[From Bruce Nevin (980615.1200 EDT)]
The phenomenon of "giving up" (or the phenomena, maybe there are more than
one) is an outward and visible manifestation of the inward and invisible
process of reorganization. Existing connections and weights are not
working, stop using them and try something different.
Put another way, as reorganization starts why is it surprising that
behavior resulting from the old organization stops?
The rush to reify is stupefying.
Bruce Nevin
[From Rick Marken (980615.1330)]
Bruce Nevin (980615.1200 EDT)
The phenomenon of "giving up" (or the phenomena, maybe there are
more than one) is an outward and visible manifestation of the
inward and invisible process of reorganization.
Maybe. Maybe not.
I was thinking of a situation where the goal (reference) seems to
remain even when the deviation of actual from reference state is
large. When the deviation is larger than some critical amount there
is "giving up"; when the deviation becomes is smaller than this
critical amount then there is renewed effort to control. For
example, as long as there is no Baskin Robbins around I don't
control for getting a Jamoca Almond Fudge, even though I would
like one; when I drive by a Baskin Robbins I pull in and get
my Jamoca Almond Fudge. If the BR is closed, I go on my way and
forget the ice cream. I seem to control for having a Jamoca Almond
Fudge only when getting one is feasible (actual state of the
perception does not deviate too much from the reference state).
This is the kind of phenomenon that suggests the _possibility_ of
a universal error curve. Of course, it could also be a higher
level system changing the reference for a lower order one.
Finding out is just a matter of comparing data to models.
Best
Rick
--
Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313
Life Learning Associates e-mail: rmarken@earthlink.net
http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken
[From Bruce Nevin (980615.2046 EDT)]
Rick Marken (980615.1330)--
I was thinking of a situation where the goal (reference) seems to
remain even when the deviation of actual from reference state is
large. When the deviation is larger than some critical amount there
is "giving up"; when the deviation becomes is smaller than this
critical amount then there is renewed effort to control. For
example, as long as there is no Baskin Robbins around I don't
control for getting a Jamoca Almond Fudge, even though I would
like one; when I drive by a Baskin Robbins I pull in and get
my Jamoca Almond Fudge. If the BR is closed, I go on my way and
forget the ice cream. I seem to control for having a Jamoca Almond
Fudge only when getting one is feasible (actual state of the
perception does not deviate too much from the reference state).
Sounds to me like there's a sequence being controlled, something like "go
to BR, order JAF, pay for JAF, eat JAF", serving as means for eating JAF
(and under that as means for raising your blood sugar and experiencing the
pleasures of certain sensations). If you had gone to the trouble of
controlling the sequence starting at home or at work-- interrupting what
you were doing, going out and starting your car, and so on--the gain must
have been pretty high. If driving someplace else you passed a BR and you
started controlling the tail end of the sequence opportunistically, the
gain was probably not so high. It might even be like turning down the
familiar road to home or to work when you intended to drive someplace else,
spacing out and driving on autopilot. In any case, there's no need to
postulate UEC as an explanatory principle. If one step of the sequence
fails, the latch mechanism quits there. You might re-try the failed step a
couple of times (shaking the door, peering in the window to see if they're
*really* closed). If the gain is high, you might seek alternative means to
re-enter the sequence using a more general program for finding things--go
to a phone booth, look for BR places in the yellow pages, call to see if
one is open, get directions, etc. By your reckoning, quitting the failed
sequence would be an instance of UEC and starting a new sequence in a
different place would be an unrelated matter?
This is the kind of phenomenon that suggests the _possibility_ of
a universal error curve.
No, it is not. But substituting a non-sequence example (pushing on a door
and finding it locked) ...
it could also be a higher
level system changing the reference for a lower order one.
Finding out is just a matter of comparing data to models.
Or it could be something simpler yet. As reorganization starts why is it
surprising that behavior resulting from the old organization stops? You
already have the reorganization system postulated as an explanatory
principle. This would be an obvious property or effect for it to have. Why
do you want to postulate yet another explanatory principle when this would
do? Perhaps this all that you are in fact saying, that the Universal Error
Curve is an observable first effect of reorganization.
You tried to refute this (with Baskin Robbins ice cream) by showing that
the UEC occurs without reorganization starting. For starters, you need
something below sequence level to get free of the latch failure effect as
an alternative explanation for giving up.
Sometimes it does not matter much. A preference, rather than a demand. Is
there truth to the sour grapes fable? Do we imagine that an erstwhile goal
is not so desirable after all? Sometimes, surely.
Reorganization, higher-order change of means, dropped latch, low gain,
imagination.... It appears to me that there is variety here, and not a
unitary phenomenon. And it seems very peculiar that you of all people
should be generalizing from the form of behavioral outputs and assuming
that because the outward forms are similar the inward origin must be the
same.
Bruce Nevin