Thinking and Reorganization

[From Bruce Gregory (2005.0123.1250)]

I find myself aware of having thoughts. Does this mean that thoughts
are associated with persistent error and that reorganization is called
for whenever I have thoughts?

The enemy of truth is not error. The enemy of truth is certainty.

[Martin Taylor 2005.01.23.13.22]

[From Bruce Gregory (2005.0123.1250)]

I find myself aware of having thoughts. Does this mean that thoughts
are associated with persistent error and that reorganization is called
for whenever I have thoughts?

I get the impression you ask this as a tease, but perhaps it should
be taken seriously.

Why do you have "thoughts"? What are they?

In the everyday sense, what you are aware of is called "perception".
Are the "thoughts of which you are aware" not also perceptions in the
PCT sense? If so, what is it about a particular thought that makes
you aware of it -- or do you believe that you are aware of all your
thoughts? If the latter, what evidence have you to support your
belief? If the former, is there something about a particular thought
that brings it to awareness? And is that something different in any
relevant aspect from whatever it is that brings any perception into
awareness?

I don't, myself, go along with the idea that any perception brought
to awareness signals that reorganization is "called for." Indeed, if
my understanding of reorganization is correct, it is never "called
for". It goes on all the time, in all parts of the complex system
that executes perceptual control (whether HPCT, HCT, or any other
acronymic variant). It may be more frequent in some parts of the
system than in others, and the frequency may correlate with
awareness. But that, even if true, would hardly signify causation,
would it?

In the other direction -- deliberate learning -- it may well be true
that a mechanism exists whereby the mind can alter the likelihood of
reorganization in a particular part of the system. The possible
existence of such a mechanism in no way suggests that it is brought
into play by all occasionas of awareness.

I think there are subtle issues here that are independent of any
particular hypothesis about the structure of perceptual control
systems. How to address them is, at the moment, not clear to me.

Martin

[From Bill Powers (2005.01.23.1145 MST)]

Bruce Gregory (2005.0123.1250)--

I find myself aware of having thoughts. Does this mean that thoughts
are associated with persistent error and that reorganization is called
for whenever I have thoughts?

No.

Best,

Bill P.

···

The enemy of truth is not error. The enemy of truth is certainty.

[From Bruce Gregory (2005.0123.1420)]

Bill Powers (2005.01.23.1145 MST)

Bruce Gregory (2005.0123.1250)--

I find myself aware of having thoughts. Does this mean that thoughts
are associated with persistent error and that reorganization is called
for whenever I have thoughts?

No.

An expert: not always correct, but never uncertain. In this case you
are dismissing an idea that Martin and I think merits attention. Pay no
attention to us.

The enemy of truth is not error. The enemy of truth is certainty.

[From Bruce Gregory (2005.0123.1430)]

Martin Taylor 2005.01.23.13.22

[From Bruce Gregory (2005.0123.1250)]

I find myself aware of having thoughts. Does this mean that thoughts
are associated with persistent error and that reorganization is called
for whenever I have thoughts?

I get the impression you ask this as a tease, but perhaps it should
be taken seriously.

I agree on both counts.

Why do you have "thoughts"? What are they?

My question is what are they in the context of HCT? (I have views on
the nature and role of thoughts, but they are not appropriate for this
forum.)

In the everyday sense, what you are aware of is called "perception".
Are the "thoughts of which you are aware" not also perceptions in the
PCT sense? If so, what is it about a particular thought that makes
you aware of it -- or do you believe that you are aware of all your
thoughts? If the latter, what evidence have you to support your
belief? If the former, is there something about a particular thought
that brings it to awareness? And is that something different in any
relevant aspect from whatever it is that brings any perception into
awareness?

Again, not appropriate for this form. I'll post a response on ECACS.

I don't, myself, go along with the idea that any perception brought
to awareness signals that reorganization is "called for." Indeed, if
my understanding of reorganization is correct, it is never "called
for". It goes on all the time, in all parts of the complex system
that executes perceptual control (whether HPCT, HCT, or any other
acronymic variant). It may be more frequent in some parts of the
system than in others, and the frequency may correlate with
awareness. But that, even if true, would hardly signify causation,
would it?

Not in my view.

