agreement

[Jim_Dundon]

----- [Jim Dundon 08.23.06.1333edst

[From Bjorn Simonsen (2006.08.23,09:45 EUST)]

From Rick Marken (2006.08.22.0900)

I am wondering whether you think any perceptual
variable can be considered objective in the sense
that it corresponds to something in our models of
external reality.

Are you asking can we consider it objective. I believe we can consider it whatever we want.

If you are asking can we know it is objective with absolute certainty then I doubt it. Can we believe it is objective with absolute certainty, yes. Believing and knowing are not the same although they can be. I can believe an innacurate statement, act on it, and never be the wiser.

I’m just interested in hearing a

discussion of the relationship between perception
and reality in PCT.

I understand that many (most)

perceptions, such as the taste of a milk shake, are

constructions based on sensed aspects of external
reality. There is no milk shake taste out there
(according to our models); just the molecules that
elicit various taste sensations, which are combined to

produce the taste “milk shake”.

I am not so sure about the _not _ existing milk shake taste out there.

• Is this not an arbitrary view?*

I would rather say that the perception of the milk shake taste is an inner representation of something out there. There is something out there but in accordance with PCT I will never perceive the something directly. In accordance with PCT nobody will ever perceive the something directly.

• What does this mean? How are you using the word directly. I can experience something but never directly? Is a perception not an experience? What is experienced directly? How and when would you use the words “experienced directly”? How can you use the words if you don’t know what they mean? How can you know what it means if you have not experienced them. If we can know that we are not experiencing anything directly we must know what it means to experience something directly therefore we must have had some direct experiences but you said that is not possible inside PCT. I suppose therefore that you have had direct experiences outside PCT. Why and how are things never perceived/experienced directly with PCT? Is it a commitment to terminology or structure? If there are limits It should be in accordance to the limits of the structure of the physical characterisics of our verbally untrained nervous systems. * * Are you saying there is no physical connection? The last time I had a relationship with a milk shake both of us were altered in unreversable physical ways. I thought it was a very direct relationship, experience, perception*. * Are you saying that PCT forbids it or are you saying that PCT has shown that it is physically impossible. Is it possible that PCT makes it impossible to experience it as direct? *

• I think the rest of your post is excellent. I am just having a bit of a problem with the above.*

Therefore I think it is a wrong question to ask what the something out there really is, either it is a milk shake taste or a stone falling towards the earth, or a colour or “the right to drive on a green light” in a road intersection or the right to bear arms.

In your earlier discussion you implied that some perceptions (like

“rights”, assuming they are perceptions) are less objective than others

because these perceptions don’t correspond to anything in our models of

external reality. I was just asking whether some perceptions are more

objective than others. For example, color could be considered an

objective perception because changes in colour correspond to changes in

what we model as changes in wavelength of light. But we also know that

a colour perception that corresponds to a single wavelength can also

result from the appropriate combination of 2 or 3 wavelengths. So it

seems to me that colour is no more objective, in terms of correspondence

between perception and model of external reality, than the perception

of a principle like “the right to bear arms”. What do you think?

Here you propose that something is more objective than something else because of the quality of the “something”. I don’t think it is the quality (out there) that makes something more objective than something else, I think it is our imagination, our inner representation of the external state out there that prescribe what we call objective quality. The more experiments we do with the “something” out there, the more different relationship we are able to implement in our inner imagination. It is the quality of our inner representation, our imagination that prescribes the objectivity of something out there. And that objectivity is subjective.

What I have written in the paragraph above is in force for me if I am the only person in the world.

If I meet another person we are able to agree about the quality of something out there. Then the imagination in the two of us is more or less equal and we are able to control the same perception.

Our imaginations are seldom absolutely equal. I have performed more experiments with the “something” out there than the other person. My imagination has more degrees of freedom than the imagination in the other person and I am sure that the “something” out there has more degrees of freedom than my imagination. I will experience that when I do new experiments later.

PCT explains the way one person has an inner representation of the external state. The reference signal, the perceptual signal and the error are parts of the PCT model and they are elements in the brain of one person.

We can’t without more ado say that PCT explains the way two people have an inner representation of the external state. In my PCT imagination there is no common brain in the two people (or in the organization of many people). But an agreement is a redeemer. An agreement helps two different brains to control a common perception. And I am curious if Kent McClelland in his coming book will use the concept “agreement”.

When the one person (above) goes to school he learns about colour, wavelengths, gravity and more. And if all the children learn their lesson, more than two people agree about more and more about the external state out there. The agreement influence the way two or more people interact.

I think you should go to the UN and teach them PCT, Rick. Maybe they will understand that agreement is the only way more than one person is able to control the same perception.

An agreement doesn’t last forever. Now and then some people (scientists) do new experiments and they get new qualities of their imagination. All agreements must be taken care of always.

Some external states can’t be sensed in the same way as we sense a stone fall toward the earth. They are words representing an inner imagination in one person. The words can be sensed. I think that what we call “rights” are external states described with words. I don’t think the imaginations describing “rights” are less objective than imaginations describing a stone falling towards the earth.

bjorn

[Richard_Marken2]

[From Rick Marken (2006.08.23.1255)]

Bjorn Simonsen (2006.08.23,09:45 EUST)--

Rick Marken (2006.08.22.0900) --

There is no milk shake taste out there

I am not so sure about the _not_ existing milk shake taste out there. I would rather say that the perception of the milk shake taste is an inner representation of something out there.

And I would agree. What I meant was that I think there is no particular external variable that corresponds to the perception "milk shake taste". The same is true of a color perception like "green", which can be produced by many different combinations of wavelengths. So there perceptions are not objective in the sense that they don't correspond to any particular aspect of our model of external reality.

�Here you propose that something is more objective than something else because of the quality of the �something�.

I didn't mean to propose anything. This stuff is way too complicated for me anyway. I actually think that perceptions are equally objective (or non-objective) inasmuch as they are like the taste of a milk shake or the color green. They are functions of what I believe to be an external reality to which I have no direct access and whose existence I take mainly on faith. But they are no objective in the sense that what I perceive does not necessarily correspond to any aspect of that external reality.

