Attaching labels

CSGnet Archive CSG2004
1

[From Rick Marken (2004.10.30.1030)]

Martin Taylor (2004.10.30.11.50) --

The question then is whether, within the general PCT framework, the
following choices are the only possible ones or whether there are
other possibilities: the labelling experience shows (1) that the
structure of perceptual functions is not a strict hierarchy, or (2)
that labelling is itself a control process in which the action of
some output is not through lower-level outputs on the outer world but
is directly on the functioning of the perceptual part of the control
hierarchy.

==============end question============

Now I ask Bruce whether this is a fair statement of his question, and
I ask everyone whether it is a reasonably stated question in PCT.

I think that the "labeling experience", per se, could suggest
hypotheses about the structure of perceptual functions and about the
nature of certain control processes. But I don't think that simply
noticing that people can call a spade a "spade" (and a club a "club"
and so on) -- that is, that people can label aspects of their
experience -- tells you much about what they are doing (whether they
are responding or controlling, for example) or how they are doing it
(whether or not it's a hierarchical control process, for example). I
think you need to set up a carefully designed situation which both
defines what you mean by "labeling" and gives you the ability to
manipulate variables and develop models that let you figure out what
might be going on when people attach labels.

Best

Rick

···

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Cell 310 729-1400

2

[Martin Taylor 2004.10.30.13.59]

[From Rick Marken (2004.10.30.1030)]

Martin Taylor (2004.10.30.11.50) --

The question then is whether, within the general PCT framework, the
following choices are the only possible ones or whether there are
other possibilities: the labelling experience shows (1) that the
structure of perceptual functions is not a strict hierarchy, or (2)
that labelling is itself a control process in which the action of
some output is not through lower-level outputs on the outer world but
is directly on the functioning of the perceptual part of the control
hierarchy.

==============end question============

Now I ask Bruce whether this is a fair statement of his question, and
I ask everyone whether it is a reasonably stated question in PCT.

I think that the "labeling experience", per se, could suggest
hypotheses about the structure of perceptual functions and about the
nature of certain control processes. But I don't think that simply
noticing that people can call a spade a "spade" (and a club a "club"
and so on) -- that is, that people can label aspects of their
experience -- tells you much about what they are doing (whether they
are responding or controlling, for example) or how they are doing it
(whether or not it's a hierarchical control process, for example). I
think you need to set up a carefully designed situation which both
defines what you mean by "labeling" and gives you the ability to
manipulate variables and develop models that let you figure out what
might be going on when people attach labels.

Quite so, as far as you go. But you missed the critical element of
the question as related to experience, which is that not only can the
perception of label be evoked by seeing the object, but also the
visual perception of the object can be evoked by hearing (or reading)
the label. I think a lot of people would agree that both experiences
happen.

It's the bidirectionality of the experience that raises the question
about the possible structural relations among perceptual functions.

Martin

3

[From Rick Marken (2004.10.30.2340)]

Martin Taylor (2004.10.30.13.59) --

not only can the perception of label be evoked by seeing the object,
but also the visual perception of the object can be evoked by hearing
(or reading) the label. I think a lot of people would agree that both
experiences happen.

It's the bidirectionality of the experience that raises the question
about the possible structural relations among perceptual functions.

I think you may have a point. I think I can suggest an experiment that
would test a hypothesis about some structural relations assumed by PCT.
  The experiment would test to see if the bidirectionality you describe
is temporally symmetrical. I think PCT would predict temporal
asymmetry. That is, I think it should take longer to evoke the label
given the object (instance) than to invoke the object given the label.
To be specific, it should take longer to select "river" (the category
label) when shown a picture of a river (rather than a mountain, say)
than to select the picture of a river when shown the category label
"river". My prediction is based on the assumption that the category
level of control is higher and, thus, slower, than the configuration
level, according to the PCT model. Selecting "river" when shown a
picture of a river requires control at the category level. That is, you
have to select "river" as the appropriate reference category for the
river configuration in the picture. On the other hand, selecting the
picture of a river given the reference category "river" requires
control at the configuration level -- a lower and, thus, a faster level
of control.

I have a feeling that people may already have done experiments of this
kind so we may have data pertinent to this question of structure
already in the literature. I can't think of the relevant studies right
off hand. Perhaps you can.