In the other direction -- deliberate learning -- it may well be true
that a mechanism exists whereby the mind can alter the likelihood of
reorganization in a particular part of the system. The possible
existence of such a mechanism in no way suggests that it is brought
into play by all occasionas of awareness.

Something may alter the likelihood of reorganization but I see no
reason to link it to awareness. (Other than Bill's desire to find a
role for awareness in HPCT.)

I think there are subtle issues here that are independent of any
particular hypothesis about the structure of perceptual control
systems.

I agree.

The enemy of truth is not error. The enemy of truth is certainty.

[From Bill Powers (2005.01.23.1613 MST)]

Bruce Gregory (2005.0123.1420)]

Bill Powers (2005.01.23.1145 MST)

Bruce Gregory (2005.0123.1250)--

I find myself aware of having thoughts. Does this mean that thoughts
are associated with persistent error and that reorganization is called
for whenever I have thoughts?

No.

An expert: not always correct, but never uncertain. In this case you
are dismissing an idea that Martin and I think merits attention. Pay no
attention to us.

You asked whether the fact that you are aware of having thoughts means that
thoughts are associated with persistent error. Since I did not propose that
awareness and thinking are limited to cases in which there is persistent
error, I replied that no, this is not what it means according to my
proposals. By the same token, the fact that you are aware of thoughts does
not imply that you are reorganizing whenever you're having thoughts,
because being aware of thoughts is not limited to cases in which there is
error, and without error there is no reorganization (at any significant
rate). Those conclusions are, of course, pertinent to what I proposed and
what I thought you were talking about.

If I had written the above paragraph instead, would you have been any more
inclined to accept "no" for an answer? I guessed that you would not, and
saved us both some time. Which has now been unsaved again.

I am certainly not coming on as an expert in this area. I am simply saying
what I've worked out and what I presently think. If you don't like it, just
offer your own alternatives, and perhaps any evidence that supports them,
if you have any.

Bill P.

[From Bruce Gregory (2005.0123.2005)]

Bill Powers (2005.01.23.1613 MST)

Persistent error attracts attention which leads to reorganization.
Other situations can also attract attention. How does reorganization
know when it should proceed and when it should not?

The enemy of truth is not error. The enemy of truth is certainty.

[From Bill Powers (2005.01.23.1850 MST)]

Bruce Gregory (2005.0123.2005)]

Persistent error attracts attention which leads to reorganization.
Other situations can also attract attention. How does reorganization
know when it should proceed and when it should not?

Try this: persistent error provides one factor needed to start
reorganization. The other factor is the degree of attention. Both factors
are required to start reorganization. Attention without error, or error
without attention = no reorganization. If you put that either-or statement
in terms of continuous variables, it will be about what I think is the
case. Degree of attention times amount of error --> rate of reorganization.
That would convey the way my mental model operates, even if it doesn't
explain the details. I'm talking here about error signals in the learned
hierarchy, not the other kinds of intrinsic errors where we don't have to
assume the involvement of conciousness (nor rule it out).

So this would accomodate Martin's "broadcast" proposal, except that while
the broadcast produce by intrinsic error reaches all systems, it is
effective only for those systems containing errors and connected to
awareness. That is a way in which a general command to reorganize can be
issued while still permitting only those systems involved with persistent
error actually to reorganized.

Other means of selecting the systems where reorganization is allowed to
proceed are probably feasible. There is also the possibility of a
distributed reorganizing system which acts locally. I have no pertinent
data about such things, only some experiments with computer models.

The possibility of modulation or direction of error-driven reorganization
by attention still remains, and it seems supported by general principles of
psychotherapy. Most therapists attempt in some way to bring hidden or
unconscious material into consciousness ("insight"), and appear to consider
this a requirement for producing change. They also, I believe, consider
that change follows from experiencing affect rather than intellectualizing
-- in other words, from consciously experiencing the effects of actual
errors during a session.

When Lloyd Klinedinst makes his tapes from the IAACT meeting available, you
will be able to see how the MOL works. You still may think there's nothing
to it, but others seem to get the idea and find it effective. There are
also the MOL workshop tapes which Dag Forssell can provide. Perhaps you
have already seen those.

Bill P.

