W. Ross Ashby: Digital Archive

Hi Rick, OK, so the idea is not to fight with them and make direct comparisons with their theoretical approaches. I struggle with that because I like to be ‘integrative’ and I like to think that PCT is the whole of the same elephant they are trying to describe (your analogy!).

···

On Thu, Jan 30, 2014 at 6:56 PM, Richard Marken rsmarken@gmail.com wrote:

[From Rick Marken (2014.01.30.1050)]


Dr Warren Mansell
Reader in Psychology
Cognitive Behavioural Therapist & Chartered Clinical Psychologist
School of Psychological Sciences

Coupland I
University of Manchester
Oxford Road
Manchester M13 9PL
Email: warren.mansell@manchester.ac.uk

Tel: +44 (0) 161 275 8589

Website: http://www.psych-sci.manchester.ac.uk/staff/131406

See teamstrial.net for further information on our trial of CBT for Bipolar Disorders in NW England

The highly acclaimed therapy manual on A Transdiagnostic Approach to CBT using Method of Levels is available now.

Check www.pctweb.org for further information on Perceptual Control Theory

On Thu, Jan 30, 2014 at 10:13 AM, Warren Mansell wmansell@gmail.com wrote:

WM: OK Rick, and given that each of these four processes clearly improve control through negative feedback, what shall we call these processes - not the negative feedback loops themselves - but the processes through which they are optimised for control in the way I have described (leaking integration, reorganisation, hierarchies and imagination)? They each involve carrying forward a signal or parameter from earlier occasions into future occasions…

RM: I I guess I don’t understand why these things have to be called anything other than what they are called. The fact that these are all processes that can optimize control seems to me to be relevant only to situations where we observe control being optimized. They are aspects of control models that can be used to explain these observed optimizations in control. Some may work better at explaining some kinds of optimizations than others.

We’ll see in chapter 5 of LCS III, for example, how hierarchy can explain optimized or adaptive control when there are changes in characteristics of the “plant” being controlled. I think your clinical observations (and some experimental work, like the wonderful Robertson/Glines “Plateau” paper) make it clear that reorganization is involved in other kinds of optimization of control. I’m finding evidence of variations in gain and slowing factors in existing control loops when people catch fly balls on different occasions – so there is some evidence that reorganization, which would vary those parameters – is always going on to optimize control.


Richard S. Marken PhD
www.mindreadings.com
The only thing that will redeem mankind is cooperation.

                                               -- Bertrand Russell

I think you may be fighting a dragon that I’m just tired of dealing with. The reason I wrote my reply regarding people who say “negative feedback is too simple” is because I think pushing back with the “fact of control” is the only way to cut the Gordian knot of criticism of PCT. All the criticisms of PCT come down to not understanding that PCT is a theory that explains the fact of control as it is seen in the behavior of living systems. When you argue with critics about whether PCT can handle this or that fact you are almost always at a disadvantage because those facts are not what control theory is designed to explain. So getting into theoretical disputes with non-PCT psychologists is just getting caught up in the threads of the Gordian knot. The only way to cut that know is to just say “I’m studying control; are you?” If they are not, just leave (lower the sword); if they don’t know what your talking about, try to explain what control is and how it is seen in behavior. If they say they are studying control too, then make sure you’re talking about the same thing and then go out and have a nice cup of tea together;-)

Best

Rick

On Thu, Jan 30, 2014 at 6:02 PM, Richard Marken rsmarken@gmail.com wrote:

[From Rick Marken (2014.01.30.1000)]


Dr Warren Mansell
Reader in Psychology
Cognitive Behavioural Therapist & Chartered Clinical Psychologist
School of Psychological Sciences

Coupland I
University of Manchester
Oxford Road
Manchester M13 9PL
Email: warren.mansell@manchester.ac.uk

Tel: +44 (0) 161 275 8589

Website: http://www.psych-sci.manchester.ac.uk/staff/131406

See teamstrial.net for further information on our trial of CBT for Bipolar Disorders in NW England

The highly acclaimed therapy manual on A Transdiagnostic Approach to CBT using Method of Levels is available now.

Check www.pctweb.org for further information on Perceptual Control Theory

On Wed, Jan 29, 2014 at 11:35 PM, Warren Mansell wmansell@gmail.com wrote:

WM: Hey folks, please read my proposal again. It is saying that leaky integration, hierachies, reorganisation and the imagination mode all have the effect of carrying forward learned parameters into the future use of negative feedback control. This can include carrying over outputs from the last iteration through integration based on the assumption that the disturbance doesn’t change THAT quickly, setting of learned higher level reference patterns from memory, optimising gains, connection strengths and delays to reduce overall error, and imagining future perceived situations including a perception of one’s own behaviour in that ‘as if’ situation.

Is this feed forward?

It’s certainly not the simplistic notion of negative feedback that challengers of PCT think we are using. But it is pure PCT.

RM: I think this all comes back to understanding that behavior is control, in fact, not in theory. Once you understand that, then it’s easy to see that negative feedback is the only possible explanation for what’s going on. The revolutionary concept of PCT that these folks (who say negative feedback is to simplistic) don’t get is not that negative feedback is the right theory of behavior it’s that the behavior to be explained by a theory is control. And that is apparently not an easy concept to grasp. But that, I think, is the most important contribution Bill Powers made to human civilization: showing that the behavior of living systems is a process of control, in fact.

I am sure that’s why his last book – the book we are going through now – is called “Living Control Systems: The FACT of CONTROL”. Bill was very careful about all his thinking; and he put particularly careful thought into choosing the titles of his books. Behavior: The Control of Perception says exactly what that book is about; and so does Making Sense of Behavior (a brilliant double entendre) and LCS III: The Fact of Control.

What we are up against, I believe, is a people who don’t know what control is and don’t know how to see (or don’t want to see) control going on in the behavior they study. Our problem is not how to convince people that PCT is the best theory of behavior; it’s how to convince people of what psychological theories should be trying to explain. What these theories should be trying to explain control (also know as purposeful behavior).

Best

Rick

What shall we call it?

A CSG consensus would be great for the paper… Can we do it this time?

Hope to hear from you,

Warren

Sent from my iPhone

On 29 Jan 2014, at 19:27, Richard Marken rsmarken@GMAIL.COM wrote:

[From Rick Marken (2014.01.29.1130)]


Richard S. Marken PhD
www.mindreadings.com
The only thing that will redeem mankind is cooperation.
– Bertrand Russell

On Wed, Jan 29, 2014 at 6:29 AM, Warren Mansell wmansell@gmail.com wrote:

Oh, we are back here again! What a live topic! Anyone think this makes sense as an answer? I originally wrote it as a proposal for a journal article that was rejected and I need to write the full article at some point!

RM: Too bad; it’s a great proposal. Keep on trying!

Best

Rick

Predictive (or feedforward) theories of motor control have replaced simple feedback theories. Yet

the limitations of feedforward theories have been recognized and „hybrid‟ models have attempted

to reintegrate feedback, but within a secondary role. We critique hybrid models and propose that

the field would progress by „going full circle‟ to make feedback control primary. Sensory feedback

is critical because it corrects inaccurate predictions. One contemporary feedback theory

(Perceptual Control Theory; PCT) can manage delays in neural signaling, circumvent limits in

sensory feedback, and learn to optimize control. We identify four original components of PCT as

alternative ways of implementing feedforward processes to enhance feedback control over four

different, parallel timescales. We discuss the implications for a unified understanding of control.

‘Going Full Circle’: Is Control More Important Than Prediction? Warren Mansell 7/2/12

My article proposes that the „hybrid‟ models of control overemphasize prediction at the expense of

control and should be superseded by returning „full circle‟ to a feedback theory of control that

subsumes feedforward processes within its architecture.

I plan to start the article with accessible examples. At the turn of the 20th century, John Dewey

proposed that “the motor response determines the stimulus just as truly as the sensory stimulus

determines movement” - while our environment can trigger changes in our behavior, it is also the

case that our behavior is affecting the environment and we sense these effects as ‘feedback’. Take

the example of chasing a moving target during hunting – a vital skill for any predator’s survival.

Processing current sensory feedback is critical to control. The prey may change direction at any

moment, as may the angle and terrain of the ground beneath the predator’s feet. Moreover, as the

predator shifts its speed and angle to compensate, the visual image of the prey it perceives on its

retina will change instantly. The brain of the predator must process current sensory and motor

information in such a way that it regularly, and efficiently, reaches its target – or ultimately it dies.

Early 20th century engineers, recognizing the importance of feedback control, developed

technologies we take for granted today, such as thermostats, amplifiers, flight control systems, and

industrial and medical devices - some of which have an accuracy of up to four parts per million.

Within psychology, feedback models peaked with the development of ‘cybernetics’ (Ashby, 1952;

Wiener, 1948). Within a few decades, however, the pendulum had swung towards the

development of feedforward theories of control (Oosting & Dickerson, 1987). Feedforward theories

are varied, yet each computes the required actions for control based on either ongoing motor

signals or computational models that predict in advance states of the body and the environment.

Despite many decades of this research, the need for considering feedback did not go away. For

example, Optimal Control Theory was converted to a ‘hybrid’ - Optimal Feedback Control Theory –

to improve its match with observed data (Todorov & Jordan, 2002). Indeed, there are examples

across wide domains where models utilizing feedforward control rely critically on feedback

processing for accurate performance (Perkell, in press; Saunders & Vijayakumar, 2011).

The limitations of recent hybrid models are increasingly well documented, including their inability to

learn their control parameters, to engage in hierarchical control, and to control cognition

(Diedrichsen et al., 2010). Consequently, there have been recent calls for a more unified,

parsimonious theory of motor control that is directly testable (Arjemian & Hogan, 2010).

In this article, we heed this call and review evidence for a theory of feedback control that has the

capacity to restore confidence in the field: Perceptual Control Theory (PCT; Powers, Clark &

McFarland, 1960a,1960b; Powers, 1973, 2008). We make explicit four components of PCT

subsumed within its architecture that ‘feedforward’ their effects in parallel over four different time

scales (leaky integration of efferent signals, hierarchies, reorganization learning, and selfgenerated

feedback).

The article will initially critique five reasons commonly offered for the apparent advantages of

feedforward control within current „hybrid‟ models:

A. Signal delays make feedback control ineffective. This view seems inconsistent with evidence of

the performance advantages of sensory feedback during early stages of control, and for fast

movements (Boer et al., 2011; Tunik et al., 2009). Moreover, when disturbances are not

predictable, a model based on feedback processing can merely reduce its performance to the

same as that of a feedforward system. A feedback model with nerve signal delays performs

effectively over a range of simulated frequencies (Powers, 2008).

B. Sensory feedback is often unavailable. Under conditions of limited sensory feedback (e.g.

blocked vision), the brain seems capable of sensory substitution, whereby alternative streams

of sensory feedback, such as proprioception, are used (Merabet & Pascual-Leone, 2010).

C. Feedforward motor signals improve control. There are examples of feedforward motor signals,

such as the vestibulo-ocular reflex. Yet, these require stabilization through feedback processing

(Montfoort et al., 2008). The predicted sensory consequences of one’s own actions do,

however, appear to be used across a range of tasks; thus, a feedback theory needs to account

for this.

D. Control parameters for feedback systems need to be learned. Learning enhances control, yet

evidence shows that sensory feedback is typically required for this learning (Perkell, in press).

E. Internal models can predict the correct motor signal. The kinematic properties of the body and

environment are associated with specific brain regions (Grafton et al., 2008). Yet, internal

models can be complex and inaccurate (e.g. Cloete & Wallis, 2009). Thus, a parsimonious

account of internal model generation constantly updated by sensory feedback is desirable.

At this point within the article, accessible pop-out boxes will be used to explain PCT and the

evidence for the accuracy of models of behavioral tasks (Marken, 2009) and its explanation for

observed behavior (e.g. Pellis & Bell, 2011). In summary, the reference values for a feedback unit

in PCT are set by the efferent signals of a hierarchically superordinate feedback unit that operates

over a longer timescale of perceptual input. The whole system „controls perception‟, within motor

and environmental constraints. The lowest system of this hierarchy is the tendon reflex. An afferent

signal representing muscle tension is compared to an efferent reference signal entering the spinal

motor neuron, with the difference – error – being amplified by the muscle and converted to an

output force to maintain a regulated tension (Powers, 1973).

