without superfluous "i"'s

[Myrexsw]

i.kurtzer (971113)

sorry the stop-gap has been so long.
here's the lastest round on the uselessness of "i"'s which as anyone might
remember began with my gripe to Rick and Bruce G. to not reify "i"'s.

this was in direct response to bill p.

me:

how that unity of

experience, the steam, is AFTERWARDS TALKED into two, the me and the > >

other, the subject and object , or reified into "things" like self or soul

is a mistake.

bill:

At that level of discourse about all I can say is "No, it's not a mistake,
so there."

What level of discourse? What i'm doing is first answering that persons can
make mistakes even with regard to how they _consider_ their experiences. That
is, they can and do talk differently and wrongly about something true and
common . If not then why have philosophers disagreed so far??? the only other
possibility to the humble admittance of being sloppy and forgettful is to
captiulate to han's world models and a philosophy of utter arbirtarism. That
is not acceptable.

  >"Absurd" means "it makes no sense to me in terms of my premises." If a

person is told that something he says is absurd, he is being told he's too
stupid to see the absurdity for himself. The use of this term usually
indicates a strong conviction on the part of its user that the user can't
defend.

If i came across as an a-hole i apologize. In fact, for myself intelligence is
moot to good philosophy. Only an _unwillingness_ to step further is needed
while still capturing the fullness of our lives. The ghost-agent "i" is for
me just such a bad step. If it only means personal, then o.k. we can all
identify persons, or if it only means one other kind of experience then o.k.
we can all identify certain kinds, but as a reason or as a something extra
beyond a kind of experience i say you've stepped too far. I qualify the
absurd with "as if" but "as if" is also "is not".

All you can say is _what is experienced_.

but this has to be done very carefully as we can see how much philosophy has
improved over two thousand years.

Your thoughts say to you, "There is NO awareness, no Observer of the
Observed." I'm sure you are aware of such thoughts. You could also think,
"There IS awareness, an Observer of the Observed." You would be aware of
that thought, too. You could switch back and forth between those thoughts
at will, if you were willing to try the experiment. After a while, you
would see that neither thought is relevant; they are only thoughts. The
thoughts can't influence the fact that you're aware of them while they're
happening: what they say in thought-language is irrelevant to the fact of
observing. The fact of observing comes before all else, including all that
you think about the fact of observing. Your thoughts may reject that fact,
but you don't. You go right on observing.

Again, something goes away and something remains. And that which remains is
knighted "me" or the observer for no reason outside of relative constancy.
Why the something extra--these subjects of experience? I agree that the FACT
OF OBSERVING comes before all else. But how did this subtle "you" get snuck
in. It seems more like a syllogism that says for every observation there must
be observer. But why does this have to be? This observer is not a hypostatic
relation so that this observer is _this_ forever, not to be confused with
_that_..the subject. Instead _one_ moment is realized differently with
respect to what is emphasized and what continues. Smack your head hard enough
and you can see that what remains is self-identified..even if it is just a
nananana of blue. I suggest a hierarchy of experience to make sense of this
framing of moments. I suggest a hierarchy is enough to account for this
mistake: that our experience is a compounding of kinds, and
self-identification is possible to any kinds so that no kind is more
substantially "me" than another excepting an arbitrary "cut and paste". All
moments pierce differently as different kinds and are discriminable even
further within the kinds but all are bound in being personal--experiences are
personal but this does not require anything extra--whether "egos", "souls",
"Mind" , or "I" . And for whether this personal-ness is the shadow of an
"i"--all i can say is that it seems a different kind, no more no less, just
different.

i.

[R_Marken]

[From Rick Marken (971114.0855)]

i.kurtzer (971113) --

Why the something extra--these subjects of experience?

Why not?

It seems more like a syllogism that says for every observation
there must be observer.

No. I think Bill's point, beautifully argued in [Bill Powers
(971109.0639 MST)] is that evidence of an observer comes from
the fact that we can shift awareness to different kinds of
perception; we can attend to sensations, configurations,
transitions, etc. Whatever is doing this observing is not part
of the hierarchy itself (as conceived in HPCT); a particular level
of the hierarchy experiences lower level perceptions in terms of
its way of perceiving; the principle level experiences sensations
as principles, not as sensations, for example. The fact that we
can become aware of sensations as sensations (I can become aware of
the tan color of my desk, for example, without noticing that this
color may be part of a "corporate" design principle) suggests
that this awareness is not a capability of the hierarchy itself.

I suggest a hierarchy is enough to account for this mistake: that
our experience is a compounding of kinds, and self-identification
is possible to any kinds so that no kind is more substantially "me"
than another excepting an arbitrary "cut and paste".

I agree that the hierarchy alone can account for our experience as
a compounding of kinds -- that we can become conscious of the
world as intensities, sensations, sequences, principles, etc.
But I don't think it can account for _what_ becomes conscious of
the world at the level at which the perception itself exists.
For example, there is a level in the brain where afferent neural
signals presumably represent the world in terms of transitions.
But what is it that notices this aspect of the world? It can't be
a higher level in the hierarchy, where the world exists as events,
sequences, principles, etc. I think what must be doing this
observing is another aspect of ourselves that has to be included
in the PCT model. I'd call it the "Observer" or the "Soul"; it's
the aspect of ourselves that can somehow experience what we
otherwise just perceive.