[From Bruce Gregory (2005.0124.0652)]

Bill Powers (2005.01.23.1850 MST)

Bruce Gregory (2005.0123.2005)]

Persistent error attracts attention which leads to reorganization.
Other situations can also attract attention. How does reorganization
know when it should proceed and when it should not?

Try this: persistent error provides one factor needed to start
reorganization. The other factor is the degree of attention. Both
factors
are required to start reorganization. Attention without error, or error
without attention = no reorganization. If you put that either-or
statement
in terms of continuous variables, it will be about what I think is the
case. Degree of attention times amount of error --> rate of
reorganization.
That would convey the way my mental model operates, even if it doesn't
explain the details. I'm talking here about error signals in the
learned
hierarchy, not the other kinds of intrinsic errors where we don't have
to
assume the involvement of conciousness (nor rule it out).

No attention, no reorganization. What do you suppose tells attention
where to go? MOL excluded, of course.

The enemy of truth is not error. The enemy of truth is certainty.

[From Bill Powers (2005.01.24.0739 MST)\

Bruce Gregory (2005.0124.0652)--

No attention, no reorganization. What do you suppose tells attention
where to go? MOL excluded, of course.

Basic answer: I don't know. It seems as if I move my own attention here and
there. This morning I thought that when something is wrong, I don't
necessarily know what it is right away. Sometimes it's obvious, but far
from always. I'll look at this and that until I realize what it is, as if I
have to search for it. The "something wrong" feeling is vague and
unspecific, but when the problem surfaces -- oh, oh, I forgot to fill the
gas tank -- it narrows down to one thing, usually a conflict. Can I make it
all the way home and then back to a gas station the next time? Or must I
turn around and do it now? That's a conflict at the planning or logic
level, something like that.

But not everything I turn my attention to is a problem. Watching a nice
sunset over the mountains, checking the weather page on the Web, cleaning
up the kitchen, and so on. And of course sometimes I pick things to do that
_cause_ errors (though not large, protracted, and uncorrectabele ones) just
by picking a goal and starting to work toward it. I suppose that starts
reorganization, too (if I don't initially know how to do it) but not at a
panic level.

What "causes" me to do this, I don't know. It seems to be something built
in. It's more like an ongoing relationship to the world, a sense of
searching and exploring, not an occasional response to a stimulus. My
awareness is something I am, not anything particular I do, or something I
can stop doing. I'm the observer, the explorer, the experimenter, the
problem solver, the knower.

That's how I describe being aware, anyhow. Putting this into words is
always somewhat disappointing. Also, it's hard to come up with a model that
really fits the experience.

Best,

Bill P.

[From Dick Robertson,2005.01.24.0955CST]

···

From: Bruce Gregory
Date: Monday, January 24, 2005 5:53 am
Subject: Re: Thinking and Reorganization

No attention, no reorganization. What do you

suppose tells attention

where to go? MOL excluded, of course.

This is a good question. That seems to me to be
where I get hung up tool

Best,

Dick R

From David Wolsk (2005.01.24.8.16PST)

[From Bruce Gregory (2005.0123.2005)]

Bill Powers (2005.01.23.1613 MST)

Persistent error attracts attention which leads to reorganization.
Other situations can also attract attention. How does reorganization
know when it should proceed and when it should not?

Some people need to hit their thumb once with the hammer, others twice
or three times before reorganizing. It might take the hammerer 30
hours of psychoanalysis with that rare breed, a truly competent
psychoanalyst, to reduce the three times to two or one.
David

Dr. David Wolsk
Associate, Centre for Global Studies
Adjunct Professor, Faculty of Education
University of Victoria, Canada

···

On Jan 23, 2005, at 5:04 PM, Bruce Gregory wrote:

[From Jason Gosnell (2005.01.24.1205CST)]

        Bill Powers (2005.01.23.1850 MST)

        The possibility of modulation or direction of error-driven
reorganization
        by attention still remains, and it seems supported by general
principles of
        psychotherapy. Most therapists attempt in some way to bring hidden
or
        unconscious material into consciousness ("insight"), and appear to
consider
        this a requirement for producing change. They also, I believe,
consider
        that change follows from experiencing affect rather than
intellectualizing
        -- in other words, from consciously experiencing the effects of
actual
        errors during a session.

