> [Bill Williams February 2004     9:20 AM CST]
> > >
> > > Martin
> > > February 2004     9:20 AM CST]
> >
> > >
> > > >[From Bill Williams  17 February 2004  12:00 PM CST]
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >>  [Martin Taylor 2004.02.18.2332]
> > > >>
> > > >>  >[From Bill Williams 17 February 2004    6:00 PM CST]
> > > >>  >
> > > >>  >  > [Martin Taylor 2004.02.18.1649]
> > > >>  >  >
> > > >>  >>  I think in the world of economics, one has to distinguish
> between
> > > >>  >>  "Economics" and "economics". The former has what Bill W likes to
> > call
> > > >>  >>  an "axiological" basis (meaning, so far as I can gather, that it
> > is a
> > > >>  >>  branch of pure maths based on finding out where logical theorems
> > > >  > >>  derived from the axioms can get you).
> > >
> 
> 
> >
> > >[From Bill Williams  17 February 2004  12:00 PM CST]
> > >
> > >
> > >>  [Martin Taylor 2004.02.18.2332]
> > >>
> > >>  >[From Bill Williams 17 February 2004    6:00 PM CST]
> > >>  >
> > >>  >  > [Martin Taylor 2004.02.18.1649]
> > >>  >  >
> > >>  >>  I think in the world of economics, one has to distinguish between
> > >>  >>  "Economics" and "economics". The former has what Bill W likes to
> call
> > >>  >>  an "axiological" basis (meaning, so far as I can gather, that it
> is a
> > >>  >>  branch of pure maths based on finding out where logical theorems
> > >  > >>  derived from the axioms can get you).
> >
> > So that was a wrong use of "axiological", which led to a wrong
> > impression of where Bill W. stands (others may have made the same
> > mistake, I guess).
> >
> > >  > >No Martin. You are getting it all confused.
> > >>
> > >>  Then could you define "axiological"? It sounds as if it means
> > >>  something like "logical consequences of axioms". If it doesn't, then
> > >>  maybe another word might be more readily interpreted.
> > >
> > >   "Axiological" is the adjective  form, but the root pertains to the
> theory
> > >of value.
> >
> > Ah...That changes a lot!
> >
> > >  If you think of the foundations of thought many people divide
> > >up fundamental topics into the theory of value (axiological concerns)
> > >and the theory of logic.
> >
> > I'd say that both would be at heart theories of logic, though
> > different.
> 
> I suppose there is a sense in which you are correct.  I started using the
> term "axiology" as a result of what I think of as a productive clash here
> between a methodological tradition that traces to Veblen, Dewey, Mead
> and others  and a Critical Realist tradition that represents a renewed
> version of British Socialism.  The debate has increasing adopted the
> full, or at least fuller, Greek nominclature of not only the more familiar
> terms, logic, and epistomology, but also the less familiar terms,
> "ontology," (theory of being) and "axiology. " (theory of value).   I've
> picked the terms up in context as the debate has gone on over the
> last few years, but I hadn't taken the time to look at the derivation of the
> terms.  After, all what-ever the terms may have once meant, what they
> mean here and now is defined by how they are used here and now.
>
> The dictionary that was availible last night wasn't much help, but I was
> surprized at how close the content is --  axiological ( theory of value) and
> axiomatic ( pertaining to logical structure ).  And, "ontology" the
> structure
> of being,  while it has a distinct subject-matter, or process as its
> concern can in many respects appear to be quite similar.
> 
> When we (Some people designate "we" in terms of American pragmatism)
> were confronted by the Criticial Realists at first, they said, "You don't
> have
> an ontology."  Evidently in their view this settle the question, and all the
> questions-- game over, and they'd won."  We didn't at first have a clue
> about
> what was an "ontology."  Now, a couple of years later we at least know what
> some of the words mean, and can hold our own in the "shoot outs."   I sat in
> on a couple of the Critical Realist classes, and after a couple of terms can
> now give the Critical Realists a hard time-- because I know what enough of
> the words mean to argue on their terms.  I'm also on "good terms" with many
> of the Critical Realists-- at least in part because I respected their work
> enough to become what they view as an informed critic of their position.
> 
>  In order to fend off another potential misunderstanding,
> > the point is that (speaking as a "conventional, credentialled expert"
> > in perception psychology), there are two fundamentally different
> > modes of thought, but the split is not between logic and value, but
> > between -- it's hard to put into one or two phrases -- exclusion and
> > inclusion. Both work together to make the best of a messy perceptual
> > situation. "Exclusion" might be imagined as looking for reasons why
> > what you see is different from X, whereas "inclusion" could be
> > imagined as looking for X, Y, Z, ... that this might be. "Exclusion"
> > relates to linguistics and logic, "inclusion" to intuition and visual
> > appearance.
> >
> > >Well, you are still identifying me with positions that I don't remotely
> > >hold.
> >
> > I may have done that,
> 
> No harm done.  And, initially such confusions seem to be unavoidable.
>
>  but I wasn't arguing with you. I was arguing a
> > more general, abstract, position.
> 
> Understood.
> 
> 
> More directedly, I was arguing that
> > there was no need for the Powers and the Jorgensons of the world to
> > try, at this point in their work, to relate what they were doing to
> > the abstract world of Economics,
> 
> But, here, I am convinced is where a divergence begins.  You talkd about
> "the abstract world of Economics" as if there was any other kind.
> 
> While it appears to me that your world of "economics" is just as "abstract"
> as the version with an uppercase "E."
> 
> 
>  or even to worry about whether the
> > conceptual constructs used in Economics are the constructs that ought
> > to be used in their modelling.
> 
> I do not see that any other kinds of concepts are availible. Some people
> are of the opinion that they only deal with "concrete" realities-- they are
> I am convinced completely mistaken.  And, this for me is a crucial point.
> What I am convinced people are doing when they insist that they are
> limiting themselves to "concrete" observations or whatever, is instead a
> way of introducing _a priori_ conceptions into the inquiry. They are
> convinced that their "conconcrete" categories are to use Adam Smith's
> phrase so "simple and obvious" that any attempt to examine what the
> terms mean is unneccesary. Veblen described in terms of a long ago
> popular song, "We don't know where we are going, but we are on our way."
> So, Bill Powers is impatient with an examination of what the terms mean,
> and he shifts the meaning of the terms as he goes. Today "investment"
> means one thing, yesterday it meant someting else. (sorry about the
> rant, back to a consideration of your position-- or at least what I perhaps
> mistakenly think is your position.)
> 
> >
> > Going back to the history of Science, I'm making the analogy with
> > whether modellers of early thermodynamics should have been concerned
> > with the properties of phlogiston. At the time, the accepted model is
> > that they should, and the accepted model could have been right. But a
> > more effective set of conceptual constructs never imagined in the
> > conventional model, such as entropy, turned out to be much more
> > useful.
> 
> Sure. I can see that there are times when inorder to make headway it
> you may be better off to abandon previous confusions.
> 
> >
> > >So, I could just as well ask you where this very strange, strange to me,
> > >vision of Bill Williams came from.
> >
> > I hope I explained that.
> >
> > >  Mostly, since we don't know each
> > >other all that well, you appears that when you hear me reject one side
> > >of the European dualism, you assume that I must be a representative
> > >of the other side of that dualism.
> >
