Wishful thinking

[From Bill Powers (2010.03.31.0844 MDT)]

Bruce Gregory (2010.03.31.0900 EDT) –

BP: OK, with that preamble out
of the way, how about trying to tell me what’s wrong with dualism?

BG:

http://www.wishfulthink.org/page47/page21/page21.html

Well, I’ve sampled it a bit, and it explains a lot. I can even see why
you thought PCT has something to do with your ideas. “Wishful
thinking” can be construed as a version of control-system behavior,
in that we think (and act) as a means of making our experiences match
what we wish to experience. Wishes, of course, are reference signals, and
wish-fulfillment is simply the usual error-correction that all control
systems do. If I wish to type “the” as I just did, the wish is
immediately made real, as we both can see.
In PCT, the pejorative sense of wishful thinking that underlies
everything you say about it could be seen as using imagination in
preference to real-time perception. I can imagine typing “the”
without actually doing so – that is, without producing any actions to
affect my own or anyone else’s perceptions. An imagined perception is, of
course, much easier to control than one that originates in sense-data.
All that’s necessary is to substitute the reference signal into the
perceptual pathways, and from there on up in the hierarchy it’s as if the
desired perception had actually occurred. You can control perceptions in
imagination that you have no way of controlling by acting on the outside
world – dreams of flying without aid are an obvious example.
Controlling imagined perceptions is, of course, useless as a way of
having any effects in the outside world. I can agree with you that this
aspect of wishful thinking is a problem and should be avoided. However,
manipulating imagined perceptions as a way of reaching a goal can also be
extremely useful; it’s called designing or planning. My first big project
at the Dearborn Observatory
led me to spend a lot of time imagining how I would achieve a wish I had
had since my first experience of a fuzzy round black and white television
screen: to put a television camera on a telescope (this was 1961 or so).
Wishful thinking did not cause this wish to be fulfilled, but it did lead
to designs of a rather complicated piece of electronics including a
television camera built from scratch in which the number of scan lines,
the speed of scanning, and the interval between scans could be varied
with precision pots on the control panel, and so on. A lot of features
were imagined before solder was ever melted. The concrete results of this
wishful thinking are still in existence and might even still operate,
though they’ve been superseded by CCD devices.
Your arguments against wishful thinking are well-founded when they
address the attempt to believe that what is actually impossible has been
achieved. I imagine that as a child I heard admonitions against this sort
of thinking almost as often as you did, and ignored them even more often
than you did. But I think I realized earlier than you did that such
admonitions were often just expressions of doubt and attempts to
discourage, disguised as lectures on strength of character. Many people,
like the Wright brothers, have done things in the face of such
discouragment, ignoring the scoffing that they were dreaming of
impossible feats, indulging in wish-fulfilling fantasies, and so on.
Accusations of wishful thinking should not be taken too seriously, since
they quite often only reveal the timidities of the accuser.
In fact, it’s all too easy to use the demonstrable cases of irrational
wishful thinking as an argument against the reality of anything one
doesn’t understand or believe in. The argument is probably used more
often that way than in legitimate cases; it has the advantage that one
doesn’t actually have to have any way of demonstrating that the wishing
is misguided. By attacking the validity of someone else’s thinking, one
can bypass the need for a convincing rebuttal.
In our present discussion, the question relates to consciousness. I
quote, I hope with permission, from your web page:

···

=============================================================================
No discussion of the brain can avoid the most obvious result of the
activities of the brain­consciousness. Countless books have been written
on the subject of consciousness. I will make only one observation. No one
has the slightest clue as to how the workings of the brain lead to
conscious awareness. No one. The question is so baffling that it is not
even clear what an answer might look like. What kind of story would
constitute a convincing solution to “the problem of consciousness?” It is
hard, not to say impossible, to imagine. With understanding the origin of
consciousness, we may have reached the limits of our ability to concoct
convincing stories.

I definitely agree with this:"No one has the slightest clue as to
how the workings of the brain lead to conscious awareness. "
However, we don’t even know IF consciousness is a brain function, which
you seem to assume without proof when you ask how it could arise from
brain function. And of course the same goes for the origin of
consciousness. One of my main points has been that we don’t know these
things, but of course that’s not what we’re arguing about. We’re arguing
about whether consciousness exists, whether we can explain it or not. I
claim, quite consciously, that it does exist. You appear to be claiming,
quite consciously and somewhat paradoxically, that it doesn’t – that
it’s just a story concocted to convince – well, that’s the question,
isn’t it? Just who is making up this story, and whom is it supposed to
convince? If there are just neural circuits converting inputs into
outputs, as you appear to be proposing in various parts of your web page,
there is nobody to be convinced in there but a collection of neurons
which are operated by chemical reactions. If your arguments convince that
collection, then they do, and if they don’t, they don’t. It doesn’t
matter which happens; the outcome is determined by physiology and
chemistry, not by truth or falsehood. By your own hypotheses, the brain
can convince itself of falsehoods, but under your apparent model, so
what?
Here’s some more:

There is nothing wrong with thinking there is a “ghost in the machine,”
so long as we keep in mind the fact that the ghost’s knowledge is limited
to what the machine tells it. A further limit to the ghost’s power is
also important; the ghost apparently has no ability to tell the machine
what to do, although the ghost thinks it is in charge.