I think that this is basically correct. Gendlin's focusing method
intentionally has the client move into his "felt-sense" (usually from the
chest and maybe including the gut as I recall) to see what is actually true
for him as he is commenting from his thinking mind. I wonder if this isn't
the purpose of Zen meditation as well. In Zen, in most
humanistic-existential therapies as well, they regard the thought-based
sense of self and world as a kind of limited representation of self and
world (seems obvious) and they also note that we try to solve our problems
by confining our self to that level very often (not so obvious is daily
action). Our heads, in a sense, can get detached from our bodies and senses.
It seems to me that the attempt in this kind of meditation is to establish
more presence in the body. Perhaps this is to allow one to note error
signals and become more intimate with them--looking into them on this most
basic level. (Another error some make I think is to disown their
head--instead of allowing all aspects of self to integrate and
harmonize--thinking becomes the demon--so they try to avoid this.

In everyday life does this need to be done purposefully? Maybe if we have a
habit of neglecting these other sources of information. Or, when we get
error signals from our heart or body we quickly find ways of closing off
from that information...I don't know.

Also, I think that there is probably a need to be able to attend in two
ways--one is to hone in on an experience, but the other is to allow a
spacious kind of attention where peripheral or associated factors can enter
the stream of central awareness from the background. So, I think that if
attention or focus is to tight or remains narrowed down on one factor, one
prevents other information related to a factor under study from emerging
into central awareness. This sounds strange, but I don't know how else to
explain it at this time. It just seems to me that sometimes we look at
something with a constricted attention that obstructs insights or other
related factors from arising in that attention. Perhaps others have been
pointing at this in some previous postings and I couldn't decipher it.

Jason Gosnell

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[From Bruce Gregory (2005.0124.1945)]

Bill Powers (2005.01.24.0739 MST)

Bill, I very much appreciate your candor. It has motivated me to offer
an approach to the problems you describe. What I describe deals with
the perceptual side of control. I offer it, not as an alternative to
HPCT, but as a way of thinking about perception. I do not expect you to
welcome this approach nor to adopt it, but I offer it as a possibility.

What "causes" me to do this, I don't know. It seems to be something
built
in. It's more like an ongoing relationship to the world, a sense of
searching and exploring, not an occasional response to a stimulus. My
awareness is something I am, not anything particular I do, or
something I
can stop doing. I'm the observer, the explorer, the experimenter, the
problem solver, the knower.

I thought for some time that when I think I manipulate abstract
patterns in the form of words. But as a result of this thread I
realized that there is no "I" to do the manipulating. There are only
patterns. If there was a "I" it would be the man behind the curtain. We
would simply be recreating the Cartesian theatre and everything of real
interest would be hidden in the observer who did the thinking and made
the choices.

In the approach I now offer, the cortex serves as a pattern matching
computer. It constantly processes perceptions by comparing perceptions
with memories. The cortex behaves as an auto-associative memory -- it
can access a memory on the basis of a partial match. When the cortex
matches some portion of a perception, it "predicts" what the remainder
of the perception, or the next perception, will be. If this prediction
holds, the search returns a match. The search process occurs outside of
consciousness until it encounters a match. Most of us, I suspect, are
familiar with this process when we cannot put a name to a familiar face
and after some time the name "pops" into awareness. Rather than being a
special case, I suggest such experiences reveal how the cortex works in
general. When the process identifies a match this information passes on
to consciousness.

This prediction has nothing to do with prediction as part of the
control process. It is a guess as to what will be perceived next. When
the guess is validated it becomes a perceptual "fact."

"Thinking" must be a similar process in which the patterns are (most
often) words. It is just the brain doing the only thing it can,
matching patterns and predicting patterns. Anything else would be
magic.

  Thinking alone exists, but none who think;
  The deed there is, but no doer thereof;
  Enlightenment, but none who seek it;
  The path, but none who travel it.

The enemy of truth is not error. The enemy of truth is certainty.

[From Bill Powers (2005.01.25.0606 MST)]

Bruce Gregory (2005.0124.1945)--

I thought for some time that when I think I manipulate abstract
patterns in the form of words. But as a result of this thread I
realized that there is no "I" to do the manipulating. There are only
patterns.