Importantly, there are four original features of PCT that could be conceptualized as ‘feed-forward’

and subserve its feedback architecture (Powers et al., 1960; Powers, 1973).

A pop-out box will

provide equations of these components and their location in a diagram. They are as follows:

(1) Leaky integration: efferent signals are integrated over periods of several milliseconds.

Therefore, the strength of a response to a disturbance in a constant direction will increase over

very brief periods. This counters signal delays (A) described above.

(2) Hierarchies: higher-level systems perceive changes that unfold over fractions of a second or

greater, and their efferent signals set the reference values for lower-level systems; these are

equivalent to the expected sensory consequences of action described above (C). For example, a

higher-level system for the desired angular position of a joint sets the desired velocity of the joint

for the system below. A mid-level system controls this variable via the efferent signals that it, in

turn, sends down to regulate acceleration via muscular forces at a lower level. Hierarchical PCT

models accurately match observed data (Marken, 1986; Powers, 2008). Future research could test

if a PCT model can utilize this information for a range of published tasks.

(3) Reorganization learning: during repeated or ongoing situations, the control parameters are

optimized through a trial-and-error learning process known as „reorganization‟, such that their

values are fed forward for improved performance. This addresses issue (D) described above.

Alternative streams of afferent input can develop through reorganization, addressing point (B).

Powers (2008) constructed and tested a computer model of 14-joint arm movement that learned its

optimal control parameters through this algorithm. Future research could test further models.

(4) Self-generated feedback: In PCT, when sensory feedback is unavailable and sensory

substitution has limited effectiveness, and/or when action is prevented, the control system can

enter ‘imagination mode’ (Powers, 1973). In this state, the reference values can be short-circuited

internally to the organism, so that approximate states of the self and world can be modeled ‘as if’

they are occurring in the environment. The motor plan that is modeled as most successful can then

be fed forward when the opportunity to control the environment is next available, subject to online

alterations through feedback control. This addresses point (E) above. Convergent evidence is

consistent with this process. Hierarchically organized closed loops of biafferent neural signals are

integral to the brain (Strick et al., 2011). Sensory deprivation in humans does indeed result in the

formation of internally generated perceptions such as spontaneous visual imagery (Mason &

Brady, 2009). Sensory deprivation in simulated robots leads to the emergence of spontaneous

internal generation of perception via a closed loop process (Gigliotta et al., 2010), and a study of

robotic systems utilizing sensory feedback models based on PCT outperformed competing models

by up to 95% (Rabinovich & Jennings, 2010).

A summary of several further advantages of adopting a PCT model of control will follow in the

article. First, a sense of control is recognised as an intrinsic need (Leotti et al., 2010), and

therefore it is appropriate that PCT places present-moment control, rather than prediction per se,

at its core. Second, cognitive control can be embodied within a PCT model (Mansell, 2011). Third,

the parsimony of PCT has made it highly adaptable to a variety of disciplines, e.g. mental health

(Carey, 2011) and organisational psychology (Vancouver & Scherbaum, 2008). Finally, the

limitations of PCT and directions for future research will be described.

Recent References

Ajemian, R., & Hogan, N. (2010). Experimenting with theoretical motor neuroscience. Journal of Motor

Behavior, 42, 333-342.

Carey, T. A. (2011). Exposure and reorganization: The what and how of effective psychotherapy. Clinical

Psychology Review, 31, 236-248.

Cloete, S. R., & Wallis, G. (2009). Limitations of feedforward control in multiple-phase steering movements.

Experimental Brain Research, 195, 481-487.

Diedrichsen, J., Shadmehr, R., & Ivry, R. B. (2010). The coordination of movement: optimal feedback control

and beyond. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 14, 31-39.

Gigliotta, O., Pezzulo, G., & Nolfi, S. (2010). Emergences of an internal model in evolving robots subjected to

sensory deprivation. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 6226, 575-586.

Grafton, S. T., Schmidt, P., Van Horn, J., & Diedrichsen, J. (2008). Neural substrates of visuomotor learning

based on improved feedback control and prediction. Neuroimage, 39, 1383-1395.

Leotti, L. A., Iyengar, S. S., & Ochsner, K. N. (2010). Born to choose: the origins and value of the need for

control. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 14, 457-463.

Mansell, W. (2011). Control of perception should be operationalised as a fundamental property of the

nervous system. Topics in Cognitive Science, 3, 257-261.

Merabet, L. B., & Pascual-Leone, A. (2010). Neural reorganization following sensory loss: The opportunity of

change. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 11, 44-52.

Marken, R. S. (2009) You say you had a revolution: Methodological foundations of closed-loop psychology.

Review of General Psychology, 13, 137-145.

Mason, O. J., & Brady, F. (2009). The psychotomimetic effects of short-term sensory deprivation. Journal of

Nervous and Mental Disease, 197, 783-785.

Montfoort, I., Van Der Geest, J. N., Slijper, H. P., De Zeeuw, C. I., & Frens, M. A. (2008). Adaptation of the

cervico- and vestibulo-ocular reflex in whiplash injury patients. Journal of Neurotrauma, 25, 687-693.

Tunik, E., Houk, J. C., & Grafton, S. T. (2009). Basal ganglia contribution to the initiation of corrective

submovements. Neuroimage, 47, 1757-1766.

Pellis, S., & Bell, H. (2011). Closing the circle between perceptions and behavior: A cybernetic view of

behavior and its consequences for studying motivation and development. Developmental Cognitive

Neuroscience, 1, 404-413.

Perkell, J. S. (in press). Movement goals and feedback and feedforward control mechanisms in speech

production. Journal of Neurolinguistics.

Saunders, I., & Vijayakumar, S. (2011). The role of feed-forward and feedback processes for closed-loop

prosthesis control. Journal of Neuroengineering and Rehabilitation, 8, 60.

Powers, W. T. (2008). Living Control Systems III: The Fact of Control. Benchmark Publications.

Rabinovich, Z., & Jennings, N. R. (2010). A hybrid controller based on the egocentric perceptual principle.

Robotics and Autonomous Systems, 58, 1039-1048.

Strick, P. L., Dum, R. P., Fiez, J. A. (2011). Cerebellum and Nonmotor Function. The Annual Review of

Neuroscience, 32, 413-434.

Vancouver, J. B. & Scherbaum, C. A. (2008). Do we self-regulate actions or perceptions? A test of two

computational models. Computational and Mathematical Organizational Theory, 14, 1-22.

Earlier References

Ashby, W. R. (1952). A Design for a Brain. Chapman & Hall.

Oosting, K. W. & Dickerson, S. L. (1987). Feed forward control for stabilisation. ASME

Powers, W. T. (1973). Behavior: The Control of Perception. Chicago, IL: Aldine.

Powers, W. T., Clark, R. K., & McFarland, R. L. (1960a). A general feedback theory of human behavior. Part

I. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 11, 71-88.

Powers, W. T., Clark, R. K., & McFarland, R. L. (1960). A general feedback theory of human behavior. Part

II. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 11, 309-323.

Todorov, E., & Jordan, M. I. (2002). Optimal feedback control as a theory of motor coordination. Nature

Neuroscience, 5, 1226-1235.

Wiener, N. (1948). Cybernetics: Or Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine. MIT Press.


Richard S. Marken PhD
www.mindreadings.com
The only thing that will redeem mankind is cooperation.

                                               -- Bertrand Russell

On Wed, Jan 29, 2014 at 4:35 AM, Richard H. Pfau richardpfau4153@aol.com wrote:

[From Richard Pfau (2014.01.28 23:36 EST)]

`Ref: [From Rick Marken (2014.01.28.1620)]

RM: Yes, how about writing an Ashby feed-forward model of the controlling a person does in a tracking task. Then let’s see how the model works in various versions of the task … Whaddaya think?

RP: Some feedback: Your suggestion for using a tracking task to test models of feed-forward and PCT feedback is highly biased in that the PCT model would surely perform better in such a tracking task.`

And a thought: In some cases, the phenomena called feedforward does seem to be taking place. (a) Bruce's example of the wrecking ball seems like one. (b) Another seems to be when you put on a coat when it's cold outside (i.e., before you are physically cold) to prevent yourself from becoming chilled when you go outside.

``

However, if as you indicated (2012.08.21.0915) and Bill Powers seemed to concur (2012.08.21.1217 MDT) that you "understood 'feedforward' to be basically equivalent to what we call a reference signal" so that [here's my interpretation now of what you seem to mean] (a) when someone shouts "Duck!" then reference signals (at the relationship and program levels?) are such that "such shouting (i.e., 'Duck!') indicates a relationship with danger" and should be quickly acted on, whereas (b)reference signals (again at the relationship and program levels?)for "when the weather is perceived to be cold, you should put on warm warm clothing when you go outside" results in the output of putting on a coat before going outside.

``

Are such interpretations more or less compatable with your thinking -- such that you feel that apparent feedforward phenomena are already covered by the PCT model?

``

With Regards,

Richard Pfau


Dr Warren Mansell
Reader in Psychology
Cognitive Behavioural Therapist & Chartered Clinical Psychologist
School of Psychological Sciences

Coupland I
University of Manchester
Oxford Road
Manchester M13 9PL
Email: warren.mansell@manchester.ac.uk

Tel: +44 (0) 161 275 8589

Website: http://www.psych-sci.manchester.ac.uk/staff/131406

See teamstrial.net for further information on our trial of CBT for Bipolar Disorders in NW England

The highly acclaimed therapy manual on A Transdiagnostic Approach to CBT using Method of Levels is available now.

Check www.pctweb.org for further information on Perceptual Control Theory

[From Rick Marken (2014.01.30.1425)]

···

[Martin Taylor 2014.01.30.14.20]

            RM: The first problem with this diagram is that there isn't

a clear demarcation between system and environment. The
environment in this diagram is the Plant/Process;
everything else is system.

MT: Correct, but neither of your comments make the diagram any less the

control of perception.

RM: Yes, control always involves control of perception. But by leaving out the perceptual function box, the psychologist would not know that the main question about the controlling done by a living control system is “What perception is being controlled”? Since that’s the main thing that distinguishes PCT from other applications of control theory to behavior I consider a control diagram that does not explicitly incorporate a perceptual function box to be not a PCT control model.

MT: Also correct. And irrelevant to the reason for showing the model,

which was to point out that you should not say “the” PCT model when
there are very many possible PCT models.

RM: It’s not irrelevant because the correct mapping of a control model to behavior is what distinguishes PCT from other applications of control theory to behavior. After all, the use of control theory to study behavior is done by a huge number of people. If all these models are PCT then Powers did nothing unique and PCT should be well accepted in psychology. So, no, these other control models, like the one in your diagram, are not PCT because they did not correctly map control theory to behavior. And they didn’t map control theory to behavior correctly because they didn’t know that behavior is control. I think you do a huge disservice to Powers by saying that models like the one you show in that diagram are all PCT. They are not.

MT: Then none of the models in which the perceptual function is a

straight-through unity multiplier are PCT models. That includes
almost all of the ones ever presented on CSGnet.

RM: No, as long as the model is properly mapped to behavior the exact nature of the perceptual function doesn’t matter; we often represent it as a unity multiplier for simplicity but, of course, the perceptual functions are, in reality, very complex, like the function that puts out a perceptual signal that represents the degree of honesty in a communication, for example.

MT: No, It's the value the signal produced by the perceptual function

would have some time in the future if it continues changing at the
current rate.

RM: Perhaps you could give me the equations for this model and I’l see if it works the way you say. The diagram says to me that the perception is some function of the input plus the derivative of the input. It looks like the system will just be controlling a perception that is the sum of these two variables. But I would like to see what you think is going on, especially if you think this is a feedforward model. Then I could see what you are talking about when you talk about feedforward.

