Attaching labels (was Phenomena Phirst)

CSGnet Archive CSG2004
1

[Martin Taylor 2004.10.30.11.50]

[From Bruce Gregory (2004.1030.0655)]

Martin Taylor 2004.10.29.20.14

And none of these addresses the question I asked (and for which I
suggested you might choose one or more of several possibilities):
What do you mean by "identify".

Anything you can describe, literally. I am not trying to be difficult.
Since there seems to be broad agreement that this is a
perceptual and not a control process, my question has been answered.
The construction of perceptions in PCT is a black box, as far as I can
tell. So it seems there is nothing more that can usefully be said at
this point.

But at this point you have clarified the problem you want addressed,
which I don't think you had done, earlier. The key is: "I really will
settle for any example of how you attach a label to any experience."
It's the "attaching label" that concerns you.

I think that this question is very legitimate, to the extent that I
have relabelled the thread. To me the question could be restated in a
rather long-winded way, but one that I think falls within the
language of PCT. It describes a phenomenon and asks about the
possible implications of the phenomenon.

================the background and the question================

The following experience is common: On perceiving A, one often
experiences a consequent perception B. Some of these A-B pairs also
appear in the form that on perceiving B one often experiences the
consequent perception A. An example is that on seeing a face, one may
also perceive the name of the person seen, and on being given the
person's name one may perceive clearly the person's face. The
perception of B being frequently consequent on the perception of A
would be consistent with a hierarchic arrangement of perceptual
functions, A being at a lower level than B. However, if one has both
A -> B and B -> A, a naive interpretation would suggest either that
the system of perceptual fucntions is not hierarchic, or that some
output from a higher level control system serves as direct input to a
lower-level perceptual function.

The question then is whether, within the general PCT framework, the
following choices are the only possible ones or whether there are
other possibilities: the labelling experience shows (1) that the
structure of perceptual functions is not a strict hierarchy, or (2)
that labelling is itself a control process in which the action of
some output is not through lower-level outputs on the outer world but
is directly on the functioning of the perceptual part of the control
hierarchy.

============================end question=========================

Now I ask Bruce whether this is a fair statement of his question, and
I ask everyone whether it is a reasonably stated question in PCT. If
it is fairly stated, then I think that addressing it might be a step
forward in understanding the structure of control processes implied
by experience.

Martin

2

[From Bill Powers (2004.10.30.1131 MDT)]

Martin Taylor 2004.10.30.11.50--

The following experience is common: On perceiving A, one often
experiences a consequent perception B. Some of these A-B pairs also
appear in the form that on perceiving B one often experiences the
consequent perception A. An example is that on seeing a face, one may
also perceive the name of the person seen, and on being given the
person's name one may perceive clearly the person's face.

I think it has to be made clear that in each case, the first perception may
be real or imagined, but the second is always imagined. That is, I presume
you're not referring to the case where A is actually perceived followed by
an actual perception of B -- though come to think of it, that does happen
and is usually how we get to know that A goes with B and (sometimes) vice
versa. But I assume that you're speaking of the case where one perception
arises either from the environment or from some internal process, and the
other is supplied internally.

The perception of B being frequently consequent on the perception of A
would be consistent with a hierarchic arrangement of perceptual
functions, A being at a lower level than B.

I don't think that's sufficient to fit my definition of hierarchically
related perceptions. Is it the case that B can't be perceived unless A is
present? Is it necessary to alter A in order to change B? That is what
would make B a function of A and thus of a higher level. You can't perceive
the distance between object A and object B unless both A and B are
perceived, but you can perceive A, B, or both without perceiving the
distance between them. You can't alter the distance between them without
moving A or B or both. That makes distance a higher-order perception than A
or B.

However, if one has both A -> B and B -> A, a naive interpretation would
suggest either that the system of perceptual fucntions is not hierarchic,
or that some output from a higher level control system serves as direct
input to a lower-level perceptual function.

I suggest that if A and B "go together" somehow, then the perception of
togetherness can be created when either one is presented alone by imagining
the other, thus completing the higher-order perception. Sugar and ..., nuts
and ..., Abbott and ..., cease and ....

As usual, a feedback loop can look like a stimulus-response system if you
leave the loop out of the description.

I'm not arguing against memory association, but we have so little idea of
how that would work that I'd rather look for more understandable
explanations first.

Best,

Bill P.

3

[From Bruce Gregory (2004.1030.1612)]

Martin Taylor 2004.10.30.11.50

The following experience is common: On perceiving A, one often
experiences a consequent perception B. Some of these A-B pairs also
appear in the form that on perceiving B one often experiences the
consequent perception A. An example is that on seeing a face, one may
also perceive the name of the person seen, and on being given the
person's name one may perceive clearly the person's face. The
perception of B being frequently consequent on the perception of A
would be consistent with a hierarchic arrangement of perceptual
functions, A being at a lower level than B.