I think the "I" is also a pattern, as you call it, or a perception, as I
call it. The "I" is the set of all my characteristics; it includes
everything from my weight to my opinions. We also use the term I when we
refer to ourselves as observers, but that is different: the Observer does
not think or have characteristics.

If there was a "I" it would be the man behind the curtain.

That depends on whether you think of the I as a single entity, in which
case it has all the characteristics of a whole person and is a Little man
in the Head, as you say. But if, as in HPCT, the whole person is the sum of
all the levels of perception and control, then each level is a specialist
and does not duplicate any functions in any other level. The logic level,
for example manipulates symbols according to rules or algorithms, but it
knows nothing of what those symbols represent in terms of categories,
sequences, relationships and so on -- nor does it deal in principles or
system concepts. So in HPCT there is no Little Man in the Head.

We would simply be recreating the Cartesian theatre and everything of real
interest would be hidden in the observer who did the thinking and made
the choices.

Yes, that would be the case if the "I" represented all the levels of
control collapsed together and repeated in another hierarchy. That's not
the case in HPCT.

In the approach I now offer, the cortex serves as a pattern matching
computer. It constantly processes perceptions by comparing perceptions
with memories. The cortex behaves as an auto-associative memory -- it
can access a memory on the basis of a partial match. When the cortex
matches some portion of a perception, it "predicts" what the remainder
of the perception, or the next perception, will be. If this prediction
holds, the search returns a match. The search process occurs outside of
consciousness until it encounters a match. Most of us, I suspect, are
familiar with this process when we cannot put a name to a familiar face
and after some time the name "pops" into awareness. Rather than being a
special case, I suggest such experiences reveal how the cortex works in
general. When the process identifies a match this information passes on
to consciousness.

This sounds very much like the category level in HPCT, or perhaps a
combination of several levels in that region of the hierarchy. You're
describing the process of converting category perceptions into symbols
standing for them. The symbols are then the perceptions or patterns that
higher-level systems operate with.

I question whether this is all that the cortex does. I especially question
whether prediction is a necessary part of this process. Perhaps you could
expand on your reasons for speaking of prediction, or rather give some
reasons instead of just stating that prediction is involved.

This prediction has nothing to do with prediction as part of the
control process. It is a guess as to what will be perceived next. When
the guess is validated it becomes a perceptual "fact."

Why does the system need to guess about what will be perceived next?
Doesn't this associative memory process work equally well to retrieve
perceptions that have already been perceived? If the predicting has nothing
to do with controlling, why is it done?

"Thinking" must be a similar process in which the patterns are (most
often) words. It is just the brain doing the only thing it can,
matching patterns and predicting patterns. Anything else would be
magic.

Do you count logical processes and mathematics as magic? Is following the
rules of grammar magic? The idea of pattern-matching and associative memory
certainly covers some of the things the brain does, but it doesn't seem
adequate to cover everything. Are you saying "brain" when you mean "certain
areas of the cortex?"

I guess this boils down to the question of why you say that anything the
brain does other than matching and predicting patterns would be magic. I
can think of lots of other things it does; either those things are magic,
according to your statement, or they are done by pattern matching and
prediction, and I would have a hard time seeing how the latter could be the
case. How do we perceive and control the continuously-variable relationship
between a cursor and a target, for example, by pattern matching and
prediction? And, I might also ask, how is it that a model which does
neither pattern-matching nor predicting can reproduce this behavior so
precisely?

Thinking alone exists, but none who think;
The deed there is, but no doer thereof;
Enlightenment, but none who seek it;
The path, but none who travel it.

Yes, I've seen the same assertions before, accompanied by the same amount
of justification, reasoning, and explanation. It seems convincing, until
you ask "Who is saying that?"

Best,

Bill P.

[From Bruce Gregory (2005.0125.1000)]

Bill Powers (2005.01.25.0606 MST)

Bruce Gregory (2005.0124.1945)--

I thought for some time that when I think I manipulate abstract
patterns in the form of words. But as a result of this thread I
realized that there is no "I" to do the manipulating. There are only
patterns.

I think the "I" is also a pattern, as you call it, or a perception, as
I
call it. The "I" is the set of all my characteristics; it includes
everything from my weight to my opinions. We also use the term I when
we
refer to ourselves as observers, but that is different: the Observer
does
not think or have characteristics.

