This topic needs a title

[From Rick Marken (930316.0800)]

Allan Randall said:

How can you say this, when the sole purpose of the control
system is to oppose the disturbance? It can't oppose something
it has NO information about. It simply cannot.

(Bill Powers 930315.0700) replied:

When you get this figured out, you can finally claim to
understand PCT.

and Martin Taylor (930315 18:30) says:

Bill, your comment is exactly saying that PCT applies only to entities
that operate in a universe thermodynamically isolated from the disturbing
variable. It would make for a very uninteresting area of application
for PCT. Let's deal in possible worlds, shall we? I think PCT applies
to a very interesting part of the real world. If what you say is true,
then I am much less interested in PCT, which has suddenly become a branch
of abstract mathematics.

How could I let this statement go by last night; clearly, Martin
has confronted my razor's edge, and balked.

Martin Taylor (930316 10:00) re:(Bill Powers 930315.1900)

I agree with everything in Bill's posting, at least at first reading.

If Rick also agrees with Bill's posting, we can see that our apparent
disagreements are based more on misunderstandings of language than of
principle.

I agree with Bill's posting, of course. I agree that there must be
some confusion about language. That's why I tried to get quantitative
in my last post. But that didn't seem to help. For example, I said:

(1) p(t) = d(t) + o(t)

What the control system perceives (and controls) is a time varying signal,
p(t) that is at any instant the result of the combined effects of an
indepedent disturbance variable, d(t) and an output being generated
by the system itself, o(t). All the system perceives is p(t); it has no
way of knowing "how much" of p(t) is at any instant the result of d(t)
or o(t). In other words, it has no information about d(t) -- all it has
is p(t)

And Martin Taylor (930316 10:20) replies:

Fine, except that the last sentence is a non-sequitur. It indicates that
the core of the argument is a misunderstanding about the nature of
information.

OK. I'm waiting to have my understanding of "information"
non-sequitized. But instead, here's what I get:

p(t) = d(t) + o(t), and therefore p(t) contains information
derived from d(t).

Another assertion; where the hell is this information? How can it
be USED. p(t) is a series of numbers -- here's part of it
23,25,30,21, -10, 3, 8 ... Now, could you please explain to
me where, in those numbers, is the information about d(t)?
If you just say ITS THERE then I might break my computer screen.
Isn't information a measure of what a message (which I take p(t)
to be) tells you about the source, which I take d(t) to be. Or
is this view of information a non-sequiter and thermodynamically
impossible. I think your response to disturbance is showing.

This in no way implies that d(t) can be recovered
from p(t) without knowledge of (as distinct from information
from) o(t).

So there is information about d(t) in p(t) but it cannot be
recovered from p(t) without knowledge of o(t) -- is that it.
So you are saying that there is information about d(t) in
p(t) but it is useless without knowledge of o(t).

I'll buy this. So you are saying that the subject get's information
about d(t) from p(t) because they know o(t)? Is that your position?
If so, then I suppose I've got to develop a demonstration to
show that the subject DOES NOT need to know about o(t) in order
to produce o(t) = -d(t). I actually presented one non-experimental
proof of this fact some time ago in the context of the "control of
error" discussion. In that discussion, I showed that perception, p(t)
was controlled (kept equal to r(t)) even when the disturbance
was added before the trasformation of output into an effect on
the controlled variable. That is, I added the disturbance to the
error signal so that o(t) = k(r-p(t))+d(t). I showed both
mathematically and with simulation that the disturbance is
compensated for; in this case, by adjustments to the error signal.
An interesting feature of this demonstration is that d(t) doesn't
enter the loop directly through p(t). In fact, d(t) enters
the loop as part of the effect of o(t), the very variable
that we had to know in order to extract the information about
d(t) from p(t).

So I'll tell you what -- how about this concession on MY part.
There IS information about d(t) in p(t) [when p(t) = d(t) + o(t)]
but it is useless and uninformative. In other words, there is
uninformative information about d(t) in p(t). How's that?

I said:

Nevertheless, it generates outputs, o(t) that are a precise mirror
or d(t)

Martin says:

That word "precise" is an argument killer. o(t) is NOT a precise mirror
of d(t). It differs by an proportion that is roughly 1/Gain. In an
integrating control, 1/Gain approaches infinity at infinite time, and
then you can talk about o(t) being a precise mirror of d(t), but only
if no disturbing "events" have happened in the interim. You can't use
infinite gain without going to zero bandwidth, because otherwise you would
be infinitely amplifying the least little noise in the comparator or
perceptual input function. That again is a question of information.

Well my statement may have been an argument killer for you but your
paragraph above is gobbldygook to me. What in the world is the point
of all this? If it's a question of information then WHAT IS THE ANSWER.
What does the lack of precision that comes from having a loop gain
of 1,000,000 instead of infinity have to do with INFORMATION.

