Anticipatory Postural Control

Hi Eva, your idea of equating melody with sequential proprioception may be more than an analogy. Maybe our most fundamental sense of sequence is proprioception because we need it for motion & coordination, and our perception of melody is a beneficial side effect of this level of perception when applied to the auditory modality? But when combined with the propensity to dance, it further facilitates temporally coordinated proprioception?

···

On 12 May 2019, at 10:54, Eva de Hullu (eva@dehullu.net via csgnet Mailing List) csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

[Eva de Hullu 2019-05-12_09:51:36 UTC]

In following this discussion about anticipatory postural control, I think an important difference between PCT and the other theories mentioned is that in PCT, causality is circular, closed loop. On the first proposed level, there is only perception of here-and-now intensities. I think one of the reasons why other theories struggle so much to fit observations into their theory, is because of their effort to model closed-loop events into linear causal models. In that way, you’ll need difficult models with prediction and anticipation, that can be explained by PCT through the perceptual hierarchy.

How could we go from a here-and-now perception to the perceived “anticipatory behavior”?

I think we could have a better understanding through the perceptual hierarchy, where levels are build from the bottom up, layer by layer, into increasing complexity. In answering these kind of questions, we could use some help from the proposed hierarchy.

Going up in the hierarchy, the perception of time emerges when transitions become a way of making sense of changing configurations. The sequence level is several steps higher, and at this level prediction must take place.

Imagine a melody, where each note is followed by another note at a certain pace and pitch. When you hear a melody for the first time, there are no references yet for this melody, and you’ll not experience the sense of predicting the next note. But after listening to it carefully, you’ll have created references for the melody, and with these references you’ll have the sense of being able to predict what follows. If you hear a familiar melody, your references and perceptual input will match if they are equal. If the melody changes from your expectations, you’ll find that you can no longer predict what’s next; without references for the melody, you’ll not recognize the song.

Following this, the anticipatory postural control could just concist of references in the form of sequential perceptions. In a melody, the sequence is a way of organizing single notes (categories) in such a way that they are no longer just single notes, but also a melody. A movement such as reaching, is not just a single pose, but also a sequence of poses. If you look at what happens from the perspective of circular causality, interpreting the steps in the sequence as (existing) references, I believe PCT is perfectly able to explain what happens.

Eva

PS I’m conscious that I might be repeating or missing some of the things already said here. I waited a bit too long submitting this answer, so excuse me if I’ve not properly addressed or incorporated other replies.

On Sat, May 11, 2019 at 9:00 PM Richard Marken csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

[Rick Marken 2019-05-11_11:58:37]

On Fri, May 10, 2019 at 8:05 PM Heather Broccard-Bell random.information.consultant@gmail.com wrote:

HB-B: I think this does make sense, and would be interesting to build. I am curious about a ‘critical experiment’ that would distinguish the PCT model from the mainstream account… although it does seem to be one of these phenomena that people have described without couching it in any particular theoretical framework, so this may not be possible.

RM: I think the APA phenomenon is implicitly couched in a particular theoretical framework; that of an open-loop causal model of behavior. The implication is that the APA is an output that is being produced open-loop in anticipation of a future perturbation. This can be tested because my model assumes that APAs are actually controlled variables that are used to control another controlled variable – the event called “reaching”. So applying an appropriately gentle, varying force disturbance to the postural change being made during the period of the APA should be resisted. This resistance should be detectable as appropriate variation in the force exerted by the animal during the APA period – the force used to produce the APA. It should also be detectable as consistency of the APA on different trials with different disturbances; this could be determined by analysis of visual records to see if the variation in the APA over trials is what would be expected based on variatoin in teh disturbances.

RM: I think there might be a way to create a “portable demo” of behavior that seems to involve an APA. I’ll see if I can think of one.

Best

Rick

On Fri, May 10, 2019, 17:05 Richard Marken csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

[Rick Marken 2019-05-10_17:04:34]

On Fri, May 10, 2019 at 12:50 PM Heather Broccard-Bell random.information.consultant@gmail.com wrote:

HB: I kind of think a lot of the problem is semantic. Some seem to be upset by the term “prediction” or “anticipation”, and I think what Rick/Henry suggest is a reasonable explanation for a mechanism for what most people would call anticipation/prediction. It can’t be magic :))

RM: The only time I get upset by terms like “prediction” and “anticipation” is when they give the wrong impression of how the PCT model explains some behaviors. This usually happens when it “looks like” a behavior involves “prediction” or “anticipation”. For example, the behavior called “catching a fly ball” appears to involve “prediction” or “anticipation”. You can see it in the movements of the fielder in my baseball catch simulation (https://www.mindreadings.com/ControlDemo/CatchXY.html). The fielder seems to be making “anticipatory field adjustments” (AFAs?) in anticipation of being in the proper position to catch the ball. But we have found that the fielder’s behavior can be accounted for quite well by a model that involves no prediction at all; the fielder in the ball catching demo gets to the correct position by controlling two present time perceptual variables: vertical and horizontal optical velocity.

RM: The PCT model I propose to account for the postural adjustments that seem to anticipate future disturbances (APAs) also involves no prediction. My model involves present time control of an event perception that I call “reach”; I didn’t define it very well because I don’t have a good idea of what it is but this event would be a temporal pattern of proprioceptive sensations – sensed angles of the limbs, center of gravity, etc. This temporal pattern is a perceptual variable, just as a temporal pattern of phonemes is a perceptual variable. The “reach” control system I proposed uses variations in posture (including APAs), limb angles and muscle forces to bring this perceptual variable to the reference state (that I called “reach”) while protecting it from disturbances that can affect the perception at any point during its production. I’m conceiving this control as being analogous to controlling for saying a particular word, as described in the “Control of Sequence” chapter of B:CP. In that model of word production there is also no prediction involved; the perceptual function just “constructs” a word based on the sequence of phonemes (analogous to the postural adjustments occurring during a “reach”) that are produced by lower level systems. It doesn’t predict what phoneme is coming next.

RM: In order to test this model we really have to come up with a clearer definition of the proposed controlled variable – which I suppose could be called “reachness”. And it really would be good to have a working model of this behavior, if for no other reason than to show how a model that controls a variable that is defined over time can be controlled. I believe that the most important way that PCT differs from other control models of the behavior of living systems is that it assumes that ALL behavior is control; And since control always involves the control of perception that means that simple behaviors involve the control of simple perceptions and complex behaviors involve the control of complex perceptions – and these are usually perceptions that are defined over sometimes considerable amounts of time. This is one of the main reasons why Bill proposed a hierarchy of perceptions. It was to account for the obviously hierarchical nature of behavior – behaviors “using” other behaviors to achieve their purposes; for example, using behaviors like running, throwing, catching and hitting to achieve the purpose of playing baseball – and for the fact that the behaviors that use other behaviors to achieve their purposes involve control of more complex perceptions than the behaviors that are being used; the perception controlled when “playing baseball” is much more complex (and defined over a much longer time period) than the perceptions controlled when running, throwing, catching and hitting.

HB-B: We know that both humans and cats fail to show APAs if they are taken by surprise.

RM: Yes, I noticed that. From the perspective of my model, that would result from not setting the reference for “reach” or " bilateral arm movement" or whatever the event is. This happens a lot in my sport, racquetball. The ideal way to take a forehand shot is to do a lot of APAs that get you into position to take it off the back wall. But sometimes I get a shot that comes at me so fast that I don’t have time to set up for a “proper forehand shot” – no APAs needed – so I just do what I can to move the racket to the ball like a beginner.

RM: I hope this makes some sense because I think it would really be a great area for research on control of higher level perceptual variables – variables that are defined over time.

Best

Rick

So yes, some environmental information serves to remove the surprise, kicking the control systems into gear. Is that (those) control system(s), dealing with the appearance of the target often used in the cat experiments to signal the upcoming stimulus, totally divorced from the “paw bat” ones? Should they be coupled? What happens if the expected stimulus never arrives, but the target remains? I guess there is fatigue at some point. What is the relevant question to ask?

In populations of upper motor neurons in motor and premotor cortex, there is often activity seconds before any movement is observed. What does that mean for control systems? That’s obviously not just delay. Those populations get input from… like everwhere. Motor cortex is bonkers!

On Fri, May 10, 2019, 11:59 Richard Marken csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

[Rick Marken 2019-05-10_11:53:31]

RM: Well, this has certainly been an interesting thread so far. I’m happy to see that there is a kind of consensus that the PCT explanation of apparent “anticipatory” behavior is that it is likely to be actions aimed at controlling a “higher level” controlled variable. The landslide was started by Henry Yin who said:

HY: There’s no conflict between negative feedback and anticipatory behavior. The real question is what kind of CV do you need to produce such behavior.

RM: I think this is the right question: what kind of CV would an organism be controlling that would result in your seeing such apparently “anticipatory” behavior. Martin suggests that the CV is a sequence:

MT: [Here is a] quick and dirty PCT approach. I start with the intention to bat at the target, which would set a reference for a sequence that could crudely be taken as “store energy, set trigger, wait, release energy when required”, or in a more general sense “Prepare, wait, execute”.

RM: And Erling agrees:

EJ: I rather like Martin’s proposal for controlling a prior stage in a sequence.

RM: And I agree that the CV is something like a sequence, but not like the one Martin suggests. In the case of the an anticipatory postural adjustments (APAs) seen in the cat’s reaching behavior (described in the Sheppen and Drew paper), it seems to me that the controlled variable is the “reach” itself – an event – like a “golf swing”. An event differs from a sequence only inasmuch as it is a continuously changing sequence of lower level perceptions that is defined over time. The “reach” requires making postural changes over time that get the paw to the intended destination while maintaining balance. So I see the APAs as the initial components of this “reach” event.

RM: I see these APA’s as being analogous to the initial muscular movements – for example, contraction of the diaphragm - that are involved in producing a word. These movements are not outputs produced in anticipation of a future disturbance but are the outputs in a control loop that is aimed at controlling a perception of the word. The word itself, like reach, is the controlled variable – a variable that is defined over time.

RM: Because “reach” is defined over time it looks like the initial postural adjustments that are made to control this perception are anticipatory. But I believe that they are actually just like the outputs in any control loop – continuously acting to keep the controlled variable in a reference state, protected from disturbances. If this is the case – if APAs are actually the initial outputs of a control loop controlling a variable that is defied over time – then disturbances to these APA’s will be resisted. Heather mentions some data that is consistent with this view:

NB-B: I suspect that the attached (Aruin, 2003) paper goes some way toward reconciling the “invariant, pre-programmed” feedforward conceptualization with the actual phenomenon: namely, it’s not really invariant (or, well, it’s not invariant in that there is a pre-programmed set of muscles activated in a pre-programmed way).

RM: I haven’t read the whole article carefully but apparently what Arium did was look to see whether variations in the initial the position of the body affected the nature of the APAs. And indeed it did. I see these variations in the initial position of the body as disturbances to a controlled variable (in Arium’s case it was “bilateral arm movement” rather than “reach”) and these disturbances are compensated for by the variations in the APAs.

RM: Of course, the idea that APAs are the outputs in a control loop controlling a variable defined over time has to be subjected to far more tests. And control models should be built to show that control of a higher level perception, like “reach”, can lead to behavior that “looks” anticipatory. So there’s some general ideas for PCT research that would be a great place to start for researchers interested in doing research on purpose!

Best

Rick


Richard S. Marken

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
–Antoine de Saint-Exupery


Richard S. Marken

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
–Antoine de Saint-Exupery


Richard S. Marken

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
–Antoine de Saint-Exupery

[Rick Marken 2019-05-13_12:15:54]

WM: Hi Eva, your idea of equating melody with sequential proprioception may be more than an analogy. Maybe our most fundamental sense of sequence is proprioception because we need it for motion & coordination, and our perception of melody is a beneficial side effect of this level of perception when applied to the auditory modality? But when combined with the propensity to dance, it further facilitates temporally coordinated proprioception?