Regards

Rick

···

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Cell 310 729-1400

4

[From Rick Marken (2004.10.30.2340)]

Martin Taylor (2004.10.30.13.59) --

not only can the perception of label be evoked by seeing the object,
but also the visual perception of the object can be evoked by hearing
(or reading) the label. I think a lot of people would agree that both
experiences happen.

It's the bidirectionality of the experience that raises the question
about the possible structural relations among perceptual functions.

I think you may have a point. I think I can suggest an experiment that
would test a hypothesis about some structural relations assumed by PCT.
The experiment would test to see if the bidirectionality you describe
is temporally symmetrical. I think PCT would predict temporal
asymmetry. That is, I think it should take longer to evoke the label
given the object (instance) than to invoke the object given the label.
To be specific, it should take longer to select "river" (the category
label) when shown a picture of a river (rather than a mountain, say)
than to select the picture of a river when shown the category label
"river". My prediction is based on the assumption that the category
level of control is higher and, thus, slower, than the configuration
level, according to the PCT model. Selecting "river" when shown a
picture of a river requires control at the category level. That is, you
have to select "river" as the appropriate reference category for the
river configuration in the picture. On the other hand, selecting the
picture of a river given the reference category "river" requires
control at the configuration level -- a lower and, thus, a faster level
of control.

This kind of experiment could be useful, but I think its
interpretation might be ambiguous. The problem is that in the
original case, the "secondary" perception is imaginary and the issue
is how this imaginary perception is invoked. In your experiment,
either both perceptions are data-based and what is being timed is how
long it takes the subject to make and to express a choice, or the
secondary perception is imaginary and the test is how long it takes
the subject to express it in a way interpretable by the experimenter.

If it's a choice question (choose this picture or choose this written
label), one has the problem of the time it takes to perceive the
choice selection as well as how long it takes to choose, and that's
not an easy pair to tease apart.

If it's an imagination question, clearly it's quicker to say "river"
than to draw an acceptable picture of one.

I have a feeling that people may already have done experiments of this
kind so we may have data pertinent to this question of structure
already in the literature. I can't think of the relevant studies right
off hand. Perhaps you can.

Possibly studies of picture-word Stroop might be relevant. But again
there is the problem that both perceptions are evoked by external
data, whereas the issue is in the nature of the feedback path(s) that
evoke the imaginary component.

At the moment, I can't think of other relevant studies. Nor can I
invent one. But there must be a way.

Martin

5

[From Bill Powers (2004.10.31.0830 MST)]

Rick Marken (2004.10.30.2340) --

Good experiment. If nobody else volunteers, do it!

Best,

Bill P.

6

[Martin Taylor 2004.10.31.12.04]

[From Rick Marken (2004.10.31.0820)]

Martin Taylor (October 31, 2004, at 06:58 AM)

Rick Marken (2004.10.30.2340)

I think you may have a point. I think I can suggest an experiment
that
would test a hypothesis about some structural relations assumed by
PCT.
The experiment would test to see if the bidirectionality you describe
is temporally symmetrical.

This kind of experiment could be useful, but I think its
interpretation might be ambiguous...

At the moment, I can't think of other relevant studies. Nor can I
invent one. But there must be a way.

Well, you just go ahead and settle back in your armchair. I think I'll
take Bill's advice and do the experiment myself if I can't find
something similar in the literature.

That isn't really what I'm doing, literally or metaphorically. Quite
the contrary, actually. I'm trying to keep, if not my head, at least
my nostrils above water in the swamp of work. But CSGnet (and I wish
ECACS) is occasionally interesting enough for me to take time off to
try to contribute something of whatever little value I can.

···

--------------------------

What I normally ask for, before embarking on any experiment, is an
understanding of what question the experiment would be likely to
answer if the data were to come out clean. In the case of your
proposal, as I said before, I think your experiment would provide
interesting results, but not results that bear on the question being
asked, which is about the two-way evocation of imagined perceptions.
Since in the experiment (if I understood your proposal correctly)
both perceptions are being invoked by externally provided data, the
two-way feedback connection(s) of interest is/are, if not eliminated
from consideration, at least compromised.

In the context of your experiment, I suggested that results on
picture-word Stroop might provide useful information. Lochlan Magee,
perhaps 20-25 years ago, did his thesis on that. I don't know where
he published, but if you want me to follow up, I can ask him this
week. I don't imagine he's the only one who worked in that area,
though.

