded rationality”:

http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/2002/kahneman-lecture.html
or the text only version, as attached

Hi John

Thanks for the Nobel talk. I see that the “theory of mind” stuff is just a small part of Kahneman’s “theory”; one of his “natural assessments”. The puzzles were fun; I’ve got to admit I found the baseball/bat thing very irritating until my wife brought me pencil and paper this morning and I did the algebra (she too though the answer was $.12). It would have been a lot simpler if we had just realized the $1 is not $1 more than $.12. The answer (which I could have figured out without the algebra if I had managed to see that fact in the first place) is, of course. $.06.

I do find it astounding that a bunch of Scandinavians (usually a very bright bunch) would award the Nobel to Kahneman rather than W. T. Powers. THe difference between their accomplishments is as clear as the difference between lutefisk and filet mignon.

Best

Rick

···

–
Richard S. Marken PhD
rsmarken@gmail.com
www.mindreadings.com

31

[From Bill Powers (2011.11.21.0915 MST)]

(JohnK 2011.11.21.16.05 NZT)

Rick, you've probably already come across some of Danny Kahnaman's little puzzles, where intuition fails. Here's a small modification on one of these as follows:
"A bat and a ball costs $1.12 and the bat costs a buck more than the ball. How much is the ball?"
The answer is not 12c.

How delightful. I got it wrong and was dead sure I was right. My answer was

Bat = $1
Ball = 0.12

So the bat and ball together cost $1.12. But does the bat cost $1 more than the ball? Is $1 a dollar more than $0.12? Nope, it's $0.88 more. Yikes.

Turning control over to an algebra subsystem at level 9, we have

Bat = ball + 1
Ball + bat = 1.12

therefore

Ball + (Ball + 1) = 1.12, or
  2*Ball + 1 = 1.12 or
  2*Ball = 0.12, or

Ball = 0.06 and
Bat = 1.06

Now it works.

It's the parallel construction that did me in:

1 + 0.12 = 1.12
bat + ball = 1.12

So I just ignored the other condition that has to be true at the same time: Bat = ball + $1.

This was very educational. When someone who seems perfectly intelligent says that stimuli cause responses, this is no casual opinion. It seems like the obvious, self-evident, only-a-fool-could-deny-it-and-I'm-not-a-fool TRUTH. The first reaction to a claim that it's not true is the same one I had when I read that the answer is not that the ball costs 12 cents. It's "You must be using words in some special way." Instant dismissal. Wow. That's what we're up against. There but for the Grace of God goes any one of us, with me leading the way.

We should be able to learn something from this about how to introduce PCT to others. We have to make it very clear that in understanding the relationship of behavior to stimuli, there are TWO conditions we have to take into account, not just one. Yes, the output actions definitely are a function of the values of the input stimuli. Let's get this straight, we're not arguing that this is untrue. After we finish explaining, it will still be true and we will go right on believing it as we do now.

But that's not the only condition that has to be satisfied. While the inputs are determining the outputs, the inputs are being determined by the combination of output effects and external independent variables we call disturbances. There are some time lags involved but they're not important, as we can easily demonstrate. What's important is that input determines output while output is simultaneously being determined by inputs of a fraction of a second ago, and current values of independent disturbances. When we try to reason out how behavior will be related to input stimuli, we have to take both of these causal relationships into account at the same time. That is the step that the early behaviorists left out, and it makes a difference.

It makes ALL the difference.

This, also, is why we have to let our working models do the talking. Verbal reasoning is too slippery and prone to error. When you program a model and set it into motion, you can talk fast and wave your arms all you please but that won't make the model behave right if it's organized wrong. I didn't get the right answer to the ball and bat problem until I formalized the analysis and used the power of mathematics to get the answer. Pretty powerful mathematics -- adding and subtracting, multiplying and dividing. But it was more powerful, evidently, than what I was using before.

Best,

Bill P.

32

[From Rick Marken (2011.11.21.0905)]

Adam Matic 2011.11.21.14.20 CET]

If we go up a level, sensors do not get input from the outside, but
get copies of p's from lower levels. Px(level2) = f (p1(level1),
p2(level1), p3 (level1))...

Actually, sensors (like the rods and cones) do transduce external
energy into neural signals. So each level 1 perception can be thought
of as a measure of the energy at a sensor (tranducer): p1.1=f1(e1),
p1.2=f1(e2)...p1.N=f1(eN) where the first subscript on p is the level
and the second is the sensor at that level. So I would put your
equation at level 2 (sensation); p2.1 = f2(p1.1,p1.2...p1.N). But you
are certainly right in your clarification of how we model perception
in PCT.