I still labor under the assumption, however, that there can be objectivity in the sense of inter-observer agreement about what is being perceived. Maybe I'm not describing this kind of objectivity correctly but it seems to me that our ability to do The Test, let alone conduct science in general, depends on the existence of this inter-observer agreement kind of objectivity. While I'm sure there are often false alarms (people agreeing when perceptions are not the same or even similar), I think that the human ability to collectively control for complex results like computers, bridges and skyscrapers suggests that we can successfully agree about what perceptions we are having and what perceptions we are (or should be) controlling.

Best

Rick

···

---
Richard S. Marken Consulting
marken@mindreadings.com
Home 310 474-0313
Cell 310 729-1400

[Bj_rn_Simonsen]

[From Bjorn Simonsen 2006.08.23.22:10 EUST)]

[Jim
Dundon 08.23.06.1333edst

Bjorn

I would rather say that the
perception of the milk shake taste is an inner representation of something out
there. There is something out there but in accordance with PCT I will never
perceive the something directly. In accordance with PCT nobody will ever
perceive the something directly.

Jim

What does this mean? How are you
using the word directly. I can experience something but never directly?
Is a perception not an experience? What is experienced directly?
How and when would you use the words “experienced directly”?
How can you use the words if you don’t know what they mean? How can you know
what it means if you have not experienced them. If we can know that we
are not experiencing anything directly we must know what it means to experience
something directly therefore we must have had some direct experiences but you
said that is not possible inside PCT. I suppose therefore that you have
had direct experiences outside PCT. Why and how are things never
perceived/experienced directly with PCT? Is it a commitment to
terminology or structure? If there are limits It should be in accordance
to the limits of the structure of the physical characterisics of
our verbally untrained nervous systems. Are you saying there is no
physical connection? The last time I had a relationship with a milk shake
both of us were altered in unreversable physical ways. I thought it was a
very direct relationship, experience, perception. * *Are you saying that PCT forbids it or
are you saying that PCT has shown that it is physically impossible. Is it
possible that PCT makes it impossible to experience it as
direct? **

I think the rest of your post is
excellent. I am just having a bit of a problem with the above.

Everything I perceive is something coming
from neural signals in my brain.

If you look at a graph showing the PCT
negative feedback loop, you also see a horizon line distinguishing the system
from the environment. The perception (the perceptual signal) is in the brain.

Let me present a physical and neurological
description.

When I look at a pen on the table the rods
and cones in my eye record light energy. The energy is transformed to
electrical impulses. These signals are transformed to other neurons helped by
some chemical transmitters. The signals are vector sums and they have an ending
place (the level where the perception is controlled). This ending place
represent something concerning the pen (or the words I heard, the temperature I
felt). These perceptual signals don’t “know” anything about the pen, but they
represent the pen. When I see the pen, it is a representation of nerve signals.
I have an experience from some nerve signals in my brain and not any experience
from outside my sensing organs.

I feel you know this and that I have
misunderstood you.

No, I can’t ever experience something directly.
My perception is what I have. Of course it is an experience, an experience of
my representation of the world out there. Nothing is experienced directly. I
don’t have any sensing cells in the pen.

I will avoid the words “experienced directly”,
but I use them metaphorical. I say I watch
a football game directly when I go to the stadium. But I know I don’t
experience what I see directly.

I have a problem when I shall explain what I
mean when I use the words “experience directly” because I can’t imagine how
anything can be experienced directly. But it happens that I know what something
means that I never have experienced. I think I know what telepathy means.

You say that if we know we are not
experiencing anything directly, we must know what it means to experience
something directly and that we have had some direct experiences.

If I will let a thermometer experience the
air temperature I put the sensing thermometer out in the air. Analogical I must
put my sensing organs “in” the pen if shall experience the pen directly.

There is a physical connection between the
pen on the table (what it ever is) and the ending point in my brain where I
perceive the pen. It is very complicated and I am not able to explain in detail.
The connection is as I said a transformation of light energy over to a kind of
electrical energy. I don’t know exactly how the electrical energy is
transformed to chemical energy in the transmitters and I neither know exactly
how the chemical energy is transformed to electrical energy in the next neuron.
There is a connection.

Remember, what I wrote in the section above
is not experienced directly, it is thoughts I have found in Bills books and
other books. It is an imagination, -the best I have.

I think PCT explains very well that it is
impossible to experience anything directly. All physicists explain the same.

bjorn

···

[Bill_Powers1]

[From Bill Powers (2006.08.23.2010 MDT)]

Jim Dundon 08.23.06.1333 edst –

What does this mean? How are you
using the word directly. I can experience something but never
directly? Is a perception not an experience? What is
experienced directly? How and when would you use the words
“experienced directly”?

It’s inevitable that questions about reality must involve theories. The
theory in question here is simply the body of knowledge we have about the
physical nature of perception. To the best of anyone’s knowledge, all
information about the state of the outside world (and we have to include
the body in that) enters the brain through sensory receptors. There is no
other route that we know of. Because of this apparent fact, what we
experience consciously must be the neural signals generated by those
receptors, or other signals derived from the primary signals. Whatever
the internal mechanisms of perception are, and we know very, very little
about them, the net result must be the world that we experience. What the
theory tells us is that this world is not the one that exists outside us,
even though that is how we see it. It is a set of neural signals inside a
brain. That is what we experience “directly.”
What we do not experience is what is causing these neural signals.
That is where other theories come in. Theories of physics and chemistry,
for example, describe a very strange world that is nothing like the one
we experience, yet all experiments seems to support the existence of this
hypothetical world of molecules, atoms, quarks, fields of gravity and
electricity and magnetism, wavelengths of electromagnetic oscillations.
Of course those theories also exist in the form of neural signals in our
brains, so they are only guesses about what exists outside of us. But
they are highly systematic guesses, tested in very challenging ways by
acting on that invisible outside world and seeing what perceptual
consequences ensue. Physical and chemical theories are very, very good at
predicting the outcomes of actions. Not perfect, but better than anything
else we have.