 RM: Actually, the hierarchical control model assumes that all the different perceptual types in the control hierarchy are independent of modality once you get above the sensation level; the model also assumes that functions that compute the same type of perception are all at the same level of the hierarchy. So the perceptual functions that produce perceptions of configurations are all at the same level, regardless of whether the configuration perception produced is visual (shape), auditory (timbre), proprioceptive (hand configuration), etc. The same is assumed to be true for sequence perception: the perceptual functions that produce perceptions of auditory sequences (melodies) are at the same level as those that produce perceptions of visual , proprioceptive, etc sequences.Â

RM: Evidence that this is the case is presented in my never published (in a peer reviewed journal) “Hierarchical behavior of perception paper” which is published in my book MORE MIND READINGS (pp. 85-112). The evidence is presented mainly on pp. 104-109. I wrote that paper in about 1990. It’s a pretty darn good paper, I think. Yet it’s one of the few papers I could never get published. Too bad because I now think that the study of the hierarchy is really what PCT research should be focused on.Â

Best

Rick

···

On Mon, May 13, 2019 at 1:44 AM Warren Mansell wmansell@gmail.com wrote:

On 12 May 2019, at 10:54, Eva de Hullu (eva@dehullu.net via csgnet Mailing List) csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

[Eva de Hullu 2019-05-12_09:51:36 UTC]Â Â

In following this discussion about anticipatory postural control, I think an important difference between PCT and the other theories mentioned is that in PCT, causality is circular, closed loop. On the first proposed level, there is only perception of here-and-now intensities. I think one of the reasons why other theories struggle so much to fit observations into their theory, is because of their effort to model closed-loop events into linear causal models. In that way, you’ll need difficult models with prediction and anticipation, that can be explained by PCT through the perceptual hierarchy.Â

How could we go from a here-and-now perception to the perceived “anticipatory behavior”?

I think we could have a better understanding through the perceptual hierarchy, where levels are build from the bottom up, layer by layer, into increasing complexity. In answering these kind of questions, we could use some help from the proposed hierarchy.Â

Going up in the hierarchy, the perception of time emerges when transitions become a way of making sense of changing configurations. The sequence level is several steps higher, and at this level prediction must take place.

Imagine a melody, where each note is followed by another note at a certain pace and pitch. When you hear a melody for the first time, there are no references yet for this melody, and you’ll not experience the sense of predicting the next note. But after listening to it carefully, you’ll have created references for the melody, and with these references you’ll have the sense of being able to predict what follows. If you hear a familiar melody, your references and perceptual input will match if they are equal. If the melody changes from your expectations, you’ll find that you can no longer predict what’s next; without references for the melody, you’ll not recognize the song.

Following this, the anticipatory postural control could just concist of references in the form of sequential perceptions. In a melody, the sequence is a way of organizing single notes (categories) in such a way that they are no longer just single notes, but also a melody. A movement such as reaching, is not just a single pose, but also a sequence of poses. If you look at what happens from the perspective of circular causality, interpreting the steps in the sequence as (existing) references, I believe PCT is perfectly able to explain what happens.

Eva

PS I’m conscious that I might be repeating or missing some of the things already said here. I waited a bit too long submitting this answer, so excuse me if I’ve not properly addressed or incorporated other replies.Â

On Sat, May 11, 2019 at 9:00 PM Richard Marken csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

[Rick Marken 2019-05-11_11:58:37]

On Fri, May 10, 2019 at 8:05 PM Heather Broccard-Bell random.information.consultant@gmail.com wrote:

HB-B: I think this does make sense, and would be interesting to build. I am curious about a ‘critical experiment’ that would distinguish the PCT model from the mainstream account… although it does seem to be one of these phenomena that people have described without couching it in any particular theoretical framework, so this may not be possible.

RM: I think the APA phenomenon is implicitly couched in a particular theoretical framework; that of an open-loop causal model of behavior. The implication is that the APA is an output that is being produced open-loop in anticipation of a future perturbation. This can be tested because my model assumes that APAs are actually controlled variables that are used to control another controlled variable – the event called “reaching”. So applying an appropriately gentle, varying force disturbance to the postural change being made during the period of the APA should be resisted. This resistance should be detectable as appropriate variation in the force exerted by the animal during the APA period – the force used to produce the APA. It should also be detectable as consistency of the APA on different trials with different disturbances; this could be determined by analysis of visual records to see if the variation in the APA over trials is what would be expected based on variatoin in teh disturbances.Â

RM: I think there might be a way to create a “portable demo” of behavior that seems to involve an APA. I’ll see if I can think of one.

BestÂ

Rick

Â

On Fri, May 10, 2019, 17:05 Richard Marken csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

[Rick Marken 2019-05-10_17:04:34]

On Fri, May 10, 2019 at 12:50 PM Heather Broccard-Bell random.information.consultant@gmail.com wrote:

HB: I kind of think a lot of the problem is semantic. Some seem to be upset by the term “prediction” or “anticipation”, and I think what Rick/Henry suggest is a reasonable explanation for a mechanism for what most people would call anticipation/prediction. It can’t be magic :))

RM: The only time I get upset by terms like “prediction” and “anticipation” is when they give the wrong impression of how the PCT model explains some behaviors. This usually happens when it “looks like” a behavior involves “prediction” or “anticipation”.  For example, the behavior called “catching a fly ball” appears to involve “prediction” or “anticipation”. You can see it in the movements of the fielder in my baseball catch simulation (https://www.mindreadings.com/ControlDemo/CatchXY.html). The fielder seems to be making “anticipatory field adjustments” (AFAs?) in anticipation of being in the proper position to catch the ball. But we have found that the fielder’s behavior can be accounted for quite well by a model that involves no prediction at all; the fielder in the ball catching demo gets to the correct position by controlling two present time perceptual variables: vertical and horizontal optical velocity.Â

RM: The PCT model I propose to account for the postural adjustments that seem to anticipate future disturbances (APAs) also involves no prediction. My model involves present time control of an event perception that I call “reach”; I didn’t define it very well because I don’t have a good idea of what it is but this event would be a temporal pattern of proprioceptive sensations – sensed angles of the limbs, center of gravity, etc. This temporal pattern is a perceptual variable, just as a temporal pattern of phonemes is a perceptual variable. The “reach” control system I proposed uses variations in posture (including APAs), limb angles and muscle forces to bring this perceptual variable to the reference state (that I called “reach”) while protecting it from disturbances that can affect the perception at any point during its production. I’m conceiving this control as being analogous to controlling for saying a particular word, as described in the “Control of Sequence” chapter of B:CP. In that model of word production there is also no prediction involved; the perceptual function just “constructs” a word based on the sequence of phonemes (analogous to the postural adjustments occurring during a “reach”) that are produced by lower level systems. It doesn’t predict what phoneme is coming next.

RM: In order to test this model we really have to come up with a clearer definition of the proposed controlled variable – which I suppose could be called “reachness”. And it really would be good to have a working model of this behavior, if for no other reason than to show how a model that controls a variable that is defined over time can be controlled. I believe that the most important way that PCT differs from other control models of the behavior of living systems is that it assumes that ALL behavior is control; And since control always involves the control of perception that means that simple behaviors involve the control of simple perceptions and complex behaviors involve the control of complex perceptions – and these are usually perceptions that are defined over sometimes considerable amounts of time. This is one of the main reasons why Bill proposed a hierarchy of perceptions. It was to account for the obviously hierarchical nature of behavior – behaviors “using” other behaviors to achieve their purposes; for example, using behaviors like running, throwing, catching and hitting to achieve the purpose of playing baseball – and for the fact that the behaviors that use other behaviors to achieve their purposes involve control of more complex perceptions than the behaviors that are being used;Â the perception controlled when “playing baseball” is much more complex (and defined over a much longer time period) than the perceptions controlled when running, throwing, catching and hitting.

HB-B: We know that both humans and cats fail to show APAs if they are taken by surprise.Â

RM: Yes, I noticed that. From the perspective of my model, that would result from not setting the reference for “reach” or " bilateral arm movement" or whatever the event is. This happens a lot in my sport, racquetball. The ideal way to take a forehand shot is to do a lot of APAs that get you into position to take it off the back wall. But sometimes I get a shot that comes at me so fast that I don’t have time to set up for a “proper forehand shot” – no APAs needed – so I just do what I can to move the racket to the ball like a beginner. Â

RM: I hope this makes some sense because I think it would really be a great area for research on control of higher level perceptual variables – variables that are defined over time.Â

Best

Rick

So yes, some environmental information serves to remove the surprise, kicking the control systems into gear. Is that (those) control system(s), dealing with the appearance of the target often used in the cat experiments to signal the upcoming stimulus, totally divorced from the “paw bat” ones? Should they be coupled? What happens if the expected stimulus never arrives, but the target remains? I guess there is fatigue at some point. What is the relevant question to ask?

In populations of upper motor neurons in motor and premotor cortex, there is often activity seconds before any movement is observed. What does that mean for control systems? That’s obviously not just delay. Those populations get input from… like everwhere. Motor cortex is bonkers! Â

On Fri, May 10, 2019, 11:59 Richard Marken csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

[Rick Marken 2019-05-10_11:53:31]

RM: Well, this has certainly been an interesting thread so far. I’m happy to see that there is a kind of consensus that the PCT explanation of apparent “anticipatory” behavior is that it is likely to be actions aimed at controlling a “higher level” controlled variable. The landslide was started by Henry Yin who said:

HY: There’s no conflict between negative feedback and anticipatory behavior. The real question is what kind of CV do you need to produce such behavior.

RM: I think this is the right question: what kind of CV would an organism be controlling that would result in your seeing such apparently "anticipatory"Â behavior. Martin suggests that the CV is a sequence:

MT: [Here is a] quick and dirty PCT approach. I start with the intention to bat at the target, which would set a reference for a sequence that could crudely be taken as “store energy, set trigger, wait, release energy when required”, or in a more general sense “Prepare, wait, execute”.

RM: And Erling agrees:

EJ: Â I rather like Martin’s proposal for controlling a prior stage in a sequence. Â

RM: And I agree that the CV is something like a sequence, but not like the one Martin suggests. In the case of the an anticipatory postural adjustments (APAs) seen in the cat’s reaching behavior (described in the Sheppen and Drew paper), it seems to me that the controlled variable is the “reach” itself – an event – like a “golf swing”. An event differs from a sequence only inasmuch as it is a continuously changing sequence of lower level perceptions that is defined over time. The “reach” requires making postural changes over time that get the paw to the intended destination while maintaining balance. So I see the APAs as the initial components of this “reach” event.Â

RM: I see these APA’s as being analogous to the initial muscular movements – for example, contraction of the diaphragm - that are involved in producing a word. These movements are not outputs produced in anticipation of a future disturbance but are the outputs in a control loop that is aimed at controlling a perception of the word. The word itself, like reach, is the controlled variable – a variable that is defined over time.Â

RM: Because “reach” is defined over time it looks like the initial postural adjustments that are made to control this perception are anticipatory. But I believe that they are actually just like the outputs in any control loop – continuously acting to keep the controlled variable in a reference state, protected from disturbances. If this is the case – if APAs are actually the initial outputs of a control loop controlling a variable that is defied over time – then disturbances to these APA’s will be resisted. Heather mentions some data that is consistent with this view:

NB-B: I suspect that the attached (Aruin, 2003) paper goes some way toward reconciling the “invariant, pre-programmed” feedforward conceptualization with the actual phenomenon: namely, it’s not really invariant (or, well, it’s not invariant in that there is a pre-programmed set of muscles activated in a pre-programmed way). Â

RM: I haven’t read the whole article carefully but apparently what Arium did was look to see whether variations in the initial the position of the body affected the nature of the APAs. And indeed it did. I see these variations in the initial position of the body as disturbances to a controlled variable (in Arium’s case it was “bilateral arm movement” rather than “reach”) and these disturbances are compensated for by the variations in the APAs.Â

RM: Of course, the idea that APAs are the outputs in a control loop controlling a variable defined over time has to be subjected to far more tests. And control models should be built to show that control of a higher level perception, like “reach”, can lead to behavior that “looks” anticipatory. So there’s some general ideas for PCT research that would be a great place to start for researchers interested in doing research on purpose!

