Martin, you actually introduced the term:
The term is not inherently ‘bad’, but the potential for confusion is. Of course social interactions are structured, but not in the same way that control-system models are structured. In the early '90s (maybe later) Bill pushed back on discussion of social structure, saying in effect show me the input and output functions, the reference input and comparator.
Bill agreed with you that the neural signals in the model are theoretical entities and that as soon as we look into the biological foundations of complex living control systems we find that what we abstract as a signal is a result of collective control by sets of cells. Likewise, when we look at a level of complexity ‘above’ the individual autonomous control systems we abstract to what Kent picturesquely described as ‘gossamer threads’ passing through aspects of the environment. These theoretical entities in the model of collective control are not signals in a superordinate control system*. For each participating CS I think of them as lines of attention, intention, and influence.
You’ve indicated small steps toward understanding the emergent properties of autonomous systems interacting collectively, varying their number and vectors of influence on a single variable. I suspect that more frequently ‘in the wild’ a single variable is collectively controlled as a consequence of CSs controlling perceptions of more than one aspect of the environment, not all the same.
The Matthew Effect is a family of behavioral examples.
Note:
- Or if they were, we would be unaware of the signals as such, just as an individual neuron does not perceive its rate of firing as such. Necessarily so, as what is perceived may come under control, which would set up conflict which, if generalized, would destroy the system of which the individuals are constituents. When I posted that observation on CSGnet, Bill said “I feel like my floor and ceiling disappeared” or words to that effect, and there was no further discussion.