> > Going back a few paragraphs, I'd say that statement is based on an
> > exclusionist mode of thought. I generally use more of an inclusionist
> > mode, wheree I look for similarities. More to the point, I tend to
> > apply polarization when it seems to me that useful distinctions are
> > not being made, and to argue for a middle (or perhaps a "third pole")
> > position when the poles are taken as the only options.
> 
> OK. "Third" something or other is often the way people seeking a way
> out of conceptual dead ends often talk about their efforts.
> 
> >
> > Since much of the rest of your post is arguing for neither pole, I
> > suspect we may be more in agreement than you think.
> 
> Very well might be. If so Good!
> 
> As in...
> >
> > >  I'm making a distinction between
> > >>  top-down and bottom-up approaches.
> > >
> > >But, there is also the possiblity of entering an inquiry from the side.
> > >This would be neither top-down or bottom-up.
> >
> > >while the other is the engineering-modelling approach
> > >>  >>  (economics) of finding models that describe from new viewpoints
> what
> > >>  >>  actually does happen in the real world,
> > >
> > >Where did, this "real world" come from?
> >
> > Good question, in context. It's a shorthand for "the world as
> > perceived when we examine it rather than examining our imaginings of
> > it." But, as Marc Abrams likes to point out, our imaginings of the
> > real world strongly affect what we perceive when we look at it.
> 
> Yes!
> 
> And, this is what appeals to me in Marc's attempt to find a more
> inclusive approach to a theory of behavior.  Even though for my purposes
> a fairly basic control theory model has such an extensive range of
> applications
> that I don't see that, again for my purposes, I need a better, more
> inclusive
> conception of behavior.
> 
> 
> And
> > that comes right back to the question of whether our conceptual
> > constructs are as useful as a different (as yet unknown) set might be
> > when we look.
> 
> This is always a possiblity.  But, it seems to me that what is already in
> view in the basic control theory scheme is something that doesn't fit
> with any consistency into either an idealist or a materialist conception
> of the world.
> 
> >
> > Interestingly enough, I've just entered into a discussion of this in
> > an entirely different area (military conflict) with someone who
> > thinks the constructs of PCT are inadequate to deal with this exact
> > problem.
> 
> Well, military issues do in a sense clear the deck.
> 
> And to make the problem more germane, much of the
> > Economics-economics world also has to do with organized, intentional
> > conflict.
> 
> Yes indeed.  In a sense the price of a commodity can be thought of as sort
> of temporary truce.  In this sense, the price of a good in many settings is
> set-- sometimes by buyer sometimes by seller, but it is set.  Transactions
> go on for various quantities.  And, until something disturbs the context
> sufficiently people would rather do their trade, and not engage in a
> struggle
> over the price. Neo-Classical theory can not, and I firmly, at least untill
> I am
> shown otherwise, explain why prices are "sticky."  According to this
> orthodoxy
> based upon maximization, prices ought to be, all the time you understand,
> sliding up and down smoothly.  Well, obviously most prices don't slide
> around
> smoothly.  And, those markets in which they do, are often troubled markets.
> 
> >
> > >   Bill Powers has been telling me for
> > >years about the "real world."  But, it has never gotten any closer, and
> he
> > >still
> > >doesn't understand about accounting identies, and I doubt he has any
> > >conception at all  of value theory.  (I will repeat-- value theory is not
> > >platonism.)
> >
> > I have no opinion on that.
> 
> OK.  However, internally, when you say, "I have no opinion on that."  I tend
> to
> read what you say in terms of "an opinion."
>
> 
> My main point was that what he and other
> > potential bottom-up workers need is enough knowledge to know how to
> > read the published figures.
> 
> I would agree.  And, many times I I have supplied such information. But, the
> he doesn't find that what nearly everyone else regard as the facts of the
> situation-- such as what the macro-accounting concepts mean-- fit his
> preconceptions. Comicly, when Powers attempted to find an economist
> that would be more sympathetic to his approach, what he hit on with Bruun
> was a person who quite plainly affirms what I have been telling Bill for a
> couple of decades.  page 71.  Money has its own logic,  p. 87.  [ I = S].
> Bruun says what I have to say about the Keynesian identity far better than
> I do.  If I encounter a student who doesn't understand the Keynesian system
> I am in a position where I solve the problem by working with students who
> do. I've got better things to do with my time.
> 
> 
> They are as liklely to be hindered as to
> > be helped by knowing the theoretical constructs which their
> > experiments might either show to be crucial or useless (without
> > value). Understanding too much has a tendency to bias the
> > experimenter, which is why, in psychology and medicine, one tries to
> > use a procedure called "double-blind."
> 
> Where it is possible to do experiments what you say is, or can be, of
> value.  But, it isn't remotely feasible for Bill Powers and Rick Marken
> to devise and collect an entirely new series of numbers that in someway
> describe economic activity.  They aren't making in this sense a new
> set of experiments, they are using the same data everyone else is using.
> But, they refuse to take the time to make a sustained effort to understand
> the nature of an accounting identity.  I've tried to explain it to Bill
> Powers.
> The result is that he argues with his instructor and call me "mathematically
> incompentent."  If there is a basic foundation of the economic threads on
> CSGnet it revolves about this issue. Powers said it well enough recently
> when he used the phrase, "Shocking stupdity."
> 
> Powers ,  explains the Keynesian system as a result of Keynes failure to
> realize that people not only save, but they also invest.   And, therefore
> the
> last two thirds of a century of work in macro-economics has been nothing
>  more than a result of this obvious over-sight.
> 
> >
> > >You appear to have adopted a "materialist" position.  It works well
> enough I
> > >suppose for physics, chemistry and a physiological psychology.  But, it
> > >doesn't work at all, at least in my understanding, for fields such as
> > >linguistics,
> > >or economics.
> >
> > Interestingly, it was my lifelong interest in psycholinguistics and
> > human communication that led me to PCT as the only (so far as I know)
> > viable foundation for linguistics. As a "credentialled expert" I have
> > co-authored a few books and more than a few papers in the area
> > (though no books with the PCT connection). My contributions to the
> > PCT special issue of the International Journal of Human Computer
> > Studies were precisely on how PCT illuminates problems of
> > communication among humans or between humans and "intelligent"
> > machines.
> 
> Impressive, but does this work speak to the question of a consistent
> foundation for linguistics?
> 
> I don't pretend to know enough about linguistics
> to pretend to have opinions, but based on my experience with other fields,
> I would suspect  that neither an idealist or a materialist approach would
> be capable of supplying the foudation for what I would regard as an
> adaquate approach to linguistics.
> 
> >
> > >  If the top-down and
> > >>  bottom-up approaches meet in the middle, that's great, but it doesn't
> > >>  make them any the less distinct.
> > >
> > >They may in some sense "meet in the middle."  But, there is no way that I
> > >have
> > >every seen that either, or both together, of the idealist or materialist
> > >conceptions
> > >can provide a self-consistent basis for econmic theory.
> >
> > Any more than strict bottom-up or strict top-down approaches can