If you think this "Observer" component of the PCT model is
unnecessary, then how do you account for shifts of awareness;
from awareness of what you are typing to awareness of the
pressure of the seat against your butt to awareness of the humm
of the ventilation system -- all of which are perceptions that
were occurring while you were unaware of them but were not
_experienced_ until your awareness somehow shifted to them?

Best

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313
Life Learning Associates e-mail: rmarken@earthlink.net
http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken

[Bruce_Gregory9]

[From Bruce Gregory (971114.1225 EST)]

Rick Marken (971114.0855)

No. I think Bill's point, beautifully argued in [Bill Powers
(971109.0639 MST)] is that evidence of an observer comes from
the fact that we can shift awareness to different kinds of
perception; we can attend to sensations, configurations,
transitions, etc. Whatever is doing this observing is not part
of the hierarchy itself (as conceived in HPCT); a particular level
of the hierarchy experiences lower level perceptions in terms of
its way of perceiving; the principle level experiences sensations
as principles, not as sensations, for example. The fact that we
can become aware of sensations as sensations (I can become aware of
the tan color of my desk, for example, without noticing that this
color may be part of a "corporate" design principle) suggests
that this awareness is not a capability of the hierarchy itself.

I concur. When Bill first made this argument to me many moons ago,
I found it persuasive. I still do.

Bruce

[Bill_Powers1]

[From Bill Powers (971114.1502 MST)]

i.kurtzer (971113)

What level of discourse? What i'm doing is first answering that persons can
make mistakes even with regard to how they _consider_ their experiences.

This is true. However, merely asserting (however vehemently) that someone
has made a mistake is not enough to prove it. You must show where there is
an error in logic or in observation. In the present case, neither is
possible. The most you can hope for is for the other person to have an
"ahah" experience that will reveal a new point of view -- or to experience
one yourself.

That is, they can and do talk differently and wrongly about something true
and common . If not then why have philosophers disagreed so far??? the

only >other possibility to the humble admittance of being sloppy and
forgettful is >to captiulate to han's world models and a philosophy of
utter arbirtarism. >That is not acceptable.

To whom? And why is that the only other possibility? Why does it follow
that the existence of an Observer makes the world of the Observed
arbitrary? One can argue quite the opposite: that if we are really pure
Observers, then the world we experience is determined completely by
processes outside of us, and we are helpless to alter it (I don't,
obviously, believe that, either: the loop is closed).

Here is a parable:

In the land of Stavia, the people spend most of their time in barrels,
looking out at the world through the bung-hole. There are two camps. One,
the anticooperians, maintain that the world simply exists outside, and that
in fact there is nobody in any of the barrels looking out. The cooperians
maintain that the world must be presenting itself _to_ someone in each
barrel, and that without anyone to watch the world, the light-rays would
simply enter the bung-holes and be dissipated. The anticooperians point out
that if you examine the world carefully, you will never see such a watcher
-- you will see only barrels with holes in them, scattered here and there
over the landscape. From one's own position, all that exists is the world
outside and the barrels in it. You certainly can't see _yourself_ looking
out. Ergo, there is nobody inside. The Observed exists; there is no need to
posit an Observer. The cooperians find this argument difficult to refute;
all they can do is insist that it _feels_ as if there is a someone looking
out of the hole, even through they can't see who is in their own barrel.

If i came across as an a-hole i apologize. In fact, for myself

intelligence >is moot to good philosophy. Only an _unwillingness_ to step
further is >needed while still capturing the fullness of our lives. The
ghost-agent >"i" is for me just such a bad step.

Spoken like a true anticooperian.

If it only means personal, then o.k. we can all identify persons, or if it
only means one other kind of experience then o.k. we can all identify
certain kinds, but as a reason or as a something extra beyond a kind of
experience i say you've stepped too far.

So a barrel with nobody inside will still be able to experience a world
through the bunghole. Like Dr. Johnson, I would kick a big rock and say
"Thus I refute you," except that I am the only one who can observe the pain
in my toe. (I believe that Dr. Johnson was attending to the motion of the
rock, but his demonstration works both ways).

Your thoughts say to you, "There is NO awareness, no Observer of the
Observed." I'm sure you are aware of such thoughts. You could also think,
"There IS awareness, an Observer of the Observed." You would be aware of
that thought, too. You could switch back and forth between those thoughts
at will, if you were willing to try the experiment. After a while, you
would see that neither thought is relevant; they are only thoughts. The
thoughts can't influence the fact that you're aware of them while they're
happening: what they say in thought-language is irrelevant to the fact of
observing. The fact of observing comes before all else, including all that
you think about the fact of observing. Your thoughts may reject that fact,
but you don't. You go right on observing.

I agree that the FACT OF OBSERVING comes before all else. But how did

this >subtle "you" get snuck in. It seems more like a syllogism that says
for >every observation there must be observer. But why does this have to be?

Because of what we mean by observation as opposed to existence. "The cat
exists" does not mean the same thing as "John perceives the cat." One can't
speak of a perception as a physical happening without speaking of something
that perceives. To speak of Observation in the terms I mean, one must speak
of something that observes.