MT: The controlled perception is the future value of the output of the

perceptual function. The fact that when that future time comes
around the value of the perceptual signal may not be what the
summation produced is no more relevant than the fact that the output
will not match the disturbance if the loop transport lag is long
compared to the rate of change of the disturbance. Since the
prediction partially compensates for the lag, it is more correct to
say that what is controlled (is kept nearest the reference) is the
output of the perceptual function, not the output of the summation.

RM: Great. Show me the equations and I’ll write the program to see how it works. This is actually relevant to chapter 1 in LCS III where Bill talks about testing control theory models by computer modeling. This would be a good example to use to show how computer modeling works.

MT: Since we have long been using prediction as a synonym for

feedforward, I would say that both are feedforward systems.

RM: Great! Then let’s see how they work. Equations please!

Best

Rick


Richard S. Marken PhD
www.mindreadings.com
The only thing that will redeem mankind is cooperation.
– Bertrand Russell

            RM: The main problem with failing to make this

demarcation clear is that there is no box showing how
the controlled aspect of the environment – the
controlled variable, y(t) – is measured.

            RM: So the fact that the "perceptual function" box is

left out of the control diagram you present is the
reason why this is not a Perceptual Control theory
(PCT) model.

            RM: the actual controlled perception is the output of

the summing circle – another perceptual function –
that goes into the comparator.

            RM: Neither of these models includes any feedforward, by

the way, unless you think including integrals and
derivatives in the output or perceptual functions of a
control system make it a feedforward system.

[Philip 2014.01.30.1440]

I think you guys have completely exhausted this discussion. There are probably 40,000 words to this post. I’m going to give you all one piece of advice and then permanently exit this discussion. I will give you ANOTHER hint as to how to bring feedforward into the model (I will ignore the fact that my earlier post hinting at a discussion of immunology was ignored).

Rick, on the cover of your book Mind Readings you depict a control system above a dashed line and the model of an environmental variable below it. This diagram is not symmetric. There is no “purpose” or “reference signal” in the environment. Why not? Because you think the concept of purpose only exists in the brain. But it doesn’t (take my word purely on faith, and search for what I’m referring to off blind faith). If you formed a model of the environment that is perfectly symmetric to the model of the brain, then you’d be a thousand times closer to your ultimate search for the truth. Powers was talking about the importance of mental representations of the external world. Though you’ve figured out what’s going on in the brain, your representation of the external world is as fundamentally incomplete as psychology was before PCT. The concept of purpose is analogous to the concept of gravity. Remember what I tried to tell you: consciousness is a controlled perception of the purpose of behavior. Control your perception of the INVISIBLE forces inside the atom by mastering your understanding of geometry and you will feed forward your perception into the external reality and your imagination will take place literally.

40,000 years ago the Phoenicians had a civilization more advanced than ours today. You think you understand time? You do not. You think you’ve identified the behavioral illusion? Western civilization is the behavioral illusion.

Nietzsche said: God is dead, but he never killed God.

I say: PCT is dead, because I have killed PCT.

I am telling you and Nietzche to get your facts straight: control is supersymmetric.

You will go through the three phases of scientific advancement just like everyone else: rejection, … I forgot the second phase…, then acceptance

···

[Martin Taylor 2014.01.30.14.20]

            RM: The first problem with this diagram is that there isn't

a clear demarcation between system and environment. The
environment in this diagram is the Plant/Process;
everything else is system.

MT: Correct, but neither of your comments make the diagram any less the

control of perception.

RM: Yes, control always involves control of perception. But by leaving out the perceptual function box, the psychologist would not know that the main question about the controlling done by a living control system is “What perception is being controlled”? Since that’s the main thing that distinguishes PCT from other applications of control theory to behavior I consider a control diagram that does not explicitly incorporate a perceptual function box to be not a PCT control model.

MT: Also correct. And irrelevant to the reason for showing the model,

which was to point out that you should not say “the” PCT model when
there are very many possible PCT models.

RM: It’s not irrelevant because the correct mapping of a control model to behavior is what distinguishes PCT from other applications of control theory to behavior. After all, the use of control theory to study behavior is done by a huge number of people. If all these models are PCT then Powers did nothing unique and PCT should be well accepted in psychology. So, no, these other control models, like the one in your diagram, are not PCT because they did not correctly map control theory to behavior. And they didn’t map control theory to behavior correctly because they didn’t know that behavior is control. I think you do a huge disservice to Powers by saying that models like the one you show in that diagram are all PCT. They are not.

MT: Then none of the models in which the perceptual function is a

straight-through unity multiplier are PCT models. That includes
almost all of the ones ever presented on CSGnet.

RM: No, as long as the model is properly mapped to behavior the exact nature of the perceptual function doesn’t matter; we often represent it as a unity multiplier for simplicity but, of course, the perceptual functions are, in reality, very complex, like the function that puts out a perceptual signal that represents the degree of honesty in a communication, for example.

MT: No, It's the value the signal produced by the perceptual function

would have some time in the future if it continues changing at the
current rate.

RM: Perhaps you could give me the equations for this model and I’l see if it works the way you say. The diagram says to me that the perception is some function of the input plus the derivative of the input. It looks like the system will just be controlling a perception that is the sum of these two variables. But I would like to see what you think is going on, especially if you think this is a feedforward model. Then I could see what you are talking about when you talk about feedforward.

MT: The controlled perception is the future value of the output of the

perceptual function. The fact that when that future time comes
around the value of the perceptual signal may not be what the
summation produced is no more relevant than the fact that the output
will not match the disturbance if the loop transport lag is long
compared to the rate of change of the disturbance. Since the
prediction partially compensates for the lag, it is more correct to
say that what is controlled (is kept nearest the reference) is the
output of the perceptual function, not the output of the summation.

RM: Great. Show me the equations and I’ll write the program to see how it works. This is actually relevant to chapter 1 in LCS III where Bill talks about testing control theory models by computer modeling. This would be a good example to use to show how computer modeling works.

MT: Since we have long been using prediction as a synonym for

feedforward, I would say that both are feedforward systems.

RM: Great! Then let’s see how they work. Equations please!

Best

Rick


Richard S. Marken PhD
www.mindreadings.com
The only thing that will redeem mankind is cooperation.
– Bertrand Russell

            RM: The main problem with failing to make this

demarcation clear is that there is no box showing how
the controlled aspect of the environment – the
controlled variable, y(t) – is measured.

            RM: So the fact that the "perceptual function" box is

left out of the control diagram you present is the
reason why this is not a Perceptual Control theory
(PCT) model.

            RM: the actual controlled perception is the output of

the summing circle – another perceptual function –
that goes into the comparator.

            RM: Neither of these models includes any feedforward, by

the way, unless you think including integrals and
derivatives in the output or perceptual functions of a
control system make it a feedforward system.

Hi Rick, as I think I’ve said before it is people like you and Bill with your purity of purpose that continue to inspire me and provide a beacon of how PCT should be studied. So please don’t change!

So anyone else willing to see the four components of PCT I mentioned as ‘feed forward’ or as something else?

Warren

···

On Thu, Jan 30, 2014 at 11:37 AM, Warren Mansell wmansell@gmail.com wrote:

Hi Rick, OK, so the idea is not to fight with them and make direct comparisons with their theoretical approaches. I struggle with that because I like to be ‘integrative’ and I like to think that PCT is the whole of the same elephant they are trying to describe (your analogy!).

RM: I’m the last person to seek advice from about how to get people to see the merits of PCT. So don’t pay any attention to me on that front. I am really no longer controlling for getting people to “buy” PCT. All I want to do is do my work on PCT as best as I can.

I do think that PCT is “integrative” in the sense that it accounts for the whole “elephant” of behavior (as control) and explains why that elephant looks like S-R to some, cognitive to others and reinforcement to still others. But this integrative view depends on people seeing the whole elephant: which is the fact of control.

I’m afraid that PCT is a truly revolutionary concept, not because it’s control theory but because it’s about something – control – that most psychologists don’t understand or even know about. So integrate all you want. It’s great that you’re doing it. But I’m not interested in integrating; I’m interested in revolutionizing. And I intend to carry out the revolution not by fighting and violence but by providing a model of how to do a science of living systems. That’s what I think Bill did and I want to imitate him.

Best

Rick


Dr Warren Mansell
Reader in Psychology
Cognitive Behavioural Therapist & Chartered Clinical Psychologist
School of Psychological Sciences

Coupland I
University of Manchester
Oxford Road
Manchester M13 9PL
Email: warren.mansell@manchester.ac.uk

Tel: +44 (0) 161 275 8589

Website: http://www.psych-sci.manchester.ac.uk/staff/131406

See teamstrial.net for further information on our trial of CBT for Bipolar Disorders in NW England

The highly acclaimed therapy manual on A Transdiagnostic Approach to CBT using Method of Levels is available now.

Check www.pctweb.org for further information on Perceptual Control Theory

On Thu, Jan 30, 2014 at 6:56 PM, Richard Marken rsmarken@gmail.com wrote:

[From Rick Marken (2014.01.30.1050)]


Richard S. Marken PhD
www.mindreadings.com
The only thing that will redeem mankind is cooperation.

                                               -- Bertrand Russell

On Thu, Jan 30, 2014 at 10:13 AM, Warren Mansell wmansell@gmail.com wrote:

WM: OK Rick, and given that each of these four processes clearly improve control through negative feedback, what shall we call these processes - not the negative feedback loops themselves - but the processes through which they are optimised for control in the way I have described (leaking integration, reorganisation, hierarchies and imagination)? They each involve carrying forward a signal or parameter from earlier occasions into future occasions…

RM: I I guess I don’t understand why these things have to be called anything other than what they are called. The fact that these are all processes that can optimize control seems to me to be relevant only to situations where we observe control being optimized. They are aspects of control models that can be used to explain these observed optimizations in control. Some may work better at explaining some kinds of optimizations than others.

We’ll see in chapter 5 of LCS III, for example, how hierarchy can explain optimized or adaptive control when there are changes in characteristics of the “plant” being controlled. I think your clinical observations (and some experimental work, like the wonderful Robertson/Glines “Plateau” paper) make it clear that reorganization is involved in other kinds of optimization of control. I’m finding evidence of variations in gain and slowing factors in existing control loops when people catch fly balls on different occasions – so there is some evidence that reorganization, which would vary those parameters – is always going on to optimize control.


Dr Warren Mansell
Reader in Psychology
Cognitive Behavioural Therapist & Chartered Clinical Psychologist
School of Psychological Sciences

Coupland I
University of Manchester
Oxford Road
Manchester M13 9PL
Email: warren.mansell@manchester.ac.uk

Tel: +44 (0) 161 275 8589

Website: http://www.psych-sci.manchester.ac.uk/staff/131406

See teamstrial.net for further information on our trial of CBT for Bipolar Disorders in NW England

The highly acclaimed therapy manual on A Transdiagnostic Approach to CBT using Method of Levels is available now.

Check www.pctweb.org for further information on Perceptual Control Theory

I think you may be fighting a dragon that I’m just tired of dealing with. The reason I wrote my reply regarding people who say “negative feedback is too simple” is because I think pushing back with the “fact of control” is the only way to cut the Gordian knot of criticism of PCT. All the criticisms of PCT come down to not understanding that PCT is a theory that explains the fact of control as it is seen in the behavior of living systems. When you argue with critics about whether PCT can handle this or that fact you are almost always at a disadvantage because those facts are not what control theory is designed to explain. So getting into theoretical disputes with non-PCT psychologists is just getting caught up in the threads of the Gordian knot. The only way to cut that know is to just say “I’m studying control; are you?” If they are not, just leave (lower the sword); if they don’t know what your talking about, try to explain what control is and how it is seen in behavior. If they say they are studying control too, then make sure you’re talking about the same thing and then go out and have a nice cup of tea together;-)

Best

Rick

On Thu, Jan 30, 2014 at 6:02 PM, Richard Marken rsmarken@gmail.com wrote:

[From Rick Marken (2014.01.30.1000)]


Richard S. Marken PhD
www.mindreadings.com
The only thing that will redeem mankind is cooperation.
– Bertrand Russell

On Wed, Jan 29, 2014 at 11:35 PM, Warren Mansell wmansell@gmail.com wrote:

WM: Hey folks, please read my proposal again. It is saying that leaky integration, hierachies, reorganisation and the imagination mode all have the effect of carrying forward learned parameters into the future use of negative feedback control. This can include carrying over outputs from the last iteration through integration based on the assumption that the disturbance doesn’t change THAT quickly, setting of learned higher level reference patterns from memory, optimising gains, connection strengths and delays to reduce overall error, and imagining future perceived situations including a perception of one’s own behaviour in that ‘as if’ situation.

