[From Fred Nickols (2010.04.28.1705 MST)]
When we say in lay terms that someone “wants” to
do something, what are we saying in PCT terms? Is it along the lines of “they
perceive a reason to do so” or something else?
Regards,
Fred Nickols
Managing
Partner
Distance Consulting LLC
1558 Coshocton
Ave - Suite 303
Mount Vernon,
OH 43050-5416
“Assistance at a
Distance”
[From Rick Marken (2010.04.29.0850)]
Fred Nickols (2010.04.28.1705 MST)--
When we say in lay terms that someone �wants� to do something, what are we
saying in PCT terms?� Is it along the lines of �they perceive a reason to do
so� or something else?
I don't know that there's a "right" answer to these kinds of questions
-- about the PCT Meaning of everyday language -- but here's my take.
When I say I "want" something what I mean is that I have a reference
for perceiving that something in a particular state. If that something
is "running for President" then I have have a reference to see my self
doing this complex activity. If I say I want to go to the market, same
thing; I want to perceive myself going to the market. When I say I
want something I I am describing what I imagine to be the perceptual
experience I would have if I actually acted to get my world (of
perception) into the wanted (reference) state. Why I want my world in
a particular state (the reason why I want to go to the market) and
whether I actually act to bring my perception of the world to that
state is a whole different matter, I think.
Best
Rick
--
Richard S. Marken PhD
rsmarken@gmail.com
www.mindreadings.com
[From Bruce Gregory (2010.04.29.1245 EDT)]
[From Rick Marken (2010.04.29.0850)]
Fred Nickols (2010.04.28.1705 MST)–
When we say in lay terms that someone wants to do something, what are we
saying in PCT terms? Is it along the lines of they perceive a reason to do
so or something else?I don’t know that there’s a “right” answer to these kinds of questions
– about the PCT Meaning of everyday language – but here’s my take.
When I say I “want” something what I mean is that I have a reference
for perceiving that something in a particular state. If that something
is “running for President” then I have have a reference to see my self
doing this complex activity. If I say I want to go to the market, same
thing; I want to perceive myself going to the market. When I say I
want something I I am describing what I imagine to be the perceptual
experience I would have if I actually acted to get my world (of
perception) into the wanted (reference) state. Why I want my world in
a particular state (the reason why I want to go to the market) and
whether I actually act to bring my perception of the world to that
state is a whole different matter, I think.
BG: I am not sure what it means to have a reference for perceiving something in a particular state while not acting to bring your perception of the world to that state. If you want to go to the market, but do nothing to make that happen, you seem to resemble a thermostat that “wants” to “perceive” a certain temperature but cannot turn the furnace on or off to satisfy that “desire.”
Bruce
[From Rick Marken (2010.04.29.1540)]
Bruce Gregory (2010.04.29.1245 EDT)--
Rick Marken (2010.04.29.0850)--
I don't know that there's a "right" answer to these kinds of questions
-- about the PCT Meaning of everyday language -- but here's my take.
When I say I "want" something what I mean is that I have a reference
for perceiving that something in a particular state.�If that something
BG: I am not sure what it means to have a reference for perceiving something
in a particular state while not acting to bring your perception of the world
to that state.
Read B: CP, the Memory chapter. It means you are controlling in
imagination. The lay terms for this are "wishing" and "hoping" and
"thinking" and "praying", "planning" and "dreaming".
If you want to go to the market, but do nothing to make that
happen, you seem to resemble a thermostat that "wants" to "perceive" a
certain temperature but cannot turn the furnace on or off to satisfy that
"desire."
i think you seem more to resemble Dionne Warwick who understood that
controlling in this way for his charms just won't get you into his
arms.
Best
Burt B.
--
Richard S. Marken PhD
rsmarken@gmail.com
www.mindreadings.com
[From Bruce Gregory (2010.04.1858 EDT)]
[From Rick Marken (2010.04.29.1540)]
Bruce Gregory (2010.04.29.1245 EDT)–
Rick Marken (2010.04.29.0850)–
I don’t know that there’s a “right” answer to these kinds of questions
– about the PCT Meaning of everyday language – but here’s my take.