To challenge this view of perception and experience, it would be
necessary to show that a lot of theories are wrong, and that would be
quite difficult. In effect you’d have to show that there is something
wrong with the physical sciences, and better scientists than we have
tried. Failing a complete revision of physics and chemistry, we have to
accept that the world of experience exists inside our heads, and we have
no idea at all of what, in the external reality, corresponds to it
(though of course physics and chemistry offer some possibilities). We
have to accept that our knowledge of the external world is indirect and
hypothetical, and is only as true as our theories are. One day we will no
doubt know more, but for now, we can only use what we know, temporary
though it may be.

Best,

Bill P.

[Jim_Dundon]

[Jim Dundon 08.27.06.10;30pmedst]

[From Bjorn Simonsen 2006.08.23.22:10 EUST)]

These perceptual signals don't "know" anything about the pen, but they represent the pen. When I see the pen, it is a representation of nerve signals. I have an experience from some nerve signals in my brain and not any experience from outside my sensing organs.

No, I can't ever experience something directly. My perception is what I have. Of course it is an experience, an experience of my representation of the world out there. Nothing is experienced directly. I don't have any sensing cells in the pen.

I think PCT explains very well that it is impossible to experience anything directly. All physicists explain the same

Almost. If they agree on the metaphor.

I can see that I did not give you enough credit for speaking metaphorically. I took you literally.

Some of the problems I see arise from taking things too literally.
For instance, you speak of the horizontal line. I would ask, if I take it literally, "what does it consist of"? Is it the blood brain barrier? Is it something else? If it is a material is it a known material or unknown. Is it chemically inert?

If it is not material it must be space. If it is space is it the same kind of space we find existing between the electrons and nucleie? if so, is it the same kind of space that we have in outer space? What about the dark matter that physicists say constitutes most of space? Is there as much of it in the space between the electrons and nucleie as in outer space? The space in atoms takes up more space than the electrons and nucleie. so if that kind of space occupies the spaces between all the atoms in my body then there must be one hell of a lot of dark matter in me and my brain and maybe that is what forms the symbolic horizontal line.

As for sensors in the pen. There is some inconsistancy between what you say and what I believe PCT says.

I believe PCT says that the body is in the environment but we do have sensors in the body. We have proproceptors in the muscles tendons. So according to your analogy with the pen we could experience the body directly. This, however is not compatable with conceptually putting the body in the envirinment.

As for experiencing directly, it easily resolved by experiencing ones experience. Who says we can't. The physicist? If I am my neoron firings and my neuron firings are my experience then I am my experience. Can't be any more direct than that. On the other hand it might be a weakening to argue for "direct connection" because if I am my experience I don't even need a connection, I am it.

Sometimes we buy too readily into things we hear without looking at all the implications.

My main point is that these are system concepts which are not always completely compatable and we ought not to worship them. Even the various maths do not fit together perfectly.

But it is still a lot of fun wandering around in these realms.
It's the wanderlust in me.

Happy metaphoring

best

Jim D

[Bill_Powers1]

[From Bill Powers (2006.08.28.0635 MDT)]

Jim Dundon 08.27.06.10;30pm edst –

Replying to Bjorn S., you say

Some of the problems I see arise
from taking things too literally.

For instance, you speak of the horizontal line. I would ask, if I
take it literally, “what does it consist of”? Is it
the blood brain barrier? Is it something else? If it is a material
is it a known material or unknown. Is it chemically
inert?

I take it that you refer to the horizontal line in the “standard
diagram” that separates the control system from its environment.
This line indicates the location of the set of all input and output
transducers in our model of the system. Of course this is a very
abbreviated diagram, showing only one typical system and one level, and
it does not show the “power supply” – the life support systems
of the body. Above the line is the nervous system. Below the line is
everything outside the nervous system (which includes the body).
And it IS a model. To make this model work we have to include not only
the parts we assign to the nervous system, but the parts that represent
the local physical environment that completes the feedback loop. This is
our model of reality as it pertains to the organization of behavior. It
is far from finished.
Is it a metaphor? Of course. What we experience and observe of human
behavior and the environment in which it takes place acts as if
the organization described in the model exists (if the model works
right). That’s the whole point of the theory embodied in the model. We
deliberately adjust and modify the model until the behavior it shows when
we run it is as close as possible to the behavior we actually see. Once
that has been achieved reasonably well, we can ask “What would the
model do if I did something new to it?” And a good model will
predict very nearly what actually is observed to happen when we try it.
We an do that now, in a modest way.

Without a model, we would have no way to predict what will happen next
except the statistical approach, We try to make models that predict
accurately, not just predicting that the past will be repeated in the
future, but predicting what will happen if we try something novel.
Empiricism can never predict something that has never happened before.
Only models can do that.

If it is not material it must be
space. If it is space is it the same kind of space we find existing
between the electrons and nucleie? if so, is it the same kind of
space that we have in outer space? What about the dark matter that
physicists say constitutes most of space? Is there as much of it in
the space between the electrons and nucleie as in outer space? The
space in atoms takes up more space than the electrons and nucleie.
so if that kind of space occupies the spaces between all the atoms in my
body then there must be one hell of a lot of dark matter in me and my
brain and maybe that is what forms the symbolic horizontal
line.

But everything you’re talking about in that paragraph is part of some
model. If your model says that whatever you’re talking about is called
“space”, then it is. What are the properties of
“space”? What behavior could you predict on the basis of those
properties? The same questions apply to parts of models that we call dark
matter, electrons, nuclei, atoms, and so on. You’re free to propose any
properties for these things that you like. The only requirement for the
resulting model to be accepted is that when you reason out how it will
behave on the basis of those properties, the model behaves just as we
observe our experiences to behave. Actually, if you propose that the
“horizontal line” is made of space, or dark matter, I don’t
think the resulting model would act much like organisms do. But go ahead
and try it – the only constraint is that it must work realistically by
rules you clearly state.
My own proposal is that the horizontal line indicates a surface through
which sensed information travels from environment to system, and outgoing
neural signals become motor actions on the environment. That’s not the
same as saying it corresponds to the skin, because the
“environment” of the nervous system consists partly of the
body.
The tricky part of this comes when you ask about the physical nature
of this model. According to the model, everything that is
experienced exists in the form of neural signals in a brain. That
includes not only sensations and objects and movements and relationships,
but ideas in the form of models. So somewhere in this model, as we
develop it, we will some day find the place where the model itself
exists.