BestÂ

Rick

Â


Richard S. MarkenÂ

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery


Richard S. MarkenÂ

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery


Richard S. MarkenÂ

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery


Richard S. MarkenÂ

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

Hi Rick, yes I know all this which is why I suggested it :wink:

···

On 13 May 2019, at 20:17, Richard Marken rsmarken@gmail.com wrote:

[Rick Marken 2019-05-13_12:15:54]

On Mon, May 13, 2019 at 1:44 AM Warren Mansell wmansell@gmail.com wrote:

WM: Hi Eva, your idea of equating melody with sequential proprioception may be more than an analogy. Maybe our most fundamental sense of sequence is proprioception because we need it for motion & coordination, and our perception of melody is a beneficial side effect of this level of perception when applied to the auditory modality? But when combined with the propensity to dance, it further facilitates temporally coordinated proprioception?

RM: Actually, the hierarchical control model assumes that all the different perceptual types in the control hierarchy are independent of modality once you get above the sensation level; the model also assumes that functions that compute the same type of perception are all at the same level of the hierarchy. So the perceptual functions that produce perceptions of configurations are all at the same level, regardless of whether the configuration perception produced is visual (shape), auditory (timbre), proprioceptive (hand configuration), etc. The same is assumed to be true for sequence perception: the perceptual functions that produce perceptions of auditory sequences (melodies) are at the same level as those that produce perceptions of visual , proprioceptive, etc sequences.

RM: Evidence that this is the case is presented in my never published (in a peer reviewed journal) “Hierarchical behavior of perception paper” which is published in my book MORE MIND READINGS (pp. 85-112). The evidence is presented mainly on pp. 104-109. I wrote that paper in about 1990. It’s a pretty darn good paper, I think. Yet it’s one of the few papers I could never get published. Too bad because I now think that the study of the hierarchy is really what PCT research should be focused on.

Best

Rick

On 12 May 2019, at 10:54, Eva de Hullu (eva@dehullu.net via csgnet Mailing List) csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

[Eva de Hullu 2019-05-12_09:51:36 UTC]

In following this discussion about anticipatory postural control, I think an important difference between PCT and the other theories mentioned is that in PCT, causality is circular, closed loop. On the first proposed level, there is only perception of here-and-now intensities. I think one of the reasons why other theories struggle so much to fit observations into their theory, is because of their effort to model closed-loop events into linear causal models. In that way, you’ll need difficult models with prediction and anticipation, that can be explained by PCT through the perceptual hierarchy.

How could we go from a here-and-now perception to the perceived “anticipatory behavior”?

I think we could have a better understanding through the perceptual hierarchy, where levels are build from the bottom up, layer by layer, into increasing complexity. In answering these kind of questions, we could use some help from the proposed hierarchy.

Going up in the hierarchy, the perception of time emerges when transitions become a way of making sense of changing configurations. The sequence level is several steps higher, and at this level prediction must take place.

Imagine a melody, where each note is followed by another note at a certain pace and pitch. When you hear a melody for the first time, there are no references yet for this melody, and you’ll not experience the sense of predicting the next note. But after listening to it carefully, you’ll have created references for the melody, and with these references you’ll have the sense of being able to predict what follows. If you hear a familiar melody, your references and perceptual input will match if they are equal. If the melody changes from your expectations, you’ll find that you can no longer predict what’s next; without references for the melody, you’ll not recognize the song.

Following this, the anticipatory postural control could just concist of references in the form of sequential perceptions. In a melody, the sequence is a way of organizing single notes (categories) in such a way that they are no longer just single notes, but also a melody. A movement such as reaching, is not just a single pose, but also a sequence of poses. If you look at what happens from the perspective of circular causality, interpreting the steps in the sequence as (existing) references, I believe PCT is perfectly able to explain what happens.

Eva

PS I’m conscious that I might be repeating or missing some of the things already said here. I waited a bit too long submitting this answer, so excuse me if I’ve not properly addressed or incorporated other replies.

On Sat, May 11, 2019 at 9:00 PM Richard Marken csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

[Rick Marken 2019-05-11_11:58:37]

On Fri, May 10, 2019 at 8:05 PM Heather Broccard-Bell random.information.consultant@gmail.com wrote:

HB-B: I think this does make sense, and would be interesting to build. I am curious about a ‘critical experiment’ that would distinguish the PCT model from the mainstream account… although it does seem to be one of these phenomena that people have described without couching it in any particular theoretical framework, so this may not be possible.

RM: I think the APA phenomenon is implicitly couched in a particular theoretical framework; that of an open-loop causal model of behavior. The implication is that the APA is an output that is being produced open-loop in anticipation of a future perturbation. This can be tested because my model assumes that APAs are actually controlled variables that are used to control another controlled variable – the event called “reaching”. So applying an appropriately gentle, varying force disturbance to the postural change being made during the period of the APA should be resisted. This resistance should be detectable as appropriate variation in the force exerted by the animal during the APA period – the force used to produce the APA. It should also be detectable as consistency of the APA on different trials with different disturbances; this could be determined by analysis of visual records to see if the variation in the APA over trials is what would be expected based on variatoin in teh disturbances.

RM: I think there might be a way to create a “portable demo” of behavior that seems to involve an APA. I’ll see if I can think of one.

Best

Rick

On Fri, May 10, 2019, 17:05 Richard Marken csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

[Rick Marken 2019-05-10_17:04:34]

On Fri, May 10, 2019 at 12:50 PM Heather Broccard-Bell random.information.consultant@gmail.com wrote:

HB: I kind of think a lot of the problem is semantic. Some seem to be upset by the term “prediction” or “anticipation”, and I think what Rick/Henry suggest is a reasonable explanation for a mechanism for what most people would call anticipation/prediction. It can’t be magic :))

RM: The only time I get upset by terms like “prediction” and “anticipation” is when they give the wrong impression of how the PCT model explains some behaviors. This usually happens when it “looks like” a behavior involves “prediction” or “anticipation”. For example, the behavior called “catching a fly ball” appears to involve “prediction” or “anticipation”. You can see it in the movements of the fielder in my baseball catch simulation (https://www.mindreadings.com/ControlDemo/CatchXY.html). The fielder seems to be making “anticipatory field adjustments” (AFAs?) in anticipation of being in the proper position to catch the ball. But we have found that the fielder’s behavior can be accounted for quite well by a model that involves no prediction at all; the fielder in the ball catching demo gets to the correct position by controlling two present time perceptual variables: vertical and horizontal optical velocity.

RM: The PCT model I propose to account for the postural adjustments that seem to anticipate future disturbances (APAs) also involves no prediction. My model involves present time control of an event perception that I call “reach”; I didn’t define it very well because I don’t have a good idea of what it is but this event would be a temporal pattern of proprioceptive sensations – sensed angles of the limbs, center of gravity, etc. This temporal pattern is a perceptual variable, just as a temporal pattern of phonemes is a perceptual variable. The “reach” control system I proposed uses variations in posture (including APAs), limb angles and muscle forces to bring this perceptual variable to the reference state (that I called “reach”) while protecting it from disturbances that can affect the perception at any point during its production. I’m conceiving this control as being analogous to controlling for saying a particular word, as described in the “Control of Sequence” chapter of B:CP. In that model of word production there is also no prediction involved; the perceptual function just “constructs” a word based on the sequence of phonemes (analogous to the postural adjustments occurring during a “reach”) that are produced by lower level systems. It doesn’t predict what phoneme is coming next.

RM: In order to test this model we really have to come up with a clearer definition of the proposed controlled variable – which I suppose could be called “reachness”. And it really would be good to have a working model of this behavior, if for no other reason than to show how a model that controls a variable that is defined over time can be controlled. I believe that the most important way that PCT differs from other control models of the behavior of living systems is that it assumes that ALL behavior is control; And since control always involves the control of perception that means that simple behaviors involve the control of simple perceptions and complex behaviors involve the control of complex perceptions – and these are usually perceptions that are defined over sometimes considerable amounts of time. This is one of the main reasons why Bill proposed a hierarchy of perceptions. It was to account for the obviously hierarchical nature of behavior – behaviors “using” other behaviors to achieve their purposes; for example, using behaviors like running, throwing, catching and hitting to achieve the purpose of playing baseball – and for the fact that the behaviors that use other behaviors to achieve their purposes involve control of more complex perceptions than the behaviors that are being used; the perception controlled when “playing baseball” is much more complex (and defined over a much longer time period) than the perceptions controlled when running, throwing, catching and hitting.

HB-B: We know that both humans and cats fail to show APAs if they are taken by surprise.

RM: Yes, I noticed that. From the perspective of my model, that would result from not setting the reference for “reach” or " bilateral arm movement" or whatever the event is. This happens a lot in my sport, racquetball. The ideal way to take a forehand shot is to do a lot of APAs that get you into position to take it off the back wall. But sometimes I get a shot that comes at me so fast that I don’t have time to set up for a “proper forehand shot” – no APAs needed – so I just do what I can to move the racket to the ball like a beginner.

RM: I hope this makes some sense because I think it would really be a great area for research on control of higher level perceptual variables – variables that are defined over time.

Best

Rick

So yes, some environmental information serves to remove the surprise, kicking the control systems into gear. Is that (those) control system(s), dealing with the appearance of the target often used in the cat experiments to signal the upcoming stimulus, totally divorced from the “paw bat” ones? Should they be coupled? What happens if the expected stimulus never arrives, but the target remains? I guess there is fatigue at some point. What is the relevant question to ask?

In populations of upper motor neurons in motor and premotor cortex, there is often activity seconds before any movement is observed. What does that mean for control systems? That’s obviously not just delay. Those populations get input from… like everwhere. Motor cortex is bonkers!

On Fri, May 10, 2019, 11:59 Richard Marken csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

[Rick Marken 2019-05-10_11:53:31]

RM: Well, this has certainly been an interesting thread so far. I’m happy to see that there is a kind of consensus that the PCT explanation of apparent “anticipatory” behavior is that it is likely to be actions aimed at controlling a “higher level” controlled variable. The landslide was started by Henry Yin who said:

HY: There’s no conflict between negative feedback and anticipatory behavior. The real question is what kind of CV do you need to produce such behavior.

RM: I think this is the right question: what kind of CV would an organism be controlling that would result in your seeing such apparently “anticipatory” behavior. Martin suggests that the CV is a sequence:

MT: [Here is a] quick and dirty PCT approach. I start with the intention to bat at the target, which would set a reference for a sequence that could crudely be taken as “store energy, set trigger, wait, release energy when required”, or in a more general sense “Prepare, wait, execute”.

RM: And Erling agrees:

EJ: I rather like Martin’s proposal for controlling a prior stage in a sequence.