On my computer, the squares seem to be moving very fast and 'jumpy'.

Does it do that when you don't touch the mouse at all? I'll try to
change the priority of the thread and see if that improves things.

By the way, is this 'theory of mind' used to explain the perceived
intentional movement of stars and planets in ancient cultures?

I think it could. I've learned that this whole "theory of mind" thing
was started by people who were studying apes and apparently had
evidence that the apes were making assumptions about the intentions of
other apes. The researcher who started it was Dave Premack, who was
one of my professors at UCSB and is famous for being one of the people
involved in teaching apes to use language (I was good friends with the
research assistant who was doing the talking to the ape). Premack
apparently came up with the "theory of mind" stuff after I graduated
so I didn't really know about it until now.

Best

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken PhD
rsmarken@gmail.com
www.mindreadings.com

33

(Gavin Ritz 2011.11.22.8.56NZT)

[From Bill Powers
(2011.11.21.0835 MST)]

(gavin
Ritz 2011.11.21.13.45NZT)

Marken: p = f(s1,s2,…sN)

GR:This
mathematical statement says to me: Variables s (or elements of a set S) are
transformed by a function f into a variable (or element) p of set P. This is my
understanding conceptually below using sets and functions. Basically a map f
transforms variables s into a variable p.

Can
someone please explain Rick’s statement above
“variables are functions of variables?” How it specifically
relates to the mathematical statement shown.

And what
is the elements s1, s2, Sn (identity).

You’re
making this way too complicated, Gavin. Set theory is irrelevant when you’re
talking about the quantitative mathematics of continuous variables.

It’s
not set theory its Category theory and it’s very relevant to all parts of
mathematics. Category theory is one of the few ways mathematically to describe
dynamical systems.

If the magnitude of a perception p is computed by adding together the
magnitudes of two stimuli s1 and s2, you get

p = s1 + s2.

In general form, this is p = f(s1,s2) where the form of the function isn’t
specified –

Sure but
f is the function and s’s are the input variables and p is the
transformed variable.

you’re
just specifying that there is some
function computed from the values of s1 and s2. In the example, the specific
form is s1 + s2, the sum of two continuous variables.

So there’s
your function a sum (a+b)

The value of the function is the sum: if s1 = 3.1 and s2 = 7.2, then the value
of the function, which is p, is 10.3. Variations in s1 and s2 will cause the
value of p to vary, unless the changes are related in a particular way (s1 = p’

  • s2, where p’ is some particular value of p arbtrarily selected). In any case,
    we say that p, the value of the function, is a variable.

Sure no worries
here.

It’s possible that the context would show that the variables are not continuous,
but, say, logical. In that case the + would conventionally mean “or”
and the variables would have only binary values. If s1 is 1 and s2 is 1 (now
meaning not magnitude but true and false) then p, or s1 + s2, equals 1, or
true. The rules for computing with logical variables are different from the
rules for computing with continuous variables, and physical devices described
by those two kinds of computation operate in different ways.

This is
not what Rick said he said “variables are functions of variables?” This makes no sense mathematically.

On a different topic:

Excessive abstraction gives you statements that are true under all conditions
but, for that very reason, trivial. To jump from the specific variables
controlled by living control systems, such as pressure, flavor, speed, wetness,
and profit to a statement that we control electromagnetism is to go from the
specific to the trivially true. Everything can be seen, with the right
interpretation, as a manifestation of electromagnetism, even flavor (since
chemoreceptors involve chemical reactions, changes in bonds and electron
exchanges and so forth).

But
which flavor is controlled at which level is determined by which specific manifestations you

You’ve
got it, that’s what I’m interested in manifestations (the nature of creativeness), I don’t care a hoot about psychology and mind (well that’s
not entity true), it’s a chimera. You only think there is such a thing as
mind and PCT proves it. That is one of the reasons why you are unable to create
form in the theory and only content.

are
talking about as well as the current actual
states as well as the laws
governing changes in states.

So
to say just “electromagnetism” in general is to say nothing useful.

It’s
not electromagnetism its electromagnetic forces I’m talking about. Electromagnetic
forces tell us all we know about the relation of matter to matter at the scale
we can observe.

It’s
like a weather forecaster predicting that tomorrow we will have weather.

Well not
in the case of PCT because you have defined a particular variable and proved
some very specific things with it. If you don’t see the significance that
is no problem with me. I have something very specific in mind and it involves PCT,
so as long as I am honest about the sources then I can do with what I want with
PCT.