> > explain what we perceive in the real world. I think we agree here.
> >
> > >  > >And, bringing back "natural laws" is one of
> > >>  >those "giant leaps in the wrong direction."
> > >>
> > >>  Perhaps you misunderstand the concept of "natural law". To me, it's a
> > >>  statement of the way things interact (behave) under some defined
> > >>  restricted set of circumstances, which cannot be altered by human
> > >>  choices. No more than that.
> > >
> > >OK. Your defintion of "natural law" is basically a "materialism."
> >
> > I am a bit wary of such labels, because, though I may agree with some
> > parts of what it means to me, others may take it that I agree with
> > aspects that are more salient to them, but with which I do not agree.
> 
> OK. Then these areas where you and materialism part company may be
> fundamental in terms of my understanding of your position.
> >
> > Having said that, I'd like to redefine "natural law" in a way that I
> > don't intend to conflict with my earlier definition, but taking it
> > from a different angle: A "natural law" describes interrelationships
> > that always are observed to hold.
> 
> OK. Makes things simple in the sense that a single reliable anomoly
> indicates that something is wrong.
> 
> 
>  Examples are much easier to find in
> > physics than in psychology or in economics,
> 
> Actually I think the Giffen case is an anomoloy in the context of
> neo-classical
> economics that is as reliable an anomoly as you can find anywhere.
> 
> but in all fields it
> > remains true (a "natural law") that no delimited entity can, over its
> > lifetime, emit more energy than it takes in. That's an important law
> > in physiology and in economics.
> 
> I am not entirely sure this relationship has, as yet, attained the status of
> a
> "law" in economics.  If it had, I think some changes would be taking place
> in economics and they aren't.
> 
> Attempts to violate that law because
> > it was not known to exist were what led to the long search for the
> > Philosophers' Stone.
> >
> > >  I think it
> > >would be
> > >helpful before continuing to identify  the who and the what that is the
> > >referent
> > >of your "disastrous Economics."
> >
> > Usually, I think of people like Jeffrey Sachs, who (unless I'm mixing
> > him up with some other person) almost single-handedly brought Russia
> > to ruin.
> 
> We agree about Jeff.  But, he had lots of help.
> 
> 
>  I'm thinking generally of the followers of Hayek, equally
> > with the believers in a planned economy.
> 
> We are also in agreement here as well. Both sides get it wrong and
> take up most of the stage on which the questions are debated.  More
> intellegent approaches are shoved almost entirely out of public view.
> >
> > >   > In other words, you are working with "economics", meaning there's no
> > >>  >>  point in arguing about "Economics."
> > >
> > >No. We aren't at this point really communicating.
> >
> > It takes time to develop an understanding, but as I mentioned at the
> > top, I hadn't intended to communicated primarily with you in this
> > area. We may have different views, but the people I intended to
> > communicate with were the modellers.
> 
> Oh, Ok, then I mis-understood the intent.
> 
> 
> >
> > >I am not sure it helps, but it seems to me that both sides of the
> division
> > >in
> > >European thought between "idealism" and "materialism" contain defects.
> > >And, between them the defects generate characteristic problems. Many of
> > >these problems land in economics.  How for instance would you define a
> > >price level?
> >
> > A question prior to that is "Do I want to define such a concept?" If
> > I can answer that with good reasons behind my answer, I have probably
> > defined what the construct is, in ways that I can defend. I haven't
> > answered it except for the price level in a single transaction, and
> > there what it means is an amount of money that to the seller has more
> > value than does the thing sold, whereas the opposite is tru for the
> > buyer.
> >
> > Is that a satisfactory answer?
> 
> I don't think that it does.  As far as I understand it, in dealing with a
> national
> economy where many commodities are produced, if you want to measure
> the economic output, you can count as a starting point the dollar volume of
> final transactions (needs a definition, but I think the usual one is
> adaquate)
> and you need some way of adjusting this number to take into account
> price changes. It doesn't appear to me that your concept supplys what's
> needed.
> 
> 
> >
> > >   You can not possibly add up the material that goes out the
> > >factory door to get a level of economic production.  You can't even add
> up
> > >apples and watermellons, let alone diamonds and sulfuric acid.  Economic
> > >output is not material.
> >
> > I have, indeed, followed Bagno in arguing precisely that.
> 
> Then your argument is faulty. I don't intend to be offensive, but I might as
> well
> be concise.
> 
> >
> > >   So, econmic output needs a
> > >completely different foundation than either materialism or idealism.
> >
> > You could be right, but the logic isn't there.
> 
> Actually, Dewey's _Logic_ has been here. What's been missing has been a
> methodology to put Dewey's (third way) into use.  And, in my view control
> theory supplys the method.
> 
> Is Bagno's measure of
> > imposed organization material or ideal? Or neither? How about the
> > Odums?
> 
> I think that these approaches are a required componate of what will
> eventually
> become the replacement for economic orthodoxy.  You will note that I
> included
> Odums professor at Yale  G. E. Hutchinson in a recent reading list.
> 
> 
> >
> > >  > Clearly, the warning is exaggerated, but I think exaggeration is
> > >>  beneficial at this point. There may come a time when the opposite
> > >>  warning might be more useful, but I don't think that time is now. Too
> > >>  many people have failed to make the distinction, and criticize
> > >>  Economics on the basis of data, which is the proper domain of
> > >>  economics.
> > >
> > >Neither Economics, nor economics can have a self-consistent foundation.
> >
> > I'm quite prepared to agree, but one of the things about the
> > perceptual world, as opposed to the logical world, is that one can
> > perceive mutually contradictory things.
> 
> I was under the impression that when this takes place as in the necker
> drawings
> what is involved is an oscilation between contradictory perceptions rather
> than
> a situation in which mutually contradictory perceptions were simultaneously
> percieved.  Or, are there experimental demonstations of simultaneously
> contradictory perceptions?
> 
>  Actually, one of the
> > implications of Godel's proof is that mathematics cannot at the same
> > time be provably self-consistent and complete.
> 
> We've kicked this around in the seminars here.  I've argued that the
> implications
> often derived from Godel's proof can be misleading.  A lack of completeness
> accompanied by self-consistency seems like an OK enviornment as far as my
> needs are involved.
> 
> 
> So why should one
> > expect "Economics" to be, and why should one expect "economics" to be
> > self-consistent, other than as a goal in the far distance.
> 
> I regard "self-consistency" as a fundamental requirement.  I think I can
> live with
> something less than completeness-- even in logic.
> 
> >
> > >  Capital-E Economics is based on the
> > >>  logical consequences of abstract axioms that have no necessary
> > >>  connection with reality, whereas economics is based on observing
> > >>  reality.
> > >
> > >Your argument is in a sense self-consistent, but we are not at this
> > >point communicating.  To repeat, I have alternatives other than the
> > >two that you suggest.
> >
> > It might be interesting for you to expound them, though it would be a
> > different topic of discussion than the one I intended in starting
> > what has become this thread.
> 
> There are other times, and indeed other place where we could consider this.
> 
> >
> > >  > >  the consistent mistake that people outside