The best I can do with this is assume that you believe that the
lack of precision of control leaves a remnent of variance in the
input, p(t), that is the INFORMATION used to guide o(t). Thus,
my challenge for you to find that remnent and reconstruct d(t)
from it. But you say this is a straw man challenge. So please
tell me what in the world is your point.

Best

Rick

[Martin Taylor 930316 15:30]
(Rick Marken 930316 08:00)

I give up. There's an impenetrable wall, or the resistance to disturbance of a
converted missionary. Every attempt at explanation is gobbledygook or
plain wrong. It's obvious that there is NO explanation that will suffice,
other than simple capitulation. So, for the purposes of clearing the
CSG airwaves, I capitulate, and will continue this information-theory
discussion with Bill Powers separately. At least Bill and I can see
common ground, even if we don't yet have a common understanding.
With Rick, as soon as there appears to be the possibility of common
ground, the rug gets whipped away to reveal a chasm. I don't like
that style of argument. T'is so, t'aint so. Stupid.

For an example, one final quote from Rick:

What does the lack of precision that comes from having a loop gain
of 1,000,000 instead of infinity have to do with INFORMATION.

Everything.

Bye (on this topic).

Martin

[From Rick Marken (939316.1200)]

Let me try to articulate what I think is really at stake in
this "information about the disturbance" discussion.

The PCT view of perception is that it is just there; it
doesn't "communicate information", it has no "cues" or
"affordances", it is not a stimulus (in the sense of
making anything happen), it is not a "reinforcement".
Perception consists of variable aspects of experience (from
the point of view of the behaving system) or simply variable
signals in the nervous system (from the point of view of a
brain scientist).

Perceptions are just "layed out" there for the perceptual control
systems to deal with. These perceptual control systems "care"
about some of these perceptual variables -- these are the
controlled perceptions; perceptual control systems act to get these
pereptual variables to match reference specifications. Other
perceptual variables are not under control -- they are uncontrolled
perceptions. These perceptions can apparently become the objects
of consciousness -- but there are no perceptual control systems
trying to get these variables to any particular reference level.

So perception (from a PCT perspective) is just raw material; control
systems act to make some of this material match internal references;
these references are selected (in theory) because by making perceptions
match these references, higher level perceptions are made to match
their references specifications.

Clearly, this view of perception is quite unusual. In conventional
psychology we often hear of perception providing "cues" for behavior
(or cues to the "real" identity of the object represented by the
perception); Gibson (and D. Norman) talk about objects having
"affordances" -- perceptual characteristics that "tell" the
perceiver how the perception can be used (the perception of a
"chair" for example "affords" sitting -- yes, these people are
serious). We often hear about perception providing "information"
about the appropriate response to make; information that can be
"used" to guide behavior (this does imply an "active" role for
the behaving system, but it suggests that perceptions have some-
thing in them -- information -- besides the perception itself;
something that can "tell" something to the behaving system about
what to do).

The PCT view is that perceptions have nothing to tell -- unless
you call the result of the comparison of a perception to a reference
"telling"; but in this comparison the perception is just what it
is -- ultimately a number, say 10. The perception "tells" nothing
in and of itself. If the reference for that perception is
5 then the comparison "tells" the system (as an error signal) that
the perception is "too big". If the reference for the perception
is 15 then the comparison tells the system that the perception is
"too small". So the same perception can "tell" the system different
things; it depends on what the system wants the perception to be.
So it is not the perception that is "telling" anything; it is the
result of the comparisom between the perception and the reference
that "tells" something.

So from a PCT perspective, perception, in itself, does not "tell"
a control system anything; it just IS. This is what I mean when
I say that there is no information in perception. Information
is not in the perception; information is in the difference between
perception and reference; information is in how the world as
it is (perception) differs from the world as it should be (the
reference).

Best

Rick

[From Samuel Saunders (950310.1145 EST)]

[Rick Marken (950309.1020)]

Samuel Saunders (950307:1310 EST) --

A minor point, but few if any EAB types would say the stimuli are causing
the responses, but rather that the stimuli "set the occasion" for
reinforcement of the respective responses.

Thanks for pointing this out, Samuel. This is another wonderful example of
more EAB animism. As far as I can tell, stimuli (like red and green lights)
are just perceptions; they can't "set the occasion" anymore than they can
"select consequences". Only purposeful systems (like the hotel staff) can do
things like "set the occasion". When EAB types say things like this, they are
just revealing their animistic faith that control (purpose) is exerted by the
environment rather by the organisms in that enviroinment.

