B:CP Course Week 9: Study Guide for CH. 8 Sensation Control

rsmarken · August 27, 2013, 6:05pm

[From Rick Marken (2013.08.28.1105)]

And here is the brief study guide for Ch. 8 on Sensation Control.

Best

Rick

Study Guide, Ch 8 Sensation Control.doc (27.5 KB)

···

--
Richard S. Marken PhD
rsmarken@gmail.com
www.mindreadings.com

Content-Type: application/msword;
name="Study Guide, Ch 8 Sensation Control.doc"
Content-Disposition: attachment;
filename="Study Guide, Ch 8 Sensation Control.doc"
X-Attachment-Id: f_hkvfdkp01

rupert · August 31, 2013, 12:45pm

[From Rupert Young (2013.08.31 13.00 BST)]

My comments and answers to leading questions below. Though first a few loose ends.

Ch.4, question 9 says, "How does the arm respond to the disturbance due to the book's weight? Hint: Watch the tendon in the crook of the elbow."

I didn't see anything, what should I be seeing?

Ch. 6, question 1 asked if you can create a sensation of pressure without effort. Rick and David said no, but I thought if you had a brick resting on your hand you could perceive pressure without effort. Am I misunderstanding something? Perhaps, the meanings of pressure and effort could be clarified..

There has been some discussion about steps and levels. I have always taken the theory described by Bill to be an idealised model of the basic principles of perceptual control and the dependency of control systems on others deriving increasingly abstract perceptions (which logically may be organised in a hierarchy). And that the reality is likely to be far more messy than indicated by the theory; many levels, and processing steps, within levels, overlap between levels and interactions between functions that may not conform to the ideal picture presented. With regards to the latter point, is there any reason, for example, why not, in some cases, an input function at one level might get its input from an error function at a lower level? This may indicate a perception of no error, or a control system having "finished" control.

Would the crying of a baby be an example of positive feedback, in that its output is not directly controlling its hunger, though of course it is indirectly controlled by the actions of its mother (or father)?

Chapter 8

Chapter 8 gives a clear description of the interaction between different control systems and the dependency between them in a hierarchical manner. This is very important in understanding the fundamentals of what perceptions are; not entities or events that exist in the outside world, but constructs of the nervous system which can be manipulated (controlled), to achieve goals which will only have significance for the organism. I use this insight to answer the old question of does a tree in a forest make a sound if there is no-one there to hear it; no, as a sound is a perception, which requires a perceptual apparatus to be present.

There was some allusion to neural support for parts of the discussion, but I don't know enough to accept the validity, or if the neuroscience has moved on since publication. It would be useful if we had a neuroscientist on board, though I suspect that neuroscientists haven't been looking out for the things that would confirm PCT.

The discussion of the propagation and consolidation of input functions to higher levels is fairly understandable, though I am less clear on how higher outputs form lower references, as the description is minimal. It is here amongst the general vagueness of the definitions of how transfer functions between levels operate that I feel PCT is missing a significant chunk of explaining the complexity of how control systems work in practice. Although I think PCT is the best theory of how living systems work some scepticism remains for me until I can see the details of how the control systems actually operate in the real world.

Leading questions:

1. Even green, like purple, is a perception derived from multiple lower-order signals. Whereas purple is derived from a combination of first-order signals activated by both red-type and blue-type wavelengths, only green-type wavelengths are present at the first level for a perception of green to occur. In fact, "green" and "purple" are just the labels we give to one-dimensional perceptions at the second level.
2. Temperature.
3. Temperature (though surely depends on what the actions are).
4. I suppose, the combination of all the signals in the input functions from the environmental boundary to the sensation-of-chocolate level itself.
5. Biting into, or chewing, something sweet.
6. Feeling how hard your fingertips are gripping the egg.

Regards,
Rupert

rsmarken · September 1, 2013, 7:04pm

[From Rick Marken (2013.09.01.1205)]

···

I’ve got to write up my summary of Ch. 8 on this Labor Day Holiday. But firs let me reply to our most diligent student:

  Rupert Young (2013.08.31 13.00
BST)–
  RY:My comments and answers to leading questions below. Though first a
few loose ends.
  Ch.4, question 9 says, "How does the arm respond to the
disturbance due to the book’s weight? Hint: Watch the tendon in
the crook of the elbow."
  I didn't see anything, what should I be seeing?