Does this lead to infinite regress? Only if you let it. If this idea
bothers you and you start to worry about a representation of the model
inside the representation of the model … and so on forever, that is
what you will be doing, and a successful model will correctly imitate
your endless worrying, just as you can write a recursive computer routine
that calls itself over and over. If you don’t build an exit criterion
into the recursive routine, it will call itself forever, or until the
stack overflows and the program becomes inoperative. So the model can
correctly predict what will happen whether you try to follow an endless
recursion, or, using different recursion rules, just consider the
relationship between the model and your behavior once (as I’m doing
here).

As you can see, no infinite regress happens if you don’t indulge in it.
So don’t do that, and it won’t happen.

Everything we say about anything we observe is a model, unless we’re just
describing the observations without commenting on them. Some models are
more carefully constructed than others, and thus work better as
predicters, Some models contradict others, so they can’t all be applied
at the same time. A good part of science is trying to modify the various
models so they can all work at the same time without mutual contradiction
(as we assume nature actually works).

The conclusions we draw about the relationship of experience to external
reality are based on this same model. The primary postulate is that the
only processes available to human awareness are neural signals in the
brain. All the rest follows from that. We have no model of awareness –
just an idea that somehow awareness can selectively receive information
from activities in the brain, and that the result is what we call
conscious experience. Given that, it’s clear that neural signals in the
model depend on events and processes outside the nervous system (below
that infamous line), and have only an indirect relationship to those
external processes. Therefore conscious experience has only an indirect,
and at present mostly unknown, relationship to the external world.
Remember that “the outside world”: is part of the model; it is
a guess about what is actually happening out there. In our practical
modeling work, we use simple models of simple environments, because so
far that’s all we can handle. I assume we’ll get better at that.

Best,

Bill P.

[Bill_Powers1]

[From Bill Powers (2006.08.28.0635 MDT)]

Jim Dundon 08.27.06.10;30pm edst –

Replying to Bjorn S., you say

Some of the problems I see arise
from taking things too literally.

For instance, you speak of the horizontal line. I would ask, if I
take it literally, “what does it consist of”? Is it
the blood brain barrier? Is it something else? If it is a material
is it a known material or unknown. Is it chemically
inert?

I take it that you refer to the horizontal line in the “standard
diagram” that separates the control system from its environment.
This line indicates the location of the set of all input and output
transducers in our model of the system. Of course this is a very
abbreviated diagram, showing only one typical system and one level, and
it does not show the “power supply” – the life support systems
of the body. Above the line is the nervous system. Below the line is
everything outside the nervous system (which includes the body).
And it IS a model. To make this model work we have to include not only
the parts we assign to the nervous system, but the parts that represent
the local physical environment that completes the feedback loop. This is
our model of reality as it pertains to the organization of behavior. It
is far from finished.
Is it a metaphor? Of course. What we experience and observe of human
behavior and the environment in which it takes place acts as if
the organization described in the model exists (if the model works
right). That’s the whole point of the theory embodied in the model. We
deliberately adjust and modify the model until the behavior it shows when
we run it is as close as possible to the behavior we actually see. Once
that has been achieved reasonably well, we can ask “What would the
model do if I did something new to it?” And a good model will
predict very nearly what actually is observed to happen when we try it.
We an do that now, in a modest way.

Without a model, we would have no way to predict what will happen next
except the statistical approach, We try to make models that predict
accurately, not just predicting that the past will be repeated in the
future, but predicting what will happen if we try something novel.
Empiricism can never predict something that has never happened before.
Only models can do that.

If it is not material it must be
space. If it is space is it the same kind of space we find existing
between the electrons and nucleie? if so, is it the same kind of
space that we have in outer space? What about the dark matter that
physicists say constitutes most of space? Is there as much of it in
the space between the electrons and nucleie as in outer space? The
space in atoms takes up more space than the electrons and nucleie.
so if that kind of space occupies the spaces between all the atoms in my
body then there must be one hell of a lot of dark matter in me and my
brain and maybe that is what forms the symbolic horizontal
line.

But everything you’re talking about in that paragraph is part of some
model. If your model says that whatever you’re talking about is called
“space”, then it is. What are the properties of
“space”? What behavior could you predict on the basis of those
properties? The same questions apply to parts of models that we call dark
matter, electrons, nuclei, atoms, and so on. You’re free to propose any
properties for these things that you like. The only requirement for the
resulting model to be accepted is that when you reason out how it will
behave on the basis of those properties, the model behaves just as we
observe our experiences to behave. Actually, if you propose that the
“horizontal line” is made of space, or dark matter, I don’t
think the resulting model would act much like organisms do. But go ahead
and try it – the only constraint is that it must work realistically by
rules you clearly state.
My own proposal is that the horizontal line indicates a surface through
which sensed information travels from environment to system, and outgoing
neural signals become motor actions on the environment. That’s not the
same as saying it corresponds to the skin, because the
“environment” of the nervous system consists partly of the
body.
The tricky part of this comes when you ask about the physical nature
of this model. According to the model, everything that is
experienced exists in the form of neural signals in a brain. That
includes not only sensations and objects and movements and relationships,
but ideas in the form of models. So somewhere in this model, as we
develop it, we will some day find the place where the model itself
exists.

Does this lead to infinite regress? Only if you let it. If this idea
bothers you and you start to worry about a representation of the model
inside the representation of the model … and so on forever, that is
what you will be doing, and a successful model will correctly imitate
your endless worrying, just as you can write a recursive computer routine
that calls itself over and over. If you don’t build an exit criterion
into the recursive routine, it will call itself forever, or until the
stack overflows and the program becomes inoperative. So the model can
correctly predict what will happen whether you try to follow an endless
recursion, or, using different recursion rules, just consider the
relationship between the model and your behavior once (as I’m doing
here).

As you can see, no infinite regress happens if you don’t indulge in it.
So don’t do that, and it won’t happen.