Is this feed forward?

It’s certainly not the simplistic notion of negative feedback that challengers of PCT think we are using. But it is pure PCT.

RM: I think this all comes back to understanding that behavior is control, in fact, not in theory. Once you understand that, then it’s easy to see that negative feedback is the only possible explanation for what’s going on. The revolutionary concept of PCT that these folks (who say negative feedback is to simplistic) don’t get is not that negative feedback is the right theory of behavior it’s that the behavior to be explained by a theory is control. And that is apparently not an easy concept to grasp. But that, I think, is the most important contribution Bill Powers made to human civilization: showing that the behavior of living systems is a process of control, in fact.

I am sure that’s why his last book – the book we are going through now – is called “Living Control Systems: The FACT of CONTROL”. Bill was very careful about all his thinking; and he put particularly careful thought into choosing the titles of his books. Behavior: The Control of Perception says exactly what that book is about; and so does Making Sense of Behavior (a brilliant double entendre) and LCS III: The Fact of Control.

What we are up against, I believe, is a people who don’t know what control is and don’t know how to see (or don’t want to see) control going on in the behavior they study. Our problem is not how to convince people that PCT is the best theory of behavior; it’s how to convince people of what psychological theories should be trying to explain. What these theories should be trying to explain control (also know as purposeful behavior).

Best

Rick

What shall we call it?

A CSG consensus would be great for the paper… Can we do it this time?

Hope to hear from you,

Warren

Sent from my iPhone

On 29 Jan 2014, at 19:27, Richard Marken rsmarken@GMAIL.COM wrote:

[From Rick Marken (2014.01.29.1130)]


Richard S. Marken PhD
www.mindreadings.com
The only thing that will redeem mankind is cooperation.

                                               -- Bertrand Russell

On Wed, Jan 29, 2014 at 6:29 AM, Warren Mansell wmansell@gmail.com wrote:

Oh, we are back here again! What a live topic! Anyone think this makes sense as an answer? I originally wrote it as a proposal for a journal article that was rejected and I need to write the full article at some point!

RM: Too bad; it’s a great proposal. Keep on trying!

Best

Rick

Predictive (or feedforward) theories of motor control have replaced simple feedback theories. Yet

the limitations of feedforward theories have been recognized and „hybrid‟ models havve attempted

to reintegrate feedback, but within a secondary role. We critique hybrid models and propose that

the field would progress by „goiing full circle‟ to make feedback control primary. Sensory feedback

is critical because it corrects inaccurate predictions. One contemporary feedback theory

(Perceptual Control Theory; PCT) can manage delays in neural signaling, circumvent limits in

sensory feedback, and learn to optimize control. We identify four original components of PCT as

alternative ways of implementing feedforward processes to enhance feedback control over four

different, parallel timescales. We discuss the implications for a unified understanding of control.

‘Going Full Circle’: Is Control More Important Than Prediction? Warren Mansell 7/2/12

My article proposes that the „hybrid‟ models of control overemphasize preddiction at the expense of

control and should be superseded by returning „full circle Ÿ to a feedback theory of control that

subsumes feedforward processes within its architecture.

I plan to start the article with accessible examples. At the turn of the 20th century, John Dewey

proposed that “the motor response determines the stimulus just as truly as the sensory stimulus

determines movement� - while our environment can trigger changes in our behavior, it is also the

case that our behavior is affecting the environment and we sense these effects as ‘feedback’. Take

the example of chasing a moving target during hunting – a vitall skill for any predator’s survival.

Processing current sensory feedback is critical to control. The prey may change direction at any

moment, as may the angle and terrain of the ground beneath the predator’s feet. Moreover, as the

predator shifts its speed and angle to compensate, the visual image of the prey it perceives on its

retina will change instantly. The brain of the predator must process current sensory and motor

information in such a way that it regularly, and efficiently, reaches its target – or ultimately it dies.

Early 20th century engineers, recognizing the importance of feedback control, developed

technologies we take for granted today, such as thermostats, amplifiers, flight control systems, and

industrial and medical devices - some of which have an accuracy of up to four parts per million.

Within psychology, feedback models peaked with the development of ‘cybernetics’ (Ashby, 1952;

Wiener, 1948). Within a few decades, however, the pendulum had swung towards the

development of feedforward theories of control (Oosting & Dickerson, 1987). Feedforward theories

are varied, yet each computes the required actions for control based on either ongoing motor

signals or computational models that predict in advance states of the body and the environment.

Despite many decades of this research, the need for considering feedback did not go away. For

example, Optimal Control Theory was converted to a ‘hybrid’ - Optimal Feedback Control Theory –

to improve its match with observed data (Todorov & Jordan, 2002). Indeed, there are examples

across wide domains where models utilizing feedforward control rely critically on feedback

processing for accurate performance (Perkell, in press; Saunders & Vijayakumar, 2011).

The limitations of recent hybrid models are increasingly well documented, including their inability to

learn their control parameters, to engage in hierarchical control, and to control cognition

(Diedrichsen et al., 2010). Consequently, there have been recent calls for a more unified,

parsimonious theory of motor control that is directly testable (Arjemian & Hogan, 2010).

In this article, we heed this call and review evidence for a theory of feedback control that has the

capacity to restore confidence in the field: Perceptual Control Theory (PCT; Powers, Clark &

McFarland, 1960a,1960b; Powers, 1973, 2008). We make explicit four componentor control that is directly testable (Arjemian & Hogan, 2010).

In this article, we heed this call and review evidence for a theory of feedback control that has the

capacity to restore confidence in the field: Perceptual Control Theory (PCT; Powers, Clark &

McFarland, 1960a,1960b; Powers, 1973, 2008). We make explicit four components of PCT

subsumed within its architecture that ‘feedforward’ their effects in parallel over four different time

scales (leaky integration of efferent signals, hierarchies, reorganization learning, and selfgenerated

feedback).

The article will initially critique five reasons commonly offered for the apparent advantages of

feedforward control within current „hybrid‟ models:
A. Signal delays make feedback control ineffective. This view seems inconsistent with evidence of

the performance advantages of sensory feedback during early stages of control, and for fast

movements (Boer et al., 2011; Tunik et al., 2009). Moreover, when disturbances are not

predictable, a model based on feedback processing can merely reduce its performance to the

same as that of a feedforward system. A feedback model with nerve signal delays performs

effectively over a range of simulated frequencies (Powers, 2008).

B. Sensory feedback is often unavailable. Under conditions of limited sensory feedback (e.g.

blocked vision), the brain seems capable of sensory substitution, whereby alternative streams

of sensory feedback, such as proprioception, are used (Merabet & Pascual-Leone, 2010).

C. Feedforward motor signals improve control. There are examples of feedforward motor signals,

such as the vestibulo-ocular reflex. Yet, these require stabilization through feedback processing

(Montfoort et al., 2008). The predicted sensory consequences of one’s own actions do,

however, appear to be used across a range of tasks; thus, a feedback theory needs to account

for this.

D. Control parameters for feedback systems need to be learned. Learning enhances control, yet

evidence shows that sensory feedback is typically required for this learning (Perkell, in press).

E. Internal models can predict the correct motor signal. The kinematic properties of the body and

environment are associated with specific brain regions (Grafton et al., 2008). Yet, internal

models can be complex and inaccurate (e.g. Cloete & Wallis, 2009). Thus, a parsimonious

account of internal model generation constantly updated by sensory feedback is desirable.

At this point within the article, accessible pop-out boxes will be used to explain PCT and the

evidence for the accuracy of models of behavioral tasks (Marken, 2009) and its explanation for

observed behavior (e.g. Pellis & Bell, 2011). In summary, the reference values for a feedback unit

in PCT are set by the efferent signals of a hierarchically superordinate feedback unit that operates

over a longer timescale of perceptual input. The whole system „žcontrols perception‟, within motor

and environmental constraints. The lowest system of this hierarchy is the tendon reflex. An afferent

signal representing muscle tension is compared to an efferent reference signal entering the spinal

motor neuron, with the difference –“ error – being amplified by the muscle and converted to an

output force to maintain a regulated tension (Powers, 1973).

Importantly, there are four original features of PCT that could be conceptualized as ‘feed-forward’

and subserve its feedback architecture (Powers et al., 1960; Powers, 1973).

A pop-out box will

provide equations of these components and their location in a diagram. They are as follows:

(1) Leaky integration: efferent signals are integrated over periods of several milliseconds.

Therefore, the strength of a response to a disturbance in a constant direction will increase over

very brief periods. This counters signal delays (A) described above.

(2) Hierarchies: higher-level systems perceive changes that unfold over fractions of a second or

greater, and their efferent signals set the reference values for lower-level systems; these are

equivalent to the expected sensory consequences of action described above (C). For example, a

higher-level system for the desired angular position of a joint sets the desired velocity of the joint

for the system below. A mid-level system controls this variable via the efferent signals that it, in

turn, sends down to regulate acceleration via muscular forces at a lower level. Hierarchical PCT

models accurately match observed data (Marken, 1986; Powers, 2008). Future research could test

if a PCT model can utilize this information for a range of published tasks.

(3) Reorganization learning: during repeated or ongoing situations, the control parameters are

optimized through a trial-and-error learning process known as „žreorganization‟, such that their

values are fed forward for improved performance. This addresses issue (D) described above.

Alternative streams of afferent input can develop through reorganization, addressing point (B).

Powers (2008) constructed and tested a computer model of 14-joint arm movement that learned its

optimal control parameters through this algorithm. Future research could test further models.

(4) Self-generated feedback: In PCT, when sensory feedback is unavailable and sensory

substitution has limited effectiveness, and/or when action is prevented, the control system can

enter ‘imagination mode’ (Powers, 1973). In this state, the reference values can be short-circuited

internally to the organism, so that approximate states of the self and world can be modeled ‘as if’

they are occurring in the environment. The motor plan that is modeled as most successful can then

be fed forward when the opportunity to control the environment is next available, subject to online

alterations through feedback control. This addresses point (E) above. Convergent evidence is

consistent with this process. Hierarchically organized closed loops of biafferent neural signals are

integral to the brain (Strick et al., 2011). Sensory deprivation in humans does indeed result in the

formation of internally generated perceptions such as spontaneous visual imagery (Mason &

Brady, 2009). Sensory deprivation in simulated robots leads to the emergence of spontaneous

internal generation of perception via a closed loop process (Gigliotta et al., 2010), and a study of

robotic systems utilizing sensory feedback models based on PCT outperformed competing models

by up to 95% (Rabinovich & Jennings, 2010).

A summary of several further advantages of adopting a PCT model of control will follow in the

article. First, a sense of control is recognised as an intrinsic need (Leotti et al., 2010), and

therefore it is appropriate that PCT places present-moment control, rather than prediction per se,

at its core. Second, cognitive control can be embodied within a PCT model (Mansell, 2011). Third,

the parsimony of PCT has made it highly adaptable to a variety of disciplines, e.g. mental health

(Carey, 2011) and organisational psychology (Vancouver & Scherbaum, 2008). Finally, the

limitations of PCT and directions for future research will be described.

Recent References

Ajemian, R., & Hogan, N. (2010). Experimenting with theoretical motor neuroscience. Journal of Motor

Behavior, 42, 333-342.

Carey, T. A. (2011). Exposure and reorganization: The what and how of effective psychotherapy. Clinical

Psychology Review, 31, 236-248.