RM: And I agree that the CV is something like a sequence, but not like the one Martin suggests. In the case of the an anticipatory postural adjustments (APAs) seen in the cat’s reaching behavior (described in the Sheppen and Drew paper), it seems to me that the controlled variable is the “reach” itself – an event – like a “golf swing”. An event differs from a sequence only inasmuch as it is a continuously changing sequence of lower level perceptions that is defined over time. The “reach” requires making postural changes over time that get the paw to the intended destination while maintaining balance. So I see the APAs as the initial components of this “reach” event.

RM: I see these APA’s as being analogous to the initial muscular movements – for example, contraction of the diaphragm - that are involved in producing a word. These movements are not outputs produced in anticipation of a future disturbance but are the outputs in a control loop that is aimed at controlling a perception of the word. The word itself, like reach, is the controlled variable – a variable that is defined over time.

RM: Because “reach” is defined over time it looks like the initial postural adjustments that are made to control this perception are anticipatory. But I believe that they are actually just like the outputs in any control loop – continuously acting to keep the controlled variable in a reference state, protected from disturbances. If this is the case – if APAs are actually the initial outputs of a control loop controlling a variable that is defied over time – then disturbances to these APA’s will be resisted. Heather mentions some data that is consistent with this view:

NB-B: I suspect that the attached (Aruin, 2003) paper goes some way toward reconciling the “invariant, pre-programmed” feedforward conceptualization with the actual phenomenon: namely, it’s not really invariant (or, well, it’s not invariant in that there is a pre-programmed set of muscles activated in a pre-programmed way).

RM: I haven’t read the whole article carefully but apparently what Arium did was look to see whether variations in the initial the position of the body affected the nature of the APAs. And indeed it did. I see these variations in the initial position of the body as disturbances to a controlled variable (in Arium’s case it was “bilateral arm movement” rather than “reach”) and these disturbances are compensated for by the variations in the APAs.

RM: Of course, the idea that APAs are the outputs in a control loop controlling a variable defined over time has to be subjected to far more tests. And control models should be built to show that control of a higher level perception, like “reach”, can lead to behavior that “looks” anticipatory. So there’s some general ideas for PCT research that would be a great place to start for researchers interested in doing research on purpose!

Best

Rick


Richard S. Marken

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
–Antoine de Saint-Exupery


Richard S. Marken

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
–Antoine de Saint-Exupery


Richard S. Marken

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
–Antoine de Saint-Exupery


Richard S. Marken

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
–Antoine de Saint-Exupery

However, I can see that re-reading my initial suggestion it seems to suggest I didn’t actually get how there is literally no differentiation across modality. Sorry!

···

Dr Warren Mansell
Reader in Clinical Psychology

School of Health Sciences
2nd Floor Zochonis Building
University of Manchester
Oxford Road
Manchester M13 9PL
Email: warren.mansell@manchester.ac.uk
Â
Tel: +44 (0) 161 275 8589
Â
Website: http://www.psych-sci.manchester.ac.uk/staff/131406

Check www.pctweb.org for further information on Perceptual Control Theory

[Rick Marken 2019-05-13_15:53:47]

WM: However, I can see that re-reading my initial suggestion it seems to suggest I didn’t actually get how there is literally no differentiation across modality. Sorry!

RM: 'm sorry. I didn’t mean to sound like I was being critical. (My granddaughter starts nearly every sentence with “actually”; she has done this since she started to talk; I don’t know if she gets it from me or me from her). I was just taking the opportunity to make what I think is an interesting point about the levels of perception in PCT and that is that the same types of perceptual functions are assumed to be at the same levels of organization, regardless of the types of input they take. So a visual sequence perception is assumed to be computed at the same level of control organization as an auditory sequence perception.Â

RM: What I should have also mentioned (which I’m sure you are also aware of) is that since the levels of the hierarchical control model are assumed to reflect levels of neurophysiological structure, the assumption that the same type of perception is computed at the same level of the control hierarchy has strong implications for what kinds of perceptions are controlled at different levels of the nervous system. Bill tried, in B:CP to point out what neurophysiologcal evidence there was at the time of writing about what levels of the nervous system are involved in control of what kinds of perceptual variables. Unfortunately, there is no physiological work (that I know of, anyway) since the publication of B:CP that tests this hypothesis.Â

BestÂ

Rick

···

On Mon, May 13, 2019 at 1:39 PM Warren Mansell wmansell@gmail.com wrote:

On Mon, May 13, 2019 at 9:04 PM Warren Mansell wmansell@gmail.com wrote:

Hi Rick, yes I know all this which is why I suggested it :wink:

On 13 May 2019, at 20:17, Richard Marken rsmarken@gmail.com wrote:

[Rick Marken 2019-05-13_12:15:54]

On Mon, May 13, 2019 at 1:44 AM Warren Mansell wmansell@gmail.com wrote:

WM: Hi Eva, your idea of equating melody with sequential proprioception may be more than an analogy. Maybe our most fundamental sense of sequence is proprioception because we need it for motion & coordination, and our perception of melody is a beneficial side effect of this level of perception when applied to the auditory modality? But when combined with the propensity to dance, it further facilitates temporally coordinated proprioception?

 RM: Actually, the hierarchical control model assumes that all the different perceptual types in the control hierarchy are independent of modality once you get above the sensation level; the model also assumes that functions that compute the same type of perception are all at the same level of the hierarchy. So the perceptual functions that produce perceptions of configurations are all at the same level, regardless of whether the configuration perception produced is visual (shape), auditory (timbre), proprioceptive (hand configuration), etc. The same is assumed to be true for sequence perception: the perceptual functions that produce perceptions of auditory sequences (melodies) are at the same level as those that produce perceptions of visual , proprioceptive, etc sequences.Â

RM: Evidence that this is the case is presented in my never published (in a peer reviewed journal) “Hierarchical behavior of perception paper” which is published in my book MORE MIND READINGS (pp. 85-112). The evidence is presented mainly on pp. 104-109. I wrote that paper in about 1990. It’s a pretty darn good paper, I think. Yet it’s one of the few papers I could never get published. Too bad because I now think that the study of the hierarchy is really what PCT research should be focused on.Â

Best

Rick

On 12 May 2019, at 10:54, Eva de Hullu (eva@dehullu.net via csgnet Mailing List) csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

[Eva de Hullu 2019-05-12_09:51:36 UTC]Â Â

In following this discussion about anticipatory postural control, I think an important difference between PCT and the other theories mentioned is that in PCT, causality is circular, closed loop. On the first proposed level, there is only perception of here-and-now intensities. I think one of the reasons why other theories struggle so much to fit observations into their theory, is because of their effort to model closed-loop events into linear causal models. In that way, you’ll need difficult models with prediction and anticipation, that can be explained by PCT through the perceptual hierarchy.Â

How could we go from a here-and-now perception to the perceived “anticipatory behavior”?

I think we could have a better understanding through the perceptual hierarchy, where levels are build from the bottom up, layer by layer, into increasing complexity. In answering these kind of questions, we could use some help from the proposed hierarchy.Â

Going up in the hierarchy, the perception of time emerges when transitions become a way of making sense of changing configurations. The sequence level is several steps higher, and at this level prediction must take place.

Imagine a melody, where each note is followed by another note at a certain pace and pitch. When you hear a melody for the first time, there are no references yet for this melody, and you’ll not experience the sense of predicting the next note. But after listening to it carefully, you’ll have created references for the melody, and with these references you’ll have the sense of being able to predict what follows. If you hear a familiar melody, your references and perceptual input will match if they are equal. If the melody changes from your expectations, you’ll find that you can no longer predict what’s next; without references for the melody, you’ll not recognize the song.

Following this, the anticipatory postural control could just concist of references in the form of sequential perceptions. In a melody, the sequence is a way of organizing single notes (categories) in such a way that they are no longer just single notes, but also a melody. A movement such as reaching, is not just a single pose, but also a sequence of poses. If you look at what happens from the perspective of circular causality, interpreting the steps in the sequence as (existing) references, I believe PCT is perfectly able to explain what happens.

Eva

PS I’m conscious that I might be repeating or missing some of the things already said here. I waited a bit too long submitting this answer, so excuse me if I’ve not properly addressed or incorporated other replies.Â

On Sat, May 11, 2019 at 9:00 PM Richard Marken csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

[Rick Marken 2019-05-11_11:58:37]

On Fri, May 10, 2019 at 8:05 PM Heather Broccard-Bell random.information.consultant@gmail.com wrote:

HB-B: I think this does make sense, and would be interesting to build. I am curious about a ‘critical experiment’ that would distinguish the PCT model from the mainstream account… although it does seem to be one of these phenomena that people have described without couching it in any particular theoretical framework, so this may not be possible.

RM: I think the APA phenomenon is implicitly couched in a particular theoretical framework; that of an open-loop causal model of behavior. The implication is that the APA is an output that is being produced open-loop in anticipation of a future perturbation. This can be tested because my model assumes that APAs are actually controlled variables that are used to control another controlled variable – the event called “reaching”. So applying an appropriately gentle, varying force disturbance to the postural change being made during the period of the APA should be resisted. This resistance should be detectable as appropriate variation in the force exerted by the animal during the APA period – the force used to produce the APA. It should also be detectable as consistency of the APA on different trials with different disturbances; this could be determined by analysis of visual records to see if the variation in the APA over trials is what would be expected based on variatoin in teh disturbances.Â

RM: I think there might be a way to create a “portable demo” of behavior that seems to involve an APA. I’ll see if I can think of one.

BestÂ

Rick

Â

On Fri, May 10, 2019, 17:05 Richard Marken csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

[Rick Marken 2019-05-10_17:04:34]

On Fri, May 10, 2019 at 12:50 PM Heather Broccard-Bell random.information.consultant@gmail.com wrote:

HB: I kind of think a lot of the problem is semantic. Some seem to be upset by the term “prediction” or “anticipation”, and I think what Rick/Henry suggest is a reasonable explanation for a mechanism for what most people would call anticipation/prediction. It can’t be magic :))

RM: The only time I get upset by terms like “prediction” and “anticipation” is when they give the wrong impression of how the PCT model explains some behaviors. This usually happens when it “looks like” a behavior involves “prediction” or “anticipation”.  For example, the behavior called “catching a fly ball” appears to involve “prediction” or “anticipation”. You can see it in the movements of the fielder in my baseball catch simulation (https://www.mindreadings.com/ControlDemo/CatchXY.html). The fielder seems to be making “anticipatory field adjustments” (AFAs?) in anticipation of being in the proper position to catch the ball. But we have found that the fielder’s behavior can be accounted for quite well by a model that involves no prediction at all; the fielder in the ball catching demo gets to the correct position by controlling two present time perceptual variables: vertical and horizontal optical velocity.Â

RM: The PCT model I propose to account for the postural adjustments that seem to anticipate future disturbances (APAs) also involves no prediction. My model involves present time control of an event perception that I call “reach”; I didn’t define it very well because I don’t have a good idea of what it is but this event would be a temporal pattern of proprioceptive sensations – sensed angles of the limbs, center of gravity, etc. This temporal pattern is a perceptual variable, just as a temporal pattern of phonemes is a perceptual variable. The “reach” control system I proposed uses variations in posture (including APAs), limb angles and muscle forces to bring this perceptual variable to the reference state (that I called “reach”) while protecting it from disturbances that can affect the perception at any point during its production. I’m conceiving this control as being analogous to controlling for saying a particular word, as described in the “Control of Sequence” chapter of B:CP. In that model of word production there is also no prediction involved; the perceptual function just “constructs” a word based on the sequence of phonemes (analogous to the postural adjustments occurring during a “reach”) that are produced by lower level systems. It doesn’t predict what phoneme is coming next.