> > >>  >economics seem to consistently make,  is to think that they can avoid
> > >>  >thinking about value.
> > >>
> > >>  What makes you say that?
> > >
> > >Read Bill Powers' posts-- he has said quite directly that he is going to
> > >approach economics as a concrete question.  ( I suppose this is due
> > >to the influence of TC Powers.  _Concrete_ do you get it?  But, Powers
> > >is, no joke, attempting to approach economics in a strictly materialist
> > >mode of inquiry.  What he doesn't tell us, however, is what good an
> > >economic model will be that only has _one_ good.  That is _all_ that his
> > >approach is ever going to support.
> >
> > Can you prove that?
> 
> I don't think that _I_ have to.  I suppose I could look it up, or ask
> around, but
> I've been making this argument here for quite some time and the consensus
> as I understand it is that the argument is correct.  I can trot it out if it
> is of
> interest.
> 
>  > It doesn't look like that to me.
> 
> I can understand that it might not appear obvious.  I know it strikes many
> people
> as a bit strange at first.  But, it has been my experience that after some
> reflection
> people conclude that a materialist conception (as I and a very big
> literature define
> materialism) can not generate a multi-commodity analysis.
>
> What his project
> > looks like to me is quite different. It doesn't seem to embody a
> > theory of economics, so much as to provide an environment within
> > which different theories can be plugged to see what might happen if
> > those theories happened to be correct.
> 
> What Powers is attempting to do is create a kind of economic theory, without
> economic preconceptions.
> 
> 
> 
> > > that the enviornment he builds may carry implications for theory that
> > > are hidden in its structure, and those implications will in turn
> > > affect the results of testing the teories that are plugged in for
> > > test.
> > >
> > > >   Without a value theory, you can not
> > > >deal with an economy with multiple commodities.
> > >
> > > Value is ALWAYS in the mind of an individual.
> 
> Here we are not in agreement.  As an defense department analysist wouldn't
> you agree that one measure of economic value is the expression of an
> economies war potential?   This war potential isn't the only measure of
> economic value, but it is a potential that has an existence apart from the
> individuals involved. And, that value is expressed in terms of the ability
> to, as they say, "prevail" on the battle field.
> 
> You can't assign an
> > > objective value to any good or service. The best you can do is to get
> > > some kind of statistical approach to coordinating the behaviours of
> > > many individuals with respect to their appreciations of the values of
> > > something. You could, for example, find a level at which 50% of the
> > > people say something is more expensive than they are willing to pay
> > > at the moment (and "at the moment" is crucial), and 50% say they
> > > would rather have the thing than the money. Or you could do it the
> > > other way round, and look at the people who have the thing and are
> > > contemplating exchanging it for money. But you don't get an objective
> > > "value" out of that process. What you get is a one-dimensional
> > > measure of the relative preferences of a lot of people.
> 
> Our preconceptions about what is involve are so different that, before we
> can proceed there are issues which require clarifcation.
> > >
> > > >Isn't Bagno's entire essay, and my thesis
> > > >>  based on it, all about value and the correspondences between the
> > > >>  value of money and the value of goods and services present, past,
> and
> > > >>  future?
> 
> In the sense that I am thinking about  value, these approaches, are _part_
> of an analysis, and I would think an essential part, but I think the issue
> of value requires something beyond what these approaches consider.
> > > >
> > > >I think your approach may be open to the criticism of materialism, that
> > > >I've been suggesting. Can you for instance tell me how you construct a
> > > >price index?   If you can not explain the construction of price index
> > then
> > > >there some severe limitations.  Not, that the work isn't useful in some
> > > >other ways, but it isn't economics, or Economcs.  Unless you can
> explain
> > > >money, and price indexs, I wouldn't think many people would consider it
> > > >economics. (in a macro-economic sense).
> > >
> > > Does the foregoing help? And doesn't have at its core the equivalence
> > > of things (goods and services, past, present, and future) and the
> > > abstraction called money?
> > >
> > > >If you read the theoretical literature in economics you very frequently
> > > >encounter what amount to "impossibility" proofs.  In a sense the
> analysis
> > > >of the Giffen paradox that Bill Powers and I worked out, amounts to an
> > > >impossibility proof for any system based upon maximization-- either as
> > > >a behavioral or a basis for a price index.   I'd have to think about it
> > but
> > > >it seems to me that if I couldn't find a proof that no materialistic
> > > >foundation
> > > >can support an economic analysis, I might be able to generate one.
> > > >And, if I can't it is likely that my Chinese mathematician can.
> > > >
> > > >At this stage I don't think we are communicating, but despite that from
> > my
> > > >standpoint this has been a most useful exchange.
> > >
> > > Well, that word "axiological" didn't help. And it may be that
> > > "materialism" is equally misleading, inasmuch as the way I understand
> > > it, if a realm of enquiry isn't based on the material world, then its
> > > conclusions are unlikely to have much importance for activity in that
> > > material world.
> 
> I think the use to which "material world" is being put is so different in
> your lexicon than in mine that we aren't communicating.
> 
> Obviously, or I think obviously, we have our existence in a world that is
> sufficiently simliar that we can to a great extent communicate.  However,
> when we attempt to communicate about issues at the basis of theoretical
> economics our communication breaks down.  This isn't unusual.
> 
> Still I regard the discussion as never-the-less being worthwhile.
>
> > > So that was a wrong use of "axiological", which led to a wrong
> > > impression of where Bill W. stands (others may have made the same
> > > mistake, I guess).
> > >
> > > >  > >No Martin. You are getting it all confused.
> > > >>
> > > >>  Then could you define "axiological"? It sounds as if it means
> > > >>  something like "logical consequences of axioms". If it doesn't, then
> > > >>  maybe another word might be more readily interpreted.
> > > >
> > > >   "Axiological" is the adjective  form, but the root pertains to the
> > theory
> > > >of value.
> > >
> > > Ah...That changes a lot!
> > >
> > > >  If you think of the foundations of thought many people divide
> > > >up fundamental topics into the theory of value (axiological concerns)
> > > >and the theory of logic.
> > >
> > > I'd say that both would be at heart theories of logic, though
> > > different.
> >
> > I suppose there is a sense in which you are correct.  I started using the
> > term "axiology" as a result of what I think of as a productive clash here
> > between a methodological tradition that traces to Veblen, Dewey, Mead
> > and others  and a Critical Realist tradition that represents a renewed
> > version of British Socialism.  The debate has increasing adopted the
> > full, or at least fuller, Greek nominclature of not only the more familiar
> > terms, logic, and epistomology, but also the less familiar terms,
> > "ontology," (theory of being) and "axiology. " (theory of value).   I've
> > picked the terms up in context as the debate has gone on over the
> > last few years, but I hadn't taken the time to look at the derivation of
> the
> > terms.  After, all what-ever the terms may have once meant, what they
> > mean here and now is defined by how they are used here and now.
> >
> > The dictionary that was availible last night wasn't much help, but I was