The first sentence is exactly my view: the ghost in the machine, which I
call awareness, knows nothing but what is represented by perceptual
signals in the machine. The objects of awareness are perceptual signals.
To awareness, perceptual signals look like a real three-dimensional world
complete with sound, smell, color, and so on. Nobody has ever found those
features of the world in neural signals, but there they are.
The second sentence is not self-evidently true, because of the phenomenon
of volitional action. There’s some circumstantial evidence that awareness
is accompanied by the ability to alter things in the hierarchy; an
ability modeled in PCT as the reorganizing system. However, the ghost as
I experience it doesn’t think. It can observe thoughts, but the thoughts
are activities in the machine, the brain: specifically, imagined
perceptul signals. These words you are reading are being organized by and
in the machine, as the ghost attempts to reorganize the machine to bring
its operation into harmony with the fact that the ghost exists, and to
get the “I” in the machine to realize that it is not,
ultimately, in charge. I, here in the machine, have realized that I do
not reorganize myself. I am a bit humbler than I used to be.
All this spooky stuff no doubt raises hackles about mysticism and
theology, which are echoes of the days of Descartes. Mysticism and
theology are attempts to avoid saying “I don’t know,” but I
don’t use that way out. I just don’t know what awareness is: like you, I
really and truly don’t even know what to guess. All I have is the
phenomenon, and a few observations about how it relates to other
experiences. And a mental model, of course, since I’m a model fan. But I
have no prejudices about the actual nature of awareness. I just don’t
know.
I can understand how wrestling with these experiences can make a
scientist nervous. The danger of lapsing back into religious explanations
seems reason enough just to stay away, not to go there. I recommend a
thorough exposure to science fiction as a way of curing the anxiety.
Eddington said that the universe is not only stranger than we imagine,
but stranger than we can imagine. Science fiction, however, makes
a pretty good try at imagining things we have yet to discover in reality.
And the things it imagines are not scenes of angels floating around in
Heaven while some white-haired God smiles at some of them and calmly
sends others to be tortured forever. The whole point of science fiction
is to encourage the suspension of disbelief, by presenting
magical-seeming phenomena as taken-for-granted aspects of ordinary life
in some other or some future world. The teleporter is housed in some
other world’s spittoons, and matter-to-energy converters power
toothbrushes. The whole message is that there’s nothing to be afraid of,
or worship, in innovations. A true science-fiction fan loves to find
things he or she doesn’t understand. Not understanding isn’t a threat;
it’s a promise.

Best,

Bill P.

[From Bruce Gregory (2010.03.31.1635 EDT)]

[From Bill Powers (2010.03.31.0844 MDT)]

Well, I've sampled it a bit, and it explains a lot. I can even see why you thought PCT has something to do with your ideas. "Wishful thinking" can be construed as a version of control-system behavior, in that we think (and act) as a means of making our experiences match what we wish to experience. Wishes, of course, are reference signals, and wish-fulfillment is simply the usual error-correction that all control systems do. If I wish to type "the" as I just did, the wish is immediately made real, as we both can see.

BG: The present financial meltdown stemmed from people imagining that they could control their wealth by buying financial instruments that were rated as AAA but in fact were potentially (and in many cases actually) worthless. They ignored evidence that the instruments were "financial weapons of mass destruction" and drastically mispriced risk. That's the kind of thing I mean by wishful thinking. Once we have made up our minds it is very easy to ignore evidence we really don't want to see.

I definitely agree with this:"No one has the slightest clue as to how the workings of the brain lead to conscious awareness. " However, we don't even know IF consciousness is a brain function, which you seem to assume without proof when you ask how it could arise from brain function.

BG: This is certainly an assumption, but I think it is the only assumption one can make within the current scientific worldview. Only when we encounter evidence that conflicts with this assumption are we likely to seek alternatives. (I can imagine one such alternative. Consciousness is a field like other quantum fields. So far all efforts to show that such a field interacts with the fields physics studies have come up empty (PK, Telepathy, Distance Viewing).) The same reasoning applies to volitional action. Here there is evidence that the brain initiates a motor act before the subject becomes aware that he has decided to act.

And of course the same goes for the origin of consciousness. One of my main points has been that we don't know these things, but of course that's not what we're arguing about. We're arguing about whether consciousness exists, whether we can explain it or not. I claim, quite consciously, that it does exist. You appear to be claiming, quite consciously and somewhat paradoxically, that it doesn't -- that it's just a story concocted to convince -- well, that's the question, isn't it?

BG: I can see that I have not been very clear. I am not arguing that consciousness does not exist. I guess I am arguing that it is an epiphenomenon. We can understand behavior without invoking a consciousness capable of causing anything to occur. This seems to me to be consistent with PCT.