It's actually far easier to support the idea of someone observing from
inside another barrel than it is to support the idea that one is sitting in
one's own barrel, observing. That is, I am more certain of _your_
capacities as an observer, which I can infer from external evidence, than I
am of my own. I can tell the difference between an empty barrel and a
barrel with you in it. But of course I never can see my own barrel empty.

I suggest a hierarchy of experience to make sense of this
framing of moments. I suggest a hierarchy is enough to account for this
mistake: that our experience is a compounding of kinds, and
self-identification is possible to any kinds so that no kind is more
substantially "me" than another excepting an arbitrary "cut and paste".

I, too, suggest the existence of a hierarchy of perceptions to account for
the details and relationships in what human beings observe. But this does
not account for the fact that these perceptions are observed: that _I_ can
observe them. The perceptions exist outside my bunghole. By wiggling around
and jostling my barrel in indescribable ways, I can bring one part or
another of my perceptions into my field of view. I can infer that some of
them must still exist (even when they're out of view) in order that others
that I can see still exist. I can see that inference, too, as activity that
is sometimes visible through the bunghole. But whatever I can see, whether
it be other barrels, the world between them, or little fragments of my own
barrel, I remain the Seer, the Observer, the one who knows that this world
of experience exists.

I'm here in this barrel, Isaac, and you're there in yours. The difference
between us and the Stavians is that we can't get out.

Best,

Bill P.

[Myrexsw]

i.kurtzer (971116)

[From Rick Marken (971114.0855)]

Whatever is doing this observing is not part
of the hierarchy itself (as conceived in HPCT);

wait a second. I'm talking about a hierarchical organization of experience,
not a theory of behavior. I really really hope you agree to that distinction.

I agree that the hierarchy alone can account for our experience as
a compounding of kinds -- that we can become conscious of the
world as intensities, sensations, sequences, principles, etc.
But I don't think it can account for _what_ becomes conscious of
the world at the level at which the perception itself exists.

It (a hierarchy of experience) sure doesn't account for _what_. And i'm saying
that is why its great; it doesn't need it. We have the whole enchilada.

  >For example, there is a level in the brain where afferent neural

signals presumably represent the world in terms of transitions.

Sorry about the tight sphincter, but...
The representation ideas get into even murkier problems which seem to be also
inspired by this subject-object dichotomy. For instance, if two discrimanbles
are similar then by what is this a representation? Would that not require
some third party that cognated the similarity, so now we have two Subjects.
And for sameness based on third things we have many more delicious problems
that have kept philosophy and now modern cognitive science in the cave for so
long. Such as by what do we now have these two things, the thing and its
representation if not by what these two share, some third; now three Objects .
And then so that third must share some feature by a forth to the other two to
be similar. And so on for the forth, fifth, sixth, to a ridiculous infinity
fore both Subjects and Objects. Of course we have none of these other
possibles, not even the so-called real world. For us there is only
experience. Just a small point on how we can talk fine up to a point and then
might realize that we had made a mistake all the while. I contend that "i"'s
are just such a mistake: a bad way of talking that becomes believed over time.

  >But what is it that notices this aspect of the world?

See above.

I think what must be doing this
observing is another aspect of ourselves that has to be included
in the PCT model.

I again really really hope that you are not identifying the PCT model with a
philosophy of experience, which is what this "i' is based on. I-talk has been
around prior to PCT, nor would i think it would be wise to submit "Control as
Fact and Theory" to the Monist, or Journal of Phenomological Studies. These
are different concerns, right?

If you think this "Observer" component of the PCT model is
unnecessary, then how do you account for shifts of awareness;
from awareness of what you are typing to awareness of the
pressure of the seat against your butt to awareness of the humm
of the ventilation system -- all of which are perceptions that
were occurring while you were unaware of them but were not
_experienced_ until your awareness somehow shifted to them?

You know i'm going to think about that very reasonable question for a while and
then get back. But for now are you saying that you do have an account of the
shifts of attentential foci that is based on some extra--something i find very
unreasonable. What is that? What is this funny thing that creates the world
out of signals and how might that be so?

i.

[HANS_BLOM2]

[Hans Blom, 971117]

(i.kurtzer (971114))

reply to bill (directly) and bruce g. and rick (indirectly) and hans
(even less directly, hi hans)concerning the subject/object dichotomy
which i feel is an arbitrary association and not philosophically
fruitful.

Hi, i.

In systems theory, we have this funny notion of a "system": a system
can be anything at all -- the thing "under consideration". Normally a
system is a dichotomous notion, because what is under consideration
is usually how "it" interacts with its environment. But that is not
necessarily so, I guess; the system might as well be "all that is".
It appears to me, however, that any type of _analysis_ is based on
the prime law "make a distinction". A drawing in white on white is
invisible, as is a drawing in black on black. We seem to need
contrasts, distinctions, in order to be able to see at all. That's
where it all must have started: "let there be light" [in the
darkness], "make a distinction".

That is not to say that an experience of "unity" -- of being one with
and feeling at home in the universe, if I may use words -- is of no
value, of course. But again it may be the contrast, the knowledge
that such an experience cannot last, that makes it so valuable.

you: >how that unity of experience, the steam, is AFTERWARDS TALKED

into two, the me and the other, the subject and object , or reified
into "things" like self or soul is a mistake.

So there is a dichotomy: some things are mistakes, [because] others
are not. Do you really want to talk about the unity of experience in
terms of dichotomies?