RM: I see slight movement of the tendon; it’s more obvious if you just you just flex the bicep.

  RY:Ch. 6, question 1 asked if you can create a sensation of pressure
without effort. Rick and David said no, but I thought if you had a
brick resting on your hand you could perceive pressure without
effort. Am I misunderstanding something? Perhaps, the meanings of
pressure and effort could be clarified…

RM: I think the idea is that you can’t vary the pressure felt on the hand when you, say, press the hand against a wall, without perceiving the effort required to produce this this pressure. I’m not sure this is such a great example, though, if the goal is to demonstrate a hierarchical relationship between these perceptions (pressure higher level than effort) since we can experience pressure without effort when an object is placed on our resting hand. But maybe I’m missing something; perhaps Kent McClelland can again see what I’m missing.

  RY: There has been some discussion about steps and levels. I have
always taken the theory described by Bill to be an idealised model
of the basic principles of perceptual control and the dependency
of control systems on others deriving increasingly abstract
perceptions (which logically may be organised in a hierarchy). And
that the reality is likely to be far more messy than indicated by
the theory; many levels, and processing steps, within levels,
overlap between levels and interactions between functions that may
not conform to the ideal picture presented. With regards to the
latter point, is there any reason, for example, why not, in some
cases, an input function at one level might get its input from an
error function at a lower level? This may indicate a perception of
no error, or a control system having “finished” control.

RM: I think you are absolutely right about the hierarchical model being idealized (I would say, it’s a hypothesis to be tested). Indeed, I think Bill is laying out this model of the hierarchy in detail as 1) a demonstration of feasibility, to show that a control of perception model can, in principle, account for all behavior, from tracking a target to playing chess and 2) as a basis for further research and testing. I think the enterprise of research on PCT is to test this hierarchical model and modify it, as necessary, based on the results of that research.

  RY: Would the crying of a baby be an example of positive feedback, in
that its output is not directly controlling its hunger, though of
course it is indirectly controlled by the actions of its mother
(or father)?

RM: Yes, it seem like it, at least temper tantrums seem like positive feedback, where crying leads to more intense crying until they are just worn out and the system collapses.

  RY: Chapter 8



  Chapter 8 gives a clear description of the interaction between
different control systems and the dependency between them in a
hierarchical manner. This is very important in understanding the
fundamentals of what perceptions are; not entities or events that
exist in the outside world, but constructs of the nervous system
which can be manipulated (controlled), to achieve goals which will
only have significance for the organism. I use this insight to
answer the old question of does a tree in a forest make a sound if
there is no-one there to hear it; no, as a sound is a perception,
which requires a perceptual apparatus to be present.
  There was some allusion to neural support for parts of the
discussion, but I don’t know enough to accept the validity, or if
the neuroscience has moved on since publication. It would be
useful if we had a neuroscientist on board, though I suspect that
neuroscientists haven’t been looking out for the things that would
confirm PCT.
  The discussion of the propagation and consolidation of input
functions to higher levels is fairly understandable, though I am
less clear on how higher outputs form lower references, as the
description is minimal. It is here amongst the general vagueness
of the definitions of how transfer functions between levels
operate that I feel PCT is missing a significant chunk of
explaining the complexity of how control systems work in practice.
Although I think PCT is the best theory of how living systems work
some scepticism remains for me until I can see the details of how
the control systems actually operate in the real world.

RM: These are all great thoughts. As far as how the hierarchy works (like how higher order output form lower level references) this is all described in great detail in part 4 of Bill’s Byte series (which I’ll try to point to in my summary). If you can understand spreadsheet computations, you can see how it’s done in a working model of a hierarchy that includes the sensation level and one more level, in my spreadsheet model at:

https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/31298693/Control%20Hierarchy.xls

I’ll get to the leading questions when I write up the chapter summary.

Best regards

Rick

  Leading questions:
      Even green, like purple, is a perception derived from
multiple lower-order signals. Whereas purple is derived from a
combination of first-order signals activated by both red-type
and blue-type wavelengths, only green-type wavelengths are
present at the first level for a perception of green to occur.
In fact, “green” and “purple” are just the labels we give to
one-dimensional perceptions at the second level.
Temperature.