Just who is making up this story, and whom is it supposed to convince? If there are just neural circuits converting inputs into outputs, as you appear to be proposing in various parts of your web page, there is nobody to be convinced in there but a collection of neurons which are operated by chemical reactions. If your arguments convince that collection, then they do, and if they don't, they don't. It doesn't matter which happens; the outcome is determined by physiology and chemistry, not by truth or falsehood. By your own hypotheses, the brain can convince itself of falsehoods, but under your apparent model, so what?

BG: I think it is important to realize that we can be mistaken. I cannot make anyone examine their beliefs. They either see the problem or they don't. I suspect the process involves pattern recognition. I can tell you there is a pattern, but you must see it for yourself.

Here's some more:

There is nothing wrong with thinking there is a �ghost in the machine,� so long as we keep in mind the fact that the ghost�s knowledge is limited to what the machine tells it. A further limit to the ghost�s power is also important; the ghost apparently has no ability to tell the machine what to do, although the ghost thinks it is in charge.

The first sentence is exactly my view: the ghost in the machine, which I call awareness, knows nothing but what is represented by perceptual signals in the machine. The objects of awareness are perceptual signals. To awareness, perceptual signals look like a real three-dimensional world complete with sound, smell, color, and so on. Nobody has ever found those features of the world in neural signals, but there they are.

The second sentence is not self-evidently true, because of the phenomenon of volitional action. There's some circumstantial evidence that awareness is accompanied by the ability to alter things in the hierarchy; an ability modeled in PCT as the reorganizing system.

BG: I think the evidence supports the claim, as you recently suggested, that awareness (or attention) goes to where reorganization is occurring. If control is working, there is no need for attention. Awareness is a very narrow channel. We seem to be aware of a great deal, but a variety of studies demonstrates that we can only attend to a very limited number of things at any given time.

However, the ghost as I experience it doesn't think. It can observe thoughts, but the thoughts are activities in the machine, the brain: specifically, imagined perceptul signals. These words you are reading are being organized by and in the machine, as the ghost attempts to reorganize the machine to bring its operation into harmony with the fact that the ghost exists, and to get the "I" in the machine to realize that it is not, ultimately, in charge. I, here in the machine, have realized that I do not reorganize myself. I am a bit humbler than I used to be.

All this spooky stuff no doubt raises hackles about mysticism and theology, which are echoes of the days of Descartes. Mysticism and theology are attempts to avoid saying "I don't know," but I don't use that way out. I just don't know what awareness is: like you, I really and truly don't even know what to guess. All I have is the phenomenon, and a few observations about how it relates to other experiences. And a mental model, of course, since I'm a model fan. But I have no prejudices about the actual nature of awareness. I just don't know.

BG: I don't know either. Thanks for looking at the site.

Bruce

[From Rick Marken (2010.03.31.1615)]

Bill Powers (2010.03.31.0844 MDT)--

I definitely agree with this:"No one has the slightest clue as to how the
workings of the brain lead to conscious awareness. " However, we don't even
know IF consciousness is a brain function

Having been under a total anesthetic a couple of times I'm convinced
that consciousness has something to do with the brain. As I recall,
being under a total wasn't like being asleep (which seems like another
conscious state to me); it was like nothing at all, literally. I was
counting backwards and then I was being told that everything was done.
Doesn't that suggest to you that consciousness has something to do
with the brain?

Best

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken PhD
rsmarken@gmail.com
www.mindreadings.com

[From Rick Marken (2010.03.31.1650)]

Bruce Gregory (2010.03.31.1635 EDT)--

BG: I can see that I have not been very clear. I am not arguing that consciousness
does not exist. I guess I am arguing that it is an epiphenomenon. We can understand
behavior without invoking a consciousness capable of causing anything to occur. This
seems to me to be consistent with PCT.

The evolutionist in me just can't accept the idea that consciousness
is an epiphenomenon. It must have some adaptive significance,
otherwise why have it? Just to give theologians something to do? So I
also find it hard to believe that consciousness suddenly "emerged" in
humans. I think it must have started way down the ancestral chain. But
of course this is just a belief (possibly wishful thinking) that can
only be tested if we could figure out how to detect consciousness in
the behavior of organisms that can't talk about it, as we can.

I agree that most behavior can be understood without "invoking"
consciousness. One of the (many) nice things about PCT is that it
allows us to understand the difference between purpose and
consciousness. These two concepts are often conflated; doing something
"on purpose" is typically confounded with doing something
"consciously". PCT shows that all behavior is purposeful and most of
it is happening outside of consciousness. But some behavior is both
purposeful and conscious; in PCT this is called _volitional_ behavior.
We can know (as actors) when our behavior is volitonal but right now I
don't think we have a good basis for discriminating purposeful
behavior done unconsciously from that done consciously just by
observing it in others. I think we might be getting at a way to make
this distinction objectively by looking for evidence of
"reorganization" in behavior, as in one of my favorite PCT studies:
Robertson, R. J., & Glines, L. A. (1985). The phantom plateau returns.
Perceptual and Motor Skills, 61, 55-64. Consciousness is involved, at
least in theory, when the system is reorganizing. So maybe looking for
evidence of reorganization is a way to study consciousness in
non-verbal organisms.

