A Model-Based Controller?

[Avery.Andrews 950526:1605]

Here's a possible model-based controller I've been thinking about.
First I'll describe the controller, then the neuro condition that
caused me to dream it up.

Suppose you need to track a reasonably large number of moving objects
in your vicinity, say in order to avoid bumping into them, and you
can't keep them all under continuous observation at the same time.
Here's a possible solution. A subsystem that I'll call the scanner
surveys the environment according to some schedule that it finds
optimal, maintaining records, which I'll call registers, of the moving
objects it detects. Into these registers (same idea as the `markers'
of Chapman and Agre's Pengo, and Chapman's Sonya) go specifications
of the position and motion of the objects. For motion I'd suggest
storing the velocity and acceleration, but probably not higher
derivatives of the position as such. So the scanner locks on an object,
object A perhaps, records its observations into a register, and then
takes on the next object. Meanwhile what happens to the register
containing the info about A? In my hypothetical model, integrators update the
position info as specified by the velocity as specified by the
acceleration, so the position info keeps getting updated, even tho no
observation, e.g., real perception of position, occurs. This info may
not be completely accurate, but it will be better than it would be
without the automatic updating.

Then when the scanner gets around to considering object A again, it
looks at the place where A is now supposed to be, updates the info, and
perhaps takes account how accurate or otherwise its prediction has been
- objects with too much prediction inaccuracy might be tracked more
often, for example.

So here we get relatively smoothly varying perceptions of position,
from the vantagepoint of higher-level control systems, on the basis
of observations which are intermittent.

So does this happen in real life? Oliver Sacks' _An Anthropologist
on Mars_ describes an (apparently very rare) condition that he calls
`motion-blindness' (footnote, pg. 26) wherein people lose their ability
to perceive motion. His patient has experiences like this: Pouring tea is
impossible, because the stuff `seems frozen, like a glacier'.
Crossing a street was very difficult: "When I'm looking at the
car first, it seems far away. But them, when I want to cross
the road, suddenly the car is very near". Rooms where more
than two people were walking were intolerable: "people were
suddenly here or there, but I had not seen them moving".

This patient's problems with rooms where more than two people are moving
around suggests to me that we actually do employ something like the
model-based system I sketched above. The patient's motion-detectors
being out of action, the predicted positions of moving people are
always just where they were last seen (0 in the acceleration and
velocity registers, so the integrators do nothing); with more than two
people in the room she can't scan fast enough for this prediction to be
tolerably accurate, so she can't stand to be there.

Of course, I said `model-based controller' in the banner, but haven't
specified any full control-system. Suppose you're trying to follow
someone through a shopping mall, where people are milling around.
So you want to maintain a high level of `perceived proximity to X',
but you don't want to keep your eye fixated on X all the time, plus
of course you don't want to crash into other people walking round,
etc. So the scanner provides you with a `position of X' perception
(relative to you, of course), & the reference is for this to be small,
etc.

So the pikkie would be:

                           RefD-to-X
                              >
                              >
                              v
                    --------> C ----
                    > >
                  abs(x) ?
                    ^
                    >
             ^ | loc(X) (vector)

ยทยทยท

     >

            ---------------
            > The Scanner |
            _______________|
             ^ ^^ |||
             > >> vvv

Note that the scanner has its own perceptual inputs and effector outputs
(the arrows hanging down off it), but also puts out position vectors
as perceptual inputs to higher-level systems; in this case the
perception that's to be controlled is the absolute value of a position-vector.

I'll confess that this was actually the hidden agenda behind my hidden
tracking query - it seems to me that if a system like this exists, we
should be able to find out something about its properties, e.g.
what kind of motion info it collects, & that's one area where this
group has considerable expertise.

Avery.Andrews@anu.edu.au

[Bruce Nevin 950530:1330]

[Avery.Andrews 950526:1605]

This could just be a kind of attention problem, at least so far as I can
see from the passages you quote and paraphrase from Sacks (I haven't read
the book). Consider that we perceive much more than we control, and that
we control much more than rises to conscious awareness.

The premise with which you start says you're tracking a large number of
objects and "you can't keep them all under continuous observation at the
same time".

If by this you mean that they go out of sight or in some other way you no
longer have perceptual input "about" them from the environment, then you
have a case for imagining their whereabouts when you lose touch with them.
But Sacks's guy seems to have had a clear view of the approaching car, or
the people in the room.

If you just mean that there are too many to control at once, maybe we need
to know about the conditions under which subliminal perceptions come to
one's conscious awareness: of the many moving objects, we control our
perceptions only of those that matter the most (closest, fastest
approaching, having attributes that are desired or feared, etc.). In the
case of the car we're not talking about a multitude of objects being
actively tracked (I assume), but there is a lot going on in the
environment. Couldn't tune out his peripheral vision?