Martin

7

[From Rick Marken (2004.10.31.0820)]

Martin Taylor (October 31, 2004, at 06:58 AM)

Rick Marken (2004.10.30.2340)

I think you may have a point. I think I can suggest an experiment
that
would test a hypothesis about some structural relations assumed by
PCT.
The experiment would test to see if the bidirectionality you describe
is temporally symmetrical.

This kind of experiment could be useful, but I think its
interpretation might be ambiguous...

At the moment, I can't think of other relevant studies. Nor can I
invent one. But there must be a way.

Well, you just go ahead and settle back in your armchair. I think I'll
take Bill's advice and do the experiment myself if I can't find
something similar in the literature.

Best

Rick

···

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marken@mindreadings.com
Home 310 474-0313
Cell 310 729-1400

8

[From Bruce Gregory (2004.1031.1343)]

Rick Marken (2004.10.31.0820)

Well, you just go ahead and settle back in your armchair.

If I am not mistaken, this is a fine example of a cheap shot. Giving
Marc some competition, I see.

Bruce Gregory

9

[From Rick Marken (2004.10.31.1210)]

Martin Taylor (2004.10.31.12.04)

Rick Marken (2004.10.31.0820)--

Well, you just go ahead and settle back in your armchair. I think
I'll
take Bill's advice and do the experiment myself if I can't find
something similar in the literature.

That isn't really what I'm doing, literally or metaphorically. Quite
the contrary, actually. I'm trying to keep, if not my head, at least
my nostrils above water in the swamp of work.

I hope you didn't think I was implying that you're lazy, Martin. I know
you're not. Far from it. What I was doing was referring to the
appearance that you were doing "armchair science". Armchair science is
done by people are prefer to evaluate theoretical questions by
discussing them rather than by testing them empirically. I tried to
suggest an empirical test of the ideas you were discussing. You
apparently didn't think that my test was appropriate. But rather than
suggest an alternative you just left it at that: my test was not
appropriate. This struck me as the attitude of an armchair scientist.
An empirical scientist -- one who does science by testing the behavior
of models against observation of the behavior of the real thing --
would have come up with an improved, or more appropriate, version of
the experiment.

There's nothing wrong with being an armchair scientist. I was just
hoping to see if we could come up with an empirical test of an aspect
of the PCT model right here on CSGNet, rather than just always
_talking_ about the model. Perhaps you could give a go at describing
an appropriate experiment to test you ideas about bidirectionality.

Best

Rick

···

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marken@mindreadings.com
Home 310 474-0313
Cell 310 729-1400

10

[Martin Taylor 2004.11.01.09.14]

[From Rick Marken (2004.10.31.1210)]

Martin Taylor (2004.10.31.12.04)

Rick Marken (2004.10.31.0820)--

Well, you just go ahead and settle back in your armchair. I think
I'll
take Bill's advice and do the experiment myself if I can't find
something similar in the literature.

That isn't really what I'm doing, literally or metaphorically. Quite
the contrary, actually. I'm trying to keep, if not my head, at least
my nostrils above water in the swamp of work.

I hope you didn't think I was implying that you're lazy, Martin. I know
you're not.

Well, it did look that way. Thanks for the clarification. I know what
you mean about armchair scientists, and I agree with it.

I was just
hoping to see if we could come up with an empirical test of an aspect
of the PCT model right here on CSGNet, rather than just always
_talking_ about the model. Perhaps you could give a go at describing
an appropriate experiment to test you ideas about bidirectionality.

I started to try to do that last night, but, being Halloween, the
goblins soon found a way to cause mischief.

The mischief was actually embedded in the prior discussion. It is the
question: "what is the question?"

My original foray into this was to ask whether there was a way within
strict HPCT to account for a phenomenon that had not been clearly
described in PCT-compatible language by Bruce Gregory. I tried to put
it in PCT language, which I can paraphrase by saying that people
often experience the (imagined) perception of a label when confronted
by a visual scene, or experience an (imagined) visual scene when
presented with a label. In some manner, the output of a function that
generates the perception of either can facilitate the perception of
the other when the data for the other are not presented to the
senses. My (and I think Bruce's) question was whether there was a
connection path within strict HPCT that allows for such a
bidirectional facilitation.

Bill P. offered a kind of story that I don't fully understand, which
involves a higher-level control system whose input is derived from
both the picture category-level perceiver and the label
category-level perceiver, and for which there is error if either
input (but not both) is null. The output of that higher-level system
invokes in some way the imagination loop for the missing
category-level system, thereby creating the joint perception. I hope
I've correctly abstracted the essence of what Bill was saying, though
I can't say I quite understand how it works.