> > surprized at how close the content is --  axiological ( theory of value)
> and
> > axiomatic ( pertaining to logical structure ).  And, "ontology" the
> > structure
> > of being,  while it has a distinct subject-matter, or process as its
> > concern can in many respects appear to be quite similar.
> >
> > When we (Some people designate "we" in terms of American pragmatism)
> > were confronted by the Criticial Realists at first, they said, "You don't
> > have
> > an ontology."  Evidently in their view this settle the question, and all
> the
> > questions-- game over, and they'd won."  We didn't at first have a clue
> > about
> > what was an "ontology."  Now, a couple of years later we at least know
> what
> > some of the words mean, and can hold our own in the "shoot outs."   I sat
> in
> > on a couple of the Critical Realist classes, and after a couple of terms
> can
> > now give the Critical Realists a hard time-- because I know what enough of
> > the words mean to argue on their terms.  I'm also on "good terms" with
> many
> > of the Critical Realists-- at least in part because I respected their work
> > enough to become what they view as an informed critic of their position.
> >
> >  In order to fend off another potential misunderstanding,
> > > the point is that (speaking as a "conventional, credentialled expert"
> > > in perception psychology), there are two fundamentally different
> > > modes of thought, but the split is not between logic and value, but
> > > between -- it's hard to put into one or two phrases -- exclusion and
> > > inclusion. Both work together to make the best of a messy perceptual
> > > situation. "Exclusion" might be imagined as looking for reasons why
> > > what you see is different from X, whereas "inclusion" could be
> > > imagined as looking for X, Y, Z, ... that this might be. "Exclusion"
> > > relates to linguistics and logic, "inclusion" to intuition and visual
> > > appearance.
> > >
> > > >Well, you are still identifying me with positions that I don't remotely
> > > >hold.
> > >
> > > I may have done that,
> >
> > No harm done.  And, initially such confusions seem to be unavoidable.
> >
> >  but I wasn't arguing with you. I was arguing a
> > > more general, abstract, position.
> >
> > Understood.
> >
> >
> > More directedly, I was arguing that
> > > there was no need for the Powers and the Jorgensons of the world to
> > > try, at this point in their work, to relate what they were doing to
> > > the abstract world of Economics,
> >
> > But, here, I am convinced is where a divergence begins.  You talkd about
> > "the abstract world of Economics" as if there was any other kind.
> >
> > While it appears to me that your world of "economics" is just as
> "abstract"
> > as the version with an uppercase "E."
> >
> >
> >  or even to worry about whether the
> > > conceptual constructs used in Economics are the constructs that ought
> > > to be used in their modelling.
> >
> > I do not see that any other kinds of concepts are availible. Some people
> > are of the opinion that they only deal with "concrete" realities-- they
> are
> > I am convinced completely mistaken.  And, this for me is a crucial point.
> > What I am convinced people are doing when they insist that they are
> > limiting themselves to "concrete" observations or whatever, is instead a
> > way of introducing _a priori_ conceptions into the inquiry. They are
> > convinced that their "conconcrete" categories are to use Adam Smith's
> > phrase so "simple and obvious" that any attempt to examine what the
> > terms mean is unneccesary. Veblen described in terms of a long ago
> > popular song, "We don't know where we are going, but we are on our way."
> > So, Bill Powers is impatient with an examination of what the terms mean,
> > and he shifts the meaning of the terms as he goes. Today "investment"
> > means one thing, yesterday it meant someting else. (sorry about the
> > rant, back to a consideration of your position-- or at least what I
> perhaps
> > mistakenly think is your position.)
> >
> > >
> > > Going back to the history of Science, I'm making the analogy with
> > > whether modellers of early thermodynamics should have been concerned
> > > with the properties of phlogiston. At the time, the accepted model is
> > > that they should, and the accepted model could have been right. But a
> > > more effective set of conceptual constructs never imagined in the
> > > conventional model, such as entropy, turned out to be much more
> > > useful.
> >
> > Sure. I can see that there are times when inorder to make headway it
> > you may be better off to abandon previous confusions.
> >
> > >
> > > >So, I could just as well ask you where this very strange, strange to
> me,
> > > >vision of Bill Williams came from.
> > >
> > > I hope I explained that.
> > >
> > > >  Mostly, since we don't know each
> > > >other all that well, you appears that when you hear me reject one side
> > > >of the European dualism, you assume that I must be a representative
> > > >of the other side of that dualism.
> > >
> > > Going back a few paragraphs, I'd say that statement is based on an
> > > exclusionist mode of thought. I generally use more of an inclusionist
> > > mode, wheree I look for similarities. More to the point, I tend to
> > > apply polarization when it seems to me that useful distinctions are
> > > not being made, and to argue for a middle (or perhaps a "third pole")
> > > position when the poles are taken as the only options.
> >
> > OK. "Third" something or other is often the way people seeking a way
> > out of conceptual dead ends often talk about their efforts.
> >
> > >
> > > Since much of the rest of your post is arguing for neither pole, I
> > > suspect we may be more in agreement than you think.
> >
> > Very well might be. If so Good!
> >
> > As in...
> > >
> > > >  I'm making a distinction between
> > > >>  top-down and bottom-up approaches.
> > > >
> > > >But, there is also the possiblity of entering an inquiry from the side.
> > > >This would be neither top-down or bottom-up.
> > >
> > > >while the other is the engineering-modelling approach
> > > >>  >>  (economics) of finding models that describe from new viewpoints
> > what
> > > >>  >>  actually does happen in the real world,
> > > >
> > > >Where did, this "real world" come from?
> > >
> > > Good question, in context. It's a shorthand for "the world as
> > > perceived when we examine it rather than examining our imaginings of
> > > it." But, as Marc Abrams likes to point out, our imaginings of the
> > > real world strongly affect what we perceive when we look at it.
> >
> > Yes!
> >
> > And, this is what appeals to me in Marc's attempt to find a more
> > inclusive approach to a theory of behavior.  Even though for my purposes
> > a fairly basic control theory model has such an extensive range of
> > applications
> > that I don't see that, again for my purposes, I need a better, more
> > inclusive
> > conception of behavior.
> >
> >
> > And
> > > that comes right back to the question of whether our conceptual
> > > constructs are as useful as a different (as yet unknown) set might be
> > > when we look.
> >
> > This is always a possiblity.  But, it seems to me that what is already in
> > view in the basic control theory scheme is something that doesn't fit
> > with any consistency into either an idealist or a materialist conception
> > of the world.
> >
> > >
> > > Interestingly enough, I've just entered into a discussion of this in
> > > an entirely different area (military conflict) with someone who
> > > thinks the constructs of PCT are inadequate to deal with this exact
> > > problem.
> >
> > Well, military issues do in a sense clear the deck.
> >
> > And to make the problem more germane, much of the
> > > Economics-economics world also has to do with organized, intentional
> > > conflict.
> >
> > Yes indeed.  In a sense the price of a commodity can be thought of as sort
> > of temporary truce.  In this sense, the price of a good in many settings
> is
> > set-- sometimes by buyer sometimes by seller, but it is set.  Transactions