RM: In order to test this model we really have to come up with a clearer definition of the proposed controlled variable – which I suppose could be called “reachness”. And it really would be good to have a working model of this behavior, if for no other reason than to show how a model that controls a variable that is defined over time can be controlled. I believe that the most important way that PCT differs from other control models of the behavior of living systems is that it assumes that ALL behavior is control; And since control always involves the control of perception that means that simple behaviors involve the control of simple perceptions and complex behaviors involve the control of complex perceptions – and these are usually perceptions that are defined over sometimes considerable amounts of time. This is one of the main reasons why Bill proposed a hierarchy of perceptions. It was to account for the obviously hierarchical nature of behavior – behaviors “using” other behaviors to achieve their purposes; for example, using behaviors like running, throwing, catching and hitting to achieve the purpose of playing baseball – and for the fact that the behaviors that use other behaviors to achieve their purposes involve control of more complex perceptions than the behaviors that are being used;Â the perception controlled when “playing baseball” is much more complex (and defined over a much longer time period) than the perceptions controlled when running, throwing, catching and hitting.

HB-B: We know that both humans and cats fail to show APAs if they are taken by surprise.Â

RM: Yes, I noticed that. From the perspective of my model, that would result from not setting the reference for “reach” or " bilateral arm movement" or whatever the event is. This happens a lot in my sport, racquetball. The ideal way to take a forehand shot is to do a lot of APAs that get you into position to take it off the back wall. But sometimes I get a shot that comes at me so fast that I don’t have time to set up for a “proper forehand shot” – no APAs needed – so I just do what I can to move the racket to the ball like a beginner. Â

RM: I hope this makes some sense because I think it would really be a great area for research on control of higher level perceptual variables – variables that are defined over time.Â

Best

Rick

So yes, some environmental information serves to remove the surprise, kicking the control systems into gear. Is that (those) control system(s), dealing with the appearance of the target often used in the cat experiments to signal the upcoming stimulus, totally divorced from the “paw bat” ones? Should they be coupled? What happens if the expected stimulus never arrives, but the target remains? I guess there is fatigue at some point. What is the relevant question to ask?

In populations of upper motor neurons in motor and premotor cortex, there is often activity seconds before any movement is observed. What does that mean for control systems? That’s obviously not just delay. Those populations get input from… like everwhere. Motor cortex is bonkers! Â

On Fri, May 10, 2019, 11:59 Richard Marken csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

[Rick Marken 2019-05-10_11:53:31]

RM: Well, this has certainly been an interesting thread so far. I’m happy to see that there is a kind of consensus that the PCT explanation of apparent “anticipatory” behavior is that it is likely to be actions aimed at controlling a “higher level” controlled variable. The landslide was started by Henry Yin who said:

HY: There’s no conflict between negative feedback and anticipatory behavior. The real question is what kind of CV do you need to produce such behavior.

RM: I think this is the right question: what kind of CV would an organism be controlling that would result in your seeing such apparently "anticipatory"Â behavior. Martin suggests that the CV is a sequence:

MT: [Here is a] quick and dirty PCT approach. I start with the intention to bat at the target, which would set a reference for a sequence that could crudely be taken as “store energy, set trigger, wait, release energy when required”, or in a more general sense “Prepare, wait, execute”.

RM: And Erling agrees:

EJ: Â I rather like Martin’s proposal for controlling a prior stage in a sequence. Â

RM: And I agree that the CV is something like a sequence, but not like the one Martin suggests. In the case of the an anticipatory postural adjustments (APAs) seen in the cat’s reaching behavior (described in the Sheppen and Drew paper), it seems to me that the controlled variable is the “reach” itself – an event – like a “golf swing”. An event differs from a sequence only inasmuch as it is a continuously changing sequence of lower level perceptions that is defined over time. The “reach” requires making postural changes over time that get the paw to the intended destination while maintaining balance. So I see the APAs as the initial components of this “reach” event.Â

RM: I see these APA’s as being analogous to the initial muscular movements – for example, contraction of the diaphragm - that are involved in producing a word. These movements are not outputs produced in anticipation of a future disturbance but are the outputs in a control loop that is aimed at controlling a perception of the word. The word itself, like reach, is the controlled variable – a variable that is defined over time.Â

RM: Because “reach” is defined over time it looks like the initial postural adjustments that are made to control this perception are anticipatory. But I believe that they are actually just like the outputs in any control loop – continuously acting to keep the controlled variable in a reference state, protected from disturbances. If this is the case – if APAs are actually the initial outputs of a control loop controlling a variable that is defied over time – then disturbances to these APA’s will be resisted. Heather mentions some data that is consistent with this view:

NB-B: I suspect that the attached (Aruin, 2003) paper goes some way toward reconciling the “invariant, pre-programmed” feedforward conceptualization with the actual phenomenon: namely, it’s not really invariant (or, well, it’s not invariant in that there is a pre-programmed set of muscles activated in a pre-programmed way). Â

RM: I haven’t read the whole article carefully but apparently what Arium did was look to see whether variations in the initial the position of the body affected the nature of the APAs. And indeed it did. I see these variations in the initial position of the body as disturbances to a controlled variable (in Arium’s case it was “bilateral arm movement” rather than “reach”) and these disturbances are compensated for by the variations in the APAs.Â

RM: Of course, the idea that APAs are the outputs in a control loop controlling a variable defined over time has to be subjected to far more tests. And control models should be built to show that control of a higher level perception, like “reach”, can lead to behavior that “looks” anticipatory. So there’s some general ideas for PCT research that would be a great place to start for researchers interested in doing research on purpose!

BestÂ

Rick

Â


Richard S. MarkenÂ

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery


Richard S. MarkenÂ

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery


Richard S. MarkenÂ

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery


Richard S. MarkenÂ

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery


Dr Warren Mansell
Reader in Clinical Psychology

School of Health Sciences
2nd Floor Zochonis Building
University of Manchester
Oxford Road
Manchester M13 9PL
Email: warren.mansell@manchester.ac.uk
Â
Tel: +44 (0) 161 275 8589
Â
Website: http://www.psych-sci.manchester.ac.uk/staff/131406

Check www.pctweb.org for further information on Perceptual Control Theory


Richard S. MarkenÂ

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

:wink:

···

On 13 May 2019, at 23:57, Richard Marken rsmarken@gmail.com wrote:

[Rick Marken 2019-05-13_15:53:47]

On Mon, May 13, 2019 at 1:39 PM Warren Mansell wmansell@gmail.com wrote:

WM: However, I can see that re-reading my initial suggestion it seems to suggest I didn’t actually get how there is literally no differentiation across modality. Sorry!

RM: 'm sorry. I didn’t mean to sound like I was being critical. (My granddaughter starts nearly every sentence with “actually”; she has done this since she started to talk; I don’t know if she gets it from me or me from her). I was just taking the opportunity to make what I think is an interesting point about the levels of perception in PCT and that is that the same types of perceptual functions are assumed to be at the same levels of organization, regardless of the types of input they take. So a visual sequence perception is assumed to be computed at the same level of control organization as an auditory sequence perception.

RM: What I should have also mentioned (which I’m sure you are also aware of) is that since the levels of the hierarchical control model are assumed to reflect levels of neurophysiological structure, the assumption that the same type of perception is computed at the same level of the control hierarchy has strong implications for what kinds of perceptions are controlled at different levels of the nervous system. Bill tried, in B:CP to point out what neurophysiologcal evidence there was at the time of writing about what levels of the nervous system are involved in control of what kinds of perceptual variables. Unfortunately, there is no physiological work (that I know of, anyway) since the publication of B:CP that tests this hypothesis.

Best

Rick

On Mon, May 13, 2019 at 9:04 PM Warren Mansell wmansell@gmail.com wrote:

Hi Rick, yes I know all this which is why I suggested it :wink:

On 13 May 2019, at 20:17, Richard Marken rsmarken@gmail.com wrote:

[Rick Marken 2019-05-13_12:15:54]

On Mon, May 13, 2019 at 1:44 AM Warren Mansell wmansell@gmail.com wrote:

WM: Hi Eva, your idea of equating melody with sequential proprioception may be more than an analogy. Maybe our most fundamental sense of sequence is proprioception because we need it for motion & coordination, and our perception of melody is a beneficial side effect of this level of perception when applied to the auditory modality? But when combined with the propensity to dance, it further facilitates temporally coordinated proprioception?

RM: Actually, the hierarchical control model assumes that all the different perceptual types in the control hierarchy are independent of modality once you get above the sensation level; the model also assumes that functions that compute the same type of perception are all at the same level of the hierarchy. So the perceptual functions that produce perceptions of configurations are all at the same level, regardless of whether the configuration perception produced is visual (shape), auditory (timbre), proprioceptive (hand configuration), etc. The same is assumed to be true for sequence perception: the perceptual functions that produce perceptions of auditory sequences (melodies) are at the same level as those that produce perceptions of visual , proprioceptive, etc sequences.

RM: Evidence that this is the case is presented in my never published (in a peer reviewed journal) “Hierarchical behavior of perception paper” which is published in my book MORE MIND READINGS (pp. 85-112). The evidence is presented mainly on pp. 104-109. I wrote that paper in about 1990. It’s a pretty darn good paper, I think. Yet it’s one of the few papers I could never get published. Too bad because I now think that the study of the hierarchy is really what PCT research should be focused on.

Best

Rick

On 12 May 2019, at 10:54, Eva de Hullu (eva@dehullu.net via csgnet Mailing List) csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

[Eva de Hullu 2019-05-12_09:51:36 UTC]

In following this discussion about anticipatory postural control, I think an important difference between PCT and the other theories mentioned is that in PCT, causality is circular, closed loop. On the first proposed level, there is only perception of here-and-now intensities. I think one of the reasons why other theories struggle so much to fit observations into their theory, is because of their effort to model closed-loop events into linear causal models. In that way, you’ll need difficult models with prediction and anticipation, that can be explained by PCT through the perceptual hierarchy.

How could we go from a here-and-now perception to the perceived “anticipatory behavior”?

I think we could have a better understanding through the perceptual hierarchy, where levels are build from the bottom up, layer by layer, into increasing complexity. In answering these kind of questions, we could use some help from the proposed hierarchy.

Going up in the hierarchy, the perception of time emerges when transitions become a way of making sense of changing configurations. The sequence level is several steps higher, and at this level prediction must take place.

Imagine a melody, where each note is followed by another note at a certain pace and pitch. When you hear a melody for the first time, there are no references yet for this melody, and you’ll not experience the sense of predicting the next note. But after listening to it carefully, you’ll have created references for the melody, and with these references you’ll have the sense of being able to predict what follows. If you hear a familiar melody, your references and perceptual input will match if they are equal. If the melody changes from your expectations, you’ll find that you can no longer predict what’s next; without references for the melody, you’ll not recognize the song.

Following this, the anticipatory postural control could just concist of references in the form of sequential perceptions. In a melody, the sequence is a way of organizing single notes (categories) in such a way that they are no longer just single notes, but also a melody. A movement such as reaching, is not just a single pose, but also a sequence of poses. If you look at what happens from the perspective of circular causality, interpreting the steps in the sequence as (existing) references, I believe PCT is perfectly able to explain what happens.

Eva

PS I’m conscious that I might be repeating or missing some of the things already said here. I waited a bit too long submitting this answer, so excuse me if I’ve not properly addressed or incorporated other replies.

On Sat, May 11, 2019 at 9:00 PM Richard Marken csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

[Rick Marken 2019-05-11_11:58:37]

On Fri, May 10, 2019 at 8:05 PM Heather Broccard-Bell random.information.consultant@gmail.com wrote:

HB-B: I think this does make sense, and would be interesting to build. I am curious about a ‘critical experiment’ that would distinguish the PCT model from the mainstream account… although it does seem to be one of these phenomena that people have described without couching it in any particular theoretical framework, so this may not be possible.