Cloete, S. R., & Wallis, G. (2009). Limitations of feedforward control in multiple-phase steering movements.

Experimental Brain Research, 195, 481-487.

Diedrichsen, J., Shadmehr, R., & Ivry, R. B. (2010). The coordination of movement: optimal feedback control

and beyond. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 14, 31-39.

Gigliotta, O., Pezzulo, G., & Nolfi, S. (2010). Emergences of an internal model in evolving robots subjected to

sensory deprivation. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 6226, 575-586.

Grafton, S. T., Schmidt, P., Van Horn, J., & Diedrichsen, J. (2008). Neural substrates of visuomotor learning

based on improved feedback control and prediction. Neuroimage, 39, 1383-1395.

Leotti, L. A., Iyengar, S. S., & Ochsner, K. N. (2010). Born to choose: the origins and value of the need for

control. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 14, 457-463.

Mansell, W. (2011). Control of perception should be operationalised as a fundamental property of the

nervous system. Topics in Cognitive Science, 3, 257-261.

Merabet, L. B., & Pascual-Leone, A. (2010). Neural reorganization following sensory loss: The opportunity of

change. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 11, 44-52.

Marken, R. S. (2009) You say you had a revolution: Methodological foundations of closed-loop psychology.

Review of General Psychology, 13, 137-145.

Mason, O. J., & Brady, F. (2009). The psychotomimetic effects of short-term sensory deprivation. Journal of

Nervous and Mental Disease, 197, 783-785.

Montfoort, I., Van Der Geest, J. N., Slijper, H. P., De Zeeuw, C. I., & Frens, M. A. (2008). Adaptation of the

cervico- and vestibulo-ocular reflex in whiplash injury patients. Journal of Neurotrauma, 25, 687-693.

Tunik, E., Houk, J. C., & Grafton, S. T. (2009). Basal ganglia contribution to the initiation of corrective

submovements. Neuroimage, 47, 1757-1766.

Pellis, S., & Bell, H. (2011). Closing the circle between perceptions and behavior: A cybernetic view of

behavior and its consequences for studying motivation and development. Developmental Cognitive

Neuroscience, 1, 404-413.

Perkell, J. S. (in press). Movement goals and feedback and feedforward control mechanisms in speech

production. Journal of Neurolinguistics.

Saunders, I., & Vijayakumar, S. (2011). The role of feed-forward and feedback processes for closed-loop

prosthesis control. Journal of Neuroengineering and Rehabilitation, 8, 60.

Powers, W. T. (2008). Living Control Systems III: The Fact of Control. Benchmark Publications.

Rabinovich, Z., & Jennings, N. R. (2010). A hybrid controller based on the egocentric perceptual principle.

Robotics and Autonomous Systems, 58, 1039-1048.

Strick, P. L., Dum, R. P., Fiez, J. A. (2011). Cerebellum and Nonmotor Function. The Annual Review of

Neuroscience, 32, 413-434.

Vancouver, J. B. & Scherbaum, C. A. (2008). Do we self-regulate actions or perceptions? A test of two

computational models. Computational and Mathematical Organizational Theory, 14, 1-22.

Earlier References

Ashby, W. R. (1952). A Design for a Brain. Chapman & Hall.

Oosting, K. W. & Dickerson, S. L. (1987). Feed forward control for stabilisation. ASME

Powers, W. T. (1973). Behavior: The Control of Perception. Chicago, IL: Aldine.

Powers, W. T., Clark, R. K., & McFarland, R. L. (1960a). A general feedback theory of human behavior. Part

I. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 11, 71-88.

Powers, W. T., Clark, R. K., & McFarland, R. L. (1960). A general feedback theory of human behavior. Part

II. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 11, 309-323.

Todorov, E., & Jordan, M. I. (2002). Optimal feedback control as a theory of motor coordination. Nature

Neuroscience, 5, 1226-1235.

Wiener, N. (1948). Cybernetics: Or Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine. MIT Press.

On Wed, Jan 29, 2014 at 4:35 AM, Richard H. Pfau richardpfau4153@aol.com wrote:

[From Richard Pfau (2014.01.28 23:36 EST)]

`Ref: [From Rick Marken (2014.01.28.1620)]

RM: Yes, how about writing an Ashby feed-forward model of the controlling a person does in a tracking task. Then let’s see how the model works in various versions of the task … Whaddaya think?

RP: Some feedback: Your suggestion for using a tracking task to test models of feed-forward and PCT feedback is highly biased in that the PCT model would surely perform better in such a tracking task.`

And a thought: In some cases, the phenomena called feedforward does seem to be taking place. (a) Bruce's example of the wrecking ball seems like one. (b) Another seems to be when you put on a coat when it's cold outside (i.e., before you are physically cold) to prevent yourself from becoming chilled when you go outside.

``

However, if as you indicated (2012.08.21.0915) and Bill Powers seemed to concur (2012.08.21.1217 MDT) that you "understood 'feedforward' to be basically equivalent to what we call a reference si be when you put on a coat when it's cold outside (i.e., before you are physically cold) to prevent yourself from becoming chilled when you go outside.

``

However, if as you indicated (2012.08.21.0915) and Bill Powers seemed to concur (2012.08.21.1217 MDT) that you "understood 'feedforward' to be basically equivalent to what we call a reference signal" so that [here's my interpretation now of what you seem to mean] (a) when someone shouts "Duck!" then reference signals (at the relationship and program levels?) are such that "such shouting (i.e., 'Duck!') indicates a relationship with danger" and should be quickly acted on, whereas (b)reference signals (again at the relationship and program levels?)for "when the weather is perceived to be cold, you should put on warm warm clothing when you go outside" results in the output of putting on a coat before going outside.

``

Are such interpretations more or less compatable with your thinking -- such that you feel that apparent feedforward phenomena are already covered by the PCT model?

``

With Regards,

Richard Pfau


Dr Warren Mansell
Reader in Psychology
Cognitive Behavioural Therapist & Chartered Clinical Psychologist
School of Psychological Sciences

Coupland I
University of Manchester
Oxford Road
Manchester M13 9PL
Email: warren.mansell@manchester.ac.uk

Tel: +44 (0) 161 275 8589

Website: http://www.psych-sci.manchester.ac.uk/staff/131406

See teamstrial.net for further information on our trial of CBT for Bipolar Disorders in NW England

The highly acclaimed therapy manual on A Transdiagnostic Approach to CBT using Method of Levels is available now.

Check www.pctweb.org for further information on Perceptual Control Theory

Wow Philip, that is a supernatural posting. I agree with the start of your post though - classically the PCT models use randomly influenced (Fourier) or totally predictable (sine wave) disturbances. But the main disturbance (and feedback function) of interest is other people. And they are a set of. whole new PCT systems. If we can internally model their hierarchical goals we have a chance of collaborating. See Roger K. Moore’s PRESENCE architecture…

···

[Martin Taylor 2014.01.30.14.20]

            RM: The first problem with this diagram is that there isn't

a clear demarcation between system and environment. The
environment in this diagram is the Plant/Process;
everything else is system.

MT: Correct, but neither of your comments make the diagram any less the

control of perception.

RM: Yes, control always involves control of perception. But by leaving out the perceptual function box, the psychologist would not know that the main question about the controlling done by a living control system is “What perception is being controlled”? Since that’s the main thing that distinguishes PCT from other applications of control theory to behavior I consider a control diagram that does not explicitly incorporate a perceptual function box to be not a PCT control model.

MT: Also correct. And irrelevant to the reason for showing the model,

which was to point out that you should not say “the” PCT model when
there are very many possible PCT models.

RM: It’s not irrelevant because the correct mapping of a control model to behavior is what distinguishes PCT from other applications of control theory to behavior. After all, the use of control theory to study behavior is done by a huge number of people. If all these models are PCT then Powers did nothing unique and PCT should be well accepted in psychology. So, no, these other control models, like the one in your diagram, are not PCT because they did not correctly map control theory to behavior. And they didn’t map control theory to behavior correctly because they didn’t know that behavior is control. I think you do a huge disservice to Powers by saying that models like the one you show in that diagram are all PCT. They are not.

MT: Then none of the models in which the perceptual function is a

straight-through unity multiplier are PCT models. That includes
almost all of the ones ever presented on CSGnet.

RM: No, as long as the model is properly mapped to behavior the exact nature of the perceptual function doesn’t matter; we often represent it as a unity multiplier for simplicity but, of course, the perceptual functions are, in reality, very complex, like the function that puts out a perceptual signal that represents the degree of honesty in a communication, for example.

MT: No, It's the value the signal produced by the perceptual function

would have some time in the future if it continues changing at the
current rate.

RM: Perhaps you could give me the equations for this model and I’l see if it works the way you say. The diagram says to me that the perception is some function of the input plus the derivative of the input. It looks like the system will just be controlling a perception that is the sum of these two variables. But I would like to see what you think is going on, especially if you think this is a feedforward model. Then I could see what you are talking about when you talk about feedforward.

MT: The controlled perception is the future value of the output of the

perceptual function. The fact that when that future time comes
around the value of the perceptual signal may not be what the
summation produced is no more relevant than the fact that the output
will not match the disturbance if the loop transport lag is long
compared to the rate of change of the disturbance. Since the
prediction partially compensates for the lag, it is more correct to
say that what is controlled (is kept nearest the reference) is the
output of the perceptual function, not the output of the summation.

RM: Great. Show me the equations and I’ll write the program to see how it works. This is actually relevant to chapter 1 in LCS III where Bill talks about testing control theory models by computer modeling. This would be a good example to use to show how computer modeling works.

MT: Since we have long been using prediction as a synonym for

feedforward, I would say that both are feedforward systems.

RM: Great! Then let’s see how they work. Equations please!

Best

Rick


Richard S. Marken PhD
www.mindreadings.com
The only thing that will redeem mankind is cooperation.
– Bertrand Russell

            RM: The main problem with failing to make this

demarcation clear is that there is no box showing how
the controlled aspect of the environment – the
controlled variable, y(t) – is measured.

            RM: So the fact that the "perceptual function" box is

left out of the control diagram you present is the
reason why this is not a Perceptual Control theory
(PCT) model.

            RM: the actual controlled perception is the output of

the summing circle – another perceptual function –
that goes into the comparator.

            RM: Neither of these models includes any feedforward, by

the way, unless you think including integrals and
derivatives in the output or perceptual functions of a
control system make it a feedforward system.

[From Rick Marken (2014.01.30.1220)]

···

On Thu, Jan 30, 2014 at 11:37 AM, Warren Mansell wmansell@gmail.com wrote:

Hi Rick, OK, so the idea is not to fight with them and make direct comparisons with their theoretical approaches. I struggle with that because I like to be ‘integrative’ and I like to think that PCT is the whole of the same elephant they are trying to describe (your analogy!).

RM: I’m the last person to seek advice from about how to get people to see the merits of PCT. So don’t pay any attention to me on that front. I am really no longer controlling for getting people to “buy” PCT. All I want to do is do my work on PCT as best as I can.

I do think that PCT is “integrative” in the sense that it accounts for the whole “elephant” of behavior (as control) and explains why that elephant looks like S-R to some, cognitive to others and reinforcement to still others. But this integrative view depends on people seeing the whole elephant: which is the fact of control.

I’m afraid that PCT is a truly revolutionary concept, not because it’s control theory but because it’s about something – control – that most psychologists don’t understand or even know about. So integrate all you want. It’s great that you’re doing it. But I’m not interested in integrating; I’m interested in revolutionizing. And I intend to carry out the revolution not by fighting and violence but by providing a model of how to do a science of living systems. That’s what I think Bill did and I want to imitate him.

Best

Rick


Richard S. Marken PhD
www.mindreadings.com
The only thing that will redeem mankind is cooperation.