Everything we say about anything we observe is a model, unless we’re just
describing the observations without commenting on them. Some models are
more carefully constructed than others, and thus work better as
predicters, Some models contradict others, so they can’t all be applied
at the same time. A good part of science is trying to modify the various
models so they can all work at the same time without mutual contradiction
(as we assume nature actually works).

The conclusions we draw about the relationship of experience to external
reality are based on this same model. The primary postulate is that the
only processes available to human awareness are neural signals in the
brain. All the rest follows from that. We have no model of awareness –
just an idea that somehow awareness can selectively receive information
from activities in the brain, and that the result is what we call
conscious experience. Given that, it’s clear that neural signals in the
model depend on events and processes outside the nervous system (below
that infamous line), and have only an indirect relationship to those
external processes. Therefore conscious experience has only an indirect,
and at present mostly unknown, relationship to the external world.
Remember that “the outside world”: is part of the model; it is
a guess about what is actually happening out there. In our practical
modeling work, we use simple models of simple environments, because so
far that’s all we can handle. I assume we’ll get better at that.

Best,

Bill P.

No virus found in this incoming message.

Checked by AVG Free Edition.

Version: 7.1.394 / Virus Database: 268.11.6/427 - Release Date:
8/24/2006

[Jim_Dundon]

[Jim Dundon 08.30.06.12:20pmedst]

[From Bill Powers (2006.08.28.0635 MDT)]

Jim Dundon 08.27.06.10;30pm edst --

Bill: you said:

Everything we say about anything we observe is a model, unless we're just describing the observations without commenting on them. Some models are more carefully constructed than others, and thus work better as predicters, Some models contradict others,

JIM:

I am limited in this conversation by not fully understanding the difference between empiricism and modeling. I thought they were related if not interdependent. But my gripe with empiricism is its claim of rerpresenting absolute total truth. Not only do models contradict each other but "empirical" systems do as well and my claim is that these systems are anthropomorphically sourced. As you indcate they all reside in the brain. even the "external" impression. It is not that I wish to perpetually regress but that with at least one regression we can see that it is all in the brain and not begin to believe that it is third party sourced. It is us sourced. We are the authors of all these systems and sciences. They require agreement on terming which some have called stragic unity.

The tendency to say they are science or nature sourced or, nature tells us her secrets, is no different purposefully than saying something is god sourced. Once nature or science says something it is assumed final. The notion of nature or science is is our creation of a third party authority. We conceived nature, science, and relegated them to the new divinity.

The contradictions in the various systems and the incompatability of the "empirical sciences" indicate two things.

1. They are not empirical except by agreement, [stragegic unity], requiring agreement on a concept of empirical as well.

2. The limitations of the brain, nervous system.

When we conceptualize, we construct. The construction can be almost anything. Each can be a reality. If we indentify with it we may be willing to die and or kill for it, just like some will kill or die for a temple or idol or the sacred hill.

That is why I brought up dark matter.
So called empirical science says that space consists mostly of dark matter. I think they say this because they were running out of things to do. Same with string theory. I don't argue with the concept because if the brain can handle it OK. But it creates some problems when I try to blend or map it to the molecules and atoms in the nervous system in your model of behavior. Does it exist in those atoms? Probably not. And that is my point. We are doing these things and running up against the limitations of our brains.

This is what we should be looking at.

Maybe i am beginning to see the difference between modeling and empiricsm. But how can i be sure modeling is not the new empiricism, or the old empiricism with a new name. I hear Rick talking about his faith in empirical science repeatedly and I recall your praise of it as well. There is as much schism among empiricists as among Islamists, Christians, Democrats, [and Republicans]. It is part of the process.

Bill:
so they can't all be applied at the same time. A good part of science is trying to modify the various models so they can all work at the same time without mutual contradiction (as we assume nature actually works).

Jim:
Nature again. The created third party authority. We no longer worship the creations of our hands, instead, we worship the creations of our minds. Nature doesn't do anything We do. We create nature when we name an experiencing. When we feel the need to create a third party authority.

Bill:
Empiricism can never predict something that has never happened before. Only models can do that.

Jim:
I have to leave for work. Please tell me more.

best

Jim

[Richard_Marken2]

[From Rick Marken (2006.08.30.1240)]

Jim Dundon (08.30.06.12:20pmedst)

I am limited in this conversation by not fully understanding the difference between empiricism and modeling. I thought they were related if not interdependent.

I see empiricism and modeling as two completely different activities. They were insightfully brought together in the late 1500s to create a new approach to understanding called "science". Empiricism is observation; all on it's own it is the basis of descriptive knowledge, such as Tycho Brahe's descriptions of the movements of the planets. Modeling is imagination; all on its own it is the basis of stories, like the wonderful Hebrew Genesis myths (there are actually two of them woven together). Science involves both observation and modeling. The scientist makes observations, invents a story (model) to explain those observations, derives predictions from the model, makes observations to test the predictions and modifies the story (model), if necessary, based on the results of those observations. This continuous cycle of observation, prediction and revision has resulted in sciences (like physics, chemistry and PCT) with models that predict never before made observations with great accuracy.

But my gripe with empiricism is its claim of rerpresenting absolute total truth.

That's a reasonable gripe. Empiricism is just one component of the scientific pursuit of truth (which I take to be an understanding of the way the world -- or at least some aspect of it -- really works). I myself think that scientific models (tested by empirical observation) are the closest we come to getting at the truth. But I certainly wouldn't say that any scientific model -- no matter how well confirmed by empirical test -- represents absolute total truth.

Not only do models contradict each other but "empirical" systems do as well and my claim is that these systems are anthropomorphically sourced.

I think you may be conflating models and observations. If models make contradictory predictions then I would think that that should be settled by observation. If a contradiction can't be settled that way then my guess would be that one or both of the contradictory models is poorly formulated.

Maybe i am beginning to see the difference between modeling and empiricsm. But how can i be sure modeling is not the new empiricism, or the old empiricism with a new name.

Because modeling and empiricism are two completely different activities.

I hear Rick talking about his faith in empirical science repeatedly and I recall your praise of it as well. There is as much schism among empiricists as among Islamists, Christians, Democrats, [and Republicans]. It is part of the process.