What i'm doing is first answering that persons can make mistakes
even with regard to how they _consider_ their experiences.

I agree that there is a difference between an experience and what can
be said about it; the latter is only a shadow of the former. That
includes how people _consider_ their experiences; that's, I think,
much like self-talk. Language is hardly a suitable way to communicate
about experiences. But, if we do want to communicate about them -- as
you seem to want to do -- do you know a better way?

That is, they can and do talk differently and wrongly about
something true and common.

There you dichotomize again!

If not then why have philosophers disagreed so far???

Because for different philosophers the thing "under consideration"
was different. And because it is so difficult to communicate about
experiences, especially ones that others have not had. We know all
about that from more familiar examples. It's hard to talk about
colors with a blind person; it's hard to talk about rape with a rape
victim if you haven't experienced rape yourself. Some things we know
from immediate experience, others only through words. I could
maintain that we don't know the latter at all.

the only other possibility to the humble admittance of being sloppy
and forgettful is to captiulate to han's world models and a
philosophy of utter arbirtarism. That is not acceptable.

Thanks for the compliment implied by "the only other possibility".
But I think you're far too generous: there may be far more options. I
also believe that you misunderstand "utter arbitrarism": what is
arbitrary to one person isn't that for someone else. And although my
"internal model" may be arbitrary _from an outsider point of view_
[which I may even cultivate myself!], it is intimately mine from my
own insider point of view. Although an "internal model" may be
utterly arbitrary ["objectively" seen, it seems that way, given the
enormous variations that we find in "world views" in different
persons], I _necessarily_ have one. And that particular one doesn't
_feel_ arbitrary at all. It _feels_ like the accumulation and
integration of all my life's experiences, a kind of "inner wisdom".
Paradox?

In fact, for myself intelligence is moot to good philosophy.

Can you explain? It seems that at least some intelligence is required
before philosophical questions can be considered at all. If not, a
rock might be a great philosopher ;-).

Only an _unwillingness_ to step further is needed while still
capturing the fullness of our lives. The ghost-agent "i" is for
me just such a bad step.

Then the problem remains why "i" is such a commonly accepted notion.
How can it be that this "bad step" seems so acceptable?

I qualify the absurd with "as if" but "as if" is also "is not".

Yes, all we can ever know are "models", as ifs of reality so to say.
I don't remember the name of that (German?) philosopher whose book is
titled "The philosophy of As If", but his is a cogent story...

Bill:

All you can say is _what is experienced_.

you:

but this has to be done very carefully as we can see how much
philosophy has improved over two thousand years.

I agree with neither of you. What is experienced cannot be said. A
great deal is lost in the mapping from experience to language. It is
only when we have had a very similar experience ourselves that
someone else's words will come across. And even then we mainly
experience _ourselves_, regrettably. It appears to me that true
mutual understanding mainly arises out of common experiences. That, I
believe, is the background of Ed Ford's notion of "quality time".

As to philosophy over the millenia: its great contribution has been
to _ask questions_. In that, is has been very successful as a social
force. Just consider yourself. Would you have asked the kind of
questions that you do if you hadn't known about philosophy? On
the other hand, if you expect _answers_ you'd better get away from
philosophy. Religion might then be the answer. Or science, as some
interpret it ;-).

I agree that the FACT OF OBSERVING comes before all else.

Remember "cogito ergo sum"? It seemed an utterly convincing Aha-
experience that if there were thoughts, then there was a thinker. But
that is, in final analysis, a philosophical position as well. Others
have considered thoughts to be the products of the brain, just like
bile is a product of the liver. In that view, the thought that there
is an "i" could have arisen accidentally. But even then we would like
to know why it became so universal and why both bile and thoughts of
"i" seem so ubiquitous. Would they have essential functions?

No, instead this "observer" is realized differently with respect to
what is emphasized and what continues.

Yes, even for one individual the thing "under consideration" changes
from moment to moment, as our perceptions change. If the moment is
"smack your head hard enough", you'll consider things that you might
not otherwise. It appears that the "world out there" tells us what to
consider...

I suggest a hierarchy of experience is consistant with this.

Great! You're designing your own epistomology! If philosophy ever had
a goal, it might be exactly that: discover what you [believe you]
know...

That our experience is a compounding of kinds, and self-
identification is possible to any kind so that no kind is more
substantially "me" than another excepting an arbitrary cut and
paste.

To a large extent I could agree with that. Even more extremely, that
rather arbitrary [here you seem to agree with me!?] "me" can get lost
in cases of depersonalisation. I would rather say that the "me" that
is present at any moment is the one that will best handle the "world"
of that moment -- given the person's limitations, of course. But that
is my personal (and rather optimistic) philosophy that I don't expect
you to embrace...

Thanks for an interesting contribution! We seem to agree far more
than you seem to think possible ;-). Could it be that our experiences
are far more similar than the way we express them?

By the way, I'm fully aware that (some of?) my questions have no
empirical answer. Just consider them philosophical "thought
experiments"...

Greetings,

Hans

[HANS_BLOM2]

[Hans Blom, 971117b]

(i.kurtzer (971114))

... concerning the subject/object dichotomy which i feel is an
arbitrary association and not philosophically fruitful.