                                               -- Bertrand Russell

On Thu, Jan 30, 2014 at 6:56 PM, Richard Marken rsmarken@gmail.com wrote:

[From Rick Marken (2014.01.30.1050)]


Dr Warren Mansell
Reader in Psychology
Cognitive Behavioural Therapist & Chartered Clinical Psychologist
School of Psychological Sciences

Coupland I
University of Manchester
Oxford Road
Manchester M13 9PL
Email: warren.mansell@manchester.ac.uk

Tel: +44 (0) 161 275 8589

Website: http://www.psych-sci.manchester.ac.uk/staff/131406

See teamstrial.net for further information on our trial of CBT for Bipolar Disorders in NW England

The highly acclaimed therapy manual on A Transdiagnostic Approach to CBT using Method of Levels is available now.

Check www.pctweb.org for further information on Perceptual Control Theory

On Thu, Jan 30, 2014 at 10:13 AM, Warren Mansell wmansell@gmail.com wrote:

WM: OK Rick, and given that each of these four processes clearly improve control through negative feedback, what shall we call these processes - not the negative feedback loops themselves - but the processes through which they are optimised for control in the way I have described (leaking integration, reorganisation, hierarchies and imagination)? They each involve carrying forward a signal or parameter from earlier occasions into future occasions…

RM: I I guess I don’t understand why these things have to be called anything other than what they are called. The fact that these are all processes that can optimize control seems to me to be relevant only to situations where we observe control being optimized. They are aspects of control models that can be used to explain these observed optimizations in control. Some may work better at explaining some kinds of optimizations than others.

We’ll see in chapter 5 of LCS III, for example, how hierarchy can explain optimized or adaptive control when there are changes in characteristics of the “plant” being controlled. I think your clinical observations (and some experimental work, like the wonderful Robertson/Glines “Plateau” paper) make it clear that reorganization is involved in other kinds of optimization of control. I’m finding evidence of variations in gain and slowing factors in existing control loops when people catch fly balls on different occasions – so there is some evidence that reorganization, which would vary those parameters – is always going on to optimize control.


Richard S. Marken PhD
www.mindreadings.com
The only thing that will redeem mankind is cooperation.

                                               -- Bertrand Russell

I think you may be fighting a dragon that I’m just tired of dealing with. The reason I wrote my reply regarding people who say “negative feedback is too simple” is because I think pushing back with the “fact of control” is the only way to cut the Gordian knot of criticism of PCT. All the criticisms of PCT come down to not understanding that PCT is a theory that explains the fact of control as it is seen in the behavior of living systems. When you argue with critics about whether PCT can handle this or that fact you are almost always at a disadvantage because those facts are not what control theory is designed to explain. So getting into theoretical disputes with non-PCT psychologists is just getting caught up in the threads of the Gordian knot. The only way to cut that know is to just say “I’m studying control; are you?” If they are not, just leave (lower the sword); if they don’t know what your talking about, try to explain what control is and how it is seen in behavior. If they say they are studying control too, then make sure you’re talking about the same thing and then go out and have a nice cup of tea together;-)

Best

Rick

On Thu, Jan 30, 2014 at 6:02 PM, Richard Marken rsmarken@gmail.com wrote:

[From Rick Marken (2014.01.30.1000)]


Dr Warren Mansell
Reader in Psychology
Cognitive Behavioural Therapist & Chartered Clinical Psychologist
School of Psychological Sciences

Coupland I
University of Manchester
Oxford Road
Manchester M13 9PL
Email: warren.mansell@manchester.ac.uk

Tel: +44 (0) 161 275 8589

Website: http://www.psych-sci.manchester.ac.uk/staff/131406

See teamstrial.net for further information on our trial of CBT for Bipolar Disorders in NW England

The highly acclaimed therapy manual on A Transdiagnostic Approach to CBT using Method of Levels is available now.

Check www.pctweb.org for further information on Perceptual Control Theory

On Wed, Jan 29, 2014 at 11:35 PM, Warren Mansell wmansell@gmail.com wrote:

WM: Hey folks, please read my proposal again. It is saying that leaky integration, hierachies, reorganisation and the imagination mode all have the effect of carrying forward learned parameters into the future use of negative feedback control. This can include carrying over outputs from the last iteration through integration based on the assumption that the disturbance doesn’t change THAT quickly, setting of learned higher level reference patterns from memory, optimising gains, connection strengths and delays to reduce overall error, and imagining future perceived situations including a perception of one’s own behaviour in that ‘as if’ situation.

Is this feed forward?

It’s certainly not the simplistic notion of negative feedback that challengers of PCT think we are using. But it is pure PCT.

RM: I think this all comes back to understanding that behavior is control, in fact, not in theory. Once you understand that, then it’s easy to see that negative feedback is the only possible explanation for what’s going on. The revolutionary concept of PCT that these folks (who say negative feedback is to simplistic) don’t get is not that negative feedback is the right theory of behavior it’s that the behavior to be explained by a theory is control. And that is apparently not an easy concept to grasp. But that, I think, is the most important contribution Bill Powers made to human civilization: showing that the behavior of living systems is a process of control, in fact.

I am sure that’s why his last book – the book we are going through now – is called “Living Control Systems: The FACT of CONTROL”. Bill was very careful about all his thinking; and he put particularly careful thought into choosing the titles of his books. Behavior: The Control of Perception says exactly what that book is about; and so does Making Sense of Behavior (a brilliant double entendre) and LCS III: The Fact of Control.

What we are up against, I believe, is a people who don’t know what control is and don’t know how to see (or don’t want to see) control going on in the behavior they study. Our problem is not how to convince people that PCT is the best theory of behavior; it’s how to convince people of what psychological theories should be trying to explain. What these theories should be trying to explain control (also know as purposeful behavior).

Best

Rick

What shall we call it?

A CSG consensus would be great for the paper… Can we do it this time?

Hope to hear from you,

Warren

Sent from my iPhone

On 29 Jan 2014, at 19:27, Richard Marken rsmarken@GMAIL.COM wrote:

[From Rick Marken (2014.01.29.1130)]


Richard S. Marken PhD
www.mindreadings.com
The only thing that will redeem mankind is cooperation.
– Bertrand Russell

On Wed, Jan 29, 2014 at 6:29 AM, Warren Mansell wmansell@gmail.com wrote:

Oh, we are back here again! What a live topic! Anyone think this makes sense as an answer? I originally wrote it as a proposal for a journal article that was rejected and I need to write the full article at some point!

RM: Too bad; it’s a great proposal. Keep on trying!

Best

Rick

Predictive (or feedforward) theories of motor control have replaced simple feedback theories. Yet

the limitations of feedforward theories have been recognized and „hybrid‟ models have attempted

to reintegrate feedback, but within a secondary role. We critique hybrid models and propose that

the field would progress by „going full circle‟ to make feedback control primary. Sensory feedback

is critical because it corrects inaccurate predictions. One contemporary feedback theory

(Perceptual Control Theory; PCT) can manage delays in neural signaling, circumvent limits in

sensory feedback, and learn to optimize control. We identify four original components of PCT as

alternative ways of implementing feedforward processes to enhance feedback control over four

different, parallel timescales. We discuss the implications for a unified understanding of control.

‘Going Full Circle’: Is Control More Important Than Prediction? Warren Mansell 7/2/12

My article proposes that the „hybrid‟ models of control overemphasize prediction at the expense of

control and should be superseded by returning „full circle‟ to a feedback theory of control that

subsumes feedforward processes within its architecture.

I plan to start the article with accessible examples. At the turn of the 20th century, John Dewey

proposed that “the motor response determines the stimulus just as truly as the sensory stimulus

determines movement” - while our environment can trigger changes in our behavior, it is also the

case that our behavior is affecting the environment and we sense these effects as ‘feedback’. Take

the example of chasing a moving target during hunting – a vital skill for any predator’s survival.

Processing current sensory feedback is critical to control. The prey may change direction at any

moment, as may the angle and terrain of the ground beneath the predator’s feet. Moreover, as the

predator shifts its speed and angle to compensate, the visual image of the prey it perceives on its

retina will change instantly. The brain of the predator must process current sensory and motor

information in such a way that it regularly, and efficiently, reaches its target – or ultimately it dies.

Early 20th century engineers, recognizing the importance of feedback control, developed

technologies we take for granted today, such as thermostats, amplifiers, flight control systems, and

industrial and medical devices - some of which have an accuracy of up to four parts per million.

Within psychology, feedback models peaked with the development of ‘cybernetics’ (Ashby, 1952;

Wiener, 1948). Within a few decades, however, the pendulum had swung towards the

development of feedforward theories of control (Oosting & Dickerson, 1987). Feedforward theories

are varied, yet each computes the required actions for control based on either ongoing motor

signals or computational models that predict in advance states of the body and the environment.

Despite many decades of this research, the need for considering feedback did not go away. For

example, Optimal Control Theory was converted to a ‘hybrid’ - Optimal Feedback Control Theory –

to improve its match with observed data (Todorov & Jordan, 2002). Indeed, there are examples

across wide domains where models utilizing feedforward control rely critically on feedback

processing for accurate performance (Perkell, in press; Saunders & Vijayakumar, 2011).

The limitations of recent hybrid models are increasingly well documented, including their inability to

learn their control parameters, to engage in hierarchical control, and to control cognition

(Diedrichsen et al., 2010). Consequently, there have been recent calls for a more unified,

parsimonious theory of motor control that is directly testable (Arjemian & Hogan, 2010).

In this article, we heed this call and review evidence for a theory of feedback control that has the

capacity to restore confidence in the field: Perceptual Control Theory (PCT; Powers, Clark &

McFarland, 1960a,1960b; Powers, 1973, 2008). We make explicit four components of PCT

subsumed within its architecture that ‘feedforward’ their effects in parallel over four different time

scales (leaky integration of efferent signals, hierarchies, reorganization learning, and selfgenerated

feedback).

The article will initially critique five reasons commonly offered for the apparent advantages of

feedforward control within current „hybrid‟ models:

A. Signal delays make feedback control ineffective. This view seems inconsistent with evidence of

the performance advantages of sensory feedback during early stages of control, and for fast

movements (Boer et al., 2011; Tunik et al., 2009). Moreover, when disturbances are not

predictable, a model based on feedback processing can merely reduce its performance to the

same as that of a feedforward system. A feedback model with nerve signal delays performs

effectively over a range of simulated frequencies (Powers, 2008).

B. Sensory feedback is often unavailable. Under conditions of limited sensory feedback (e.g.

blocked vision), the brain seems capable of sensory substitution, whereby alternative streams

of sensory feedback, such as proprioception, are used (Merabet & Pascual-Leone, 2010).

C. Feedforward motor signals improve control. There are examples of feedforward motor signals,

such as the vestibulo-ocular reflex. Yet, these require stabilization through feedback processing

(Montfoort et al., 2008). The predicted sensory consequences of one’s own actions do,

however, appear to be used across a range of tasks; thus, a feedback theory needs to account

for this.

D. Control parameters for feedback systems need to be learned. Learning enhances control, yet

evidence shows that sensory feedback is typically required for this learning (Perkell, in press).

E. Internal models can predict the correct motor signal. The kinematic properties of the body and

environment are associated with specific brain regions (Grafton et al., 2008). Yet, internal

models can be complex and inaccurate (e.g. Cloete & Wallis, 2009). Thus, a parsimonious

account of internal model generation constantly updated by sensory feedback is desirable.

At this point within the article, accessible pop-out boxes will be used to explain PCT and the

evidence for the accuracy of models of behavioral tasks (Marken, 2009) and its explanation for

observed behavior (e.g. Pellis & Bell, 2011). In summary, the reference values for a feedback unit

in PCT are set by the efferent signals of a hierarchically superordinate feedback unit that operates

over a longer timescale of perceptual input. The whole system „controls perception‟, within motor

and environmental constraints. The lowest system of this hierarchy is the tendon reflex. An afferent

signal representing muscle tension is compared to an efferent reference signal entering the spinal

motor neuron, with the difference – error – being amplified by the muscle and converted to an

output force to maintain a regulated tension (Powers, 1973).

Importantly, there are four original features of PCT that could be conceptualized as ‘feed-forward’

and subserve its feedback architecture (Powers et al., 1960; Powers, 1973).