Best

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken PhD
rsmarken@gmail.com
www.mindreadings.com

[From Bruce Gregory (2010.03.31.2025 EDT)]

[From Rick Marken (2010.03.31.1650)]

Bruce Gregory (2010.03.31.1635 EDT)–

BG: I can see that I have not been very clear. I am not arguing that consciousness
does not exist. I guess I am arguing that it is an epiphenomenon. We can understand
behavior without invoking a consciousness capable of causing anything to occur. This
seems to me to be consistent with PCT.

RM: So maybe looking for
evidence of reorganization is a way to study consciousness in
non-verbal organisms.

BG: Interesting. But does this imply that e-coli are conscious?

Bruce

[From Rick Marken (2010.03.31.1820)]

Bruce Gregory (2010.03.31.2025 EDT)]

Rick Marken (2010.03.31.1650)]

RM: So maybe looking for
evidence of reorganization is a way to study consciousness in
non-verbal organisms.

BG: Interesting. But does this imply that e-coli are conscious?

Good question. Actually, I do think it's possible that E. coli has
consciousness (if it does it doesn't have much to be conscious of; not
much of a hierarchy in there; two levels tops, I'd guess)> But I don't
think that because of E. coli's method of navigating. The E. coli
bacteria is not reorganizing when it uses the E. coli method of
navigation -- the length of the interval between tumbles to a new
random direction being directly related to the size of the sensed
nutrient gradient through which it is moveing. What E. coli is doing
is controlling it's perception of nutrient gradient (and as a side
effect, it's movement toward the nutrient source) even though it can't
steer; it's direction of motion after a tumble (output) is random.
This E. coli approach to control is called "reorganization" when it is
used to control the error in other control systems by randomly varying
the parameters of these system. I'm guessing that consciousness is an
aspect of this process, possibly in terms of which control systems
become the focus of reorganization (so consciousness might somehow
direct this reorganization process to where in the hierarchy it is
"needed").

Best

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken PhD
rsmarken@gmail.com
www.mindreadings.com

[From Bill Powers (2010.03.31.1905 MDT)]

Bruce Gregory (2010.03.31.1635 EDT) --

BG: The present financial meltdown stemmed from people imagining that they could control their wealth by buying financial instruments that were rated as AAA but in fact were potentially (and in many cases actually) worthless. They ignored evidence that the instruments were "financial weapons of mass destruction" and drastically mispriced risk. That's the kind of thing I mean by wishful thinking. Once we have made up our minds it is very easy to ignore evidence we really don't want to see.

BP: "Ignoring" something is an odd concept; it seems to be used to mean that one is conscious of the thing to be ignored and chooses not to be conscious of it. What about the cases where innocent but ignorant people simply made a mistake? But I understand what you mean; it's another case of substituting a wish (a reference signal) for something perceived.

BP previously:" I definitely agree with this:"No one has the slightest clue as to how the workings of the brain lead to conscious awareness. " However, we don't even know IF consciousness is a brain function, which you seem to assume without proof when you ask how it could arise from brain function.

BG: This is certainly an assumption, but I think it is the only assumption one can make within the current scientific worldview.

BP: Why make any assumption? When you accept something as true without evidence, isn't that called faith or belief? I don't see anything wrong with just withholding judgment. The current scientific worldview will be very out of date in a hundred years, I would guess. Why take the side of the losers? Remember the ludicrous figure of Priestley on his death-bed declaring his unshakeable faith in phlogiston.

BG: Only when we encounter evidence that conflicts with this assumption are we likely to seek alternatives. (I can imagine one such alternative. Consciousness is a field like other quantum fields. So far all efforts to show that such a field interacts with the fields physics studies have come up empty (PK, Telepathy, Distance Viewing).)

BP: You're leaving out a whole type of evidence: subjective experience. Science has to account for that, too, and in fact scientific evidence always comes down to a human observer and direct subjective experience. It's legitimate to ask other people what they experience and compare the answers (as best you can) with your own -- just as legitimate as it would be to ask another person to read the meter you're looking at and tell you what reading he sees there. Comparison of subject experiences through communication was how John Dalton finally discovered color blindness (once the mysterious inconsistencies among color-names were seen as evidence).

BG: The same reasoning applies to volitional action. Here there is evidence that the brain initiates a motor act before the subject becomes aware that he has decided to act.

BP: That evidence doesn't take the hierarchy into account; neuroscience tends to treat all experiences as if they happened at the same level. Naturally, if a person waits until perception of the start of an effort occurs to say he has decided something, or if there's a delay between perceiving something and reporting it, or if we simply can't perceive reference signals directly, the change in reference level will occur before the report of the change in perception occurs. Anyway, if my ideas about consciousness are correct, awareness is selective and mobile, and does not receive information from everywhere in the brain at the same time. What if the instructions are "Press the button when you have decided which action you will produce, then wait for the light to come on and produce it as quickly afterward as you can." If you don't provide a way to distinguish a decision to act in a certain way from the actual initiation of the act, the results are likely to be confusing. As far as I have seen, neuroscience doesn't make that distinction.