I am not persuaded that the Observer is anything more than a thought.
Who observes the Observer? How does the Observer communicate her
existence to us?

If there was a "I" it would be the man behind the curtain.

That depends on whether you think of the I as a single entity, in which
case it has all the characteristics of a whole person and is a Little
man
in the Head, as you say. But if, as in HPCT, the whole person is the
sum of
all the levels of perception and control, then each level is a
specialist
and does not duplicate any functions in any other level. The logic
level,
for example manipulates symbols according to rules or algorithms, but
it
knows nothing of what those symbols represent in terms of categories,
sequences, relationships and so on -- nor does it deal in principles or
system concepts. So in HPCT there is no Little Man in the Head.

I think the Observer is a Little Man in the Head. He is outside the
hierarchy and able to intervene in its operation. Or at least as I
understand it, awareness is outside the hierarchy and able to intervene
in its operation.

We would simply be recreating the Cartesian theatre and everything of
real
interest would be hidden in the observer who did the thinking and made
the choices.

Yes, that would be the case if the "I" represented all the levels of
control collapsed together and repeated in another hierarchy. That's
not
the case in HPCT.

I question whether this is all that the cortex does. I especially
question
whether prediction is a necessary part of this process. Perhaps you
could
expand on your reasons for speaking of prediction, or rather give some
reasons instead of just stating that prediction is involved.

One of the problems I have had with the hierarchy is that it does not
seem to anticipate or expect anything, it simply reacts to
disturbances. No disturbances, no error. No error, no action. In my
experience I am always anticipating the results of my actions. I am
surprised if the results are not what I anticipated.

Prediction is necessary if an organism is to survive. My commute
constantly involves prediction. What will the car in front of me do
next? Is the car in the inside lane likely to pull out to pass the
slower moving truck? Do I have enough gas? How fast can I drive over
without risking being pulled over? What is the next exit? Will I be in
time for the meeting? When will I pick up my prescription?

This prediction has nothing to do with prediction as part of the
control process. It is a guess as to what will be perceived next. When
the guess is validated it becomes a perceptual "fact."

Why does the system need to guess about what will be perceived next?
Doesn't this associative memory process work equally well to retrieve
perceptions that have already been perceived? If the predicting has
nothing
to do with controlling, why is it done?

The associative memory predicts on the basis of memories of what has
been perceived in the past, what actions were taken in the past and
what the results of those actions were done. Prediction has nothing to
do with the mechanism of controlling. Prediction has everything to do
with the reasons for controlling.

"Thinking" must be a similar process in which the patterns are (most
often) words. It is just the brain doing the only thing it can,
matching patterns and predicting patterns. Anything else would be
magic.

Do you count logical processes and mathematics as magic? Is following
the
rules of grammar magic? The idea of pattern-matching and associative
memory
certainly covers some of the things the brain does, but it doesn't seem
adequate to cover everything.

I am claiming that it does cover everything. I realize this is a
radical claim but it is consistent with everything I know about how the
brain might work. Take a logical argument, for example:

George W. Bush is a Republican.
All Republicans are fools.
Therefore, George W. Bush is a fool.

How do you know that this series of statements is logical? I say it is
because it follows a pattern that you recognize on the basis of your
experience with similar patterns. In the same way, I constructed the
sequence based on my experience with similar patterns. No magic, just
patterns.

Are you saying "brain" when you mean "certain
areas of the cortex?"

The cortex as a whole, yes.

I guess this boils down to the question of why you say that anything
the
brain does other than matching and predicting patterns would be magic.
I
can think of lots of other things it does; either those things are
magic,
according to your statement, or they are done by pattern matching and
prediction, and I would have a hard time seeing how the latter could
be the
case.

I know it is not easy. Otherwise I would have come up with the idea
years ago :wink:

How do we perceive and control the continuously-variable relationship
between a cursor and a target, for example, by pattern matching and
prediction? And, I might also ask, how is it that a model which does
neither pattern-matching nor predicting can reproduce this behavior so
precisely?

I am not proposing a model of behavior. I am proposing a model of
perception and expectation. You "solve" the problem by proposing a
perceptual signal. I ask, "How do we know we are seeing a cursor and a
target? Why would we be surprised if either disappeared? Why are
carrying out this task in the first place?"