It would probably have been fairer if I has said "presentation of the
stimulus set the occasion". The idea that "stimuli cause responses" is one
by which EAB (radical behaviorist) sensibilities are ruffled. While there
is animism in the EAB world view and in the "neo-behaviorist" world view,
there is nothing more likely to cause trouble in communicating with an
animist than attributing the wrong animist doctrine to his sect. Anyone
who wants to get a good idea of the radical behaviorist view should
probably read large sections of Skinner's _Verbal Behavior_. There is a
great deal of discussion of "multiple causation" and of what sense
causality is to be given in EAB in that book.

I should warn the list participants that "stimulus control" is central to
most of my backgound and work, so I am likely to slip into EAB speak from
time to time and would appreciate reminders when I do.

//----------------------------------------------------------------------------
//Samuel Spence Saunders,Ph.D.

Found
this today on Yuni words of wisdom…

“He
who knoweth the precepts by heart, but faileth to practice them, is like unto
one who lighteth a lamp and then shutteth his eyes.” - Siddha Nagarjuna
(100-200) Indian-Tibetan Religious Leader

Thought you’d like
that.

Rgrds,

Marco Plas

[From Rick Marken (2006.04.16.1050)]

Marco Plas writes

Found this today on Yuni words of wisdom�

�"He who knoweth the precepts by heart, but faileth to practice them, is like unto one who lighteth a lamp and then shutteth his eyes." - Siddha Nagarjuna (100-200) Indian-Tibetan Religious Leader

Thought you�d like that.

Depends on what the precepts are, don't you think. I think anyone who knoweth the precepts of, say, Bushian Republicanism by heart but faileth to practice them is like unto one who keepeth from lighting the lamp the will shutteth down the country;-)

Happy Easter!! (My favorite religious holiday)

Best

Rick

···

---
Richard S. Marken Consulting
marken@mindreadings.com
Home 310 474-0313
Cell 310 729-1400

[From Bill Powers (2011.04.19.1005 MDT)]
Hello, all:
This is a reminder that you need to reserve a hotel room and send your
conference fee to me with the filled-out form – all information attached
again in case you’re misplaced your copy – before the end of
April
.

Contact the hotel directly and arrange for a room with them. Then fill
out the form, and send it with the conference fee of $300 per person and
optional $45 membership fee per person to me – I will get all the checks
to Rick at the end of the month. Addresses and web links are given in the
attached documents.

I hasten to add that we will have a conference even if it’s only with the
5 people who have signed up so far. More have said they are coming but we
need some evidence pretty soon to assure our room discounts.

Best,

Bill P.

CSGConf2011JULY.doc (57 KB)

CSGConf2011MENU.doc (32.5 KB)

[From Bill Powers (2003.05.15.1533 MDT)]

Bruce Gregory (2003.0515.1622)--

Bill Powers (2003.05.15.1250 MDT)

Marc Abrams (2003.05.15.1214)--

>Purpose, or human intent can only be known ( to the extent it can ever be
known ) by >observing someone's behavior.

I think you need to consider that statement a bit further. If you see me
raise my hand with the forefinger pointed up, what purpose do you deduce
from that behavior?

You seem to be committing the logical fallacy of affirming the consequent.
Since that would be unlike you, I'm not sure what you are saying. As far as I
can tell, both Marc's statement and yours are true. They are certainly not
logically exclusive.

True, one must observe behavior while conducting the Test for the
Controlled Variable, in order to verify that the person's action is
responsible for stabilizing the variable against experimental disturbances.
However, I would have put observing the stabilization of variables assumed
to be under purposive control first in the list of things that must be
observed, and determining the reference level of the controlled variable
second.

I will agree that observing behavior is necessary for deducing purposes.
But it's not sufficient.

Best,

Bill P.

Once again, I have no idea what has been going on on the net, but I found a
journal today which some of you may or may not care to know about. I don't
know much about prestige or whatever else might relate to opinions about
journals, but I do know that _New Ideas in Psychology_ has a recurring
theme, self-determination/volition/will etc among other interesting topics.
  I found it via references in Howard's article in Volitional Action.

So maybe everyone is familiar with it or no one cares but if you're
interested in getting some ideas out there to be discussed (much like is
done here) with people sympathetic to volitional studies, ya might want to
check it out.

The first issues in 1984 have alot on voltion and I think 1990 ones do
also. Other issues have it scattered around.

Mark

Educational Psychology 210 USmail: 405 South 6th St. #4

College of Education Champaign, IL 61820
Univ of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
phone: (home) 351-8257 e-mail: (Internet) m-olson@uiuc.edu
       (office) 244-8080 (Bitnet) FREE0850@uiucvmd

[From Rick Marken (920514 12:30)]

Gary Cziko (920513) says:

Now that I understand the math, I'm wondering why k.o has to be so large.