My faith is in empirical _science_ (which I would describe as modeling tempered by observation, ie., empiricism) not in empiricism per se, which, I believe, is the idea that knowledge comes from observation alone. I am definitely not an empiricist; I am (or try to be ) a scientist. The disagreements in science (which usually are over which model works best) are (or should be) resolved by empirical test. The disagreements among religious and political ideologues persist because their models (ideas) are not subjected (and are usually not even subjectable) to empirical test.

Best regards

Rick

···

---
Richard S. Marken Consulting
marken@mindreadings.com
Home 310 474-0313
Cell 310 729-1400

[Bill_Powers1]

[From Bill Powers (2006.08.30.1115 MDT)]

Jim Dundon 08.30.06.12:20pmedst –

I am limited in this
conversation by not fully understanding the difference between empiricism
and modeling. I thought they were related if not
interdependent. But my gripe with empiricism is its claim of
rerpresenting absolute total truth.

I would have a gripe with that, too. When I speak of empiricism, I mean
only the idea of projecting the future on the basis of observations in
the past. Even without any model of the solar system, a person could
predict quite reliably that the sun will rise at a certain point on the
horizon simply from the way it has behaved in the past. If you flip a
switch on the wall, a certain light will turn on – no theory or model
required, just previous experience. However, a lot of empirical knowlege
is statistical in nature, because when we don’t have any idea why
things behave as they do, there are all kinds of variations and
perturbations we have no way of knowing about, and we can’t know what is
critical about the surrounding conditions. So sometimes things happen as
they have happened before, and sometimes they don’t. That’s my basic
definition of empirical knowlege: sometime it works and sometimes it
doesn’t.

Models are attempts to explain why things happen as they do, in terms of
underlying mechanisms. Empirically, we know that when you push down on
one end of a lever, the other end goes up. That’s a pretty reliable
empirical fact. But an engineer uses a model to explain why this is true,
and also why, when a specific force is applied to one end of a lever with
a specific shape and made of specific materials, a particular lever bends
or breaks and both ends go down.

Not only do models contradict
each other but “empirical” systems do as well and my claim is
that these systems are anthropomorphically sourced.

The success rate depends on what models and what empirical systems you’re
talking about, doesn’t it? Of course all human knowledge is
“anthropomorphically sourced”, if I deduce your meaning
correctly – I doubt that plants have knowledge, and other animals do not
have human knowledge (though it’s hard to speak for a beetle). All this
term says is that human theories are created by human beings. Did you
mean something else?

Models contradict each other mainly when proposed by different people.
But a lot of the scientific enterprise is devoted to discussing and
trying to correct such contradictions – they’re pretty much expected to
occur especially with new theories. If two models predict different
outcomes in the same circumstances, it’s generally assumed that only one
of them (at most) should be retained, or both of them might need
modification to eliminate whatever is causing the contradiction. Whatever
the case, contradictory models are relatively easy to compare and the
contradictions aren’t tolerated for long. It says here in the instruction
manual.

Contradictory empirical findings are also commonplace, in part because
it’s rare to find that one scientist literally replicates an experiment
done by another scientist. That’s too boring, and doesn’t make you
famous. Most replications are not replications at all – there are clear
differences in circumstances as scientists introduce whimsical variations
on the original study because they think they should make no difference,
or because the original materials are unavailable or too expensive, or
because there wasn’t time to carry out all the details of the original
procedures, or because the scientist read the description of the original
study too hastily, or because the original description was incompetently
presented. When you’re working purely empirically, there’s no way to know
what should and should not make a difference, and even when you try
seriously, it’s hard to replicate someone else’s experiment.

As you indicate they all reside
in the brain. even the “external” impression. It is not
that I wish to perpetually regress but that with at least one
regression we can see that it is all in the brain and not begin to
believe that it is third party sourced. It is us sourced. We are the
authors of all these systems and sciences. They require agreement
on terming which some have called stragic unity.

Yes, I agree that some scientists do speak as if knowledge is external to
the brain. They all wish it were – then they wouldn’t make so many
mistakes. This is especially annoying when there’s no model behind the
empirical “findings”. That word “findings” is an
attempt to persuade others that the observations were just lying there
waiting to be found, and one simply found them. The roles of
interpretation, illusion, imprecision, and random variations are
downplayed.

That is why I brought up dark
matter.

So called empirical science says that space consists mostly of dark
matter. I think they say this because they were running out of things to
do.

I think that’s unfair, because you don’t really know why dark matter was
proposed. In observing the orbits of stars in other galaxies (which is
possible to do in an approximate way using doppler-shift measurements of
radial velocity) it is found that the orbital velocities are too high (by
a large margin) for the amount of matter (producing gravitational
attraction) that can be seen in the form of stars and dust in the
galaxies. The stars should have gone flying off into space long ago, but
they didn’t. So there must be more matter there than we can see as
radiating stars and obscuring dust clouds, and it must be dark because we
can’t see it. That seems not unreasonable to me.

Same with string theory. I
don’t argue with the concept because if the brain can handle it
OK.

Not mine. The mathematics is, I am told, pretty hairy and certainly
beyond me. Do you understand it?

But it creates some
problems when I try to blend or map it to the molecules and atoms in the
nervous system in your model of behavior. Does it exist in those
atoms? Probably not. And that is my point. We are doing
these things and running up against the limitations of our
brains.

Some brains are less limited than others. There is always a faster gun
somewhere. Perhaps you have not encountered anyone smarter than you are
yet, but I can tell you there are quite a few people smarter than I am
about many things (I reserve the right to think I am smart about some
things, or at least not zero things). When you say “probably
not,” do you know that. or is that just an impression?

Best,

Bill P.

[bnhpct]

[From: Bruce Nevin (Mon 930830 15:34:45 EDT)]

( Michael Fehling 930830 10:02 AM PDT ) --

Yes, I believe we are in agreement

I thought of the earlier discussion of agreement as focussing on
nonverbal agreement, and thought of my 930830 09:22:01 EDT post as saying
(or emphasizing) something additional.

my "agreements" are a technical construct
that capture any _functional_coordination_ of the actions of group members.