Thinking alone exists, but none who think;
The deed there is, but no doer thereof;
Enlightenment, but none who seek it;
The path, but none who travel it.

Yes, I've seen the same assertions before, accompanied by the same
amount
of justification, reasoning, and explanation. It seems convincing,
until
you ask "Who is saying that?"

Obviously, "I" am saying that. But I am nothing more, and nothing less,
than the pattern matching and prediction making cortex in this
particular body.

The enemy of truth is not error. The enemy of truth is certainty.

[From Rick Marken (2005.01.25.0900)]

Bruce Gregory (2005.0125.1000)

Bill Powers (2005.01.25.0606 MST)

Why does the system need to guess about what will be perceived next?
Doesn't this associative memory process work equally well to retrieve
perceptions that have already been perceived? If the predicting has
nothing to do with controlling, why is it done?

The associative memory predicts on the basis of memories of what has
been perceived in the past, what actions were taken in the past and
what the results of those actions were done. Prediction has nothing to
do with the mechanism of controlling. Prediction has everything to do
with the reasons for controlling.

It would help me understand your point if you could illustrate it using a
simple behavioral example and showing how your "associative memory
prediction" model accounts for the behavior. This would also make it easier
for us to compare your model to the PCT model.

···

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Richard S. Marken
MindReadings.com
Home: 310 474 0313
Cell: 310 729 1400

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[From Bruce Gregory (2005.0125.1321)]

Rick Marken (2005.01.25.0900)

It would help me understand your point if you could illustrate it
using a
simple behavioral example and showing how your "associative memory
prediction" model accounts for the behavior. This would also make it
easier
for us to compare your model to the PCT model.

Thanks for your request. It suggests that I have not been as clear as I
might have been. What I have been talking about are the elements of our
experience that are _not_ modeled in HPCT. Bill discussed some of these
a day or so. One example is the role of awareness. To the extent that
awareness is not incorporated into the HPCT model, my comments about
prediction based on associate memory are not incorporated into the HCT
model. I am _not_ proposing a model of behavior. There is no way to
compare my proposals with the predictions of the HPCT model any more
than there is a way to compare Bill's proposals with the predictions of
the HCT model. As far as modeling behavior is concerned, Bill and I are
both accepting a hierarchical control system as a model. The discussion
is about how we experience what we experience, not about how we model
behavior.

The enemy of truth is not error. The enemy of truth is certainty.

[From Rick Marken (2005.01.25.1100)]

Bruce Gregory (2005.0125.1321) --

Rick Marken (2005.01.25.0900) --

It would help me understand your point if you could illustrate it
using a simple behavioral example and showing how your "associative
memory prediction" model accounts for the behavior. This would
also make it easier for us to compare your model to the PCT model.

Thanks for your request. It suggests that I have not been as clear as I
might have been. What I have been talking about are the elements of our
experience that are _not_ modeled in HPCT.

That's fine. But it is a model of something (experience) so it is testable,
right? How do you test the model? What observations could you make that
would lead to rejection of the model?

···

--
Richard S. Marken
MindReadings.com
Home: 310 474 0313
Cell: 310 729 1400

--------------------

This email message is for the sole use of the intended recipient(s) and
may contain privileged information. Any unauthorized review, use,
disclosure or distribution is prohibited. If you are not the intended
recipient, please contact the sender by reply email and destroy all copies
of the original message.

[From Bruce Gregory (2005.0125.1420)]

Rick Marken (2005.01.25.1100)

That's fine. But it is a model of something (experience) so it is
testable,
right? How do you test the model? What observations could you make that
would lead to rejection of the model?

Exactly the same observations that Bill uses to test the extent
awareness plays a role in reorganization. Or any of the other
suggestions made in B:CP that have never been tested. Why don't you ask
Bill what observations he could make to lead to rejection of his claim:

Bill Powers (2005.01.24.0739 MST)

What "causes" me to do this, I don't know. It seems to be something
built
in. It's more like an ongoing relationship to the world, a sense of
searching and exploring, not an occasional response to a stimulus. My
awareness is something I am, not anything particular I do, or
something I
can stop doing. I'm the observer, the explorer, the experimenter, the
problem solver, the knower.

The enemy of truth is not error. The enemy of truth is certainty.