BG: I can see that I have not been very clear. I am not arguing that consciousness does not exist. I guess I am arguing that it is an epiphenomenon. We can understand behavior without invoking a consciousness capable of causing anything to occur. This seems to me to be consistent with PCT.

BP: You're right that we can understand behavior without involving conciousness. None of my PCT models has any consciousness. But we can't understand control of perception just by watching behavior. I have, as you know, shown that there is a difference between perception and awareness, so even perception can happen without consciousness, but consciousness can't happen without consciousness.

The definitions of "epiphenomenon" I have seen say it is "a secondary phenomenon that is a by-product of another phenomenon" and things like that. The implication is that epiphenomena are effects, not causes of anything, so feelings of having consciously initiated any sort of behavior or other experience are thereby pronounced to be illusions. For no good reason that I can see except to give the appearance of backing up the conclusion that consciousness can't cause anything if that's how you want it to come out.
Speaking of wishful thinking. And of course anyone who claims that this conclusion is wrong is accused of wishful thinking. It seems to be extraordinarily important to some people to do away with the ideas of awareness and volition. Those concepts must threaten some vital assumption that isn't being discussed.

I've never understood how anyone could make such a self-defeating argument. If awareness and volition can't cause anything, then all apparently conscious processes, such as reasoning, are merely side-effects of no significance. The 11740only causes that are left to make any difference are those initiated by the external world or by inherited tendencies beyond conscious control. However, accepting that conclusion cancels the conscious reasoning that led to it and resets the argument to where it began. Stating a conclusion would be an effect of conscious reasoning, so if conscious reasoning is rejected as a possible cause, so is the conclusion.

BG: I think it is important to realize that we can be mistaken. I cannot make anyone examine their beliefs. They either see the problem or they don't. I suspect the process involves pattern recognition. I can tell you there is a pattern, but you must see it for yourself.

BP: Why must I see it -- consciously, I presume -- for myself? If what I experience consciously is an epiphenomenon, the experience of seeing the pattern can play no causal role in my behavior or my thoughts, and can make no difference in what I do next (except perhaps to make me feel stupid as I keep doing the same obviously wrong thing again and again as a result of causes I am unable to affect consciously).

I think that what may have happened here is that in some very subtle way, a circularity in the arguments about consciousness has crept in, unnoticed. This has the result of making statements like "consciousness is an epiphenomenon" (which I know were fomulated long ago and are not your fault) seem to make perfect sense to people who don't want consciousness to play any active role, and sound like nonsense to everyone else.

This is the sort of thing that makes, has always made, scientific progress difficult. All we can do about that is keep trying to ferret out mistakes and be willing to abandon them when found.

Best,

Bill P.

[From Bruce Gregory (2010.04.01.0733 EDT)]

[From Bill Powers (2010.03.31.1905 MDT)]

Bruce Gregory (2010.03.31.1635 EDT) –

BG: The present financial meltdown stemmed from people imagining that they could control their wealth by buying financial instruments that were rated as AAA but in fact were potentially (and in many cases actually) worthless. They ignored evidence that the instruments were “financial weapons of mass destruction” and drastically mispriced risk. That’s the kind of thing I mean by wishful thinking. Once we have made up our minds it is very easy to ignore evidence we really don’t want to see.

BP previously:" I definitely agree with this:"No one has the slightest clue as to how the workings of the brain lead to conscious awareness. " However, we don’t even know IF consciousness is a brain function, which you seem to assume without proof when you ask how it could arise from brain function.

BG: This is certainly an assumption, but I think it is the only assumption one can make within the current scientific worldview.

BP: Why make any assumption? When you accept something as true without evidence, isn’t that called faith or belief? I don’t see anything wrong with just withholding judgment. The current scientific worldview will be very out of date in a hundred years, I would guess. Why take the side of the losers? Remember the ludicrous figure of Priestley on his death-bed declaring his unshakeable faith in phlogiston.

BG: Perhaps for the same reason you assume all behavior is closed-loop. It’s a working hypothesis.

BG: Only when we encounter evidence that conflicts with this assumption are we likely to seek alternatives. (I can imagine one such alternative. Consciousness is a field like other quantum fields. So far all efforts to show that such a field interacts with the fields physics studies have come up empty (PK, Telepathy, Distance Viewing).)

BP: You’re leaving out a whole type of evidence: subjective experience. Science has to account for that, too, and in fact scientific evidence always comes down to a human observer and direct subjective experience. It’s legitimate to ask other people what they experience and compare the answers (as best you can) with your own – just as legitimate as it would be to ask another person to read the meter you’re looking at and tell you what reading he sees there. Comparison of subject experiences through communication was how John Dalton finally discovered color blindness (once the mysterious inconsistencies among color-names were seen as evidence).

BG: I agree that what humans say is important. The problem with subjective experience is that it can lead to unwarranted conclusions. Think of the hundreds of millions of people who “know” there is a God because they have experienced his love, or grace, or some such. I can’t disprove they have had an experience. I simply interpret it as the result of activity in the brain rather than divine inspiration.