Gavin

Best,

Bill P.

34

[From Bill Powers (2011.11.23.0140 MST)]

BP earlier: If the magnitude of
a perception p is computed by adding together the magnitudes of two
stimuli s1 and s2, you get

p = s1 + s2.

In general form, this is p = f(s1,s2) where the form of the function
isn’t specified –

GR: Sure but f
is the function and s’s are the input variables and p is the transformed
variable.
you’re just specifying that
there is some function computed from the values of s1 and s2. In
the example, the specific form is s1 + s2, the sum of two continuous
variables.
So there’s your
function a sum (a+b)BP earlier: The value of the function is the sum: if s1 = 3.1 and s2
= 7.2, then the value of the function, which is p, is 10.3. Variations in
s1 and s2 will cause the value of p to vary, unless the changes are
related in a particular way (s1 = p’ - s2, where p’ is some particular
value of p arbtrarily selected). In any case, we say that p, the value of
the function, is a variable.
GR: Sure no
worries here.

BP: Then I don’t see your problem. In the example, the value of
the function is called “p”, and since it’s variable we say that
the value of the function is a variable. When you see the function
in a mathematical expression, you can treat it like any other variable:
it’s just a number that can vary. In the above example, f(s1,s2) + 10 is
20.3 when s1 is 3.1 and s2 is 7.2 and the form of the function is s1 +
s2.

Best,

Bill P.

Best,

Bill P.

35

(gavin ritz
2011.11.23.1046NZT)

[From Bill Powers
(2011.11.23.0140 MST)]

BP: Then I don’t see your problem.

Rick’s comment “variables that are functions of input variables" Which he says
is the basis of my problem with PCT.

I am unable to make any
sense of this mathematically. I asked some of my mathematics colleagues they
have no idea what it is either.

In the example, the value
of the function is called “p”, and since it’s variable we say that
the value of the function is a variable.

When you see the function
in a mathematical expression, you can treat it like any other variable:

A function is not a variable it’s a function
it transforms a variable into another variable. A function is an associating
factor it’s not a variable.

“In mathematics,
a function associates one
quantity, the argument
of the function, also known as the input,
with another quantity, the value
of the function, also known as the output”
from Wikepedia.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Function_%28mathematics%29

This is the wiki definition and it’s
the only one I know, I don’t understand yours or Rick’s argument at all.
Some parts you write make sense then others like the above statement I just don’t
get. It’s not mathematically consistent at all.

One precise definition of a function is an
ordered triple of sets, written (X,
Y, F), where X is
the domain, Y is the codomain,
and F is a set of ordered pairs (a, b).
In each of the ordered pairs, the first element a is from the domain, the second element b is from the codomain, and a necessary
condition is that every element in the domain is the first element in exactly
one ordered pair. The set of all b
is known as the image
of the function, and need not be the whole of the codomain. Most authors use
the term “range” to mean the image, while some use “range”
to mean the codomain.

I gave a simple drawing (sets and
functions (arrows)) earlier where you said that sets have nothing to do with functions,
but this is exactly what I drew, domain, co-domain and function.

It looks like we are using very different language
to describe things. I just don’t understand some of your language it
makes no sense to me.

Regards

Gavin

36

[From Rick Marken (2011.11.23.1100)]

gavin ritz
(2011.11.23.1046NZT)

BP earlier: The value of the function is the sum: if s1 = 3.1 and s2
= 7.2, then the value of the function, which is p, is 10.3. Variations in
s1 and s2 will cause the value of p to vary, unless the changes are
related in a particular way (s1 = p’ - s2, where p’ is some particular
value of p arbtrarily selected). In any case, we say that p, the value of
the function, is a variable.

GR: Sure no
worries here

BP: Then I don’t see your problem.

GR: Rick’s comment “variables that are functions of input variables" Which he says
is the basis of my problem with PCT.

How odd. Bill explained that a perceptual variable, p, is a function of input variables, s1 and s2,. You say you have no problem with that but rather your problem is with my statement (which I think is a paraphase of what I said anyway) that “variables are functions of input variables”. That statement is completely consistent with saying that p=f(s1,s2), which is what you ostensibly had “no worries” about. Methinks you protest way too much.