So, if Bill's presentation is fleshed out into a workable model,
that's the answer to the original question. An experiment would have
to probe the workings of that model, by comparing something with the
simulation predictions of the model.

But the experiment you suggested answered a different (and
worthwhile) question, which was to determine whether the picture
perception and the label perception could be said to be at different
levels, given that each independently would be evoked by sensory
data, assuming that HPCT provided a correct model.

When I started to try to devise an experiment (which I was basing on
the long tradition of "priming" studies and of Stroop tests), I was
looking at yet another question. My question assumed the correctness
of the original statement about the bidirectional experiences, and
posed Bill's "strict HPCT" model against a model that, while possibly
hierarchic, did not invoke control at all, but allowed for cross
connections in which each perceptual function's output formed part of
the other's input. I was then going to try to work out an experiment
that did not use brain imaging (too expensive, I think, for anyone on
CSGnet), by using priming and Stroop to affect the timing of when a
subject would accept that a picture had formed after a label was
presented, or that a correct label had been perceived after a picture
was presented.

The priming would be the prior presentation of, say "airplane" before
showing a picture of a river or of an airplane, and asking the
subject to press a button when a label for the picture had come to
mind, and in the other sense showing a picture of an airplane before
showing the word "airplane" or "river" and asking the subject to
press when an appropriate picture had come to mind.

Stroop would be a similar kind of study, except that the "airplane"
word would be presented along with the picture of an airplane or a
river, instead of beforehand.

In both priming and Stroop situations, a "neutral" pattern of "XXXXX"
or a random dot pattern would serve as a baseline condition.

The experiment might give results, but then I asked myself what those
results would tell, in respect of the two models. What would the
models predict the effects of the priming or Stroop presentation to
be? And I didn't know, for either model. For the cross-connected
perceptual functions model, one might be able to make some
qualitative predictions, but I don't know about Bill's model. Would
the qualitative predictions be any different?

At that point, I decided to go to bed, so I could awake on All
Saints' Day, and trusting that the saints who post on CSGnet might be
able to help.

Martin

11

[From Rick Marken (2004.11.01.0915 PST)]

Martin Taylor (2004.11.01.09.14) --

The experiment might give results, but then I asked myself what those
results would tell, in respect of the two models. What would the
models predict the effects of the priming or Stroop presentation to
be?

It's really very simple. The model would predicts that it will take longer
to point to the category (the word "red", say) given the sensation (red)
than it would to point to the sensation given the category. The difference
would probably be on the order of milliseconds. There might be a clever way
to design the study to reveal this difference consistently.

So I think you're right about Stroop-type studies being relevant. I don't
remember the results of such studies. I'll look them up on the web when I
get a chance. But my prediction (based on HPCT) is that it will take longer
to identify the category (color name) given the sensation (color) than to
identify the sensation given the category.

I don't see the relevance of whether this is done in imagination or not. I
imagine you'd get the same result in imagination -- ie. longer time to
imagine the category after imagining the sensation than vice versa -- it
would just be harder to measure it.

I'll get back to you when I find some results.

Regards

Rick

···

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MindReadings.com
Home: 310 474 0313
Cell: 310 729 1400

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12

[From Rick Marken (2004.11.01.0940 PST)]

Rick Marken (2004.11.01.0915 PST)---

So I think you're right about Stroop-type studies being relevant. I don't
remember the results of such studies. I'll look them up on the web when I get
a chance. But my prediction (based on HPCT) is that it will take longer to
identify the category (color name) given the sensation (color) than to
identify the sensation given the category.

Actually, I did a quick look through the Stroop literature and I don't think
that's not where we're going to find the relevant data. The Stroop test
presents color words in colors that don't correspond to the word. Ie. The
word "red" written in blue ink.

What I think we need are studies of, say, visual search where a person is
searching for a color given the category (search for the red patch) or for
the category given the color (search for the word that is the appropriate
label for the color of this patch). There must be a study like that that has
been done. Can you try to find one, Martin?

Thanks

Rick

···

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MindReadings.com
Home: 310 474 0313
Cell: 310 729 1400

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13

[Martin Taylor 2004.11.01.1246]

[From Rick Marken (2004.11.01.0915 PST)]

Martin Taylor (2004.11.01.09.14) --

The experiment might give results, but then I asked myself what those
results would tell, in respect of the two models. What would the
models predict the effects of the priming or Stroop presentation to
be?