BG: The same reasoning applies to volitional action. Here there is evidence that the brain initiates a motor act before the subject becomes aware that he has decided to act.

BP: That evidence doesn’t take the hierarchy into account; neuroscience tends to treat all experiences as if they happened at the same level. Naturally, if a person waits until perception of the start of an effort occurs to say he has decided something, or if there’s a delay between perceiving something and reporting it, or if we simply can’t perceive reference signals directly, the change in reference level will occur before the report of the change in perception occurs. Anyway, if my ideas about consciousness are correct, awareness is selective and mobile, and does not receive information from everywhere in the brain at the same time.

BG: I agree. I think most neuroscientists would also agree.

What if the instructions are “Press the button when you have decided which action you will produce, then wait for the light to come on and produce it as quickly afterward as you can.” If you don’t provide a way to distinguish a decision to act in a certain way from the actual initiation of the act, the results are likely to be confusing. As far as I have seen, neuroscience doesn’t make that distinction.

BG: One way the experiment was carried out, if I recall properly, was by having the subject note the time when he or she decided to press the button. Activity in the premotor cortex typically preceded this decision by 500 msec. I suspect one could come with an explanation for this delay if one really wanted to.

BG: I can see that I have not been very clear. I am not arguing that consciousness does not exist. I guess I am arguing that it is an epiphenomenon. We can understand behavior without invoking a consciousness capable of causing anything to occur. This seems to me to be consistent with PCT.

BP: You’re right that we can understand behavior without involving conciousness. None of my PCT models has any consciousness. But we can’t understand control of perception just by watching behavior. I have, as you know, shown that there is a difference between perception and awareness, so even perception can happen without consciousness, but consciousness can’t happen without consciousness.

BG: I’m afraid you lost me there.

BP: The definitions of “epiphenomenon” I have seen say it is “a secondary phenomenon that is a by-product of another phenomenon” and things like that. The implication is that epiphenomena are effects, not causes of anything, so feelings of having consciously initiated any sort of behavior or other experience are thereby pronounced to be illusions. For no good reason that I can see except to give the appearance of backing up the conclusion that consciousness can’t cause anything if that’s how you want it to come out.
Speaking of wishful thinking. And of course anyone who claims that this conclusion is wrong is accused of wishful thinking. It seems to be extraordinarily important to some people to do away with the ideas of awareness and volition. Those concepts must threaten some vital assumption that isn’t being discussed.

BG: Here is an analogy. The thermostat becomes aware that the room has gotten cold. It decides to act. It exercises its volition and turns the furnace on. As far as I can tell there is nothing wrong with that description. It works. Does denying that the thermostat is aware, decides to act, and then does so, threaten some vital assumption that isn’t being discussed? I don’t think so. We simply apply Ockham’s razor and eliminate the story when talking about a thermostat. There’s nothing wrong with the story. It simply adds nothing to our ability to predict the behavior of the thermostat.

I’ve never understood how anyone could make such a self-defeating argument. If awareness and volition can’t cause anything, then all apparently conscious processes, such as reasoning, are merely side-effects of no significance.

BG: It depends on what you mean by “no significance.” We perceive light with a certain range of wavelengths as “red.” Is that of no significance? Perhaps to a physicist constructing a photometer, but it is “significant” to the rest of us. It is the way we experience photons of a certain energy. Is beauty of no significance? Our subjective impressions are very important to us, but that does not mean that they have no physical correlates.

The 11740only causes that are left to make any difference are those initiated by the external world or by inherited tendencies beyond conscious control. However, accepting that conclusion cancels the conscious reasoning that led to it and resets the argument to where it began. Stating a conclusion would be an effect of conscious reasoning, so if conscious reasoning is rejected as a possible cause, so is the conclusion.

BG: It seems to me that the important thing is the reasoning, not whether or not it was conscious. When TurboTax tells we what my tax refund is, I don’t reject it because the program is not conscious.

BG: I think it is important to realize that we can be mistaken. I cannot make anyone examine their beliefs. They either see the problem or they don’t. I suspect the process involves pattern recognition. I can tell you there is a pattern, but you must see it for yourself.

BP: Why must I see it – consciously, I presume – for myself? If what I experience consciously is an epiphenomenon, the experience of seeing the pattern can play no causal role in my behavior or my thoughts, and can make no difference in what I do next (except perhaps to make me feel stupid as I keep doing the same obviously wrong thing again and again as a result of causes I am unable to affect consciously).

BG: I don’t think pattern recognition needs to be conscious. If you think of an auto-associative memory, you can imagine the process without any conscious recognition. I suspect that the conscious recognition comes after the pattern has been activated.

I think that what may have happened here is that in some very subtle way, a circularity in the arguments about consciousness has crept in, unnoticed. This has the result of making statements like “consciousness is an epiphenomenon” (which I know were fomulated long ago and are not your fault) seem to make perfect sense to people who don’t want consciousness to play any active role, and sound like nonsense to everyone else.