If it interests you, and if you can tolerate just a little bit of
math, turn to

  http://www.ai.mit.edu/people/minsky/minsky.html

and read his "Matter, Mind and Models". Although not in detail my
position, it will tell you how (someone in) the AI part of the world
approaches your concerns.

Greetings,

Hans

[Bruce_Gregory9]

[From Bruce Gregory (971117.1100 EST)]

i.kurtzer (971116)

You know i'm going to think about that very reasonable question for a while and
then get back. But for now are you saying that you do have an account of the
shifts of attentential foci that is based on some extra--something i find very
unreasonable. What is that? What is this funny thing that creates the world
out of signals and how might that be so?

Excellent questions. Glad you are not ignoring the problem. (Or
denying that it exists.) Nobody I know has good answers. The
field is wide open. Go for it!

Bruce

[R_Marken]

[From Rick Marken (971117.0820)]

i.kurtzer (971116) --

It (a hierarchy of experience) sure doesn't account for _what_
[has the experience]

How does your "hierarchy of experience" relate to the HPCT hierarchy
of perception? I don't consider "perception" and "experience"
equivalent, by the way. For me, a "perception" is the existance of
a neural signal in a perceptual pathway; an "experience" is perception
plus awareness. The sound of the heating system is a just perception
until I become aware of it, at which point it becomes an experience.

And i'm saying that is why its [PCT?] great; it doesn't need it
[something to do the experiencing]. We have the whole enchilada.

I don't believe that is true. The perceptual control hierarchy
is a hierarchy of controlled _perceptions_ (as defined above).
There is no awareness in the hierarchy itself. Something must
be added to the HPCT model which accounts for the fact that
subsets of these perceptions move in and out of experience.
That something, I believe, is the PCT model of consciouness (which
is basically the reorganizing system).

Sorry about the tight sphincter, but... The representation ideas
get into even murkier problems which seem to be also inspired by
this subject-object dichotomy.

I think a perception "represents" in the sense that it is a variable
that is a function of other variables: p = f(i1, i2...in). I think
variations in p represents some function of variations in i1, i2...in;
the function f() defines the nature of the represntation. What's so
murky about that?

I again really really hope that you are not identifying the PCT
model with a philosophy of experience, which is what this "i' is
based on.

No. I am identifying a part of the PCT model (the reorganization
system) as a _model_ of experience -- just as the HPCT hierarchy
is a model of perception and control.

But for now are you saying that you do have an account of the
shifts of attentential foci that is based on some extra

Yes. I have no explanation for it. Right now, shifts of attention
are just a phenomenon I can observe in myself.

Best

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313
Life Learning Associates e-mail: rmarken@earthlink.net
http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken

[Myrexsw]

i.kurtzer (971118)

[Hans Blom, 971117]

hans you very very..

That is not to say that an experience of "unity" -- of being one with
and feeling at home in the universe, if I may use words -- is of no
value, of course. But again it may be the contrast, the knowledge
that such an experience cannot last, that makes it so valuable.

i'm am not resticting unity to some mystical resort. i mean only that as some
things pass, not all does. i agree that both conjuction and disjunctions are
present. i have no gripe against disjunctions per se, just improper ones.

you: >how that unity of experience, the steam, is AFTERWARDS TALKED

into two, the me and the other, the subject and object , or reified
into "things" like self or soul is a mistake.

So there is a dichotomy: some things are mistakes, [because] others
are not. Do you really want to talk about the unity of experience in
terms of dichotomies?

i accept both, but what
i really want to express is that "i"-talk and subject-talk is yuck-talk.

That is, they can and do talk differently and wrongly about
something true and common.

There you dichotomize again!

see above.

If not then why have philosophers disagreed so far???

Because for different philosophers the thing "under consideration"
was different.

is this not in contradiction to:

I agree that there is a difference between an experience and what can
be said about it; the latter is only a shadow of the former.

. I
also believe that you misunderstand "utter arbitrarism": what is
arbitrary to one person isn't that for someone else. And although my
"internal model" may be arbitrary _from an outsider point of view_

no outside or inside right now. Let me just say i have never heard of someone
walking W. Some experiences can be had whilst others are inconcievable like
the relation of a dog behind a primary number. Relations of behinds are for
configurations not system concepts. This is not arbitrary. Even in my dreams
i am not engulfed or devoured by events or sequences. Only by monsters. That
is a truth across all emphases, or states. That is a truth for everyone i
have met. That is enough for me. Now for arbitrarism it would be different.
Some persons could taste sequences, and jump over irrational numbers.

Although an "internal model" may be
utterly arbitrary ["objectively" seen, it seems that way, given the
enormous variations that we find in "world views" in different
persons], I _necessarily_ have one

well, since its necessary, why do you keep on presenting it as an synthetic
proposition?

In fact, for myself intelligence is moot to good philosophy.

Can you explain.

good philosophy and intelligence are only linked if ones defines intelligence
following good philosophy. To me that makes for too few intelligent persons.
Instead, since there are plenty of seemingly intelligent individuals that will
never be interested in philosphy and since there are many seemingly
intelligent philosophers who were/are outright wrong then i say the two seem
independent.

Then the problem remains why "i" is such a commonly accepted notion.
How can it be that this "bad step" seems so acceptable?