RM: I think the APA phenomenon is implicitly couched in a particular theoretical framework; that of an open-loop causal model of behavior. The implication is that the APA is an output that is being produced open-loop in anticipation of a future perturbation. This can be tested because my model assumes that APAs are actually controlled variables that are used to control another controlled variable – the event called “reaching”. So applying an appropriately gentle, varying force disturbance to the postural change being made during the period of the APA should be resisted. This resistance should be detectable as appropriate variation in the force exerted by the animal during the APA period – the force used to produce the APA. It should also be detectable as consistency of the APA on different trials with different disturbances; this could be determined by analysis of visual records to see if the variation in the APA over trials is what would be expected based on variatoin in teh disturbances.

RM: I think there might be a way to create a “portable demo” of behavior that seems to involve an APA. I’ll see if I can think of one.

Best

Rick

On Fri, May 10, 2019, 17:05 Richard Marken csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

[Rick Marken 2019-05-10_17:04:34]

On Fri, May 10, 2019 at 12:50 PM Heather Broccard-Bell random.information.consultant@gmail.com wrote:

HB: I kind of think a lot of the problem is semantic. Some seem to be upset by the term “prediction” or “anticipation”, and I think what Rick/Henry suggest is a reasonable explanation for a mechanism for what most people would call anticipation/prediction. It can’t be magic :))

RM: The only time I get upset by terms like “prediction” and “anticipation” is when they give the wrong impression of how the PCT model explains some behaviors. This usually happens when it “looks like” a behavior involves “prediction” or “anticipation”. For example, the behavior called “catching a fly ball” appears to involve “prediction” or “anticipation”. You can see it in the movements of the fielder in my baseball catch simulation (https://www.mindreadings.com/ControlDemo/CatchXY.html). The fielder seems to be making “anticipatory field adjustments” (AFAs?) in anticipation of being in the proper position to catch the ball. But we have found that the fielder’s behavior can be accounted for quite well by a model that involves no prediction at all; the fielder in the ball catching demo gets to the correct position by controlling two present time perceptual variables: vertical and horizontal optical velocity.

RM: The PCT model I propose to account for the postural adjustments that seem to anticipate future disturbances (APAs) also involves no prediction. My model involves present time control of an event perception that I call “reach”; I didn’t define it very well because I don’t have a good idea of what it is but this event would be a temporal pattern of proprioceptive sensations – sensed angles of the limbs, center of gravity, etc. This temporal pattern is a perceptual variable, just as a temporal pattern of phonemes is a perceptual variable. The “reach” control system I proposed uses variations in posture (including APAs), limb angles and muscle forces to bring this perceptual variable to the reference state (that I called “reach”) while protecting it from disturbances that can affect the perception at any point during its production. I’m conceiving this control as being analogous to controlling for saying a particular word, as described in the “Control of Sequence” chapter of B:CP. In that model of word production there is also no prediction involved; the perceptual function just “constructs” a word based on the sequence of phonemes (analogous to the postural adjustments occurring during a “reach”) that are produced by lower level systems. It doesn’t predict what phoneme is coming next.

RM: In order to test this model we really have to come up with a clearer definition of the proposed controlled variable – which I suppose could be called “reachness”. And it really would be good to have a working model of this behavior, if for no other reason than to show how a model that controls a variable that is defined over time can be controlled. I believe that the most important way that PCT differs from other control models of the behavior of living systems is that it assumes that ALL behavior is control; And since control always involves the control of perception that means that simple behaviors involve the control of simple perceptions and complex behaviors involve the control of complex perceptions – and these are usually perceptions that are defined over sometimes considerable amounts of time. This is one of the main reasons why Bill proposed a hierarchy of perceptions. It was to account for the obviously hierarchical nature of behavior – behaviors “using” other behaviors to achieve their purposes; for example, using behaviors like running, throwing, catching and hitting to achieve the purpose of playing baseball – and for the fact that the behaviors that use other behaviors to achieve their purposes involve control of more complex perceptions than the behaviors that are being used; the perception controlled when “playing baseball” is much more complex (and defined over a much longer time period) than the perceptions controlled when running, throwing, catching and hitting.

HB-B: We know that both humans and cats fail to show APAs if they are taken by surprise.

RM: Yes, I noticed that. From the perspective of my model, that would result from not setting the reference for “reach” or " bilateral arm movement" or whatever the event is. This happens a lot in my sport, racquetball. The ideal way to take a forehand shot is to do a lot of APAs that get you into position to take it off the back wall. But sometimes I get a shot that comes at me so fast that I don’t have time to set up for a “proper forehand shot” – no APAs needed – so I just do what I can to move the racket to the ball like a beginner.

RM: I hope this makes some sense because I think it would really be a great area for research on control of higher level perceptual variables – variables that are defined over time.

Best

Rick

So yes, some environmental information serves to remove the surprise, kicking the control systems into gear. Is that (those) control system(s), dealing with the appearance of the target often used in the cat experiments to signal the upcoming stimulus, totally divorced from the “paw bat” ones? Should they be coupled? What happens if the expected stimulus never arrives, but the target remains? I guess there is fatigue at some point. What is the relevant question to ask?

In populations of upper motor neurons in motor and premotor cortex, there is often activity seconds before any movement is observed. What does that mean for control systems? That’s obviously not just delay. Those populations get input from… like everwhere. Motor cortex is bonkers!

On Fri, May 10, 2019, 11:59 Richard Marken csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

[Rick Marken 2019-05-10_11:53:31]

RM: Well, this has certainly been an interesting thread so far. I’m happy to see that there is a kind of consensus that the PCT explanation of apparent “anticipatory” behavior is that it is likely to be actions aimed at controlling a “higher level” controlled variable. The landslide was started by Henry Yin who said:

HY: There’s no conflict between negative feedback and anticipatory behavior. The real question is what kind of CV do you need to produce such behavior.

RM: I think this is the right question: what kind of CV would an organism be controlling that would result in your seeing such apparently “anticipatory” behavior. Martin suggests that the CV is a sequence:

MT: [Here is a] quick and dirty PCT approach. I start with the intention to bat at the target, which would set a reference for a sequence that could crudely be taken as “store energy, set trigger, wait, release energy when required”, or in a more general sense “Prepare, wait, execute”.

RM: And Erling agrees:

EJ: I rather like Martin’s proposal for controlling a prior stage in a sequence.

RM: And I agree that the CV is something like a sequence, but not like the one Martin suggests. In the case of the an anticipatory postural adjustments (APAs) seen in the cat’s reaching behavior (described in the Sheppen and Drew paper), it seems to me that the controlled variable is the “reach” itself – an event – like a “golf swing”. An event differs from a sequence only inasmuch as it is a continuously changing sequence of lower level perceptions that is defined over time. The “reach” requires making postural changes over time that get the paw to the intended destination while maintaining balance. So I see the APAs as the initial components of this “reach” event.

RM: I see these APA’s as being analogous to the initial muscular movements – for example, contraction of the diaphragm - that are involved in producing a word. These movements are not outputs produced in anticipation of a future disturbance but are the outputs in a control loop that is aimed at controlling a perception of the word. The word itself, like reach, is the controlled variable – a variable that is defined over time.

RM: Because “reach” is defined over time it looks like the initial postural adjustments that are made to control this perception are anticipatory. But I believe that they are actually just like the outputs in any control loop – continuously acting to keep the controlled variable in a reference state, protected from disturbances. If this is the case – if APAs are actually the initial outputs of a control loop controlling a variable that is defied over time – then disturbances to these APA’s will be resisted. Heather mentions some data that is consistent with this view:

NB-B: I suspect that the attached (Aruin, 2003) paper goes some way toward reconciling the “invariant, pre-programmed” feedforward conceptualization with the actual phenomenon: namely, it’s not really invariant (or, well, it’s not invariant in that there is a pre-programmed set of muscles activated in a pre-programmed way).

RM: I haven’t read the whole article carefully but apparently what Arium did was look to see whether variations in the initial the position of the body affected the nature of the APAs. And indeed it did. I see these variations in the initial position of the body as disturbances to a controlled variable (in Arium’s case it was “bilateral arm movement” rather than “reach”) and these disturbances are compensated for by the variations in the APAs.

RM: Of course, the idea that APAs are the outputs in a control loop controlling a variable defined over time has to be subjected to far more tests. And control models should be built to show that control of a higher level perception, like “reach”, can lead to behavior that “looks” anticipatory. So there’s some general ideas for PCT research that would be a great place to start for researchers interested in doing research on purpose!

Best

Rick


Richard S. Marken

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
–Antoine de Saint-Exupery


Richard S. Marken

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
–Antoine de Saint-Exupery


Richard S. Marken

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
–Antoine de Saint-Exupery


Richard S. Marken

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
–Antoine de Saint-Exupery


Dr Warren Mansell
Reader in Clinical Psychology

School of Health Sciences
2nd Floor Zochonis Building
University of Manchester
Oxford Road
Manchester M13 9PL
Email: warren.mansell@manchester.ac.uk

Tel: +44 (0) 161 275 8589

Website: http://www.psych-sci.manchester.ac.uk/staff/131406

Check www.pctweb.org for further information on Perceptual Control Theory


Richard S. Marken

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
–Antoine de Saint-Exupery

[Mike Acree 2019.05.11.12.53 PST]

Â

The “anticipatory pretension,â€? or whatever, is what presumably
prevents us from tickling ourselves as effectively as another person can.

Â

The phenomenon also makes me think of the “cortical readiness
wave� discovered by the British neurophysiologist Grey Walter about 60 years
ago—a potential preceding any voluntary motor act by a few millisecconds.Â
He had people viewing a sequence of slides, advancing them by pressing a
button; but when he wired the projector to be operated by the cortical
readiness wave, all they had to do was “get readyâ€? for the next slide to
appear—to “willâ€? it into existence, as it wereâ—and there it was. The
experience was so unnerving that several people wet their pants.

Â

Hi Rick,
I agree with you that the perceptual hierarchy deserves more attention. However, literature on these levels is sparse and most books about PCT don’t go beyond the introductory level. It would be great to read this darn good paper to improve this situation. Are you willing to share it? Or could anyone share any papers or suggestions to dive deeper into the subject? That would be most welcome.

Eva

···

On Tue, May 14, 2019 at 9:06 AM Warren Mansell csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

:wink:

On 13 May 2019, at 23:57, Richard Marken rsmarken@gmail.com wrote:

[Rick Marken 2019-05-13_15:53:47]

On Mon, May 13, 2019 at 1:39 PM Warren Mansell wmansell@gmail.com wrote:

WM: However, I can see that re-reading my initial suggestion it seems to suggest I didn’t actually get how there is literally no differentiation across modality. Sorry!

RM: 'm sorry. I didn’t mean to sound like I was being critical. (My granddaughter starts nearly every sentence with “actually”; she has done this since she started to talk; I don’t know if she gets it from me or me from her). I was just taking the opportunity to make what I think is an interesting point about the levels of perception in PCT and that is that the same types of perceptual functions are assumed to be at the same levels of organization, regardless of the types of input they take. So a visual sequence perception is assumed to be computed at the same level of control organization as an auditory sequence perception.Â

RM: What I should have also mentioned (which I’m sure you are also aware of) is that since the levels of the hierarchical control model are assumed to reflect levels of neurophysiological structure, the assumption that the same type of perception is computed at the same level of the control hierarchy has strong implications for what kinds of perceptions are controlled at different levels of the nervous system. Bill tried, in B:CP to point out what neurophysiologcal evidence there was at the time of writing about what levels of the nervous system are involved in control of what kinds of perceptual variables. Unfortunately, there is no physiological work (that I know of, anyway) since the publication of B:CP that tests this hypothesis.Â

BestÂ

Rick

On Mon, May 13, 2019 at 9:04 PM Warren Mansell wmansell@gmail.com wrote:

Hi Rick, yes I know all this which is why I suggested it :wink:

On 13 May 2019, at 20:17, Richard Marken rsmarken@gmail.com wrote:

[Rick Marken 2019-05-13_12:15:54]

On Mon, May 13, 2019 at 1:44 AM Warren Mansell wmansell@gmail.com wrote:

WM: Hi Eva, your idea of equating melody with sequential proprioception may be more than an analogy. Maybe our most fundamental sense of sequence is proprioception because we need it for motion & coordination, and our perception of melody is a beneficial side effect of this level of perception when applied to the auditory modality? But when combined with the propensity to dance, it further facilitates temporally coordinated proprioception?