BG: I don’t “want” consciousness not to play an active role, I just can’t find any evidence that it does. In the same way, I can’t find any evidence that the world would work any differently if I discovered that what I perceive as red, you perceive as green. If you are really really fond of talking about consciousness, why not invoke the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics? As I understand the story, the so-called “collapse of the state vector” only happens when consciousness observes the outcome of an experiment. This is still referred to as the “orthodox interpretation.” It is a story, but not one that plays a role in the everyday practices of physicists.

This is the sort of thing that makes, has always made, scientific progress difficult. All we can do about that is keep trying to ferret out mistakes and be willing to abandon them when found.

Indeed. (And no, this is not an April fool’s joke!)

Bruce

[From Bruce Gregory (2010.04.01.1000 EDT)]

[From Rick Marken (2010.03.31.1820)]

Good question. Actually, I do think it’s possible that E. coli has
consciousness (if it does it doesn’t have much to be conscious of; not
much of a hierarchy in there; two levels tops, I’d guess)> But I don’t
think that because of E. coli’s method of navigating. The E. coli
bacteria is not reorganizing when it uses the E. coli method of
navigation – the length of the interval between tumbles to a new
random direction being directly related to the size of the sensed
nutrient gradient through which it is moveing. What E. coli is doing
is controlling it’s perception of nutrient gradient (and as a side
effect, it’s movement toward the nutrient source) even though it can’t
steer; it’s direction of motion after a tumble (output) is random.
This E. coli approach to control is called “reorganization” when it is
used to control the error in other control systems by randomly varying
the parameters of these system. I’m guessing that consciousness is an
aspect of this process, possibly in terms of which control systems
become the focus of reorganization (so consciousness might somehow
direct this reorganization process to where in the hierarchy it is
“needed”).

Thanks for the clarification. My guess would be that the hierarchy “knows” where reorganization is needed and that persistent error activates attention circuits. But that’s just a guess.

Bruce

[From Rick Marken (2010.04.01.0840)]

Bruce Gregory (2010.04.01.1000 EDT)--

Rick Marken (2010.03.31.1820)]

RM: This E. coli approach to control is called "reorganization" when it is
used to control the error in other control systems by randomly varying
the parameters of these system. ..

Thanks for the clarification. My guess would be that the hierarchy "knows"
where reorganization is needed and that persistent error activates attention
circuits. But that's just a guess.

How does the hierarchy "know" this about itself? What do "attention"
circuits have to do with it? It's hard to tell, from these words, how
you think reorganization works.

One reason I think we have so much difficulty coming to any agreement
about things (other than politics and religion) is that your
theorizing tends to be done in terms of words (perhaps that's why you
like the idea of "stories" so much) while I prefer theorizing in terms
of mechanism. In both cases our theories are just guesses but I prefer
the mechanistic kind (like PCT) because such guesses can be tested
more precisely. And as you know (from my hobby horse) testing theories
against empirical data is what I find to be the most exciting aspect
of science.

Best

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken PhD
rsmarken@gmail.com
www.mindreadings.com

[From Bruce Gregory (2010.04.01.1410 EDT)]

[From Rick Marken (2010.04.01.0840)]

Bruce Gregory (2010.04.01.1000 EDT)–

Rick Marken (2010.03.31.1820)]

RM: This E. coli approach to control is called “reorganization” when it is
used to control the error in other control systems by randomly varying
the parameters of these system. …

Thanks for the clarification. My guess would be that the hierarchy “knows”
where reorganization is needed and that persistent error activates attention
circuits. But that’s just a guess.

How does the hierarchy “know” this about itself? What do “attention”
circuits have to do with it? It’s hard to tell, from these words, how
you think reorganization works.

One reason I think we have so much difficulty coming to any agreement
about things (other than politics and religion) is that your
theorizing tends to be done in terms of words (perhaps that’s why you
like the idea of “stories” so much) while I prefer theorizing in terms
of mechanism. In both cases our theories are just guesses but I prefer
the mechanistic kind (like PCT) because such guesses can be tested
more precisely. And as you know (from my hobby horse) testing theories
against empirical data is what I find to be the most exciting aspect
of science.

I’m a bit surprised that you have no trouble understanding Bill. He constantly invokes unmodeled explanations such as observers that somehow interact with the control hierarchy. I suspect the problem is that fact that I don’t use “PCTspeak.” Let me try again. Reorganization occurs when there are persistent errors. Attention occurs where error are greatest. In this sense, attention “follows” reorganization. Is that any better?

Bruce

[From Rick Marken (2010.04.01.2250)]

Bruce Gregory (2010.04.01.1410 EDT)--

Rick Marken (2010.04.01.0840)--

RM: One reason I think we have so much difficulty coming to any agreement
about things (other than politics and religion) is that your
theorizing tends to be done in terms of words (perhaps that's why you
like the idea of "stories" so much) while I prefer theorizing in terms
of mechanism...