I'm afraid I don't follow this. Why is the individual's name lower or
higher on a hierarchy than the perception of the individual?

Bruce

4

[Martin Taylor 2004.10.30.17.05]

[From Bruce Gregory (2004.1030.1612)]

Martin Taylor 2004.10.30.11.50

The following experience is common: On perceiving A, one often
experiences a consequent perception B. Some of these A-B pairs also
appear in the form that on perceiving B one often experiences the
consequent perception A. An example is that on seeing a face, one may
also perceive the name of the person seen, and on being given the
person's name one may perceive clearly the person's face. The
perception of B being frequently consequent on the perception of A
would be consistent with a hierarchic arrangement of perceptual
functions, A being at a lower level than B.

I'm afraid I don't follow this. Why is the individual's name lower or
higher on a hierarchy than the perception of the individual?

That's exactly the point. Wasn't it your point initially?

If you have input data that lead to perception A, and that often is
followed by perception B for which there is no incoming data, one
would be tempted to think that A formed part of the input to the
"B-perceiving mechanism". If they were arranged in a hierarchy, A
would be lower in the hierarchy than B.

If you have input data that lead to perception B, and that often is
followed by perception A for which there is no incoming data, one
would be tempted to think that B formed part of the input to the
"B-perceiving mechanism". If they were arranged in a hierarchy, B
would be lower in the hierarchy than A.

But both experiences occur. Which, then, is at the lower level of the
hierarchy? Is the fact that both experiences occur compatible with
the notion that the perceptual functions exist in a strict hierarchy?
Or, as Bill P. seems to suggest, is something else going on?

[From Bill Powers (2004.10.30.1131 MDT)]

I suggest that if A and B "go together" somehow, then the perception of
togetherness can be created when either one is presented alone by imagining
the other, thus completing the higher-order perception. Sugar and ..., nuts
and ..., Abbott and ..., cease and ....

As usual, a feedback loop can look like a stimulus-response system if you
leave the loop out of the description.

In what you responded to, I gave that as one of the options, but only
in a form that does not fit the strict hierarchic model. I'm assuming
your response is based in your mind on a set of connections that are
within the standard model. I guess I'm missing something. I think
it's where you say "...by imagining...", which suggests that the
imagining is a mechanism whereby some perception is brought to its
reference value at a higher level in the hierarchy.

Sorry.

Martin

5

[From Bill Powers (2004.10.30.1530 MDT)]

Martin Taylor 2004.10.30.17.05--

I guess I'm missing something. I think it's where you say "...by
imagining...", which suggests that the imagining is a mechanism whereby
some perception is brought to its reference value at a higher level in the
hierarchy.

No, it's a process by which a perceptual signal is obtained directly from
the output of a control system rather than from lower-order systems, so it
appears that a reference signal has been sent to a lower-order system and
immediately matched. The actual process I have proposed (BCP, p. 216 ff)
works as if the downgoing reference signal were simply short-circuited back
into the input function of the higher system, as if lower-order control had
been perfect and instantaneous. Thus missing parts of the input to a
perceptual input function can be supplied in such a way as to reduce the
error in the higher system. That's my model of imagination. It would
explain how one input to a higher-order PIF might lead through feedback
effects to supplying a missing input to complete the higher-order perception.

Best,

Bill P.

6

[Martin Taylor 2004.10.30.18.06]

[From Bill Powers (2004.10.30.1530 MDT)]

Martin Taylor 2004.10.30.17.05--

I guess I'm missing something. I think it's where you say "...by
imagining...", which suggests that the imagining is a mechanism whereby
some perception is brought to its reference value at a higher level in the
hierarchy.

No, it's a process by which a perceptual signal is obtained directly from
the output of a control system rather than from lower-order systems, so it
appears that a reference signal has been sent to a lower-order system and
immediately matched. The actual process I have proposed (BCP, p. 216 ff)
works as if the downgoing reference signal were simply short-circuited back
into the input function of the higher system, as if lower-order control had
been perfect and instantaneous. Thus missing parts of the input to a
perceptual input function can be supplied in such a way as to reduce the
error in the higher system. That's my model of imagination. It would
explain how one input to a higher-order PIF might lead through feedback
effects to supplying a missing input to complete the higher-order perception.

Yes, I understand all that. It's always been clear. It allows one to
perceive A when not all the components of A are present in the data,
or, in the use to which I more usually put the imagination loop, it
allows one to plan.

What I don't see is how it applies to the almost automatic
imagination of A when B is perceived from incoming data and
symmetrically of B when A is perceived from incoming data. I guess
it's your last sentence above that is a bit murky in this situation.

Martin