 RM: Actually, the hierarchical control model assumes that all the different perceptual types in the control hierarchy are independent of modality once you get above the sensation level; the model also assumes that functions that compute the same type of perception are all at the same level of the hierarchy. So the perceptual functions that produce perceptions of configurations are all at the same level, regardless of whether the configuration perception produced is visual (shape), auditory (timbre), proprioceptive (hand configuration), etc. The same is assumed to be true for sequence perception: the perceptual functions that produce perceptions of auditory sequences (melodies) are at the same level as those that produce perceptions of visual , proprioceptive, etc sequences.Â

RM: Evidence that this is the case is presented in my never published (in a peer reviewed journal) “Hierarchical behavior of perception paper” which is published in my book MORE MIND READINGS (pp. 85-112). The evidence is presented mainly on pp. 104-109. I wrote that paper in about 1990. It’s a pretty darn good paper, I think. Yet it’s one of the few papers I could never get published. Too bad because I now think that the study of the hierarchy is really what PCT research should be focused on.Â

Best

Rick

On 12 May 2019, at 10:54, Eva de Hullu (eva@dehullu.net via csgnet Mailing List) csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

[Eva de Hullu 2019-05-12_09:51:36 UTC]Â Â

In following this discussion about anticipatory postural control, I think an important difference between PCT and the other theories mentioned is that in PCT, causality is circular, closed loop. On the first proposed level, there is only perception of here-and-now intensities. I think one of the reasons why other theories struggle so much to fit observations into their theory, is because of their effort to model closed-loop events into linear causal models. In that way, you’ll need difficult models with prediction and anticipation, that can be explained by PCT through the perceptual hierarchy.Â

How could we go from a here-and-now perception to the perceived “anticipatory behavior”?

I think we could have a better understanding through the perceptual hierarchy, where levels are build from the bottom up, layer by layer, into increasing complexity. In answering these kind of questions, we could use some help from the proposed hierarchy.Â

Going up in the hierarchy, the perception of time emerges when transitions become a way of making sense of changing configurations. The sequence level is several steps higher, and at this level prediction must take place.

Imagine a melody, where each note is followed by another note at a certain pace and pitch. When you hear a melody for the first time, there are no references yet for this melody, and you’ll not experience the sense of predicting the next note. But after listening to it carefully, you’ll have created references for the melody, and with these references you’ll have the sense of being able to predict what follows. If you hear a familiar melody, your references and perceptual input will match if they are equal. If the melody changes from your expectations, you’ll find that you can no longer predict what’s next; without references for the melody, you’ll not recognize the song.

Following this, the anticipatory postural control could just concist of references in the form of sequential perceptions. In a melody, the sequence is a way of organizing single notes (categories) in such a way that they are no longer just single notes, but also a melody. A movement such as reaching, is not just a single pose, but also a sequence of poses. If you look at what happens from the perspective of circular causality, interpreting the steps in the sequence as (existing) references, I believe PCT is perfectly able to explain what happens.

Eva

PS I’m conscious that I might be repeating or missing some of the things already said here. I waited a bit too long submitting this answer, so excuse me if I’ve not properly addressed or incorporated other replies.Â

On Sat, May 11, 2019 at 9:00 PM Richard Marken csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

[Rick Marken 2019-05-11_11:58:37]

On Fri, May 10, 2019 at 8:05 PM Heather Broccard-Bell random.information.consultant@gmail.com wrote:

HB-B: I think this does make sense, and would be interesting to build. I am curious about a ‘critical experiment’ that would distinguish the PCT model from the mainstream account… although it does seem to be one of these phenomena that people have described without couching it in any particular theoretical framework, so this may not be possible.

RM: I think the APA phenomenon is implicitly couched in a particular theoretical framework; that of an open-loop causal model of behavior. The implication is that the APA is an output that is being produced open-loop in anticipation of a future perturbation. This can be tested because my model assumes that APAs are actually controlled variables that are used to control another controlled variable – the event called “reaching”. So applying an appropriately gentle, varying force disturbance to the postural change being made during the period of the APA should be resisted. This resistance should be detectable as appropriate variation in the force exerted by the animal during the APA period – the force used to produce the APA. It should also be detectable as consistency of the APA on different trials with different disturbances; this could be determined by analysis of visual records to see if the variation in the APA over trials is what would be expected based on variatoin in teh disturbances.Â

RM: I think there might be a way to create a “portable demo” of behavior that seems to involve an APA. I’ll see if I can think of one.

BestÂ

Rick

Â

On Fri, May 10, 2019, 17:05 Richard Marken csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

[Rick Marken 2019-05-10_17:04:34]

On Fri, May 10, 2019 at 12:50 PM Heather Broccard-Bell random.information.consultant@gmail.com wrote:

HB: I kind of think a lot of the problem is semantic. Some seem to be upset by the term “prediction” or “anticipation”, and I think what Rick/Henry suggest is a reasonable explanation for a mechanism for what most people would call anticipation/prediction. It can’t be magic :))

RM: The only time I get upset by terms like “prediction” and “anticipation” is when they give the wrong impression of how the PCT model explains some behaviors. This usually happens when it “looks like” a behavior involves “prediction” or “anticipation”.  For example, the behavior called “catching a fly ball” appears to involve “prediction” or “anticipation”. You can see it in the movements of the fielder in my baseball catch simulation (https://www.mindreadings.com/ControlDemo/CatchXY.html). The fielder seems to be making “anticipatory field adjustments” (AFAs?) in anticipation of being in the proper position to catch the ball. But we have found that the fielder’s behavior can be accounted for quite well by a model that involves no prediction at all; the fielder in the ball catching demo gets to the correct position by controlling two present time perceptual variables: vertical and horizontal optical velocity.Â

RM: The PCT model I propose to account for the postural adjustments that seem to anticipate future disturbances (APAs) also involves no prediction. My model involves present time control of an event perception that I call “reach”; I didn’t define it very well because I don’t have a good idea of what it is but this event would be a temporal pattern of proprioceptive sensations – sensed angles of the limbs, center of gravity, etc. This temporal pattern is a perceptual variable, just as a temporal pattern of phonemes is a perceptual variable. The “reach” control system I proposed uses variations in posture (including APAs), limb angles and muscle forces to bring this perceptual variable to the reference state (that I called “reach”) while protecting it from disturbances that can affect the perception at any point during its production. I’m conceiving this control as being analogous to controlling for saying a particular word, as described in the “Control of Sequence” chapter of B:CP. In that model of word production there is also no prediction involved; the perceptual function just “constructs” a word based on the sequence of phonemes (analogous to the postural adjustments occurring during a “reach”) that are produced by lower level systems. It doesn’t predict what phoneme is coming next.

RM: In order to test this model we really have to come up with a clearer definition of the proposed controlled variable – which I suppose could be called “reachness”. And it really would be good to have a working model of this behavior, if for no other reason than to show how a model that controls a variable that is defined over time can be controlled. I believe that the most important way that PCT differs from other control models of the behavior of living systems is that it assumes that ALL behavior is control; And since control always involves the control of perception that means that simple behaviors involve the control of simple perceptions and complex behaviors involve the control of complex perceptions – and these are usually perceptions that are defined over sometimes considerable amounts of time. This is one of the main reasons why Bill proposed a hierarchy of perceptions. It was to account for the obviously hierarchical nature of behavior – behaviors “using” other behaviors to achieve their purposes; for example, using behaviors like running, throwing, catching and hitting to achieve the purpose of playing baseball – and for the fact that the behaviors that use other behaviors to achieve their purposes involve control of more complex perceptions than the behaviors that are being used;Â the perception controlled when “playing baseball” is much more complex (and defined over a much longer time period) than the perceptions controlled when running, throwing, catching and hitting.

HB-B: We know that both humans and cats fail to show APAs if they are taken by surprise.Â

RM: Yes, I noticed that. From the perspective of my model, that would result from not setting the reference for “reach” or " bilateral arm movement" or whatever the event is. This happens a lot in my sport, racquetball. The ideal way to take a forehand shot is to do a lot of APAs that get you into position to take it off the back wall. But sometimes I get a shot that comes at me so fast that I don’t have time to set up for a “proper forehand shot” – no APAs needed – so I just do what I can to move the racket to the ball like a beginner. Â

RM: I hope this makes some sense because I think it would really be a great area for research on control of higher level perceptual variables – variables that are defined over time.Â

Best

Rick

So yes, some environmental information serves to remove the surprise, kicking the control systems into gear. Is that (those) control system(s), dealing with the appearance of the target often used in the cat experiments to signal the upcoming stimulus, totally divorced from the “paw bat” ones? Should they be coupled? What happens if the expected stimulus never arrives, but the target remains? I guess there is fatigue at some point. What is the relevant question to ask?

In populations of upper motor neurons in motor and premotor cortex, there is often activity seconds before any movement is observed. What does that mean for control systems? That’s obviously not just delay. Those populations get input from… like everwhere. Motor cortex is bonkers! Â

On Fri, May 10, 2019, 11:59 Richard Marken csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

[Rick Marken 2019-05-10_11:53:31]

RM: Well, this has certainly been an interesting thread so far. I’m happy to see that there is a kind of consensus that the PCT explanation of apparent “anticipatory” behavior is that it is likely to be actions aimed at controlling a “higher level” controlled variable. The landslide was started by Henry Yin who said:

HY: There’s no conflict between negative feedback and anticipatory behavior. The real question is what kind of CV do you need to produce such behavior.

RM: I think this is the right question: what kind of CV would an organism be controlling that would result in your seeing such apparently "anticipatory"Â behavior. Martin suggests that the CV is a sequence:

MT: [Here is a] quick and dirty PCT approach. I start with the intention to bat at the target, which would set a reference for a sequence that could crudely be taken as “store energy, set trigger, wait, release energy when required”, or in a more general sense “Prepare, wait, execute”.

