A Test of "Collective Control" Theory

[rsmarken]

@bnhpct

As is generally the case with higher levels, getting quantitative data will be more difficult than with variables like hand pressure. That’s a very important methodological problem that I had hoped your book would help with…

@rsmarken

My book didn’t include this this “very important methodological point” because I never encountered the problem …

Actually, you did have that problem for one of the examples in your book. The data presented in “The social motivation of a sound change” (Labov 1963) crucially depend upon control of perceptions as high as the system concept of self-image.

I see no methodological problem there. Even if what you say about the Labov data “crucially depending on control of system concept perceptions” is true (and I don’t think it is) it is not relevant to my modeling, the aim of which was simply to see whether controlling for imitation within subgroups would produce the consistent difference in regional pronunciation observed by Labov; and it could.

@bnhpct

the ‘centralization index’ that you took as data is not a measure of an output quantity Qo. It is not even a measure of individual behavior.

Right, it is a measure of the average value of a controlled variable.

@bnhpct

So by accepting Labov’s centralization data you were using statistical methods …]

Labov’s data were average centralization scores. My model produced results for individuals randomly interacting within groups and it was found that the average of the centralization scores for those individuals, when separated into different groups, stabilized at different values. So a descriptive statistic (the mean) was used but none of the inferential statistics used in conventional social science studies were used. It was model fitting all the way.

@bnhpct

I’ve given other examples [of the methodological problem] which you’ve rejected outright because you require me to give data first…

I just want you to show me how the purported methodological problem that you clam exists in my research would affect the results of some PCT experiment and how you would fix the problem.

@bnhpct

Here is a discussion of where we were 28 years ago in February of 1994:

@William_T_Powers2

One of our difficulties on CSGnet is that we talk about PCT at many levels, from tracking experiments where we know quite well what we are talking about to therapy, politics, religion, etc. where we are adding a lot of personal opinion, other experiences, and knowledge, and are really just testing how it feels to try to apply PCT as a general notion. This is a difficulty, but I’m happy to see it going on. The ideas that others bring in at the higher levels help us to see what sorts of phenomena and problems PCT will have to accommodate as the model grows to encompass more of what is observed and experienced. I think it’s expectable that this process will be messy.

“As the model grows,” he said, and the model has grown since then “to encompass more of what is observed and experienced” at higher levels.

I am asking you to participate, rather than resisting.

What am I not participating in? I’ve done studies of control of higher level variables – sequence and program – and you didn’t seem to think much of them. And I’m pretty sure Bill wasn’t saying that he was looking forward to seeing the model grow "to encompass more of what is observed and experienced’ by just having people make up extensions to the model – unneeded and confusing extensions like atenfels. Bill wanted the model expanded by testing the model he built, PCT – a model that includes hypotheses about the higher level perceptual variables that are controlled when we see people doing “therapy, politics, religion, etc.”

@bnhpct

Your model of the lowest level of Labov’s data is a good start. Keep going. For anyone who understands what Labov did, it’s kind of an embarrassment, until it’s clear that you reported only the first steps toward a model.

The people who would find my model of Labov’s findings “embarrassing” are the kind of people who are happy with their “understandingness”. They will never understand PCT so their opinion of my work is of no interest to me.

@bnhpct

@rsmarken

I am interested in how models fit actual data so what would be more helpful to me is a description of the kind of data that would test the collective control model along with an explanation of why it would.

You’re the experimental psychologist. You’ve written as an authority on methodology of psychology. …I should think you would relish the challenge of extending the ‘Little Man’ program to run two instances at once,

I am an experimental psychologist, not a roboticist. Building a model of people shaking hands would be something I would do only if I had data on people shaking hands and my goal was to see if a PCT model could account for the data.

@bnhpct

@rsmarken

I see nothing that I would call “cooperation” occurring in Kent’s model.

Would you consider the achievement of a handshake cooperative?

Yes, and in my discussion of Tom Bourbon’s model two person interaction I explain how that kind of cooperative behavior happens; although, as I explain in my discussion of it, Tom’s model assumes that there has already been agreement between the parties regarding the the higher level variable to be controlled.

@bnhpct

It sometimes happens that you end up modeling something different from the phenomenon that you intended to model. Your ‘Marken effect’ is an example.

@rsmarken

@bnhpct

BN: What phenomena does this model?

RM: The improved ability to control when placed in conflict with a low-gain, 0-transport lag control system.

Your methodological requirement that you lay on me is that one should start out with a phenomenon and the model comes later. In this case, the phenomenon emerged unexpectedly from performance of a model of controlling with a slight disturbance.

This is not the case at all. I set up a situation where I was controlling a variable while in conflict with another control system. I measured my control behavior in that situation (as RMS deviation from the cursor) and compared it to my behavior when there was no conflict. That is the data (phenomena) I observed.

I expected control in the conflict situation to be worse than that in the non-conflict situation. The actual result was the exact opposite of what I expected. So I tried to figure out why that happened and eventually discovered that I get that result if the higher gain control system has a non-zero transport lag. So I discovered how the PCT model explains the observed phenomenon.

But this discussion has gone on way too long. You’re not going to change your mind about how to do PCT research or about the merits of Kent’s “collective control” model and it’s very unlikely that I’m going to change mine. So good night and good luck.

Best, Rick