> > go on for various quantities.  And, until something disturbs the context
> > sufficiently people would rather do their trade, and not engage in a
> > struggle
> > over the price. Neo-Classical theory can not, and I firmly, at least
> untill
> > I am
> > shown otherwise, explain why prices are "sticky."  According to this
> > orthodoxy
> > based upon maximization, prices ought to be, all the time you understand,
> > sliding up and down smoothly.  Well, obviously most prices don't slide
> > around
> > smoothly.  And, those markets in which they do, are often troubled
> markets.
> >
> > >
> > > >   Bill Powers has been telling me for
> > > >years about the "real world."  But, it has never gotten any closer, and
> > he
> > > >still
> > > >doesn't understand about accounting identies, and I doubt he has any
> > > >conception at all  of value theory.  (I will repeat-- value theory is
> not
> > > >platonism.)
> > >
> > > I have no opinion on that.
> >
> > OK.  However, internally, when you say, "I have no opinion on that."  I
> tend
> > to
> > read what you say in terms of "an opinion."
> >
> >
> > My main point was that what he and other
> > > potential bottom-up workers need is enough knowledge to know how to
> > > read the published figures.
> >
> > I would agree.  And, many times I I have supplied such information. But,
> the
> > he doesn't find that what nearly everyone else regard as the facts of the
> > situation-- such as what the macro-accounting concepts mean-- fit his
> > preconceptions. Comicly, when Powers attempted to find an economist
> > that would be more sympathetic to his approach, what he hit on with Bruun
> > was a person who quite plainly affirms what I have been telling Bill for a
> > couple of decades.  page 71.  Money has its own logic,  p. 87.  [ I = S].
> > Bruun says what I have to say about the Keynesian identity far better than
> > I do.  If I encounter a student who doesn't understand the Keynesian
> system
> > I am in a position where I solve the problem by working with students who
> > do. I've got better things to do with my time.
> >
> >
> > They are as liklely to be hindered as to
> > > be helped by knowing the theoretical constructs which their
> > > experiments might either show to be crucial or useless (without
> > > value). Understanding too much has a tendency to bias the
> > > experimenter, which is why, in psychology and medicine, one tries to
> > > use a procedure called "double-blind."
> >
> > Where it is possible to do experiments what you say is, or can be, of
> > value.  But, it isn't remotely feasible for Bill Powers and Rick Marken
> > to devise and collect an entirely new series of numbers that in someway
> > describe economic activity.  They aren't making in this sense a new
> > set of experiments, they are using the same data everyone else is using.
> > But, they refuse to take the time to make a sustained effort to understand
> > the nature of an accounting identity.  I've tried to explain it to Bill
> > Powers.
> > The result is that he argues with his instructor and call me
> "mathematically
> > incompentent."  If there is a basic foundation of the economic threads on
> > CSGnet it revolves about this issue. Powers said it well enough recently
> > when he used the phrase, "Shocking stupdity."
> >
> > Powers ,  explains the Keynesian system as a result of Keynes failure to
> > realize that people not only save, but they also invest.   And, therefore
> > the
> > last two thirds of a century of work in macro-economics has been nothing
> >  more than a result of this obvious over-sight.
> >
> > >
> > > >You appear to have adopted a "materialist" position.  It works well
> > enough I
> > > >suppose for physics, chemistry and a physiological psychology.  But, it
> > > >doesn't work at all, at least in my understanding, for fields such as
> > > >linguistics,
> > > >or economics.
> > >
> > > Interestingly, it was my lifelong interest in psycholinguistics and
> > > human communication that led me to PCT as the only (so far as I know)
> > > viable foundation for linguistics. As a "credentialled expert" I have
> > > co-authored a few books and more than a few papers in the area
> > > (though no books with the PCT connection). My contributions to the
> > > PCT special issue of the International Journal of Human Computer
> > > Studies were precisely on how PCT illuminates problems of
> > > communication among humans or between humans and "intelligent"
> > > machines.
> >
> > Impressive, but does this work speak to the question of a consistent
> > foundation for linguistics?
> >
> > I don't pretend to know enough about linguistics
> > to pretend to have opinions, but based on my experience with other fields,
> > I would suspect  that neither an idealist or a materialist approach would
> > be capable of supplying the foudation for what I would regard as an
> > adaquate approach to linguistics.
> >
> > >
> > > >  If the top-down and
> > > >>  bottom-up approaches meet in the middle, that's great, but it
> doesn't
> > > >>  make them any the less distinct.
> > > >
> > > >They may in some sense "meet in the middle."  But, there is no way that
> I
> > > >have
> > > >every seen that either, or both together, of the idealist or
> materialist
> > > >conceptions
> > > >can provide a self-consistent basis for econmic theory.
> > >
> > > Any more than strict bottom-up or strict top-down approaches can
> > > explain what we perceive in the real world. I think we agree here.
> > >
> > > >  > >And, bringing back "natural laws" is one of
> > > >>  >those "giant leaps in the wrong direction."
> > > >>
> > > >>  Perhaps you misunderstand the concept of "natural law". To me, it's
> a
> > > >>  statement of the way things interact (behave) under some defined
> > > >>  restricted set of circumstances, which cannot be altered by human
> > > >>  choices. No more than that.
> > > >
> > > >OK. Your defintion of "natural law" is basically a "materialism."
> > >
> > > I am a bit wary of such labels, because, though I may agree with some
> > > parts of what it means to me, others may take it that I agree with
> > > aspects that are more salient to them, but with which I do not agree.
> >
> > OK. Then these areas where you and materialism part company may be
> > fundamental in terms of my understanding of your position.
> > >
> > > Having said that, I'd like to redefine "natural law" in a way that I
> > > don't intend to conflict with my earlier definition, but taking it
> > > from a different angle: A "natural law" describes interrelationships
> > > that always are observed to hold.
> >
> > OK. Makes things simple in the sense that a single reliable anomoly
> > indicates that something is wrong.
> >
> >
> >  Examples are much easier to find in
> > > physics than in psychology or in economics,
> >
> > Actually I think the Giffen case is an anomoloy in the context of
> > neo-classical
> > economics that is as reliable an anomoly as you can find anywhere.
> >
> > but in all fields it
> > > remains true (a "natural law") that no delimited entity can, over its
> > > lifetime, emit more energy than it takes in. That's an important law
> > > in physiology and in economics.
> >
> > I am not entirely sure this relationship has, as yet, attained the status
> of
> > a
> > "law" in economics.  If it had, I think some changes would be taking place
> > in economics and they aren't.
> >
> > Attempts to violate that law because
> > > it was not known to exist were what led to the long search for the
> > > Philosophers' Stone.
> > >
> > > >  I think it
> > > >would be
> > > >helpful before continuing to identify  the who and the what that is the
> > > >referent
> > > >of your "disastrous Economics."
> > >
> > > Usually, I think of people like Jeffrey Sachs, who (unless I'm mixing
> > > him up with some other person) almost single-handedly brought Russia
> > > to ruin.
> >
> > We agree about Jeff.  But, he had lots of help.
> >
> >
> >  I'm thinking generally of the followers of Hayek, equally
> > > with the believers in a planned economy.
> >