        Bruce N.

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<[Bill Leach 950530.20:03 U.S. Eastern Time Zone]

[Bruce Nevin 950530:1330]

Hi Bruce, been awhile...

I think you are missing what Avery was really presenting. The Sacks
examples were to point out that it appears possible that we really do (at
least under some conditions) store position and velocity information of
some nature concerning objects in our environment. The descriptions by
Sacks' patients are the sort of thing you would expect if a person viewed
a moving object that had previously thought was stationary.

I don't know about others, but this is yet another example of something
similar that I remember experiencing. In several situations in the past,
I have viewed a "potentially" moving object briefly, concluded that it
was stationary and then discovered shortly thereafter that the object was
and had been in motion. I believe that when this has happened "visual
tricks" were operative.

For example, in all cases that I recall, the lighting was either poor or
unusual (high intensity vapor lamps mounted close to the ground). In one
situation the "reference for stationary" that I was probably using was a
"box car" with an obviously stationary switching engine very close to me
and on the same track. What I did not see was that the curved part of
the track contained an additional switching engine attached to the car
and in motion. I appearently concluded that the truck next to the box
car was also stationary (it was relative to the box car).

I also remember situations where equipment in tunnels can be very
difficult to analyze for motion -- again, I presume because of the
effects of lighting changes that might fool your perceptions be masking
"visual clues" of change.

Have you ever merged onto a hiway, noted a car behind you at a "great
distance" only to be shocked as the driver of said car swerves violently
while blowing the horn as he blasts past you? I can envision that the
feeling must be much like what Sacks' patients describe for their
"normal" encounters.

Secondarily, what is an "attention problem"? I believe that this is one
of the terms that is almost meaningless from a PCT point of view. To a
PCT researcher a short or completely non-existant attention span would be
"a problem" since it would then be about impossible to perform the test.

For example, I don't believe that autistic children are "troubled" by
their lack of attention -- it is the observer that is troubled.

subliminal

It seems to me that we also control most of our perceptions without
conscious awareness (I hope this does not lead to another "alerting
phenomenon" discussion). As when I just typed the preceeding sentence, I
was not conscious of the acutal act of typing as I am now for this one!
Even still, there is some much going on in that act with which I am not
fully aware - detailed finger motions for instance.

-bill

[Bruce Nevin 950531:1013]

[Bill Leach 950530.20:03 U.S. Eastern Time Zone]

I should be more explicit: When we propose a new mechanism to account for a
phenomenon, we have to ask whether we can account for the phenomenon by
some other mechanism which we already need for independent reasons.

I am not claiming that stimuli grab attention or some such. Movement is a
disturbance or it is not. If it isn't, why?

Maybe it is not perceived at all, due to pathology of transition-level
control systems.

Maybe gain in those systems for some reason cannot be set high enough for
movement to be a disturbance.

Maybe attention is stuck on the event level and the patient can't attend to
transition perceptions. Why is attention relevant? Determining when to
cross the street through traffic, and managing social as well as physical
relationships with people in a room, both require attention, I believe, in
ways that e.g. drinking a beer or typing do not.

Maybe the person for some reason does not attend to ongoing perceptual
input from the environment and instead attends to a remembered (now
imagined) perception of where the object just was. This sounds like the
familiar phenomenon of "spacing out" or daydreaming, in a pathological
form. Such a pathology would give the outward appearance of model-based
control gone awry. It was this last that I had in mind because of its
similarity to model-based control, so far as I understand it.

How is "model-based control" different from imagination? What is required
other than imagination and something that elects to attend to imagined
perceptions rather than perceptual input from the environment? (These are
seriously intended questions--given the sometime tone of discussion I guess
I have to say that explicitly too.) How do we model the deliberate
attending to imagined perceptions, when actual perceptual input is
available? We have to account for this somehow anyway. Might this
mechanism go awry? These were the questions I was trying to raise.

Can't linger, but it's good to (try to) tag along as a reader of digests.
I may have more time in a month or two.

        Bruce N.

      .. .. Bruce Nevin
      >> >> Cisco - ATM Business Unit (LightStream)
      >> >> 1100 Technology Park Drive
     >>>> >>>> Billerica, MA 01821
..:||||||:..:||||||:.. Phone: 508 262-1120
   Cisco Systems, Inc. Email: bnevin@cisco.com

<[Bill Leach 950531.18:28 U.S. Eastern Time Zone]

[Bruce Nevin 950531:1013]

I am not claiming that stimuli grab attention or some such.
Movement is a disturbance or it is not. If it isn't, why?

Your "attention" comments sound to me (rightly or wrongly) like a
"Stimulas-Response" view. For example the assertion that "movement is a
disturbance" is flatly a "Stimulas-Response" view.