I don’t think I ever said that the comment above was the basis of your problem with PCT. But I can tell you right now that your “problems” with PCT are far deeper than not understanding that perceptual variables are a function of input variables. My hypothesis is that you want PCT to be something that it is not – a theory that supports your ideas about control of energy or whatever – and when anyone makes comments that suggests that your understanding of PCT is not correct, that is a disturbance that you counteract with retorts (often in the form of petulant questions but sometimes in the form of assertions that what you say about PCT is simply true – the latter being Fox News approach to dealing with data-based disturbances to their noxious political views ) that maintain your perception of PCT in the state you want it to be in.

Whatever you are doing (controlling for) it’s certainly OK with me. But if you could manage to go into learning mode (which would mean taking the painful step of giving up all your preconceptions) I think you’d find that PCT is a wonderful tool for understanding human nature.

RSM

···

–
Richard S. Marken PhD
rsmarken@gmail.com
www.mindreadings.com

37

(Gavin Ritz 2011.11.23.9.04NZT)

[From
Rick Marken (2011.11.23.1100)]

gavin ritz
(2011.11.23.1046NZT)

. But if you could manage to go into learning mode (which would mean taking the
painful step of giving up all your preconceptions) .

Rick its not at all painful in any way. That’s
what you are controlling for. In fact I find learning rather exhilarating. I
like things clarified I do not take things at face value there’s no value
in it… (but please let’s move on)

In fact I love to learn new things, but
the language you use makes no sense to me mathematically. The fact that you
think a variable is a function is a big problem mathematically but let’s
move on.

I think you’d find that
PCT is a wonderful tool for understanding human nature.

I really do think PCT is a wonderful tool
but that’s another issue.

Okay please help with my comments and
questions on another thread, I have been asking a simple question but get
answers that have nothing to do with my question.

It starts below**. (The question is I’m looking at a scenery
(nothing else for this thought experiment) I then say to myself in silent sound
“beautiful” internally no vocal cords used).**

In other
words I utter the sound silently in my head. Also assume everything biologically
works they way it should.

Ignore, wind,
gravity, sore eyes, glaring sun, sunglasses, rough ground, in fact no physical movements
at all.

What are the disturbances?

Why is this question so hard to answer
???

GR

Hi Erling

Okay so
let’s start with the controlled variables you mention.

·

Scenery

·

Full scope of scenery

·

Sensation of moisture in eyes

·

Beauty

Okay so
your disturbances are:

·

Poor peripheral vision

·

Dryness in air

Would
you say this is it for the two variables in this case?

Erling:

You might get a start on
those answers by pulling out relevant

items from the
“qualitative descriptions” that I offered.

For instance, I listed a
number of behavioral outputs (e.g.,

stopping, standing, etc.),
each of which would be implemented by

its own cascade of
controlled perceptions at lower levels.

BP: The levels of perception are important here: what Erling calls an output is
a controlled perception of a lower level, which is generally stabilized against
disturbances. There are also uncontrolled lower-order perceptions, which can
act unhindered as disturbances to higher-order perceptions.

Remember that a disturbance is anything other than your own actions that can
affect a controlled perception. Say your intention is to look at a beautiful
sunset. The lower-level perception you can affect with your muscles is
“looking.” That certainly affects your perception of the sunset – if
you don’t look in the right direction, or don’t look at all, you won’t see one.
But the earth’s atmospheric phenomena and the time of day also
affect the perception of the sunset. If you look at noon, you will not see a sunset. If there are no clouds, or too many, or the wrong kind, you will
see a less beautiful sunset than you wanted to see.

If you forgot that you’re
still wearing sunglasses, you’ll see a more vivid sunset than you had imagined
seeing, and that’s a surprise – also a disturbance.

I don’t want to add any extra pieces
like sunglasses and bad weather etc just my original question, I’m
looking at a scenery and I then say : in a silent sound inside my head
“beautiful”. What is the disturbances in this case. And what is the
controlled variables. Lets except for this thought experiment nothing else is
going on .

If you’re very
nearsighted and forgot your regular glasses, what you see will also be
affected. If the beauty stirs you to tears, the nice sunset will get blurry.

What part of the scenery is the
disturbance then, or is the whole scenery the disturbance.

I don’t want to add any additional
statements to the scenery like nice sunset or blurry, glasses, nearsightedness
etc.

And don’t forget that just standing and looking is a constant fight against
gravity, uneven or shifting terrain, other people getting in the way, blowing
winds, and so on. The fact that you think you’re just standing and looking
shows how good your control systems are. All sorts of little disturbances are
always acting – Erling mentioned a few. But they aren’t having much effect
even though elementary physics says they should be having effects. If a mild
gust of wind comes by, you should fall over, according to physics. But you
don’t, because you shift a foot to brace against it, and lean into it, and
maybe put out a hand to hold onto something, all without even noticing you’re
making these little alterations of your motor outputs.