Do i have to explain someone's goof? Should i then explain the particular
points of departure for each and every bad philosophy? i won't, but i will be
decent and say that people can make mistakes-- i am of the opinion that
philosophical mistakes are no different then forgetting that one has a date,
or one has put on differently colored socks.

  >As to philosophy over the millenia: its great contribution has been

to _ask questions_. In that, is has been very successful as a social
force. Just consider yourself. Would you have asked the kind of
questions that you do if you hadn't known about philosophy? On
the other hand, if you expect _answers_ you'd better get away from
philosophy. Religion might then be the answer. Or science, as some
interpret it ;-).

Great, just what i want, two thousand more unanswerables?! This is progress?
Umpteen fundamentally antagonistic positions and thats just fine? i hope
everyone can see the utter arbitrarism of this.

Remember "cogito ergo sum"? It seemed an utterly convincing Aha-
experience that if there were thoughts, then there was a thinker.
But
that is, in final analysis, a philosophical position as well.

I know, its the one i'm saying is wrong; the same one that inspires
"representations" as phantom go-betweens for subject and object, or
"world-models" in modern parlance.

But even then we would like
to know why it became so universal and why both bile and thoughts of
"i" seem so ubiquitous. Would they have essential functions?

i would suggest the function is zero as the knower and the known are the same
thing named differently. To be.

We seem to agree far more
than you seem to think possible ;-). Could it be that our experiences
are far more similar than the way we express them?

i think that you believe some things that are truthful. And i agree that our
Thats our similar, though not our Reasons.

i.

[Myrexsw]

i.kurtzer (971118)

[From Bruce Gregory (971117.1100 EST)]

i.kurtzer (971116)

You know i'm going to think about that very reasonable question for a while

and

then get back. But for now are you saying that you do have an account of

the

shifts of attentential foci that is based on some extra--something i find

very

unreasonable. What is that? What is this funny thing that creates the

world

out of signals and how might that be so?

Excellent questions. Glad you are not ignoring the problem. (Or
denying that it exists.) Nobody I know has good answers. The
field is wide open. Go for it!

I am afraid you are misreading me. I think that the search for the "extra" is
folly as it does not exist. in short, i am against I's. That there are a
shortage of good answers to a question i find bad does lend the question any
more appeal to me.

i.

[Bruce_Gregory9]

[From Bruce Gregory (971119.1225 EST)]

i.kurtzer (971118)

I am afraid you are misreading me. I think that the search for the "extra" is
folly as it does not exist. in short, i am against I's. That there are a
shortage of good answers to a question i find bad does lend the question any
more appeal to me.

HPCT is a wonderful theory of purposeful action. It is not a
theory of consciousness. You seem to be saying that
consciousness does not exist. If I am reading you correctly,
you seem to be a very different animal than I am. Of course, I
cannot _prove_ that you are conscious...

Bruce

[HANS_BLOM2]

[Hans Blom, 971120c]

(i.kurtzer (971118))

hans you very very..

i., if you expect me to be able to decode utterances like this one,
you really overexpect ;-).

That is not to say that an experience of "unity" -- of being one
with and feeling at home in the universe, if I may use words -- is
of no value, of course. But again it may be the contrast, the
knowledge that such an experience cannot last, that makes it so
valuable.

i'm am not resticting unity to some mystical resort. i mean only
that as some things pass, not all does.

To be more specific: what does not?

i agree that both conjuction and disjunctions are present.

That is not what _I_ said (or meant). It is my position that there
_are_ no conjunctions or disjunctions. Yet we can easily _perceive_
them: both "conjunction" and "disjunction" are _human_ concepts that
help us to order/classify our experiences so that we can communicate
about them. And why communicate? That seems to be one of our most
basic goals as humans, social animals that we are. Have you ever
wondered why so many of our posts here are about -- on more than
superficial analysis -- "let's try to come to an agreement"?

i have no gripe against disjunctions per se, just improper ones.

We humans seem to be able to make up any type of disjunction at all
if that is useful to us. And what is useful to me may not be so to
you. So what is "improper" for you may be entirely proper for me!

Or not? Why would your judgments be superior to mine?

what i really want to express is that "i"-talk and subject-talk is
yuck-talk.

To _you_, that is. Not to me, sometimes...

If not then why have philosophers disagreed so far???

Because for different philosophers the thing "under consideration"
was different.

is this not in contradiction to:

I agree that there is a difference between an experience and what
can be said about it; the latter is only a shadow of the former.

A long time ago I made an unforgettable walk in the woods with a
biologist friend of mine who once and again pointed out little plants
and flowers to me, things that I would not have noticed on my own. In
a sense, he made me see a different -- and very pretty -- world.
Since then I've often noticed how others help me to expand my vision
and suddenly perceive what I didn't perceive before, although it was
there all along.

Philosophers similarly point at things and ask you to look at what
may be new to you, previously not "under consideration". Their main
problem is that their concepts ("truth", "identity" and "similarity",
"conjunction" and "disjunction" and such) are far murkier -- because
far more abstract? -- than that a tiny little flower than is easily
perceived once it is pointed out to you. More than once I have found
myself in the weird position that I "understood" the experience or
notion that was described, although the "words" were all wrong.

The world that biologist lived in was very different from mine: he
saw a great deal that I didn't. And the other way around, no doubt.
That's what I mean what I say that there may be great differences in
what is "under consideration".

Some experiences can be had whilst others are inconcievable like
the relation of a dog behind a primary number.