Jan Talman pointed out an error in my math; my equation 4 should be

r = s*/k.f - (k.e/k.f) d

So the relationship between reference and response depends on the feedback
function. This will require some major rewrites (Bill P already suggested
others) on the reinforcement section; it also has interesting implications
for the cognitive view. But it doesn't significantly change the conclusions
of the paper (that the different perspective on behavior are different way
of looking at the aspects of control described in equation 4).

k.o is generally large because it involves the amplification produced by
all those big strong muscles. k.f probably is generally close to 1 because
it is just a mapping of physical units into other physical units; there
can be some amplification but that would involve adding energy into the
system -- making k.f the representation of some kind of machine that has
an energy supply. The magnification due to k.o requires an external energy
supply too -- control systems must eat. Because they have this external
energy supply, control systems are "open" in the thermodynamic sense; and
are, thus, free to violate the first (second?) law of thermodynamics -- they
reduce (rather than create) entropy.

Regards

Rick

···

**************************************************************

Richard S. Marken USMail: 10459 Holman Ave
The Aerospace Corporation Los Angeles, CA 90024
E-mail: marken@aero.org
(310) 336-6214 (day)
(310) 474-0313 (evening)

[From Bill Powers (940527.1400 MDT)]

Bill Cunningham (940527.1000) --

An interesting problem you pose: identifying missing information. I
sense a couple of approaches here, which may be partly hierarchical
and partly not.

Consider the case of the locations and number of fires. Knowing the
locations necessarily provides the information of how many, but not
vice versa. Thus how many is a higher-order variable than where.
Another dimension at the level of where is how large or intense.
These are two variables that must be perceived as the basis for
allocating resources to any one fire. They are at the same level
because they must both be known at the same time, and neither
implies the other.

At the same level are other specific kinds of disasters like water
main or gas main breaks, bridge collapses, landslides, and so forth.
Enumerating this list is itself a higher-level mode of perception.
The enumeration creates a blank form, specifying the kind of
perception that is required but not the specific value of it. So we
could consider this list-maker to be a perceptual function with a
set of input wires each of which could carry one certain kind of
information, if the lower-level perceptions are there.

The reference level for the perception generated by the list-maker
perceptual function is not any particular value for any input
signal, but simply _completeness_. The perceived degree of
completeness is a function of the presence of signals on the input
lines. The reference degree of completeness is something near 100
percent, although it could be less, depending on whether the list
contains any redundancy. The error signal is what ends up setting
reference signals for many data-gathering lower-level systems,
telling them gently or urgently to place sensors where the
information might be.

This process is like a clerk scanning over a form, not to read what
is entered in each blank space but just to see that there are no
blank spaces left; that there is some name where a name is supposed
to go and some number where a number is supposed to go.

Other higher-order systems in the meantime are receiving copies of
the same lower-order perceptions that are on the list, and are
dealing with them as they exist. If the list-maker keeps demanding
perceptions of the number, kind, and extent of disasters, the
numbers will keep changing and the allocation-system will revise its
assignment of resources accordingly, diverting fire equipment,
ambulances, and frontloaders from one destination to another even
while they're in transit. And at the same time, the lower-level
systems will be looking for more information as long as more is
being called for -- that is, looking in different places for the
same kind of information and reporting the type and location of each
disaster. An intermediate system will be extracting information like
number of disasters of a given kind, based on counting nonduplicate
locations.

It's interesting that looking at a response to a disaster with real
people involved brings out the parallel operation of a hierchical
control system. The lower systems aren't waiting for the higher ones
to make a decision; they begin acting right away on the basis of
whatever perceptions exist at any time that are relevant to their
normal goals. A report of a mudslide will send a front-loader toward
the location, as well as generating a perception for higher systems.
The orders may be changed if the front-loader is more urgently
needed somewhere else, but if it isn't, it will take care of the
disturbance without being told what to do.

You could associate the term "uncertainty" with the amount of data
that is seen to be unreported. This requires, of course, having a
list of data that should be reported, which is the reason for the
analogy of the blank form. This isn't really statistical
uncertainty, however, because it is known specifically what
information is missing. It's the specific missing information that
is used to direct the manipulation of reference signals to lower-
level systems. If the form is partly filled in, there's no point in
getting the existing information again (although some level of data-
gathering is still required because the data keep changing).

The problem with characterizing even high-level control systems as
trying to "reduce uncertainty" is that this is too general to allow
designing a control system. If the error signal indicates only that
the perceived degree of uncertainty is too high, this doesn't
connect with actions that should be taken to reduce the uncertainty.
The actions that will do the job must be specific to what one is
uncertain about, which means they will be different in every case of
uncertainty-reduction. If you're uncertain about how to allocate
resources because of a lack of information about the number of
fires, it won't reduce your uncertainty to tell the department of
sanitation to look harder for water leaks. All that will reduce your
uncertainty about the number of fires is to demand information from
fire-watchers-for. That implies a very specific control system
concerned with obtaining a very specific kind of perceptual
information.