RM: And Erling agrees:

EJ: Â I rather like Martin’s proposal for controlling a prior stage in a sequence. Â

RM: And I agree that the CV is something like a sequence, but not like the one Martin suggests. In the case of the an anticipatory postural adjustments (APAs) seen in the cat’s reaching behavior (described in the Sheppen and Drew paper), it seems to me that the controlled variable is the “reach” itself – an event – like a “golf swing”. An event differs from a sequence only inasmuch as it is a continuously changing sequence of lower level perceptions that is defined over time. The “reach” requires making postural changes over time that get the paw to the intended destination while maintaining balance. So I see the APAs as the initial components of this “reach” event.Â

RM: I see these APA’s as being analogous to the initial muscular movements – for example, contraction of the diaphragm - that are involved in producing a word. These movements are not outputs produced in anticipation of a future disturbance but are the outputs in a control loop that is aimed at controlling a perception of the word. The word itself, like reach, is the controlled variable – a variable that is defined over time.Â

RM: Because “reach” is defined over time it looks like the initial postural adjustments that are made to control this perception are anticipatory. But I believe that they are actually just like the outputs in any control loop – continuously acting to keep the controlled variable in a reference state, protected from disturbances. If this is the case – if APAs are actually the initial outputs of a control loop controlling a variable that is defied over time – then disturbances to these APA’s will be resisted. Heather mentions some data that is consistent with this view:

NB-B: I suspect that the attached (Aruin, 2003) paper goes some way toward reconciling the “invariant, pre-programmed” feedforward conceptualization with the actual phenomenon: namely, it’s not really invariant (or, well, it’s not invariant in that there is a pre-programmed set of muscles activated in a pre-programmed way). Â

RM: I haven’t read the whole article carefully but apparently what Arium did was look to see whether variations in the initial the position of the body affected the nature of the APAs. And indeed it did. I see these variations in the initial position of the body as disturbances to a controlled variable (in Arium’s case it was “bilateral arm movement” rather than “reach”) and these disturbances are compensated for by the variations in the APAs.Â

RM: Of course, the idea that APAs are the outputs in a control loop controlling a variable defined over time has to be subjected to far more tests. And control models should be built to show that control of a higher level perception, like “reach”, can lead to behavior that “looks” anticipatory. So there’s some general ideas for PCT research that would be a great place to start for researchers interested in doing research on purpose!

BestÂ

Rick

Â


Richard S. MarkenÂ

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery


Richard S. MarkenÂ

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery


Richard S. MarkenÂ

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery


Richard S. MarkenÂ

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery


Dr Warren Mansell
Reader in Clinical Psychology

School of Health Sciences
2nd Floor Zochonis Building
University of Manchester
Oxford Road
Manchester M13 9PL
Email: warren.mansell@manchester.ac.uk
Â
Tel: +44 (0) 161 275 8589
Â
Website: http://www.psych-sci.manchester.ac.uk/staff/131406

Check www.pctweb.org for further information on Perceptual Control Theory


Richard S. MarkenÂ

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

Angus
Jenkinson in, June 10, 2019, 1248 (UK)

Colleagues

Since Martin reposted the original interesting question by Heather, there have been a number of contributions about internal models, “prediction�, direct perception on the retina, Houdini’s preparation, and so forth. All very interesting.
But as no one has addressed a particular aspect of the original question, I would like to bring it up.

It seems to me that the control principle works “all the way down�. That is to say, every internal organism and ‘subunit’ is involved in controlling its own activities in the same way (as is evidenced in the original question.) Generally,
control “precipitates� or flows through the complex organism (I think the mediaeval mind would say that they participate the action). A macro intention leads to billions of controlled micro-actions, many simply routinely engaged by control feedback (like sugar
use), others directly serving the macro goal (both autonomously — their own control — and automaomatically, ruled by the master goal)*.

To me, this means that the question can be recast or rephrased: how do ‘subunits’ and ‘subunits’ of ‘subunits’ ‘know’ that they should be taking perceptually controlled action ‘of their own’ within a coordinated physico-temporal structure?
How does the retina image relate to the muscle in the little toe? Normally we would expect it to be responding to what is already happening to maintain a homeostat, but a large intention (resist punch, catch ball).

If I want to pick up a glass, certain things have to happen before others with a whole bevy of actors each controlling their own activities — ultimately every cell — need to to work in a coordinated way. Most people picking up a glass or walking
along the road are not even conscious of what they’re doing and it takes practice (such as Houdini’s) to become ‘fully’ conscious, that is actually able to observe and be presenced in the action itself. I (as I normally understand myself) certainly cannot
be responsible for organising all that myriad of action.

I will leave possible answers out of my question.

···

………â¦â€¦â€¦………………………………………………………………….

Angus Jenkinson

The key variation is the extent to which by having a metalevel — to use a termm of approximation here — a particular organnism — like a human being — might have somsome degree of independent choice.

On 09/05/2019, 14:29, “Heather Broccard-Bell” csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

I suspect that the attached (Aruin, 2003) paper goes some way toward reconciling the “invariant, pre-programmed” feedforward conceptualization with the actual phenomenon: namely, it’s not really invariant (or, well, it’s not invariant in
that there is a pre-programmed set of muscles activated in a pre-programmed way). So, I suspect that some of the problem in the “mainstream” is semantic.

Anyway, long (~500 ms) stimulation of motor cortex has already demonstrated that “motor output” seems to be about goals, and not specific, muscle-by-muscle motor programs (see Graziano, 2002; attached), and really the only way you could
get that to work is hierarchical control with continuous feedback…

On Wed, May 8, 2019, 21:16 Martin Taylor csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

[Martin Taylor 2019.05.09.00.09]

[Rick Marken 2019-05-08_17:57:30]

RM: Some time ago Heather Broccard-Bell asked me what the PCT explanation might be of a behavior that looks like a pretty robust example of anticipatory (or feedforward) control. Here’s how Heather described it to me:

HB-B: I was reading about this finding (and perhaps you are already familiar) that, if if you measure muscle activation during behavior, you often see compensatory activation of the axial musculature well before you get activation in the
muscles that direct the part of the body that does the thing you’re focused on. For example, they trained cats to bat at a target with their forepaw.
**Well before the limb/forepaw muscles are active, there is activation in the trunk musculature, seemingly anticipating the requisite compensatory stabilization that will become necessary when the forepaw is lifted. ** I am wondering what a PCT perspective
might be on that? What is the relevant controlled variable, since the thing that actually changes sensory input that should activate control architecture hasn’t yet happened? Am I missing something? It appears to be a rather robust finding.[emphasis mine–RM]

RM: I am posting this to you experts on PCT (with Heather’s permission) because I think this is a very interesting discovery that seems to pose a challenge to PCT and I would like to see what you think about this.

Here is section of what I wrote to Heather on this question April 12.


[Here is a] quick and dirty PCT approach. I start with the intention to bat at the target, which would set a reference for a sequence that could crudely be taken as “store energy, set trigger, wait, release energy when required”, or in a more general sense
“Prepare, wait, execute”. You call the storage “prestabilizing”, but I think Powers would have called that a “dormitive principle” that just labels what happens without in any way explaining how or why. The “stabilizing” is postural control of the normal kind,
the same as would happen if you pushed the cat. If you have seen a video of the “Big Dog” robot, you have seen this kind of stabilization.

The magician Harry Houdini died because he hadn’t stored the energy to resist a blow to his abdomen when someone hit him before he was prepared, which he did by tensing (supplying energy to) the stomach muscles. He had offered a general challenge that nobody
could hit him there hard enough to hurt him, but the hitter was supposed to do it in a formal kind of way, when he was prepared. When the fatal blow was struck, his muscles had insufficient stored energy to oppose the shock energy in the blow.

I think the actual stabilization is simply the use of some of the pre-tensioned stored energy in normal postural control against a force that would be destabilizing, but instead of the control being entirely to oppose a sensed disturbance, it is part of the
output side support of the sequence controller. The “bat” is not simply sending reference values to muscles that move the paw relative to the torso, it is sending reference values to all the postural muscles in a temporal pattern that has been reorganized
into the control hierarchy in the same way as a trained athlete such as a ballerina coordinates the timings and strengths of her muscle movements so that what an observer calls “the” action doesn’t interfere with her balance.

Anyway, those are my first thoughts on the question, before breakfast.


I haven’t considered the problem since then, but I thought I might offer the suggestion.

The saying “Reculer pour mieux sauter” seems to be about the same phenomenon.

Martin

[From Bruce Nevin 20190615.13:34 ET]

Yes, it looks to me like they’re isolating just the last part of a sequence as ‘the’ action. If I see someone has tripped and is falling toward me I’m sure the muscles of my torso tense well before whatever next result I control, whether to catch their elbow to support them, or step out of the way to let them recover, or simply receive the impact. How is that different? Muscles that we don’t think about routinely maintain the stability of the spine and ribcage as a platform for the work of the limbs.

···

/B

On Thu, May 9, 2019 at 9:28 AM Heather Broccard-Bell csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

I suspect that the attached (Aruin, 2003) paper goes some way toward reconciling the “invariant, pre-programmed” feedforward conceptualization with the actual phenomenon: namely, it’s not really invariant (or, well, it’s not invariant in that there is a pre-programmed set of muscles activated in a pre-programmed way). So, I suspect that some of the problem in the “mainstream” is semantic.

Anyway, long (~500 ms) stimulation of motor cortex has already demonstrated that “motor output” seems to be about goals, and not specific, muscle-by-muscle motor programs (see Graziano, 2002; attached), and really the only way you could get that to work is hierarchical control with continuous feedback…

On Wed, May 8, 2019, 21:16 Martin Taylor csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

[Martin Taylor 2019.05.09.00.09]

[Rick Marken 2019-05-08_17:57:30]

          RM: Some time ago Heather Broccard-Bell asked me what

the PCT explanation might be of a behavior that looks like
a pretty robust example of anticipatory (or feedforward)
control. Here’s how Heather described it to me:

            HB-B: I was reading

about this finding (and perhaps you are already
familiar) that, if if you measure muscle activation
during behavior, you often see compensatory activation
of the axial musculature well before you get activation
in the muscles that direct the part of the body that
does the thing you’re focused on. For example, they
trained cats to bat at a target with their forepaw. ** Well
before the limb/forepaw muscles are active, there is
activation in the trunk musculature, seemingly
anticipating the requisite compensatory stabilization
that will become necessary when the forepaw is
lifted. ** I am wondering what a PCT perspective
might be on that? What is the relevant controlled
variable, since the thing that actually changes sensory
input that should activate control architecture hasn’t
yet happened? Am I missing something? It appears to be
a rather robust finding.[emphasis mine–RM]

          RM: I am posting this to you experts on PCT

(with Heather’s permission) because I think this is a very
interesting discovery that seems to pose a challenge to
PCT and I would like to see what you think about this.

Here is  section of what I wrote to Heather on this question April
--------



[Here is a] quick and dirty PCT approach. I start with the intention

to bat at the target, which would set a reference for a sequence
that could crudely be taken as “store energy, set trigger, wait,
release energy when required”, or in a more general sense “Prepare,
wait, execute”. You call the storage “prestabilizing”, but I think
Powers would have called that a “dormitive principle” that just
labels what happens without in any way explaining how or why. The
“stabilizing” is postural control of the normal kind, the same as
would happen if you pushed the cat. If you have seen a video of the
“Big Dog” robot, you have seen this kind of stabilization.

The magician Harry Houdini died because he hadn't stored the energy

to resist a blow to his abdomen when someone hit him before he was
prepared, which he did by tensing (supplying energy to) the stomach
muscles. He had offered a general challenge that nobody could hit
him there hard enough to hurt him, but the hitter was supposed to do
it in a formal kind of way, when he was prepared. When the fatal
blow was struck, his muscles had insufficient stored energy to
oppose the shock energy in the blow.

I think the actual stabilization is simply the use of some of the

pre-tensioned stored energy in normal postural control against a
force that would be destabilizing, but instead of the control being
entirely to oppose a sensed disturbance, it is part of the output
side support of the sequence controller. The “bat” is not simply
sending reference values to muscles that move the paw relative to
the torso, it is sending reference values to all the postural
muscles in a temporal pattern that has been reorganized into the
control hierarchy in the same way as a trained athlete such as a
ballerina coordinates the timings and strengths of her muscle
movements so that what an observer calls “the” action doesn’t
interfere with her balance.

Anyway, those are my first thoughts on the question, before

breakfast.

-------

 I haven't considered the problem since then, but I thought I might

offer the suggestion.

The saying "Reculer pour mieux sauter" seems to be about the same

phenomenon.

Martin