A pop-out box will

provide equations of these components and their location in a diagram. They are as follows:

(1) Leaky integration: efferent signals are integrated over periods of several milliseconds.

Therefore, the strength of a response to a disturbance in a constant direction will increase over

very brief periods. This counters signal delays (A) described above.

(2) Hierarchies: higher-level systems perceive changes that unfold over fractions of a second or

greater, and their efferent signals set the reference values for lower-level systems; these are

equivalent to the expected sensory consequences of action described above (C). For example, a

higher-level system for the desired angular position of a joint sets the desired velocity of the joint

for the system below. A mid-level system controls this variable via the efferent signals that it, in

turn, sends down to regulate acceleration via muscular forces at a lower level. Hierarchical PCT

models accurately match observed data (Marken, 1986; Powers, 2008). Future research could test

if a PCT model can utilize this information for a range of published tasks.

(3) Reorganization learning: during repeated or ongoing situations, the control parameters are

optimized through a trial-and-error learning process known as „reorganization‟, such that their

values are fed forward for improved performance. This addresses issue (D) described above.

Alternative streams of afferent input can develop through reorganization, addressing point (B).

Powers (2008) constructed and tested a computer model of 14-joint arm movement that learned its

optimal control parameters through this algorithm. Future research could test further models.

(4) Self-generated feedback: In PCT, when sensory feedback is unavailable and sensory

substitution has limited effectiveness, and/or when action is prevented, the control system can

enter ‘imagination mode’ (Powers, 1973). In this state, the reference values can be short-circuited

internally to the organism, so that approximate states of the self and world can be modeled ‘as if’

they are occurring in the environment. The motor plan that is modeled as most successful can then

be fed forward when the opportunity to control the environment is next available, subject to online

alterations through feedback control. This addresses point (E) above. Convergent evidence is

consistent with this process. Hierarchically organized closed loops of biafferent neural signals are

integral to the brain (Strick et al., 2011). Sensory deprivation in humans does indeed result in the

formation of internally generated perceptions such as spontaneous visual imagery (Mason &

Brady, 2009). Sensory deprivation in simulated robots leads to the emergence of spontaneous

internal generation of perception via a closed loop process (Gigliotta et al., 2010), and a study of

robotic systems utilizing sensory feedback models based on PCT outperformed competing models

by up to 95% (Rabinovich & Jennings, 2010).

A summary of several further advantages of adopting a PCT model of control will follow in the

article. First, a sense of control is recognised as an intrinsic need (Leotti et al., 2010), and

therefore it is appropriate that PCT places present-moment control, rather than prediction per se,

at its core. Second, cognitive control can be embodied within a PCT model (Mansell, 2011). Third,

the parsimony of PCT has made it highly adaptable to a variety of disciplines, e.g. mental health

(Carey, 2011) and organisational psychology (Vancouver & Scherbaum, 2008). Finally, the

limitations of PCT and directions for future research will be described.

Recent References

Ajemian, R., & Hogan, N. (2010). Experimenting with theoretical motor neuroscience. Journal of Motor

Behavior, 42, 333-342.

Carey, T. A. (2011). Exposure and reorganization: The what and how of effective psychotherapy. Clinical

Psychology Review, 31, 236-248.

Cloete, S. R., & Wallis, G. (2009). Limitations of feedforward control in multiple-phase steering movements.

Experimental Brain Research, 195, 481-487.

Diedrichsen, J., Shadmehr, R., & Ivry, R. B. (2010). The coordination of movement: optimal feedback control

and beyond. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 14, 31-39.

Gigliotta, O., Pezzulo, G., & Nolfi, S. (2010). Emergences of an internal model in evolving robots subjected to

sensory deprivation. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 6226, 575-586.

Grafton, S. T., Schmidt, P., Van Horn, J., & Diedrichsen, J. (2008). Neural substrates of visuomotor learning

based on improved feedback control and prediction. Neuroimage, 39, 1383-1395.

Leotti, L. A., Iyengar, S. S., & Ochsner, K. N. (2010). Born to choose: the origins and value of the need for

control. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 14, 457-463.

Mansell, W. (2011). Control of perception should be operationalised as a fundamental property of the

nervous system. Topics in Cognitive Science, 3, 257-261.

Merabet, L. B., & Pascual-Leone, A. (2010). Neural reorganization following sensory loss: The opportunity of

change. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 11, 44-52.

Marken, R. S. (2009) You say you had a revolution: Methodological foundations of closed-loop psychology.

Review of General Psychology, 13, 137-145.

Mason, O. J., & Brady, F. (2009). The psychotomimetic effects of short-term sensory deprivation. Journal of

Nervous and Mental Disease, 197, 783-785.

Montfoort, I., Van Der Geest, J. N., Slijper, H. P., De Zeeuw, C. I., & Frens, M. A. (2008). Adaptation of the

cervico- and vestibulo-ocular reflex in whiplash injury patients. Journal of Neurotrauma, 25, 687-693.

Tunik, E., Houk, J. C., & Grafton, S. T. (2009). Basal ganglia contribution to the initiation of corrective

submovements. Neuroimage, 47, 1757-1766.

Pellis, S., & Bell, H. (2011). Closing the circle between perceptions and behavior: A cybernetic view of

behavior and its consequences for studying motivation and development. Developmental Cognitive

Neuroscience, 1, 404-413.

Perkell, J. S. (in press). Movement goals and feedback and feedforward control mechanisms in speech

production. Journal of Neurolinguistics.

Saunders, I., & Vijayakumar, S. (2011). The role of feed-forward and feedback processes for closed-loop

prosthesis control. Journal of Neuroengineering and Rehabilitation, 8, 60.

Powers, W. T. (2008). Living Control Systems III: The Fact of Control. Benchmark Publications.

Rabinovich, Z., & Jennings, N. R. (2010). A hybrid controller based on the egocentric perceptual principle.

Robotics and Autonomous Systems, 58, 1039-1048.

Strick, P. L., Dum, R. P., Fiez, J. A. (2011). Cerebellum and Nonmotor Function. The Annual Review of

Neuroscience, 32, 413-434.

Vancouver, J. B. & Scherbaum, C. A. (2008). Do we self-regulate actions or perceptions? A test of two

computational models. Computational and Mathematical Organizational Theory, 14, 1-22.

Earlier References

Ashby, W. R. (1952). A Design for a Brain. Chapman & Hall.

Oosting, K. W. & Dickerson, S. L. (1987). Feed forward control for stabilisation. ASME

Powers, W. T. (1973). Behavior: The Control of Perception. Chicago, IL: Aldine.

Powers, W. T., Clark, R. K., & McFarland, R. L. (1960a). A general feedback theory of human behavior. Part

I. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 11, 71-88.

Powers, W. T., Clark, R. K., & McFarland, R. L. (1960). A general feedback theory of human behavior. Part

II. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 11, 309-323.

Todorov, E., & Jordan, M. I. (2002). Optimal feedback control as a theory of motor coordination. Nature

Neuroscience, 5, 1226-1235.

Wiener, N. (1948). Cybernetics: Or Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine. MIT Press.


Richard S. Marken PhD
www.mindreadings.com
The only thing that will redeem mankind is cooperation.

                                               -- Bertrand Russell

On Wed, Jan 29, 2014 at 4:35 AM, Richard H. Pfau richardpfau4153@aol.com wrote:

[From Richard Pfau (2014.01.28 23:36 EST)]

`Ref: [From Rick Marken (2014.01.28.1620)]

RM: Yes, how about writing an Ashby feed-forward model of the controlling a person does in a tracking task. Then let’s see how the model works in various versions of the task … Whaddaya think?

RP: Some feedback: Your suggestion for using a tracking task to test models of feed-forward and PCT feedback is highly biased in that the PCT model would surely perform better in such a tracking task.`

And a thought: In some cases, the phenomena called feedforward does seem to be taking place. (a) Bruce's example of the wrecking ball seems like one. (b) Another seems to be when you put on a coat when it's cold outside (i.e., before you are physically cold) to prevent yourself from becoming chilled when you go outside.

``

However, if as you indicated (2012.08.21.0915) and Bill Powers seemed to concur (2012.08.21.1217 MDT) that you "understood 'feedforward' to be basically equivalent to what we call a reference signal" so that [here's my interpretation now of what you seem to mean] (a) when someone shouts "Duck!" then reference signals (at the relationship and program levels?) are such that "such shouting (i.e., 'Duck!') indicates a relationship with danger" and should be quickly acted on, whereas (b)reference signals (again at the relationship and program levels?)for "when the weather is perceived to be cold, you should put on warm warm clothing when you go outside" results in the output of putting on a coat before going outside.

``

Are such interpretations more or less compatable with your thinking -- such that you feel that apparent feedforward phenomena are already covered by the PCT model?

``

With Regards,

Richard Pfau


Dr Warren Mansell
Reader in Psychology
Cognitive Behavioural Therapist & Chartered Clinical Psychologist
School of Psychological Sciences

Coupland I
University of Manchester
Oxford Road
Manchester M13 9PL
Email: warren.mansell@manchester.ac.uk

Tel: +44 (0) 161 275 8589

Website: http://www.psych-sci.manchester.ac.uk/staff/131406

See teamstrial.net for further information on our trial of CBT for Bipolar Disorders in NW England

The highly acclaimed therapy manual on A Transdiagnostic Approach to CBT using Method of Levels is available now.

Check www.pctweb.org for further information on Perceptual Control Theory

[Martin Taylor 2014.01.30.23.00]

Well, at least we agree about the fact that how something is

represented affects how people see it. That’s the propaganda value
of an effective display. What we seem not to agree about is whether it affects the way the
thing operates and the mathematics behind it. For you, one control
model that controls perception is a PCT model, while another control
model that controls perception is not. I don’t know how anyone else
will know what is a PCT model and what is not, other than by
restricting the name to just the one structure, drawn the one way
up, that we usually see on CSGnet. Also what we don’t agree on is
whether “the” PCT model with a straight-through unity multiplier
perceptual function is the same as a model in which the perceptual
function is replaced by a straight-through unity multiplier
connection.
Since what we are (or at least I am) interested in is the modelling
of how perceptual control is done in biological organisms, I prefer
to call any model mechanism that controls perception a Perceptual
Control Theory model. I do not know a priori that the standard
drawing orientation or the standard circuit is the PCT model used by
living things, or if there is only one type of PCT model used by all
biological systems everywhere a perception is controlled. You do
seem to know this, but I prefer not to take your unaided word for it
in the absence of other evidence.
Unless you are changing the meaning of the term from the way it has
been used in previous discussions, such as the thread under the
subject “Feedforward” in a smaller group discussion, “feedforward”
means “incorporating prediction”. If you remember, your first contribution to the long “feedforward”
thread started with this:“I do not like predictive control, I do not
like it on the whole. I do not like it in on a roll, I do not like
it in a bowl. I do not like it Warren I am, I do not like green eggs
and ham;-)” and finished with "But I don’t think we’ll sly this
predictive control dragon until we have build a control of
perception model that actually does what looks like predictive
control. But until then I’ll just have to reject predictive (or
feedforward) control based on simple little demos like the one Doesn’t this rather suggest that we have the same meaning for
“feedforward”?
o(t) = leaky_integral(e(t))
e(t) = (r(t)-p(t))
p(t) = s(t) + k*(ds(t)/dt)
s(t) = o(t-lag)+d(t)
Just make sure you get the derivative calculation right. I told you
how to do it the last time we went through this, but you refused to
do it right, and thereby proved that the model was wrong. Remember
also that the critical thing about optimizing k is the relation
between the lag and the integration and leak rates.
The interesting question at this point in the discussion is whether,
when k is optimized, s or p is kept nearer the reference value. It
is not (at this point) how well models with k = 0 and with k
optimized fit human data for various transport lags. That would be
of interest later, if and when we do comparative tests on a variety
of PCT models.

···

[From Rick Marken (2014.01.30.1425)]

            [Martin Taylor

2014.01.30.14.20]

                  RM: The first problem with this

diagram is that there isn’t a clear demarcation
between system and environment. The environment in
this diagram is the Plant/Process; everything else
is system.