I just want to focus on the scenery and
not on side winds or gravity or anything like that.

Only a few of your
control systems are in conscious awareness at a given time: if
you’re attending to something you perceive as beautiful, you may recall,
falsely, that there were no disturbances simply because they were there but
didn’t succeed in actually disturbing any perceptions enough to notice. As I
have said many times, we use the term disturbance in two ways: the wind
disturbs your balance, but your balance is not disturbed by the wind. The wind
applies a causal disturbing force to your body, but does not succeed in
producing the effect of disturbing your balance, because your control systems
automatically change their outputs to resist the forces.

I would like to focus on the scenery and
my original comment. I’m looking at a scenery and I then say : in a
silent sound inside my head “beautiful”. What is the disturbances
in this case.

Regards

Gavin

Best,

Bill P.

···
38

[From Rick Marken (2011.11.23.1300)]

Gavin Ritz (2011.11.23.9.04NZT)

GR: In fact I love to learn new things, but
the language you use makes no sense to me mathematically. The fact that you
think a variable is a function is a big problem mathematically but let’s
move on.

No let’s not. You are the one saying that I think a variable is a function. I have never said such a thing. What I said was “perceptual variables are a function of input variables”. You keep reading that as though all I said was “perceptual variables are a function…” which is kind of infuriating, especially since I wrote what I meant in mathematical notation: p=f(s1,s2…sN). Here a variable, p, is some function, f(), of the input arguments (which are varables), s1, s2…sN. The function, f(), is not the same as the variable, p. I’m willing to bet that this still makes no sense to you mathematically – or at least that you will say it doesn’t-- so I’m probably wasting my time. But if this really doesn’t make sense to you mathematically then I see no hope for us ever communicating in what I consider to be a rational manner.

GR: Okay please help with my comments and
questions on another thread, I have been asking a simple question but get
answers that have nothing to do with my question.

I saw both Erling’s and Bill’s answers and I could not possibly improve on them. Bill, of course, said exactly what I would have said. My only thought when I saw their replies was “suckers” – at least they were suckers if they thought you were asking your questions because you actually wanted to learn something. I suspected that you had another agenda and would dismiss their analyses as being irrelevant and, sure enough, that’s what you did. I just want Erling and Bill to know that they did not waste their time because their thoughtful answers were useful to me and, I’m sure, to many others on the net who are watching these conversations with their jaws on the floor.

RSM

It starts below**. (The question is I’m looking at a scenery
(nothing else for this thought experiment) I then say to myself in silent sound
“beautiful” internally no vocal cords used).**

In other
words I utter the sound silently in my head. Also assume everything biologically
works they way it should.

Ignore, wind,
gravity, sore eyes, glaring sun, sunglasses, rough ground, in fact no physical movements
at all.

What are the disturbances?

Why is this question so hard to answer
???

GR

Hi Erling

Okay so
let’s start with the controlled variables you mention.

·

Scenery

·

Full scope of scenery

·

Sensation of moisture in eyes

·

Beauty

Okay so
your disturbances are:

·

Poor peripheral vision

·

Dryness in air

Would
you say this is it for the two variables in this case?

Erling:

You might get a start on
those answers by pulling out relevant

items from the
“qualitative descriptions” that I offered.

For instance, I listed a
number of behavioral outputs (e.g.,

stopping, standing, etc.),
each of which would be implemented by

its own cascade of
controlled perceptions at lower levels.

BP: The levels of perception are important here: what Erling calls an output is
a controlled perception of a lower level, which is generally stabilized against
disturbances. There are also uncontrolled lower-order perceptions, which can
act unhindered as disturbances to higher-order perceptions.

Remember that a disturbance is anything other than your own actions that can
affect a controlled perception. Say your intention is to look at a beautiful
sunset. The lower-level perception you can affect with your muscles is
“looking.” That certainly affects your perception of the sunset – if
you don’t look in the right direction, or don’t look at all, you won’t see one.
But the earth’s atmospheric phenomena and the time of day also
affect the perception of the sunset. If you look at noon, you will not see a sunset. If there are no clouds, or too many, or the wrong kind, you will
see a less beautiful sunset than you wanted to see.

If you forgot that you’re
still wearing sunglasses, you’ll see a more vivid sunset than you had imagined
seeing, and that’s a surprise – also a disturbance.