It's really very simple. The model would predicts that it will take longer
to point to the category (the word "red", say) given the sensation (red)
than it would to point to the sensation given the category. The difference
would probably be on the order of milliseconds. There might be a clever way
to design the study to reveal this difference consistently.

So I think you're right about Stroop-type studies being relevant. I don't
remember the results of such studies. I'll look them up on the web when I
get a chance. But my prediction (based on HPCT) is that it will take longer
to identify the category (color name) given the sensation (color) than to
identify the sensation given the category.

I don't see the relevance of whether this is done in imagination or not. I
imagine you'd get the same result in imagination -- ie. longer time to
imagine the category after imagining the sensation than vice versa -- it
would just be harder to measure it.

If you don't see the relevance of whether it's done in imagination or
not, you don't see the question being asked.

The question being asked initially was whether the fact that the
sensory perception of label often causes the (imagination) perception
of picture, and the sensory perception of picture often causes the
(imagination) perception of label, is consistent with strict HPCT.

It's beyond me how you can test this without reference to the fact
that thew question is created by the bidrectionality of the influence
on the IMAGINED perception.

Martin

14

[From Rick Marken (2004.11.01.1050)]

Martin Taylor 2004.11.01.1246]

Rick Marken (2004.11.01.0915 PST)--

I don't see the relevance of whether this is done in imagination or not. I
imagine you'd get the same result in imagination -- ie. longer time to
imagine the category after imagining the sensation than vice versa -- it
would just be harder to measure it.

If you don't see the relevance of whether it's done in imagination or
not, you don't see the question being asked.

The question being asked initially was whether the fact that the
sensory perception of label often causes the (imagination) perception
of picture, and the sensory perception of picture often causes the
(imagination) perception of label, is consistent with strict HPCT.

Maybe I would understand this better if you would tell me how I can
demonstrate the phenomenon to myself. Is it just that when I see the word
"red" I sometimes imagine the color red and sometimes not? Or when I see the
color red I sometimes imagine the word "red" and sometimes not? If so, it
seems like a phenomenon that's pretty obviously consistent with HPCT. I
imagine the color or the word upon seeing the word or the color when I have
some reason (goal) for producing that perception in imagination.

Regards

Rick

···

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MindReadings.com
Home: 310 474 0313
Cell: 310 729 1400

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15

[From Bill Powers (2004.11.01.1210 MST)]

Rick Marken (2004.11.01.1050) –

Is it just that when I see the
word “red” I sometimes imagine the color red and sometimes not?
Or when I see the color red I sometimes imagine the word “red”
and sometimes not? If so, it seems like a phenomenon that’s pretty
obviously consistent with HPCT. I imagine the color or the word upon
seeing the word or the color when I have some reason (goal) for producing
that perception in imagination.

This can be treated as an automatic response (I’m pretty sure that’s how
the idea of “association” is thought of generally), or as a
purposive process. If it’s automatic and not purposive, then we get a
picture of A evoking B or B evoking A without any particular goal driving
the process. Like “content-addressed memory.” But if it’s
purposive, we have to ask what the purpose would be – why do we want
names to evoke images or images to evoke names? Is the purpose the same
in either case? I doubt it. When I look at all the hundreds of things
around me, I know I could come up with at least one name for most
of them, but I don’t unless I have some need for the name, as when
constructing a description, or remembering the name of the person I’m
talking to. Given names, I generally follow along in imagination with the
thing named, because this is what I call “understanding what’s being
said,” but unless I’m hearing directions for going somewhere or
something critical like that, I don’t construct any elaborate or detailed
images to go with the words – just enough so I get a sense of knowing
what’s being talked or written about. Not that this is a vividly
conscious process. It doesn’t get vivid unless there’s some pressing
reason to get it right.

So, just that one comment: we have to be aware of whether we’re looking
for a purposive or nonpurposive explanation.

Best,

Bill P.

16

[From Rick Marken (2004.11.01.1430)]

Bill Powers (2004.11.01.1210 MST)]

Rick Marken (2004.11.01.1050) --

Is it just that when I see the word "red" I sometimes imagine the color red
and sometimes not? Or when I see the color red I sometimes imagine the word
"red" and sometimes not?

This can be treated as an automatic response (I'm pretty sure that's how the
idea of "association" is thought of generally), or as a purposive process.

Good point. I guess my point was that I know the kind of imaginative
associations Martin described only as part of a purposive process.