> > We are also in agreement here as well. Both sides get it wrong and
> > take up most of the stage on which the questions are debated.  More
> > intellegent approaches are shoved almost entirely out of public view.
> > >
> > > >   > In other words, you are working with "economics", meaning there's
> no
> > > >>  >>  point in arguing about "Economics."
> > > >
> > > >No. We aren't at this point really communicating.
> > >
> > > It takes time to develop an understanding, but as I mentioned at the
> > > top, I hadn't intended to communicated primarily with you in this
> > > area. We may have different views, but the people I intended to
> > > communicate with were the modellers.
> >
> > Oh, Ok, then I mis-understood the intent.
> >
> >
> > >
> > > >I am not sure it helps, but it seems to me that both sides of the
> > division
> > > >in
> > > >European thought between "idealism" and "materialism" contain defects.
> > > >And, between them the defects generate characteristic problems. Many of
> > > >these problems land in economics.  How for instance would you define a
> > > >price level?
> > >
> > > A question prior to that is "Do I want to define such a concept?" If
> > > I can answer that with good reasons behind my answer, I have probably
> > > defined what the construct is, in ways that I can defend. I haven't
> > > answered it except for the price level in a single transaction, and
> > > there what it means is an amount of money that to the seller has more
> > > value than does the thing sold, whereas the opposite is tru for the
> > > buyer.
> > >
> > > Is that a satisfactory answer?
> >
> > I don't think that it does.  As far as I understand it, in dealing with a
> > national
> > economy where many commodities are produced, if you want to measure
> > the economic output, you can count as a starting point the dollar volume
> of
> > final transactions (needs a definition, but I think the usual one is
> > adaquate)
> > and you need some way of adjusting this number to take into account
> > price changes. It doesn't appear to me that your concept supplys what's
> > needed.
> >
> >
> > >
> > > >   You can not possibly add up the material that goes out the
> > > >factory door to get a level of economic production.  You can't even add
> > up
> > > >apples and watermellons, let alone diamonds and sulfuric acid.
> Economic
> > > >output is not material.
> > >
> > > I have, indeed, followed Bagno in arguing precisely that.
> >
> > Then your argument is faulty. I don't intend to be offensive, but I might
> as
> > well
> > be concise.
> >
> > >
> > > >   So, econmic output needs a
> > > >completely different foundation than either materialism or idealism.
> > >
> > > You could be right, but the logic isn't there.
> >
> > Actually, Dewey's _Logic_ has been here. What's been missing has been a
> > methodology to put Dewey's (third way) into use.  And, in my view control
> > theory supplys the method.
> >
> > Is Bagno's measure of
> > > imposed organization material or ideal? Or neither? How about the
> > > Odums?
> >
> > I think that these approaches are a required componate of what will
> > eventually
> > become the replacement for economic orthodoxy.  You will note that I
> > included
> > Odums professor at Yale  G. E. Hutchinson in a recent reading list.
> >
> >
> > >
> > > >  > Clearly, the warning is exaggerated, but I think exaggeration is
> > > >>  beneficial at this point. There may come a time when the opposite
> > > >>  warning might be more useful, but I don't think that time is now.
> Too
> > > >>  many people have failed to make the distinction, and criticize
> > > >>  Economics on the basis of data, which is the proper domain of
> > > >>  economics.
> > > >
> > > >Neither Economics, nor economics can have a self-consistent foundation.
> > >
> > > I'm quite prepared to agree, but one of the things about the
> > > perceptual world, as opposed to the logical world, is that one can
> > > perceive mutually contradictory things.
> >
> > I was under the impression that when this takes place as in the necker
> > drawings
> > what is involved is an oscilation between contradictory perceptions rather
> > than
> > a situation in which mutually contradictory perceptions were
> simultaneously
> > percieved.  Or, are there experimental demonstations of simultaneously
> > contradictory perceptions?
> >
> >  Actually, one of the
> > > implications of Godel's proof is that mathematics cannot at the same
> > > time be provably self-consistent and complete.
> >
> > We've kicked this around in the seminars here.  I've argued that the
> > implications
> > often derived from Godel's proof can be misleading.  A lack of
> completeness
> > accompanied by self-consistency seems like an OK enviornment as far as my
> > needs are involved.
> >
> >
> > So why should one
> > > expect "Economics" to be, and why should one expect "economics" to be
> > > self-consistent, other than as a goal in the far distance.
> >
> > I regard "self-consistency" as a fundamental requirement.  I think I can
> > live with
> > something less than completeness-- even in logic.
> >
> > >
> > > >  Capital-E Economics is based on the
> > > >>  logical consequences of abstract axioms that have no necessary
> > > >>  connection with reality, whereas economics is based on observing
> > > >>  reality.
> > > >
> > > >Your argument is in a sense self-consistent, but we are not at this
> > > >point communicating.  To repeat, I have alternatives other than the
> > > >two that you suggest.
> > >
> > > It might be interesting for you to expound them, though it would be a
> > > different topic of discussion than the one I intended in starting
> > > what has become this thread.
> >
> > There are other times, and indeed other place where we could consider
> this.
> >
> > >
> > > >  > >  the consistent mistake that people outside
> > > >>  >economics seem to consistently make,  is to think that they can
> avoid
> > > >>  >thinking about value.
> > > >>
> > > >>  What makes you say that?
> > > >
> > > >Read Bill Powers' posts-- he has said quite directly that he is going
> to
> > > >approach economics as a concrete question.  ( I suppose this is due
> > > >to the influence of TC Powers.  _Concrete_ do you get it?  But, Powers
> > > >is, no joke, attempting to approach economics in a strictly materialist
> > > >mode of inquiry.  What he doesn't tell us, however, is what good an
> > > >economic model will be that only has _one_ good.  That is _all_ that
> his
> > > >approach is ever going to support.
> > >
> > > Can you prove that?
> >
> > I don't think that _I_ have to.  I suppose I could look it up, or ask
> > around, but
> > I've been making this argument here for quite some time and the consensus
> > as I understand it is that the argument is correct.  I can trot it out if
> it
> > is of
> > interest.
> >
> >  > It doesn't look like that to me.
> >
> > I can understand that it might not appear obvious.  I know it strikes many
> > people
> > as a bit strange at first.  But, it has been my experience that after some
> > reflection
> > people conclude that a materialist conception (as I and a very big
> > literature define
> > materialism) can not generate a multi-commodity analysis.
> >
> > What his project
> > > looks like to me is quite different. It doesn't seem to embody a
> > > theory of economics, so much as to provide an environment within
> > > which different theories can be plugged to see what might happen if
> > > those theories happened to be correct.
> >
> > What Powers is attempting to do is create a kind of economic theory,
> without economic preconceptions.  This seems to me to violate what
  I thought were generally recognized understandings that perceptions
  of anysort are not possible in the absence of preconceptions. I
  thought that the notion of "direct" perception had been abandoned.
  So, I was surprized that when Powers starts talking about his
  economic ideas, this notion of "concreteness" emerges. Where is
  this stuff coming from?  It looks to me like the most naive and
  uninformed methodological approach immaginable.