In this context, uncertainty reduction is much like anxiety
reduction. You may not like feeling anxious, but if all you know is
that you feel anxious, and don't know what you feel anxious about,
there isn't much chance of reducing the cause of the anxiety.
Uncertainty (aside from its formal definition) is an emotional state
like anxiety or fear; it's a consequence of other things. You don't
control anxiety by calming down; you control it by getting the
specific variables under control that are at the root of the
anxiety. Same for uncertainty. You don't control for a zero sense of
uncertainty by acting directly to reduce it. If the uncertainty is
due to a lack of information, you do what is necessary to get more
information. If it's due to having too much information, you try to
week out the distractions and duplications. If it's the result of
not knowing how to correct an error, you find some way of learning
how to correct that error -- not the uncertainty, but the error in
whatever controlled variable you are uncertain ABOUT.

The gathering of information to fill in a form would work the same
way whether the system doing the gathering felt uncertain or not.
One person might constantly be trying to guess what the next piece
of information to show up will be, and what its value will be, while
another simply directs the lower data-gathering processes according
to the missing data, without trying to guess and without feeling
uncertain. The system will work the same way in either case.

You can certainly say that once you have located the lion that broke
out of its cage, your uncertainty about its location is greatly
decreased, if you had been wondering where it is. Another person who
had not been wondering, and sees the same lion, would also get the
information as to where the lion is, but would not experience any
decrease in uncertainty. Uncertainty is an emotional state.

If all you knew was that a person was feeling uncertain, there
wouldn't be much you could do to reduce that uncertainty. I think of
anxiety and uncertainty and fear and such as ephiphenoma which are
indicators of the state of a whole control hierarchy but which are
controlled by controlling something else much more specific.

As to Mr. Thigh Cream, he's gone and forgotten.

···

------------------------------------------------------------------
Best,

Bill P.

[From Bruce Abbott (950526.1410 EST)]

Rick Marken (950526.0900)

In complex systems like this, nearly every action has perceptual
consequences. A closed loop does not necessarily indicate the presence of a
control system. What you have to ask is, does the system actually control a
perceptual variable.

That's right! And how do we ask that? All together now...

We seem to have lost the thread here. I was never arguing that we should
determine these things from wiring diagrams (although having them would
certainly help); I was arguing for doing the research rather than jumping to
conclusions. And how do we do the research? All together now...

Now here is a version of a PCT description.

Plausible but it would have been overkill within the brief aside in which I
offered my description. I think my description provided a clear enough
picture of the basic strategy the fly employs to land on the ceiling,
without recourse to fantasy.

The point is that cause-effect descriptions, like those of the fly behavior,
may be grist for the start of research -- they suggest possible controlled
variables -- but they they are not the data to be explained.

The fly approaches the ceiling at a steep angle, sticks out its legs,
contacts the ceiling with its forelegs, rotates around this contact until
its body is horizontal, and stops beating its wings. All this pure
descriptive observation and answers, at one very superficial level, a
question many have wondered about: how does a fly land on the ceiling? If
you want a more detailed explanation in terms of controlled variables, you
will have to do the research. Some of this research has been done, which is
why I can state some of the sensory inputs involved.

I hope my make-believe PCT explanation shows that this is not correct at
all. It implies that existing behavioral data (like that on fly landing) is
satisfactory and that all we need to do is to show how PCT can explain it.

Perhaps it implies that to you, but not to me. I certainly never made that
claim. There are explanations and there are explanations. If I want to
know why an airliner fell out of the air it may be enough for me to hear
that the pilot stalled the aircraft. Someone else may want to understand
what variables the pilot was attempting to control and how the interaction
of his control systems with each other and with external disturbances led to
the stall. Neither explanation is incorrect, they just operate at different
levels of detail.

As long as people keep looking for PCT explanations of data like that on fly-
landing -- data that tells us nearly nothing about the variables that are
being controlled -- then the real data we need will not be collected.

Skinner said the same thing about cognitive explanations. To paraphrase,
"as long as people keep looking for mentalistic explanations of behavior,
then the real data we need (on the environemental causes of behavior) will
not be collected."

That's
why I get so upset when people (like Bruce) keep saying that PCT has to
explain the existing behavioral science data to "prove itself worthy. This
is upsetting because 1) most existing data (like the fly landing data)
contains only the faintest hints about what variables MIGHT be under
control and 2) it just wastes time until the real, systematic PCT data
collection begins.

Researchers will have to collect the right kind of data in order to develop
and test PCT models. My argument is that the models so developed should
then explain (certain) existing behavioral science data. If your PCT model
leads you to conclude that a fly can't land on the ceiling, your PCT model
is wrong.

Furthermore, (certain) existing behavioral science data can provide strong
hints about where to begin when designing a program of PCT research. The
fly data, for example, reveal that the fly is sensitive to a number of
sensory variables that _appear_ to influence its behavior in certain ways.