In the GATHER (aka CROWD) demo, it appears that individual agents are
functionally coordinated in their formation of arcs and rings. But this
is merely an appearance to an outside observer. For the agents, it is a
byproduct of their control of a very few perceptual signals, which do not
include a perception of rings or arcs. It is thus important to
figure out how one might specify agreement so as to exclude the mere
appearance of agreement.

It seems to me that the test for controlled variables could appear to
support the notion that the agents in this demo control a perception of
their forming (with their fellows) rings or arcs around a point of mutual
"interest". If an agent is prevented from forming an arc by some
obstacle, the agent resists the disturbance. What rescues us is Occam's
razor: there is a simpler account of what controlled perception is being
disturbed. Of course, it helps to know how the agents are programmed,
and that in fact they perceive only proximity (to other objects, such as
other agents and obstacles, and to a goal). But if an outside observer
became convinced that the formation of rings and arcs must be a
controlled perception, it would take a peculiarly hard-headed persistence
to set that conviction aside and look for simpler alternatives.

I am sure you must have given considerable thought to these issues.

    Bruce
    bn@bbn.com

[Jim_Dundon]

[Jim Dundon09.01.06.1200edst]

[From Rick Marken (2006.08.30.1240)]

Jim Dundon (08.30.06.12:20pmedst)

I am limited in this conversation by not fully understanding the difference between empiricism and modeling. I thought they were related if not interdependent.

I see empiricism and modeling as two completely different activities.

Perhaps as in playing poker [modeling] and counting winnings [empiricism]

Please describe an empirical activity which has no relationship to a model. Do mean the counting of repeated successes with a model?
Does not modeling anticipate empiricism i.e. reapeatable experiences.

They were insightfully brought together in the late 1500s to create a new approach to understanding called "science". Empiricism is observation; all on it's own it is the basis of descriptive knowledge, such as Tycho Brahe's descriptions of the movements of the planets.

I think of Tycho Brahe's work as modeling. He used reason and language to deduce planetary motion. Empirical observations appears to me to contain a model.

His activity which you call empirical was in fact based on a model, the model of "application of particulr mathematical skills produces more concrete understanding of planetary motion"

Modeling is imagination; all on its own it is the basis of stories, like the wonderful Hebrew Genesis myths (there are actually two of them woven together). Science involves both observation and modeling. The scientist makes observations, invents a story (model) to explain those observations, derives predictions from the model, makes observations to test the predictions and modifies the story (model), if necessary, based on the results of those observations. This continuous cycle of observation, prediction and revision has resulted in sciences (like physics, chemistry and PCT) with models that predict never before made observations with great accuracy.

But my gripe with empiricism is its claim of rerpresenting absolute total truth.

That's a reasonable gripe. Empiricism is just one component of the scientific pursuit of truth (which I take to be an understanding of the way the world -- or at least some aspect of it -- really works). I myself think that scientific models (tested by empirical observation) are the closest we come to getting at the truth. But I certainly wouldn't say that any scientific model -- no matter how well confirmed by empirical test -- represents absolute total truth.

Not only do models contradict each other but "empirical" systems do as well and my claim is that these systems are anthropomorphically sourced.

I think you may be conflating models and observations. If models make contradictory predictions then I would think that that should be settled by observation. If a contradiction can't be settled that way then my guess would be that one or both of the contradictory models is poorly formulated.

If you are saying that counting the successful repitions of the model is the empirical part I can agree but that counting is also an observation, is it not

Maybe i am beginning to see the difference between modeling and empiricsm. But how can i be sure modeling is not the new empiricism, or the old empiricism with a new name.

Because modeling and empiricism are two completely different activities.

Could you give an example of an empirical statement that is made without reflecting, representing, having roots in a model or which in itself a model?

I hear Rick talking about his faith in empirical science repeatedly and I recall your praise of it as well. There is as much schism among empiricists as among Islamists, Christians, Democrats, [and Republicans]. It is part of the process.

My faith is in empirical _science_ (which I would describe as modeling tempered by observation, ie., empiricism) not in empiricism per se, which, I believe, is the idea that knowledge comes from observation alone.

An observation is a model. It is a verbal model. In "The Phenomenon of Science" Valentin Turchin gives the act of verbalized observanton of the fact of the rising of a planetary body at a certain point on the horizon in conjunction with observed climatic changes as a n example of modeling.

A model would probably start with an observation and obsevations contain models. Is it possible that they cannot be separated?

  I am definitely not an empiricist; I am (or try to be ) a

scientist. The disagreements in science (which usually are over which model works best) are (or should be) resolved by empirical test.

By this do you mean counting and measuring. What is an empirical test? does it not contain a model? give me an example of an empirical test which is independent of a model.

To me, an empirical test of the above example from Turchin would be my continued experience of the same relationships year after year. Is this what you mean by empirical, a depenable model. that gives countable repititions?

The disagreements among religious and political ideologues persist because their models (ideas) are not subjected (and are usually not even subjectable) to empirical test.

best

Jim

···

Best regards

Rick
---
Richard S. Marken Consulting
marken@mindreadings.com
Home 310 474-0313
Cell 310 729-1400

[Richard_Marken2]

[From Rick Marken (2006.09.01.1215)]

Jim Dundon (09.01.06.1200edst) --

Rick Marken (2006.08.30.1240)--

I see empiricism and modeling as two completely different activities.

Perhaps as in playing poker [modeling] and counting winnings [empiricism]

No. From my experience, playing poker involves both modeling (guessing what your opponent might have, for example) and empiricism (seeing what you have). Counting winnings is pretty empirical though, like all empirical observation, it is done from the point of view of a model (of the rules of arithmetic, for example).

Please describe an empirical activity which has no relationship to a model.

I agree that all observations are made from the point of view of what could be called a model of what we are seeing. It's very hard to look at my surroundings without assuming (unconsciously) that what I am seeing is a three dimensional world, for example. So, yes, I believe (based on my model of how perception works) that observation is done from the point of view of various unconscious models. But that is quite different that the process of modeling. The models that are the basis of our observations are part of the perceptual process itself. The models we develop (through the activity of modeling) to explain our observations are consciously constructed mechanisms that are designed to explain those observations.