Go work in a mental hospital for a year. That would greatly expand
your notion of which experiences are conceivable ;-).

This is not arbitrary. Even in my dreams i am not engulfed or
devoured by events or sequences. Only by monsters.

But can you imagine that someone else, say Rick Marken, is?

That is a truth across all emphases, or states. That is a truth for
everyone i have met. That is enough for me.

I suggest you meet more people ;-).

Besides, if one searches for the truth, what do the mere opinions of
others matter?

Some persons could taste sequences, and jump over irrational
numbers.

I'm quite sure you can learn to do so as well. Why not, if others can
do it?

Although an "internal model" may be utterly arbitrary
["objectively" seen, it seems that way, given the enormous
variations that we find in "world views" in different persons],
I _necessarily_ have one

well, since its necessary, why do you keep on presenting it as an
synthetic proposition?

Well, how to express it? That we all have _an_ internal model is
fundamental to me. At this moment; I reserve the right to change my
opinion any time soon now...

good philosophy and intelligence are only linked if ones defines
intelligence following good philosophy.

A matter of definition only? Nothing deeper?

Instead, since there are plenty of seemingly intelligent individuals
that will never be interested in philosphy and since there are many
seemingly intelligent philosophers who were/are outright wrong then
i say the two seem independent.

May I then deduce that, according to you, very unintelligent people
can be excellent philosophers?

Then the problem remains why "i" is such a commonly accepted
notion. How can it be that this "bad step" seems so acceptable?

Do i have to explain someone's goof?

It appears to me that there is a (communication) problem if one puts
himself outside the existing "community of understanding", yet wishes
to be understood.

Greetings,

Hans

[Myrexsw]

i.kurtzer

forgot a little "not" as in:

I think that the search for the "extra" is
folly as it does not exist. in short, i am against I's. That there are a
shortage of good answers to a question i find bad does [NOT] lend the

question any

more appeal to me.

oops!

i.

[Myrexsw]

i.kurtzer (971121)

[Hans Blom, 971120c]

(i.kurtzer (971118))

hans you very very..

i., if you expect me to be able to decode utterances like this one,
you really overexpect ;-).

You know..i haven't been able to decode that one either.
But it does seem right.

i'm am not resticting unity to some mystical resort. i mean only
that as some things pass, not all does.

To be more specific: what does not?

Thankyou. But you misread me i think if you are projecting this to some "out
there" object(s) which is "represented" "over here" by us subjects. I am
refering without the metaphysical faith in "things-in-themselves" and am
instead pointing to the phenomological status of the subject/object dichotomy
as arbitrary and derivitive of the fact that some moments remain whilst others
slough away. Just sit still for ten minutes and see what happens. In short,
I's do not exist. If you wish to conduct experiments then one can put on a
certain metaphysical cap, but for a philosophy of experience these leaps are
out of bounds; if one accepts that the thought not thought of is a nothing. i
do.

Some experiences can be had whilst others are inconcievable like
the relation of a dog behind a primary number.

Go work in a mental hospital for a year. That would greatly expand
your notion of which experiences are conceivable ;-).

"Nuff said".

good philosophy and intelligence are only linked if ones defines
intelligence following good philosophy.

Instead, since there are plenty of seemingly intelligent individuals
that will never be interested in philosphy and since there are many
seemingly intelligent philosophers who were/are outright wrong then
i say the two seem independent.

May I then deduce that, according to you, very unintelligent people
can be excellent philosophers?

that would be me.

Then the problem remains why "i" is such a commonly accepted
notion. How can it be that this "bad step" seems so acceptable?

Do i have to explain someone's goof?

It appears to me that there is a (communication) problem if one puts
himself outside the existing "community of understanding", yet wishes
to be understood.

I have already pointed out the experiential foundation for this mistake, and
suggested the heirarchy of experience could sidestep the pitfalls of
"representationism" .

i.

[Myrexsw]

i.kurtzer (971121)

[From Bill Powers (971114.1502 MST)]

i.kurtzer (971113)

What level of discourse? What i'm doing is first answering that persons can
make mistakes even with regard to how they _consider_ their experiences.

This is true. However, merely asserting (however vehemently) that someone
has made a mistake is not enough to prove it. You must show where there is
an error in logic or in observation. In the present case, neither is
possible. The most you can hope for is for the other person to have an
"ahah" experience that will reveal a new point of view -- or to experience
one yourself.

I have been trying to point to errors in logic such as :
1) the infinite regress to justify cognitio ergo sum or the recent effort ergo
sum.
2) the omniscent status presumed by representational theories
3)the improper syllogism "for every observance there is an observer". That
there are observances certainly, as well as persons, but no extra "i"'s running
around.

That is, they can and do talk differently and wrongly about something true
and common . If not then why have philosophers disagreed so far??? the

only >other possibility to the humble admittance of being sloppy and
forgettful is >to captiulate to han's world models and a philosophy of
utter arbirtarism. >That is not acceptable.

To whom? And why is that the only other possibility? Why does it follow
that the existence of an Observer makes the world of the Observed
arbitrary?

No no. I mean that person's talk must be inaccurate if we agree that persons
have common experiences. Otherwise, Parmedies and Heraclitus really did live
sticky and loosy-goosily, respectively.