Finally, you really should take a look at some of this insect research. In
this field, at least, the "real, systematic, PCT data collection" seems to
be much more common than you seem to believe.

Which reminds me -- how's that PCT rat research coming along Bruce?

I'm working on some making and installing some sensors for the operant
chamber, thank you. After that I have to get the experiment program written
and get the rats used to being handled.

Regards,

Bruce

[From Dag Forssell (2001.0608.1950)]

I have now mailed all archive and courtesy videos, including one order,
of the PCT computer workshop that Tom Bourbon held in Phoenix,
January 16-18, 2001.

A copy of my PCT CD dated June 2001 was included.

···

=====================================================
The CD includes a nearly complete archive of
ResponsibleThinking.net through March, 2001

From its inception in January 1996 to April 1998, this discussion
list was hosted by Maricopa University. I have 401 digests
strung together in four Word files for easy reading. Perhaps 20
digests are missing from this archive. Does anyone have a
duplicate archive of these digests?

The second incarnation of ResponsibleThinking.net, starting in
April 1998, is complete but archived with complete headers, each post
an individual file. Does anyone know of software that will strip
headers and make this archive more accessible?

The last item to be finished and included on this CD is
Bruce Gregory's book: Inventing Reality - Physics as Language

This is not a book on PCT. I appreciate it as a meta-scientific
book on science. Just like Thomas Kuhn brings a realization
that science is not merely an accumulation of facts over time,
Bruce makes it clear that our language and understanding and
language and understanding changes over time. It's the old
chicken and egg question. What comes before the chicken?
An earlier kind of egg!

I like to believe that reading Bruce's book will help people
develop scepticism about the life sciences of today, help them
realize that an entirely different language and understanding
may make a major difference.

From the back cover:

"...a rich account of the dogged and often futile attempt of
physicists to talk about nature."
        �Alan Lightman
             Author of Time Travel and Papa Joe's Pipe:
             Essays on the Human side of Science

"This book makes for smooth riding over the rough terrain of ...
modern physics... [Gregory] steers the reader unerringly to his
provocative conclusion: reality is a function of language..."
          �Lynn Margulis
              Coauthor of Microcosmos, Five Kingdoms, and
              Origins of Sex

Physicists do not discover the physical world. Rather, they
invent a physical world�a story that closely fits the facts
they create in experimental apparatus. From the time of
Aristotle to the present, Inventing Reality explores science's
attempts to understand the world by inventing new vocabularies
and new ways to describe nature.

Drawing on the work of such modern physicists as Bohr,
Einstein, and Feynman, Inventing Reality explores the
relationship between language and the world. Using
ingenious metaphors, concrete examples from everyday
life, and engaging, nontechnical language, Gregory
colorfully illustrates how the language of physics
works, and demonstrates the notion that, in the words
of Einstein, "physical concepts are free creations of
the human mind."

BRUCE GREGORY is an Associate Director of the Harvard
Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics. For over twenty
years he has made science intelligible to audiences
ranging from junior high school students to Members of
Congress.

=====================================================
Copyright � 1999 Bruce Gregory. All rights reserved.

This book was originally published in 1988 by
John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Copyright returned by
John Wiley & Sons to the author in 1999.

This reproduction was created by Dag Forssell
in May, 2001. This pdf-file "printed" on May 31, 2001.

Bruce Gregory has granted permission to freely distribute
this book in pdf-file form for personal use only.
Not for commercial use or corporate distribution.

For printed copies or commercial/corporate use, contact:
Bruce Gregory
86 Fox Hill Road
Pomfret Center, CT 06259-1133 USA

=====================================================
I will e-mail the file: InventingReality.pdf (850 KB)
to anyone who asks for it. Anyone can share it in turn.

Another file is Closed Loop volume 1 # 2 (May 1991).
(Finished just yesterday, after the CD)

This second issue of Closed Loop features two threads:

The Method of Levels and Internal Conflict
(Bill Powers, Ed Ford and Tom Bourbon)

"Conditioning"
(Gary Cziko, Rick Marken, Bill Powers and Wayne Hershberger)

=====================================================
I will e-mail the file: Closed Loop vol1 #2.pdf (85 KB)
to anyone who asks for it.

Previous issues available for the asking are:
Closed Loop vol1 #1.pdf (55 KB)
Closed Loop vol2 #4.pdf (550 KB)
Closed Loop vol3 #1.pdf (600 KB)
Closed Loop vol3 #4.pdf (650 KB)
(I spelled out the content in my post March 21)

=====================================================

I will continue to recreate issues of Closed Loop.
Five down, ten to go. If anyone has a preference
for which issue to recreate next, let me know.

For every issue I recreate, I am impressed with the loving
effort Greg Williams put into editing and typesetting
the Closed Loop Journal.