I'm a bit surprised that you have no trouble understanding Bill. He
constantly invokes unmodeled explanations such as observers that somehow
interact with the control hierarchy. I suspect the problem is that fact that
I don't use "PCTspeak."

No, actually there is always a model behind what Bill says. That's why
I can understand Bill so well, even when he describes his ideas in
words.There is a long history of modeling behind our interactions; I
learned PCT by building models and testing them, often together with
Bill. This infrastructure of modeling supports all of my discussions
about PCT. When Bill or I do have questions about the meaning and
implications of the words we say we will implement those ideas as
models to see what actually happens. Modeling is the basis of
everything I do in PCT.

Bill never invokes unmodeled explanations, as far as I know, because
there is no such thing; if it hasn't been modeled then it hasn't been
explained. As far as observers interacting with the hierarchy, for
example, one aspect of this has been modeled; the reorganization
system, which is an "observer" control system monitoring error in the
hierarchy and adjusting the parameters, using the E. coli approach, to
reduce it. The model is described in LCS III (Ch. 7)/ The other things
Bill has said about the interaction of observer and the hierarchy,
such as the idea that awareness is focused where error is large, are
observations, not explanation.

Let me try again.�Reorganization occurs when there
are persistent errors. Attention occurs where error are greatest. In this
sense, attention "follows" reorganization. Is that any better?

Sounds like PCT, except that we assume that reorganization is always
happening, the rate of reorganization being proportional to the size
of the error in a control system. But if you want it to be all or
none, then lets see if that works any better than our constant
reorganization model. What you say about attention sounds like the
kind of observation Bill has made (though it would be error and not
reorganization that is followed), not an explanation.

Best

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken PhD
rsmarken@gmail.com
www.mindreadings.com

[From Bruce Gregory (2010.04.02.0657 EDT)]

[From Rick Marken (2010.04.01.2250)]

Bill never invokes unmodeled explanations, as far as I know, because
there is no such thing; if it hasn’t been modeled then it hasn’t been
explained. As far as observers interacting with the hierarchy, for

example, one aspect of this has been modeled; the reorganization
system, which is an “observer” control system monitoring error in the
hierarchy and adjusting the parameters, using the E. coli approach, to
reduce it. The model is described in LCS III (Ch. 7)/ The other things
Bill has said about the interaction of observer and the hierarchy,
such as the idea that awareness is focused where error is large, are
observations, not explanation.

Very helpful. I can see that many of the things I thought Bill was trying to explain, he was simply offering as observations. I will do my best to avoid commenting on observations, since that activity usually proves unproductive. If I have a conjecture that has not been modeled (as most of my conjectures have not) I will try to remember to label it an observation.

Bruce

[From Rick Marken (2010.04.02.0915)]

Bruce Gregory (2010.04.02.0657 EDT)--

Very helpful. I can see that many of the things I thought Bill was trying to
explain, he was simply offering as observations. I will do my best to avoid
commenting on observations, since that activity usually proves
unproductive.�If I have a conjecture that has not been modeled (as most of
my conjectures have not) I will try to remember to label it an observation.

I think it would be far more valuable if you would try to formulate
your explanations in the form of models. It would help me understand
what you are talking about and I suspect it might help you to realize
that some of your explanations are not very explanatory (in the sense
that much is being taken for granted).

Best

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken PhD
rsmarken@gmail.com
www.mindreadings.com

[From Bruce Gregory (2010.04.02.1340 EDT)]

[From Rick Marken (2010.04.02.0915)]

Bruce Gregory (2010.04.02.0657 EDT)–

Very helpful. I can see that many of the things I thought Bill was trying to
explain, he was simply offering as observations. I will do my best to avoid
commenting on observations, since that activity usually proves
unproductive. If I have a conjecture that has not been modeled (as most of
my conjectures have not) I will try to remember to label it an observation.

I think it would be far more valuable if you would try to formulate
your explanations in the form of models. It would help me understand
what you are talking about and I suspect it might help you to realize
that some of your explanations are not very explanatory (in the sense
that much is being taken for granted).

BG: I’m afraid that I have very few explanations. Mostly stories. Sorry.

Bruce

[From Rick Marken (2010.04.02.1110)]

Bruce Gregory (2010.04.02.1340 EDT)--

BG: I'm afraid that I have very few explanations. Mostly stories. Sorry.

Well, if your stories are as good as the Wife of Bath's Tale then you
have nothing to apologize for. But Iif stories is what you've got
you're probably better off on the literature lists. We do science over
here; the stories are for recreation.

Best

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken PhD
rsmarken@gmail.com
www.mindreadings.com

[From Bruce Gregory (2010.04.02.1447 EDT)]

[From Rick Marken (2010.04.02.1110)]

Bruce Gregory (2010.04.02.1340 EDT)–

BG: I’m afraid that I have very few explanations. Mostly stories. Sorry.

Well, if your stories are as good as the Wife of Bath’s Tale then you
have nothing to apologize for. But Iif stories is what you’ve got
you’re probably better off on the literature lists. We do science over
here; the stories are for recreation.

Thanks. It has been most enlightening.

Bruce