            MT: Correct, but neither of your comments make the

diagram any less the control of perception.

          RM: Yes, control always involves control of perception.

But by leaving out the perceptual function box, the
psychologist would not know that the main question about
the controlling done by a living control system is “What
perception is being controlled”? Since that’s the main
thing that distinguishes PCT from other applications of
control theory to behavior I consider a control diagram
that does not explicitly incorporate a perceptual function
box to be not a PCT control model.

                          RM: the actual controlled perception

is the output of the summing circle –
another perceptual function – that goes
into the comparator.

            MT: No, It's the

value the signal produced by the perceptual function
would have some time in the future if it continues
changing at the current rate.

          RM: Perhaps you could give me the equations for this

model and I’l see if it works the way you say. The diagram
says to me that the perception is some function of the
input plus the derivative of the input. It looks like the
system will just be controlling a perception that is the
sum of these two variables. But I would like to see what
you think is going on, especially if you think this is a
feedforward model. Then I could see what you are talking
about when you talk about feedforward.

  •  I
    

describe above."

            MT: The controlled

perception is the future value of the output of the
perceptual function. The fact that when that future time
comes around the value of the perceptual signal may not
be what the summation produced is no more relevant than
the fact that the output will not match the disturbance
if the loop transport lag is long compared to the rate
of change of the disturbance. Since the prediction
partially compensates for the lag, it is more correct to
say that what is controlled (is kept nearest the
reference) is the output of the perceptual function, not
the output of the summation.

          RM: Great. Show me the equations and I'll write the

program to see how it works.

          This is actually relevant to chapter 1 in LCS III

where Bill talks about testing control theory models by
computer modeling. This would be a good example to use to
show how computer modeling works.

                          RM: Neither of these models includes

any feedforward, by the way, unless you
think including integrals and derivatives
in the output or perceptual functions of a
control system make it a feedforward
system.

            MT: Since we have long been using prediction as a

synonym for feedforward, I would say that both are
feedforward systems.

          RM: Great! Then let's see how they work. Equations

please!

[From Rick Marken (2014.01.31.1300)]

Martin Taylor (2014.01.30.23.00)

RM: Yes, control always involves control of perception.

MT: For you, one control model that
controls perception is a PCT model, while another control model that
controls perception is not.

RM: No, a non-PCT model is simply one that does not make it clear that
the _type_ of the perception that is under control is the central
concern in the application of control theory to understanding the
controlling done by a control system that has already been built and
it's controlling is quite stable. The type of perception that is
controlled is defined by the nature of the perceptual function. So a
_diagram_ of a control system that doesn't explicitly include a
definition is not a PCT diagram; it's a fine diagram for use by an
engineer who wants to build a control system; but it's misleading for
the psychologist who wants to understand the controlling done by
systems that have already been built.

MT: Also
what we don't agree on is whether "the" PCT model with a straight-through
unity multiplier perceptual function is the same as a model in which the
perceptual function is replaced by a straight-through unity multiplier
connection.

RM: If the perceptual function is not shown explicitly in the diagram
of the model then it's not a PCT model. If a diagram with the unity
multiplied places that multiplier in a perceptual function box then
it's a PCT Model. If it eliminates the perceptual function box and
just let's the observer "assume" that the perceptual function is a
unity mulitplier, then it's not a PCT Model (at least as far as I'm
concern).

RM: Perhaps you could give me the equations for this [feedforward] model and I'lI > see if it works the way you say.

MT: o(t) = leaky_integral(e(t))
e(t) = (r(t)-p(t))
p(t) = s(t) + k*(ds(t)/dt)
s(t) = o(t-lag)+d(t)

RM: Thanks. This is what I thought. This is regular closed-loop
control model that controls the perception s(t) + k*(ds(t)/dt). There
is no feedforward that I can see. I implemented it in a spreadsheet
and it works just fine. Control degrades as the contribution of the
derivative to the perception increases (control is best when k = 0 and
goes down from there). If the derivative is considered the feedforward
component of this model, it actually hurts more than it helps.

Best

Rick

···

Just make sure you get the derivative calculation right. I told you how to
do it the last time we went through this, but you refused to do it right,
and thereby proved that the model was wrong. Remember also that the critical
thing about optimizing k is the relation between the lag and the integration
and leak rates.

This is actually relevant to chapter 1 in LCS III where Bill talks about
testing control theory models by computer modeling. This would be a good
example to use to show how computer modeling works.

RM: Neither of these models includes any feedforward, by the way, unless
you think including integrals and derivatives in the output or perceptual
functions of a control system make it a feedforward system.

MT: Since we have long been using prediction as a synonym for feedforward,
I would say that both are feedforward systems.

RM: Great! Then let's see how they work. Equations please!

The interesting question at this point in the discussion is whether, when k
is optimized, s or p is kept nearer the reference value. It is not (at this
point) how well models with k = 0 and with k optimized fit human data for
various transport lags. That would be of interest later, if and when we do
comparative tests on a variety of PCT models.

--
Richard S. Marken PhD
www.mindreadings.com

The only thing that will redeem mankind is cooperation.
                                                   -- Bertrand Russell

[Martin Taylor 2014.01.31.16.13]

[From Rick Marken (2014.01.31.1300)]

Martin Taylor (2014.01.30.23.00)

RM: Yes, control always involves control of perception.
MT: For you, one control model that
controls perception is a PCT model, while another control model that
controls perception is not.

RM: No, a non-PCT model is simply one that does not make it clear ...

So a model is only as good as its propaganda value?

...So a
_diagram_ of a control system that doesn't explicitly include a
definition is not a PCT diagram;

So a model is the same as a diagram?

MT: Also
what we don't agree on is whether "the" PCT model with a straight-through
unity multiplier perceptual function is the same as a model in which the
perceptual function is replaced by a straight-through unity multiplier
connection.

RM: If the perceptual function is not shown explicitly in the diagram
of the model then it's not a PCT model.

Yes, you make it quite clear that for you a model is a diagram, and vice-versa, and it is irrelevant how the described structure behaves.

For me a model is a behaving functional structure. Its value is in the insight it gives when it is implemented in hardware or software. Whether the diagram is drawn upside-down, sideways, in squiggly lines, or uses one or another pictorial representation of a straight-through unity multiplier is to me irrelevant in evaluating the model as PCT or non-PCT. If you are evaluating the diagram in respect of how someone looking at the diagram would be persuaded that it is perception that is controlled, that's another matter entirely.

RM: Perhaps you could give me the equations for this [feedforward] model and I'lI > see if it works the way you say.
MT: o(t) = leaky_integral(e(t))
e(t) = (r(t)-p(t))
p(t) = s(t) + k*(ds(t)/dt)
s(t) = o(t-lag)+d(t)

RM: Thanks. This is what I thought. This is regular closed-loop
control model that controls the perception s(t) + k*(ds(t)/dt). There
is no feedforward that I can see.

OK, you can avoid the issue by redefining it if you want. Mathematically, it's exactly the same as the version you proposed a long time ago and that we used in the last go-round of this circuit -- the one where the scaled derivative of the perceptual signal is subtracted from the reference signal. That version clearly uses feedforward.

  I implemented it in a spreadsheet
and it works just fine. Control degrades as the contribution of the
derivative to the perception increases (control is best when k = 0 and
goes down from there). If the derivative is considered the feedforward
component of this model, it actually hurts more than it helps.

What values of lag did you use, what values of integrator gain, and what values of leak rate for the integrator? And did you calculate the derivative correctly this time, or did you do it the way you did the last time we went round this loop? Which of s and p stabilized more accurately for the different values of k you tried with this matrix of parameters?

Unquoted from the message to which you are responding:

MT: The interesting question at this point in the discussion is whether, when k
is optimized, s or p is kept nearer the reference value. It is not (at this
point) how well models with k = 0 and with k optimized fit human data for
various transport lags. That would be of interest later, if and when we do
comparative tests on a variety of PCT models.

Martin

[From Rick Marken (2014.01.31.1812)]

Martin Taylor (2014.01.31.16.13)--

RM: This discussion with you and Bruce has been very useful to me.
Thank you. I'll answer a couple things here but I think we can wrap it
up now.

MT: So a model is only as good as its propaganda value?

RM: To the extent that the way the model is described points you in a
particular direction I suppose it is. But it's really the mapping of
model to phenomenon that is important to me here. The PCT model is
certainly a control model like the ones you pointed out. But what's
different about PCT is how the control model is mapped to behavior
compared to how it's mapped to behavior by other psychologists who use
control theory. In non-PCT applications of control theory, for
example, what we call the disturbance variable is treated as a
reference variable. The simultaneous control equations of a non-PCT
control model applied to behavior often look like this:

e = k1*(d-o)
o = k2*e

Here the output,o, is equivalent to the perception in PCT , the
disturbance, d, is equivalent to the reference and error is the cv in
PCT. This is because psychologists using control theory consider error
the input to the human controller and the output is thought of as what
is controlled. So this is a control model and it will work; the
variable o will be kept equal to d (the "reference") and d will look a
lot like the stimulus causing output.

So how you map the model to behavior makes a big difference. The PCT
model of the same situation would look like this (assuming I got the
signs right):

o = k1(r- p)
p = k2(o - d)

This model will also control but now it will be clear that p is the
controlled variable, kept equal to r.

MT: What values of lag did you use, what values of integrator gain, and what
values of leak rate for the integrator?

RM: You wrote the lags in the wrong place; you have current input
being affected by prior output; you have to put the lag in the
perception; output should depend on a lagged value of perception. I
used a couple of different lags -- I don't know what they were in
terms of time; the model isn't that precise yet -- but the lags just
made things worse.

MT: And did you calculate the derivative
correctly this time, or did you do it the way you did the last time we went
round this loop?

RM: I don't know. I just used p(t)-p(t-1)

MT: Which of s and p stabilized more accurately for the
different values of k you tried with this matrix of parameters?

For all values of k other than 0 p was stabilized better than s, which
makes sense since p is the controlled variable. The poorer
stabilization of s results from the increased effect of output
variance on s due to the addition of the derivative to the perception.
Increasing k also makes p less stable but not nearly as much as s.

MT: The interesting question at this point in the discussion is whether,
when k is optimized, s or p is kept nearer the reference value. It is not (at
this point) how well models with k = 0 and with k optimized fit human data for
various transport lags. That would be of interest later, if and when we do
comparative tests on a variety of PCT models.

RM: I don't know what "optimized" would mean here but there is no
question that p is stabilized better than s because p is the
controlled variable.

Anyway, go off and study control whatever what you like. And thanks
for participating in this discussion. I've learned a lot. Hope you
have too. Hope about some comments on LCS III Chapter 1?

Best

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken PhD
www.mindreadings.com

The only thing that will redeem mankind is cooperation.
                                                   -- Bertrand Russell

[Martin Taylor 2014.01.31.22.55]

[From Rick Marken (2014.01.31.1812)]

Martin Taylor (2014.01.31.16.13)--

........

MT: What values of lag did you use, what values of integrator gain, and what
values of leak rate for the integrator?

RM: You wrote the lags in the wrong place; you have current input
being affected by prior output;

That's the correct place. The simulated situation is that the environmental feedback takes time.

  you have to put the lag in the
perception; output should depend on a lagged value of perception.

That's a different problem. If you want to test what happens with that problem, you are perfectly free to do so. Just don't pretend that what you are doing is answering the question originally posed. The difference is that in your problem the output "now" is opposing the disturbance "now". That's not the issue. The question is the effect of prediction if the disturbance "now" is opposed by the output "yesterday".

  I
used a couple of different lags -- I don't know what they were in
terms of time; the model isn't that precise yet -- but the lags just
made things worse.

MT: And did you calculate the derivative
correctly this time, or did you do it the way you did the last time we went
round this loop?

RM: I don't know. I just used p(t)-p(t-1)

Yes, that's what you did the last time around, despite my having told you how you should do it, and having explained to you why this is the wrong thing to do.

Please don't expect me to believe anything you say about your modelling, at least not in this study.

Martin