When I say I “want” something what I mean is that I have a reference
for perceiving that something in a particular state. If that somethingBG: I am not sure what it means to have a reference for perceiving something
in a particular state while not acting to bring your perception of the world
to that state.Read B: CP, the Memory chapter. It means you are controlling in
imagination. The lay terms for this are “wishing” and “hoping” and
“thinking” and “praying”, “planning” and “dreaming”.
BG: Quite right. But the hierarchy does not need to remember anything to control in imagination. The thermostat can control in imagination so long as the signal associated with its reference level is fed back to the temperature it perceives. That’s fine. Memory is not necessary in order for the hierarchy to function, unless you mean by memory a reference level.
If you want to go to the market, but do nothing to make that
happen, you seem to resemble a thermostat that “wants” to “perceive” a
certain temperature but cannot turn the furnace on or off to satisfy that
“desire.”i think you seem more to resemble Dionne Warwick who understood that
controlling in this way for his charms just won’t get you into his
arms.
BG: But she will never know it, will she? As long as the reference signal is fed back into the perceptual input, Dianne Warwick will be as happy as a short circuited thermostat.
Bruce
[From Rick Marken (2010.04.29.1630)]
Bruce Gregory (2010.04.1858 EDT)--
RM: Read B: CP, the Memory chapter. It means you are controlling in
imagination. The lay terms for this are "wishing" and "hoping" and
"thinking" and "praying", "planning" and "dreaming".BG: Quite right. But the hierarchy does not need to remember anything to
control in imagination.
Of course it does. When I imagine doing an "iron cross" on the rings,
the reference for that perception was retrieved from memory (a memory
laid down quite a long time ago, I'm afraid).
The thermostat can control in imagination so long as
the signal associated with its reference level is �fed back to the
temperature it perceives. That's fine. Memory is not necessary in order for
the hierarchy to function, unless you mean by memory a reference level.
But there's no hierarchy of control involved in your thermostat
example. Memory would be involved if the thermostat were embedded in a
hierarchy that for some reason (due to the goals of some other control
system(s) in the hierarchy) wanted to imagine (recall) the temperature
it was controlling for at 5pm yesterday. In that case the relevant
control systems would have to retrieve from memory (see the memory
chapter in B:CP to see how this might be done in terms of content
addressable memory) and send to the thermostat control system the
reference setting from 5pm yesterday and the thermostat will play back
the associated temperature perception and the part of the hierarchy
that wanted that remembered perception would experience (as an
imagination) yesterdays temperature (just as I am now experiencing the
imagination of me as a taught young gymnast impressing the girls with
an iron cross).
Best
Rick
--
Richard S. Marken PhD
rsmarken@gmail.com
www.mindreadings.com
[From Bruce Gregory (2010.04.29.1952 EDT)]
[From Rick Marken (2010.04.29.1630)]
Bruce Gregory (2010.04.1858 EDT)--
RM: Read B: CP, the Memory chapter. It means you are controlling in
imagination. The lay terms for this are "wishing" and "hoping" and
"thinking" and "praying", "planning" and "dreaming".BG: Quite right. But the hierarchy does not need to remember anything to
control in imagination.Of course it does. When I imagine doing an "iron cross" on the rings,
the reference for that perception was retrieved from memory (a memory
laid down quite a long time ago, I'm afraid).
BG: Acknowledging my lack of understanding of PCT, I know of no mechanism by which a reference can be "retrieved from memory." I assume that in the past a control circuit for doing an iron cross was created by reorganization. That control circuit can be short circuited (run in imagination mode) so that the reference level is shunted to the input. There is no need for the hierarchy to remember anything as far as I can tell.
The thermostat can control in imagination so long as
the signal associated with its reference level is fed back to the
temperature it perceives. That's fine. Memory is not necessary in order for
the hierarchy to function, unless you mean by memory a reference level.But there's no hierarchy of control involved in your thermostat
example. Memory would be involved if the thermostat were embedded in a
hierarchy that for some reason (due to the goals of some other control
system(s) in the hierarchy) wanted to imagine (recall) the temperature
it was controlling for at 5pm yesterday.