Best, Dag

Dag Forssell
dag@forssell.com, www.forssell.com
23903 Via Flamenco, Valencia CA 91355-2808 USA
Tel: +1 661 255 6948 Fax: +1 661 254 7956

[From Bill Powers (2002.06.06.1224 MDT)]

Concerning the Graziano et. al. paper, check out the reference from Ranson
and Clark starting at the bottom of p. 121 in B:CP. Looks as if Ward did a
very similar experiment prior to 1947.

Best,

Bill P.

Hi Bruce!

Just wanted you to know that I've been following along on these threads and appreciate what you've been trying to do, and with such finesse. I agree with your assessment of the problems; of course, the really difficult part is discovering workable solutions . . .

HPCT, so far as it goes, provides a nice starting point -- as complete as Bill could make it with the information available to him way back when -- but if you take Bill at his word it was always intended as a starting point for research and not as the final product to be defended to the death. [It doesn't always seem like this in debate, does it?] Glad to see someone identifying some of the problems and thinking about possible ways to deal with them. This is the sort of thing I like to see on CSGnet.

Will you be attending the conference this year? [I'm signed up.]

Bruce A.

[from Mary Powers 980618]

Richard Kennaway (980617.1640 BST)

But I can't resist putting on my idiot hat and asking a few
leading questions [about coercion].

Actually, I can.

Way to go!

Mary P.

[From Dennis Delprato (920615)]

Rick Marken (920614) refers to Republicans and Democrats, the
leaders. I recently heard the Presidential candidate of the
Libertarian Party quote another (foreign) leader. To paraphrase:

  You Americans attempt entirely too much to control your
  citizens. It won't work. I know for I tried.

According to my source, this came from none other than
Hermann Goering--at his trial in Israel.

This sort of observation brings home just how far removed
from our world as lived is PCT. Tied in with this is the
fact that despite widespread dissatisfaction with
Republication and Democrat policies, few people seem to
have any idea of what Libertarians are all about.

The moral here may be to stay quite close to pure science
for the time being. I assume many members of this network
have thought about the Libertarian-PCT connection.

[From Richard Thurman (930611.1430)]

Rick Marken (930611.0800) --

I'm curious about the 'control of sequence' vs 'control of
configuration' study you were about to do last March. Anything
to it yet?

I haven't worked on it at all. My current priority is trying to
write a book about PCT; something along the lines of "Perceptual
Park" with huge, cloned control systems running around terrifying
visit

Hey! What a great idea! You could beat everybody to the evolutionary
chase. Why mess around with writing roach control algorithms (a la
Beer bugs) when you can cut right to flesh eating carnivores!

I wish you would come to the CSG meeting in July. I'll bring the
program that is sort of the prototype of the kind of experiment
I had in mind. I think we could make much better progress if we
could sit down together and brainstorm about possible ways to
do the experiment -- and possibly test some ideas right there
using HyperCard of Basic or Pascal.

Unfortunately I have other commitments and I will not be able to
attend the CSG meeting in July. I agree that the efficiency of any
research efforts would increase dramatically if we could spend some
good solid time working together in a setting such as the CSG meeting.
However, at this point, we will just have to work it out via the net.

If you (or Tom H.) can't make the meeting, I'm certainly willing to try
to brainstorm on the net about possible research projects. Some of
the "scholarship" on the configuration/sequence control stuff already
exists in my "Hierarchical control of perception" paper; did you get
a copy?

I have a copy of a paper called "The Hierarchal Behavior of Perception"
which you put on the net last October. It has a very helpful section
called "Levels of Perception" in which 'Perceptual Speed Limits' are
discussed. I will try to get more familiar with it over the next few
days.

As far as brainstorming over the network goes.... I think what I need
is a few more ideas on how move from researching lower level skills
to doing higher levels. Both Tom H. and I (oops... maybe I should just
speak for myself) are steeped in the cog. sci. tradition and may not
always see how to apply 'tracking task' studies to more 'cognitive'
tasks. Also I have to admit a weakness in moving from a more traditional
group-means-statistical approach to a modeling based approach. Am I the
only one, or are others on the net struggling with a change in research
paradigms?

···

------------------------------------------------------------------------

On another note -- I just cant help myself from butting into someone
else's thread.

Rick Marken (930611.0900) replying to Martin Taylor (930611 10:30) --

The people we are talking about (Carver, Scheier, et al) don't need
to be "missionized"; they already believe in the Gospel According to
PCT and claim to be PCTers (or, at least, Powersian Control Theorists;
hey, another meaning of PCT). While I do desire that they come to CSG
meetings and participate on the net, I desire it, not because I want them
to join the fold (they are ostensibly already in the fold); I just want to
engage in an exchange of ideas with colleagues. Since these people are
already converts, I am puzzled by their reluctance to come to "church".
I don't want to force them to do it; I just don't understand the reluctance.
It is really kind of a strange thing. The analogy seems to me to be that
Carver and Scheier et al are like self-converted Mormons who are
enthusiastic about being Mormon's but refuse to go to the Mormon temple.
In fact, they continue to schmooze at their old church -- Our Lady of
Lineal Causality. It's just puzzling to me, that's all.

