# Trying Again...

**URL:** <http://discourse.iapct.org/t/trying-again/11788>\
**Category:** CSG1998\
**Created:** [April 27, 1998, 12:12am UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/trying-again/11788 "1998-04-27T00:12:47Z")\
**Posts on this page:** 2\
**Page:** 1

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**Author:** ![Fred\_Nickols3](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/f/9de053/32.png) [@Fred\_Nickols3](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Fred_Nickols3)\
**Post date:** [April 27, 1998, 12:12am UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/trying-again/11788/1 "1998-04-27T00:12:47Z")

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I posted the message below...

> Fred Nickols (980423.1625 EDT)
> 
> Bruce Gregory (980422.1713 EDT)]
> 
> > Bill Powers (980422.1344 MDT)
> > 
> > > If a variable stays in the state you prefer without any action being  
> > > needed, you never experience any error and in fact you don't even need to  
> > > learn what to do in case there is an error. I think we accept the world  
> > > that we experience, quite quickly, as the world we expect to experience,  
> > > meaning that we make our perception of it into a reference level for it.
> 
> Bruce:
> 
> > Yes. I've been thinking this for a while. It's nice to learn that it is not  
> > a heresy!
> 
> Fred  
> A question...
> 
> Would the making of an expectation into a reference condition qualify as a

partial definition of "learning"?

To which Bill P responded...

> Bill Powers (980424.0837 MDT)]
> 
> Fred Nickols (980423.1625 EDT) --
> 
> > Would the making of an expectation into a reference condition qualify as a  
> > partial definition of "learning"?
> 
> Since I defined an expectation as a reference condition, how should I  
> answer this question? It presumes that an expectation is initially  
> something different from a reference condition, so it can be "made into" a  
> reference condition. If "expectation" is just another word for "reference  
> condition," the asserted transformation doesn't happen. However, if I  
> answer "no", the answer, under the questioner's built-in assumption, would  
> imply that expectations can't turn into reference condition

Okay; I went back and revisited your original post. The words you used of  
interest to me are, "I think we accept the world that we experience, quite  
quickly, as the world we expect to experience, meaning that we make our  
perception of it into a reference level for it."

I guess I was so taken aback by the equating of "expectation" and "reference  
level" that I posed my question too hastily. (I was taken aback because to  
date I've understood that expectations do not equal reference levels.) In  
any event, I'll try again.

Would the making of a perception of the world we experience into a reference  
level for it qualify as a partial definition of learning?

Regards,

Fred Nickols  
The Distance Consulting Company  
nickols@worldnet.att.net  
[http://home.att.net/~nickols/distance.htm](http://home.att.net/~nickols/distance.htm)

&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;"The Internet offers the best graduate-level education  
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;to be found anywhere."

---

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**Author:** ![Bill\_Powers1](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/b/8e7dd6/32.png) [@Bill\_Powers1](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Bill_Powers1)\
**Post date:** [April 27, 1998, 5:42am UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/trying-again/11788/2 "1998-04-27T05:42:55Z")

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[From Bill Powers (980426.1105 MDT)]

Fred Nickols (9804236)

> I guess I was so taken aback by the equating of "expectation" and "reference  
> level" that I posed my question too hastily. (I was taken aback because to  
> date I've understood that expectations do not equal reference levels.)

How would you define an expectation in the HPCT framework? Or under any  
other model?

> In any event, I'll try again.
> 
> Would the making of a perception of the world we experience into a reference  
> level for it qualify as a partial definition of learning?

I'm still not sure how to answer your question. Are we creating a new  
meaning for the word "learning" here, or are you asking if making a  
perception into a reference level corresponds to some already-defined  
phenomenon that we already mean by the word learning? Learning isn't really  
a technical term as it's already used -- when I use it I mean to refer  
loosely to changes in habitual ways of behaving, without saying whether the  
changes amount to reorganization, acquisition of new information, or some  
higher-order system acting in an already-learned way to alter how a  
lower-order system reacts to disturbances.

If you see a traffic light showing yellow, this leads to an expectation  
that the red light will be next in the sequence, followed by releasing the  
brake and stepping on the accelerator pedal. Is that "learning?" I wouldn't  
think so. But does it involve setting up a reference signal? I think it  
does; the next color that \_should\_ appear is red. If we see green instead,  
we would be very surprised, and would see this as an error in the  
"expected" sequence. Traffic lights do not go green, yellow, green. The  
second green would be a sequence error, showing that we have a reference  
condition set up defining the "right" sequence.

But that's not quite what you're asking, is it? When we initially form this  
expectation, we don't know what the "natural" sequence of colors of a  
traffic light is. We have to learn the sequence by observing it. So we  
start out with a perception of a sequence that gradually becomes familiar,  
meaning we remember its having occurred before. When we have seen this  
sequence often enough, we come to "expect" it. So I guess the answer to  
your question is "yes," because we form this expectation only after having  
experienced the sequence enough times. Once it exists in memory, a  
higher-level system can then try to reproduce the same experience. It does  
this, under PCT, by selecting a remembered sequence and routing the memory  
signal to the reference input of a sequence-control system (see the chapter  
in B:CP on memory for more details on this proposition).

When we're talking about things like sunrise, we never do have to develop  
an output function for this control system, because the sun always comes up  
by itself, and there's no effort we can make that will bring it up sooner  
or keep it from coming up. We set the reference signal for sunrise when the  
sky gets to a certain degree of lightness, and pretty soon the error goes  
to zero.

I don't know if that's really true; it's just my way of trying to explain  
the expectancy we feel when sunrise is about to happen.

This does explain, however, why we often \_do\_ take action when something  
that is expected to happen doesn't happen. When you turn the ketchup bottle  
upside down, you "expect" ketchup to come out, meaning you \_intend\_ for  
ketchup to come out. Sometimes it does and sometimes it doesn't. If it does  
come out you don't have to do anything further, but if it doesn't you  
generate a lot of behavior like pounding on the base of the bottle to make  
the ketchup come out. In that case, the "expectation" is pretty clearly a  
reference signal.

Best,

Bill P.