BG: Has this mechanism ever been modeled? I ask because I can't think of any situation where control requires that the system remember anything. If you would specify a goal that you claim requires memory I am reasonably confident that I can explain the behavior of the system (using error and reorganization) with recourse to memory.
In that case the relevant
control systems would have to retrieve from memory (see the memory
chapter in B:CP to see how this might be done in terms of content
addressable memory) and send to the thermostat control system the
reference setting from 5pm yesterday and the thermostat will play back
the associated temperature perception and the part of the hierarchy
that wanted that remembered perception would experience (as an
imagination) yesterdays temperature (just as I am now experiencing the
imagination of me as a taught young gymnast impressing the girls with
an iron cross).
BG: I don't doubt that you remember things. I claim that the hierarchy does not have to remember things to exercise control. To avoid confusion, let's call this BGCT. There is no memory mechanism in BGCT. Any PCT model that does require memory is identical to the BGCT model of any phenomenon.
Bruce
[From Bill Powers (2010.04.30.0835 MDT)]
Bruce Gregory (2010.04.29.1952 EDT) --
BG: Acknowledging my lack of understanding of PCT, I know of no mechanism by which a reference can be "retrieved from memory."
BP: See B:CP, Chapter 15, Figure 15.2 and 15.3. A higher system sends a reference signal to the control system portrayed, but according to this proposed modification, the reference signal coming from above is actually an address signal which selects and replays a recording of a previous perception at this level, which assures that the actual reference signal will be of a kind that this system can perceive. I had worried, perhaps needlessly, about how a higher system could know what lower-order perception it would require at the input to the higher input function, since it perceives only its own perceptual signal which is a function of many lower perceptual signals, not just a function of the one shown here.
When both parts of the switch in fig. 15.3 are thrown, the perceptual signal going upward comes from the lower system's memory instead of the lower system's perceptual input function. The address signal from above would thus be selecting the memory to be replayed. This would be the imagination mode. If the higher system were controlling as I assume it would be, it could vary the input signal it was receiving by varying the address, and thus affect its own perceptual signal just as if the lower system had been used and had succeeded in producing the required amount of perceptual signal.
Notice that as far as the upper system, above the system in fig. 15-3, is concerned, it controls its own perception just as it usually does. It doesn't know that part of its own perception is coming from a recording of a past value of this lower system's perceptual signal, instead of from lower systems or the environment. Many people have remarked that perceptions include a lot of imagined information; I was trying to guess how that might be done.
I'm sure you realize as I do that this proposal leaves a lot of questions unanswered (but perhaps a few less than existed before). This is the best I could do to incorporate a lot of memory phenomena into the model. I think it does pretty well at that, but it creates other questions that remain unanswered. If you read Chapter 15 again, all the way to the end, I think you'll find all the proper disclaimers, which are real, not conventional boilerplate.
Best,
Bill P.
[From Bruce Gregory (2010.05.04.1741 EDT)]
[From Bill Powers (2010.04.30.0835 MDT)]
Bruce Gregory (2010.04.29.1952 EDT) –
BG: Acknowledging my lack of understanding of PCT, I know of no mechanism by which a reference can be “retrieved from memory.”
BP: See B:CP, Chapter 15, Figure 15.2 and 15.3. A higher system sends a reference signal to the control system portrayed, but according to this proposed modification, the reference signal coming from above is actually an address signal which selects and replays a recording of a previous perception at this level, which assures that the actual reference signal will be of a kind that this system can perceive. I had worried, perhaps needlessly, about how a higher system could know what lower-order perception it would require at the input to the higher input function, since it perceives only its own perceptual signal which is a function of many lower perceptual signals, not just a function of the one shown here.
BG: Thanks, Bill. We think about memory slightly differently, but I have no problems with your description. If I had to build a model, I doubt I could improve on yours.
Bruce
[From Bill Powers (2010.05.04.1603 MDT)]
Bruce Gregory (2010.05.04.1741 EDT)
BG: Thanks, Bill. We think about memory slightly differently, but I have no problems with your description. If I had to build a model, I doubt I could improve on yours.
Unfortunately there isn't much progress yet toward figuring out how memory actually works in a brain. It's hard to know whether anyone's use of memory in models will have to be changed when we know more. But thanks.
Best,
Bill P.