Does not modeling anticipate empiricism i.e. reapeatable experiences.

I would say that we do modeling because we have found that models can be used to reliably (repeatedly) predict experiences.

I think of Tycho Brahe's work as modeling. He used reason and language to deduce planetary motion. Empirical observations appears to me to contain a model.

Tycho did do some modeling to the extent that he tried to deduce planetary motions. But I count his measurements of ephemeris data as empirical observations. There is no explicit modeling activity (by my definition of modeling) involved in measuring ephemerides, even if the measurements are made from the point of view of what could be called a mental model of what is being measured.

His activity which you call empirical was in fact based on a model, the model of "application of particulr mathematical skills produces more concrete understanding of planetary motion"

Yes, I agree. But he wasn't _doing_ modeling when he was making the measurements.

I think you may be conflating models and observations. If models make contradictory predictions then I would think that that should be settled by observation. If a contradiction can't be settled that way then my guess would be that one or both of the contradictory models is poorly formulated.

If you are saying that counting the successful repitions of the model is the empirical part I can agree but that counting is also an observation, is it not

No, I'm not saying that counting the successful repetitions of the the model is the empirical part. The empirical part of science is observing the relevant predictions of an explicitly developed model. If the model is f = ma and one derives the prediction that a ball hit into the air will (all other things equal) follow an elliptical path, then you test this model by observing the path of a ball hit into the air (with all other things held constant).

Because modeling and empiricism are two completely different activities.

Could you give an example of an empirical statement that is made without reflecting, representing, having roots in a model or which in itself a model?

As I said, I believe that observation is always made from the point of view of what could be called unconscious mental models. That's just the way observation (perception) presumably works. But the activity called observation (though, in theory, model based) is not the same as the activity of modeling (which is also, in theory, model based, in the sense that it is done in the context of unconscious mental models of how things like logic and mathematics work).

My faith is in empirical _science_ (which I would describe as modeling tempered by observation, ie., empiricism) not in empiricism per se, which, I believe, is the idea that knowledge comes from observation alone.

An observation is a model. It is a verbal model.

I don't understand this. I make non-verbal observations all the time. In fact, the only time an observation become verbal is when I try to communicate it to someone else ("look at that lovely blue heron over there"). And in that case it's not the observation that becomes verbal. All that is verbal is my attempt to point to my own observation so that someone else might be able to make it as well.

In "The Phenomenon of Science" Valentin Turchin gives the act of verbalized observanton of the fact of the rising of a planetary body at a certain point on the horizon in conjunction with observed climatic changes as a n example of modeling.

I myself wouldn't call that modeling.

A model would probably start with an observation and obsevations contain models. Is it possible that they cannot be separated?

I think observations cannot be separated from the fact that they are made from the point of view of what I would call unconscious mental models. But the process of observing can certainly be treated separately from the process of modeling. It's done all the time, very successfully, in science.

To me, an empirical test of the above example from Turchin would be my continued experience of the same relationships year after year. Is this what you mean by empirical, a depenable model. that gives countable repititions?

No. What I mean by observation is seeing, hearing, tasting, feeling, smelling, etc. What I mean by observation is exactly what the dictionary says I mean: an act or instance of noticing or perceiving.

Best

Rick

···

---
Richard S. Marken Consulting
marken@mindreadings.com
Home 310 474-0313
Cell 310 729-1400

[Bill_Powers1]

[From Bill Powers (2006.09.03.0343 MDT)]

I’m in my new apartment in Lafayette, CO. There’s a water leak and I have
no high-speed internet yet (this is dialup with no web-browing ability –
just email). Unpacking proceeds slowly. I trust things will be back to
normal in a week or so.

Jim Dundon 09.01.06.1200 edst

Please describe an
empirical activity which has no relationship to a model. Do
mean the counting of repeated successes with a model?

Does not modeling anticipate empiricism i.e. reapeatable
experiences.

Not the way I use the term. For me, modeling is proposing an underlying
organization or mechanism that explains regularities that we
observe.
Here’s an example: we observe that when copper wires are connected from a
battery to a resistor (a small cylindrical object with colored bands on
it), we can feel the resistor get warm. That is the empirical
observation. The names of the objects have no theoretical significance;
they are labels for identification. We are simply reporting certain
things than we can see and feel happening when we see and feel ourselves
performing actions of specific kinds. That’s the basic process we call
empiricism. Of course that word carries a lot of associative baggage, but
that’s the basis.
Now we ask, why does the resistor get warm? An empiricist is not
allowed to ask that question, because we cannot observe the why – only
the what. To explain why, we use a very large complex model called the
theory of electricity. Electricity itself is part of a model consisting
of voltages and currents and other things. If E stands for the amount of
voltage, and I stands for the amount of current flow, then the power
flowing when E volts drives I amperes though a resisance is (E times I)
watts. The model explains that power can be converted to heat, where
“power” and “heat” are names of unobservable entities
in the model. “Heat” raises the temperature of an object, and
we can sense temperature – the resistor feels hotter.
“Temperature” refers both to an entity in the model and to
something we can sense. That is where the model connects to an
experience. It says that when we connect the wires, the resistor
should feel hotter. That “should” is the prediction we
obtain from the model, and the larger models of physics and neurology
that are involved. The empiricist would say only that the resistor gets
hotter when we do this operation because that is what it always does when
we do this operation.

Empiricism is simply writing down experiences that we have, which
includes the readings we get from scientific instruments (if nobody looks
at the instrument, there is no measurement, no matter what quantum
physicists say). Of course there’s more to it than that; the point is to
look for regularities, patterns that repeat, or relationships that can be
seen again and again. No model of underlying mechanisms, however, is
necessary. In fact, empiricists, as I understand how the term is used,
reject the use of models – “hypothetical constructs” or
“intervening variables” are dismissed as metaphysical.
According to one empiricist whose statement I once read, all theories are
simply “summaries of observations.”

That’s my take on this subject. No doubt there are others.

Best,

Bill P.