Mormons used to (around the turn of the century) have a term for such
individuals. They referred to them as Jack Mormons. I believe the
implication was that just as you couldn't get a jackass to come around
to your way of doing things, some Mormons just wouldn't budge from some
preconceived notions. They would just sit there braying and holding
up traffic ... so to speak.

Does this mean we need to start referring to the Carver and Scheier crowd
as Jack PCTers?

Martin Taylor (930611 10:30) --

They presumably think that the discussions
on the net and at the meeting will be as unprofitable as the Mormon would
presumably think a session of bathing in the Ganges to be. Why bother?

Rick Marken (930611.0900)

I agree. So, again, it is puzzling. They should know that the CSG meeting
is filled with fellow Mormons (er... PCTers) and that no Ganges bathing is
done at all -- yet, indeed, they treat their fellows (us) as though we were
the infidels. It's just puzzling. If they don't really like PCT then why don't
they just use a different model?

I know that the gist of this thread is winding in another direction, but
I would just like to say as convert to (and former missionary for) the
Mormon Church I have immensely enjoyed the PCT and religion discussion. I
think Joel Judd, Greg Williams, Bill Powers, and Rick Marken (did I miss
anybody) did a great job of keeping the tread on a PCT relevant level. It
helped me see a little more clearly just how PCT can be integrated with
(as well as assess) ones personal belief system.

PCT and CSG-L -- ain't they great! Where else could the topic of scholarly
conversation range all the way from 'perceptual theme parks' to 'non-Ganges-
river-baithing Mormons' to 'perceptual speed limits!'

Rich

--------------------------------------------------
Richard Thurman
Air Force Armstrong Lab
BLDG. 558
Williams AFB AZ. 85240-6457

(602) 988-6561
Internet: Thurman%HRLOT1.Decnet@EIS.Brooks.AF.Mil
or
Thurman@192.207.189.65
---------------------------------------------------

[From Bruce Abbott (950608.1750 EST)]

Judge Ito wants the lawyers in the Simpson case to follow a strict format
when they object: state the objection, the legal grounds, and perhaps a
brief supporting statement, without further argument. I thought I'd follow
Judge Ito's requirement here:

Rick Marken (950607.1545)] --

Bruce Abbott (950607.1355 EST)

My example was intended to convey the point that having control can be
stressful if maintaining control is difficult.

To the extent that control is not maintained there is error -- and stress IS
error. But NOT having control is always AT LEAST as bad as having it, and
usually FAR worse.

Objection, your horor. Beside the point and untrue. Assumes facts not in
evidence.

Bruce Abbott (950607.1155 EST)

No real control system can keep the controlled perception exactly at
reference at all times regardless of disturbance.

The phrase "regardless of disturbance" is ambiguous. Do you mean "given
disturbances that change over time" or "no matter what the disturbance
happens to be"? If you mean the latter, then the statement is obviously not
true since a real control system can keep p exactly equal to r as long as
d is a constant.

Objection, your Honor. Argumentative. It's obvious in what sense the term
"disturbance" was meant. Counsel is attempting to confuse the issue. Also,
contrary to fact. In the basic control system there is no output to counter
the disturbance -- constant or otherwise -- when the error is zero.

Bruce Abbott (950607.1245 EST) --

Hmmmm. Rick, you don't have a CLUE as to what my motives are.

You are correct. I don't know your motives because there is no such thing
as a "motive". "Motive" is a dormative principle that was used to explain
behavior before people understood the nature of behavior as the control of
perception. Poeple don't have motives any more than flammable materials have
phlogiston.

Objection Your Honor. Counsel knows full well what "motive" means: the
value of some controlled variable is not at its reference state. Counsel is
attempting to deflect the argument from the issue at hand.

It's impossible to hide
the perceptions one is controlling from someone who knows how to find out
what they are (using the Test). That's what I meant when I said
(950606.1900):

When you know what to look for, controlled perceptions are really quite
obvious. Of course, Bill Powers (950606.1440 MDT) picked up on it too.

Objection Your Honor. Not an argument. Counsel is only repeating his
earlier statement. Also, contrary to HPCT. The person may be controlling
another variable that appears correlated with the obvious one. Also,
assumes facts not in evidence. Counsel has not conducted such Tests in any
systematic, formal sense that would yield unambiguous answers.

But if you're interested, I'd be happy to tell you what perceptions I think
you are controlling.

Your Honor, my client would be most interested if counsel would be willing
to share his insights with the court.

Regards,

Bruce