I don’t want to add any extra pieces
like sunglasses and bad weather etc just my original question, I’m
looking at a scenery and I then say : in a silent sound inside my head
“beautiful”. What is the disturbances in this case. And what is the
controlled variables. Lets except for this thought experiment nothing else is
going on .

If you’re very
nearsighted and forgot your regular glasses, what you see will also be
affected. If the beauty stirs you to tears, the nice sunset will get blurry.

What part of the scenery is the
disturbance then, or is the whole scenery the disturbance.

I don’t want to add any additional
statements to the scenery like nice sunset or blurry, glasses, nearsightedness
etc.

And don’t forget that just standing and looking is a constant fight against
gravity, uneven or shifting terrain, other people getting in the way, blowing
winds, and so on. The fact that you think you’re just standing and looking
shows how good your control systems are. All sorts of little disturbances are
always acting – Erling mentioned a few. But they aren’t having much effect
even though elementary physics says they should be having effects. If a mild
gust of wind comes by, you should fall over, according to physics. But you
don’t, because you shift a foot to brace against it, and lean into it, and
maybe put out a hand to hold onto something, all without even noticing you’re
making these little alterations of your motor outputs.

I just want to focus on the scenery and
not on side winds or gravity or anything like that.

Only a few of your
control systems are in conscious awareness at a given time: if
you’re attending to something you perceive as beautiful, you may recall,
falsely, that there were no disturbances simply because they were there but
didn’t succeed in actually disturbing any perceptions enough to notice. As I
have said many times, we use the term disturbance in two ways: the wind
disturbs your balance, but your balance is not disturbed by the wind. The wind
applies a causal disturbing force to your body, but does not succeed in
producing the effect of disturbing your balance, because your control systems
automatically change their outputs to resist the forces.

I would like to focus on the scenery and
my original comment. I’m looking at a scenery and I then say : in a
silent sound inside my head “beautiful”. What is the disturbances
in this case.

Regards

Gavin

Best,

Bill P.

···

–
Richard S. Marken PhD
rsmarken@gmail.com
www.mindreadings.com

39

[From Bill Powers (2011.11.2,1400 MST)]

Gavin Ritz 2011.11.23.9.04NZT

···

–

GR:
**
Ignore, wind, gravity, sore eyes, glaring sun, sunglasses, rough
ground, in fact no physical movements at all.**
What are the disturbances?
Why is this question so hard to answer ???
Because you are carefully enumerating all the sources of
disturbances and saying we should ignore them, and then are asking what
the disturbances are. After you remove or prevent all possible
disturbances, there are no disturbances. Is that the answer you’re
looking for?

When you’re controlling imagined perceptions, of course disturbances are
far less likely to interfere. Control systems work just fine without
disturbances, but it’s harder to say why control is needed in that case.
The disturbances show up when you try to actually control a perception
derived from sensory information instead of imagination. The imagined
action doesn’t quite work right. After you’d been imagining saying
“beautiful” for a while and you try to actually say it, you
might find that you have to clear your throat before you can get the word
out right.

Bill P.

40

(Gavin Ritz 2011.11.24.10.26NZT)

[From Bill Powers
(2011.11.2,1400 MST)]

Gavin Ritz 2011.11.23.9.04NZT –

GR: Ignore, wind, gravity, sore eyes, glaring
sun, sunglasses, rough ground, in fact no physical movements at all.

What are
the disturbances?

Why is
this question so hard to answer ???

Because you are carefully
enumerating all the sources of disturbances and saying we should ignore them,
and then are asking what the disturbances are. After you remove or prevent all
possible disturbances, there are no disturbances. Is that the answer you’re
looking for?

Okay so when I’m looking at the scenery
that’s the controlled variable in this case.

When you’re controlling imagined perceptions, of course disturbances are far
less likely to interfere. Control systems work just fine without disturbances,

Ok so what you are saying in this instance
the light (photons) striking my eyes are not disturbances.

but it’s harder to say
why control is needed in that case.

Is control needed?, should it be needed.

The disturbances show up
when you try to actually control a perception derived from sensory information
instead of imagination.

Is this not always the case in every single
circumstance though?

The imagined action
doesn’t quite work right. After you’d been imagining saying
“beautiful” for a while and you try to actually say it, you might
find that you have to clear your throat before you can get the word out right.

I tried it as I have beautiful views form
my house, there was no problem saying it straight out no hesitation. Not sure
what you mean here.

GR

Bill P.