Best

Rick

···

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Home: 310 474 0313
Cell: 310 729 1400

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17

[From Bruce Gregory (2004.1101.1736)]

Rick Marken (2004.11.01.1430)

Good point. I guess my point was that I know the kind of imaginative
associations Martin described only as part of a purposive process.

This assumption can only be confirmed by applying the Test, according
to my limited understanding of PCT.

Bruce gregory

18

[From Rick Marken (2004.11.01.2100)]

Bruce Gregory (2004.1101.1736)--

Rick Marken (2004.11.01.1430)

Good point. I guess my point was that I know the kind of imaginative
associations Martin described only as part of a purposive process.

This assumption can only be confirmed by applying the Test, according
to my limited understanding of PCT.

Yes. That's formally true. My own experience, however, suggests that
it's very likely that thinking the word "radio" when I look at the box
near my computer, for example, is not something evoked by seeing the
radio. I look over there all the time and rarely say "radio" to myself
when I see the radio; I just use the thing. When someone asks me what
that box is (or when I want to make a point like this on the net) I
think of the word "radio" when I see the radio. I do this only for some
purpose (ie. to achieve some goal) like answering a question,
demonstrating a point, etc. But most of the time the radio is just an
unnamed visual perception that is also the source of some nice auditory
perceptions (sounds like a Beethoven trio). I don't think the sight of
the radio ever just evokes the word "radio" in my mind. Whenever I
look over there and say "radio" to myself I can always tell that there
was some reason (purpose) for this lurking in the background.

This is just anecdotal evidence, of course. I think it would be
interesting to see of there is any way to get evidence that an
association _can_ be evoked, with no purpose behind the evocation.
Something like the Test would have to be involved, I imagine.

RSM

···

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Cell 310 729-1400

19

[From Bruce Gregory (2004.1102.0627)]

Rick Marken (2004.11.01.2100)

This is just anecdotal evidence, of course. I think it would be
interesting to see of there is any way to get evidence that an
association _can_ be evoked, with no purpose behind the evocation.
Something like the Test would have to be involved, I imagine.

I suspect that even when you are not consciously thinking the word
"radio" you "know" the object is a radio. If I asked you, "Would you
turn on the radio?" you would know what I wanted without having to
figure it out. It seems to me that we know the names of objects in our
immediate surroundings without having a purpose for this knowledge. Of
course, I may be wrong in this regard.

Bruce Gregory

20

[From Bill Powers (2004.11.02.0623 MSR)]

Bruce Gregory (2004.1102.0627)--

I suspect that even when you are not consciously thinking the word
"radio" you "know" the object is a radio.

I suspect the same thing; the "knowledge" is there in the fact that you are
organized to retrieve the word if you have some purpose for doing so, as
Rick said. But do you believe that whenever you look at any object, see any
action, observe any attribute, a little whisper (or shout) of the
auditorily-perceived or visually-perceived name appears in your brain as a
perceptual signal?

If I asked you, "Would you turn on the radio?" you would know what I
wanted without having to figure it out.

The retrieval mechanism works very fast, when needed -- at the speed of
thought, as they say. If you point to the box and ask "What's that?" I can
supply the name almost before the words are out of your mouth -- but there
is a lag, because I hadn't been thinking of the name.

I'm very leery of theories that rely on "facts" that can't be observed. I
am not aware of the names of most of the objects I'm looking at, or most of
the other experiences I have, until there's some reason to need the name.
My experience is like Rick's, and you have not actually said that your
experience is any different. All you's said is that you "suspect" that you
"know" the name of the object, meaning that your only evidence is the same
as ours. You aren't aware of the name of the object until the name appears
in consciousness.

It seems to me that we know the names of objects in our
immediate surroundings without having a purpose for this knowledge. Of
course, I may be wrong in this regard.

No, you are simply using the word "know" in a fuzzy way. You mean, I think,
that you could quickly come up with the name if there were some reason to
do so, such as being asked for it. This says nothing about the form taken
by this knowledge. If you take the "association" idea literally, then
everything you see for which you "know" a word will evoke the word every
time you see it -- you would live in a world in which everything
incessantly and annoyingly kept telling you in words what it is. The din
would be terrible. I see no evidence at all for that sort of explanation of
how words are "attached" to other experiences. I don't think they're
attached at all -- that implies an automatic process and I don't think it's
automatic. I think we attach them, as needed. I see nothing to indicate
otherwise.

Best,

Bill P.