Things have gotten a bit garbled.  I've had to patch things here.

The discussion continues with Martin asserting that:


> Value is ALWAYS in the mind of an individual.

I don't believe that this is actually the case. There is the
expression of value in terms of military potential. And this
value is ultimately measured in terms of the ablity to prevail
on the battlefield. This ablity to "prevail" is not a subjective
matter. It is a testable proposition.

> You can't assign an objective value to any good or service.

In military terms I believe you can.

Martin's subsequent argument elaborates what I regard as a
mistaken position.  I snip it and return to the discussion

>Isn't Bagno's entire essay, and my thesis
>>  based on it, all about value and the correspondences between the
>>  value of money and the value of goods and services present, past, and
>>  future?

I think to consider this productively we need to clarify issues that
are in a sense "up-stream."  I would say that your work, Bagno's,
Odums and other can be expected to be a part of a new economics, but
I don't think that it is sufficiently comprehensive to _be_ the
new economics.

>Does the foregoing help? And doesn't have at its core the equivalence
>of things (goods and services, past, present, and future) and the
> abstraction called money?

The question of equivalence, is I think problematic, in the absence of
a way of constructing price indexs.

>If you read the theoretical literature in economics you very frequently
>encounter what amount to "impossibility" proofs.  In a sense the analysis
>of the Giffen paradox that Bill Powers and I worked out, amounts to an
>impossibility proof for any system based upon maximization-- either as
>a behavioral or a basis for a price index.   I'd have to think about it but
>it seems to me that if I couldn't find a proof that no materialistic
>foundation
>can support an economic analysis, I might be able to generate one.
>And, if I can't it is likely that my Chinese mathematician can.
>
>At this stage I don't think we are communicating, but despite that from my
>standpoint this has been a most useful exchange.

>Well, that word "axiological" didn't help.

Perhaps not, but it is a perfectly good word, and I like it better
that the phrase "value theory" or "theory of valuation" which I
used to use.

And it may be that "materialism" is equally misleading,

Yes.  I think it would be interesting and productive if you would
specify where your position differs from the one most people would
associate with the term "materialism."

>inasmuch as the way I understand
>it, if a realm of enquiry isn't based on the material world, then its
>conclusions are unlikely to have much importance for activity in that
>material world.

I would contrast your assertion with one that I will construct which
says, "That if economic analysis is not about values, it isn't about
economics."  Now, it should be understood that what I mean by the
term "values" is humpty-dumpty fashion is what I mean by values and
nothing more nor less.

I've enjoyed the discussion, and I hope you have too.

If we continue this, I think it is past time to abandon the
by now tattered stream of comments and replys for a fresh page.

Bill Williams