In the land of Stavia, the people spend most of their time in barrels,
looking out at the world through the bung-hole. There are two camps. One,
the anticooperians, maintain that the world simply exists outside, and that
in fact there is nobody in any of the barrels looking out. The cooperians
maintain that the world must be presenting itself _to_ someone in each
barrel, and that without anyone to watch the world, the light-rays would
simply enter the bung-holes and be dissipated. The anticooperians point out
that if you examine the world carefully, you will never see such a watcher
-- you will see only barrels with holes in them, scattered here and there
over the landscape. From one's own position, all that exists is the world
outside and the barrels in it. You certainly can't see _yourself_ looking
out. Ergo, there is nobody inside. The Observed exists; there is no need to
posit an Observer. The cooperians find this argument difficult to refute;
all they can do is insist that it _feels_ as if there is a someone looking
out of the hole, even through they can't see who is in their own barrel.

This outside/inside dichotomy plays directly to the subject/object position.
For us there is neither in that sense, only presentness.

So a barrel with nobody inside will still be able to experience a world
through the bunghole.

What the heck. I belive in persons, but not in ghosts. Experiences are had by
persons. I not only agree with that, i stated it upfront on my first anti-i
rampage.

I agree that the FACT OF OBSERVING comes before all else. But how did

this >subtle "you" get snuck in. It seems more like a syllogism that says
for >every observation there must be observer. But why does this have to be?

Because of what we mean by observation as opposed to existence. "The cat
exists" does not mean the same thing as "John perceives the cat." One can't
speak of a perception as a physical happening without speaking of something
that perceives. To speak of Observation in the terms I mean, one must speak
of something that observes.

I too have a faith that there is some residium left after we sleep without a
kat in our dream. But that is metaphysics. For each of us there is not this
"observer" , only a faith that after we cease something will continue.

I, too, suggest the existence of a hierarchy of perceptions to account for
the details and relationships in what human beings observe. But this does
not account for the fact that these perceptions are observed: that _I_ can
observe them.

You are sooooo stubborn!!What is an unexperienced experience?! You are
considering like a modeler..which is great for modelling. But models are not
appropriate for some questions.

But whatever I can see, whether
it be other barrels, the world between them, or little fragments of my own
barrel, I remain the Seer, the Observer, the one who knows that this world
of experience exists.

Something remains, yes. I say experience.

I suppose that i'll let this rest for now.
Good jostling.

i.

[HANS_BLOM2]

[Hans Blom, 971123b]

(i.kurtzer (971121))

hans you very very..

i., if you expect me to be able to decode utterances like this one,
you really overexpect ;-).

You know..i haven't been able to decode that one either. But it does seem

right.

I love that answer, i. It makes everything so nice and arbitrary! Just my kind
of
thing!

i'm am not resticting unity to some mystical resort. i mean only
that as some things pass, not all does.

To be more specific: what does not?

Thankyou. But you misread me i think if you are projecting this to some "out

there"

object(s) which is "represented" "over here" by us subjects. I am refering

without

the metaphysical faith in "things-in-themselves" and am instead pointing to

the

phenomological status of the subject/object dichotomy as arbitrary and

derivitive

of the fact that some moments remain whilst others slough away. Just sit

still
for

ten minutes and see what happens. In short, I's do not exist. If you wish

to
conduct

experiments then one can put on a certain metaphysical cap, but for a

philosophy
of

experience these leaps are out of bounds; if one accepts that the thought not

thought

of is a nothing. i do.

Let me repeat my question: what does not pass according to the/your philosophy
of
experience?

It appears to me that there is a (communication) problem if one puts himself
outside the existing "community of understanding", yet wishes to be

understood.

I have already pointed out the experiential foundation for this mistake, and

suggested

the heirarchy of experience could sidestep the pitfalls of "representationism"

.

Which mistake?

Greetings,

Hans

[Myrexsw]

i.kurtzer (971127)
me:

you misread me i think if you are projecting this to some "out

there"

object(s) which is "represented" "over here" by us subjects. I am refering

without

the metaphysical faith in "things-in-themselves" and am instead pointing to

the

phenomological status of the subject/object dichotomy as arbitrary and

derivitive

of the fact that some moments remain whilst others slough away. Just sit

still
for

ten minutes and see what happens. In short, I's do not exist. If you

wish to
conduct

experiments then one can put on a certain metaphysical cap, but for a

philosophy
of

experience these leaps are out of bounds; if one accepts that the thought

not
thought

of is a nothing. i do.

Let me repeat my question: what does not pass according to the/your
philosophy of
experience?

the tao

It appears to me that there is a (communication) problem if one puts

himself

outside the existing "community of understanding", yet wishes to be

understood.

I have already pointed out the experiential foundation for this mistake, and

suggested

the heirarchy of experience could sidestep the pitfalls of

"representationism" .

Which mistake?

Since philosophy has not come any closer to resolving its questions so that
there are nearly as many distinct philosophies as persons. Where the only
cumulation is the impossibilty of our world, and where its methodological
counterpart is the most unlaudable "cognitive science"..then i'd say there must
be a mistake. One of them is the "representational mind" which has adherants
as diverse as Dennet and Fodor. It is one of the cornerstones of cognitive
science, and its foundation is patently yuck.
i really suggest persons sit for ten minutes and notice what is.

i.