It is correct that movement of a perceived object could represent a
disturbance to that perception and will if:

1. The movement of the object is perceived and
2. their exists reference values for the object's movement and
3. the perceived movement is outside this "allowed" range.

If the movement is not perceived, regardless of reason then there will be
no control action based upon the movement - rather obvious of course but
that does include biological system failures.

Maybe gain in those ssytem for some reason cannot be set high enough ...

I would still class this as a biological system failure (with recognition
that there are some situations that can be postulated where any 'normal'
system would also fail - such as dodging a bullet - but this in not the
type of case that Avery or I am referring to).

Maybe attention is stuck on the event level and the patient can't attend
to transition perceptions.

Are we here talking about a biological problem? If not then possibly
your suggestion might be of the sort where a person is "attending" to a
matter of such a great importance to them that they ignore everything
else around them. Much discussion has taken place concerning "alerting
phenomenon", priority, priority alteration, auctioneering, gain changing
and the like but little has been resolved short of most of us concluding
that no "special mechanism" need exist for alerting.

Why is attention relevant? Determining when to cross the street through
traffic, and managing social as well as physical relationships with
people in a room, both require attention, I believe, in ways that e.g.
drinking a beer or typing do not.

[I usually don't drink alone - especially beer] :slight_smile:

I suppose that I would need proof of this assertion. I don't believe
that I always consciously "focus attention" in crossing the street. This
may be a case of me "generating smoke" but when I cross a street, I
beleive that one of the references that gets set is that there are no
objects (above some minimum size) moving toward (and likely moving away
also) me. Now while I may indeed most often actually consciously observe
and examine the roadway, I am all but certain that on occassions I do
not but the reference is there nevertheless. The presence of a moving
vehicle in this latter case may "surprise" me but I am satisfied that
this "sudden" awareness is due NOT to the presence of the moving car but
rather due to the error that is generated in the higher level reference
set to having a perception of me on the other side of the street.

Maybe the person for some reason does not attend to ongoing perceptual
input from the environment and instead attends to a remembered (now
imagined) perception of where the object just was. This sounds like the
familiar phenomenon of "spacing out" or daydreaming, in a pathological
form. Such a pathology would give the outward appearance of model-based
control gone awry. It was this last that I had in mind because of its
similarity to model-based control, so far as I understand it.

I have encountered the study to which Avery referred once before (or at
least one similar). I believe that in the example of the car, the
problem is that the person can stare directly at the car and still be
disoriented -- that is they do not have to glance away or otherwise
divert the "attention" for their observation of the behaviour of the
moving vehicle to be disconcerting.

Avery's suggestion is but one possibility. I like it because it happens
to also be the simplest explaination that I can think of that both
explains "observed" phenomenon and is certainly consistent with a control
theory mechanism.

How is "model-based control" different from imagination? What is
required other than imagination and something that elects to attend to
imagined perceptions rather than perceptual input from the environment?
(These are seriously intended questions--given the sometime tone of
discussion I guess I have to say that explicitly too.)

I don't think that anyone envisions model-based control as working
without "imagination" but then that is probably not what you mean.
Depending upon exactly what you (or anyone else) means by the term
"model-based control", I think that it is safe to say that humans and
probably most "higher" animal all use model-based control to some extent.

Whenever one actually attempts to bring about a result that one can not
perceive continously but instead controls other perceptions (believed to
be related to the ultimate desired perception in some "formal way") to
references "designed" to achieve the perception that is not continously
perceived then one can be considered to be using a form of "model-based"
control. In this sense, I believe that we use model-based control all
the time but it is equally important to recognize that in such a case ALL
output to the environment is still in a closed loop negative feedback
system. Everything that you might observe this individual "doing"
involves controlling current perceptual inputs to current reference
values. Unless the person is quite literally "flopping around" nothing
else makes sense.

How do we model the deliberate attending to imagined perceptions, when
actual perceptual input is available? We have to account for this
somehow anyway. Might this mechanism go awry? These were the
questions I was trying to raise.

Bill P. of course, posited one possible "mechanical" way that this could
happen. Why we do it is I think solely a subject for speculation. I do
personally beleive now that we humans and probably most animals do have a
reference for "understanding" our own environment that is at quite a high
level. To my thinking, such probably can not actually be an "intrinsic"
since curiosity is not all that difficult to surpress (unfortuantely).

Maybe we do "have to account for this" sometime though I rather suspect
that as the higher levels of the hiearchy are better identified and we
begin to understand their organization and operation this whole matter of
"daydreaming" and "imagination" will just "fall out" as an obvious and
necessary part.

Obviously the mechanism can go awry and I am pretty sure that much of
what we will learn will come from determining the nature of the specific
control system losses as a result of these malfunctions.

Like you, I find thinking about these subject very interesting but
suspect that we are a rather long way from being able to do more than
just muse.

-bill