Temperature (though surely depends on what the actions are).
      I suppose, the combination of all the signals in the input
functions from the environmental boundary to the
sensation-of-chocolate level itself.

Biting into, or chewing, something sweet.

Feeling how hard your fingertips are gripping the egg.
Regards,
Rupert

–
Richard S. Marken PhD
rsmarken@gmail.com
www.mindreadings.com

_Boris_Hartman · September 1, 2013, 9:13pm

Hi Rupert,

it’s nice discourse you presented, only this one is not clear enough :

RY: Would the crying of a baby be an example of positive feedback, in that its output is not directly controlling its hunger, though of course it is indirectly controlled by the actions of its mother (or father)?

RM: Yes, it seem like it, at least temper tantrums seem like positive feedback, where crying leads to more intense crying until they are just worn out and the system collapses.

HB :

I don’t see it, why babies cry is positive feed-back ? Baby’s cry seems to me to be a normal negative feed-back. At least I see it as genetically produced function of “protecting” organism against disturbances. Not outer. Inside…

RY: Chapter 8
Chapter 8 gives a clear description of the interaction between different control systems and the dependency between them in a hierarchical manner. This is very important in understanding the fundamentals of what perceptions are; not entities or events that exist in the outside world, but constructs of the nervous system which can be manipulated (controlled), to achieve goals which will only have significance for the organism.

HB :

Perfect. I think this is enogh for understanding babies cry.

Best,

Boris

···

----- Original Message -----

From:
Richard Marken

To: CSGNET@LISTSERV.ILLINOIS.EDU

Sent: Sunday, September 01, 2013 9:04 PM

Subject: Re: B:CP Course Week 9: Study Guide for CH. 8 Sensation Control

[From Rick Marken (2013.09.01.1205)]

I’ve got to write up my summary of Ch. 8 on this Labor Day Holiday. But firs let me reply to our most diligent student:

Rupert Young (2013.08.31 13.00 BST)–

RY:My comments and answers to leading questions below. Though first a few loose ends.

Ch.4, question 9 says, "How does the arm respond to the disturbance due to the book's weight? Hint: Watch the tendon in the crook of the elbow."

I didn't see anything, what should I be seeing?

RM: I see slight movement of the tendon; it’s more obvious if you just you just flex the bicep.

RY:Ch. 6, question 1 asked if you can create a sensation of pressure without effort. Rick and David said no, but I thought if you had a brick resting on your hand you could perceive pressure without effort. Am I misunderstanding something? Perhaps, the meanings of pressure and effort could be clarified..

RM: I think the idea is that you can’t vary the pressure felt on the hand when you, say, press the hand against a wall, without perceiving the effort required to produce this this pressure. I’m not sure this is such a great example, though, if the goal is to demonstrate a hierarchical relationship between these perceptions (pressure higher level than effort) since we can experience pressure without effort when an object is placed on our resting hand. But maybe I’m missing something; perhaps Kent McClelland can again see what I’m missing.

RY: There has been some discussion about steps and levels. I have always taken the theory described by Bill to be an idealised model of the basic principles of perceptual control and the dependency of control systems on others deriving increasingly abstract perceptions (which logically may be organised in a hierarchy). And that the reality is likely to be far more messy than indicated by the theory; many levels, and processing steps, within levels, overlap between levels and interactions between functions that may not conform to the ideal picture presented. With regards to the latter point, is there any reason, for example, why not, in some cases, an input function at one level might get its input from an error function at a lower level? This may indicate a perception of no error, or a control system having "finished" control.

RM: I think you are absolutely right about the hierarchical model being idealized (I would say, it’s a hypothesis to be tested). Indeed, I think Bill is laying out this model of the hierarchy in detail as 1) a demonstration of feasibility, to show that a control of perception model can, in principle, account for all behavior, from tracking a target to playing chess and 2) as a basis for further research and testing. I think the enterprise of research on PCT is to test this hierarchical model and modify it, as necessary, based on the results of that research.

RY: Would the crying of a baby be an example of positive feedback, in that its output is not directly controlling its hunger, though of course it is indirectly controlled by the actions of its mother (or father)?

RM: Yes, it seem like it, at least temper tantrums seem like positive feedback, where crying leads to more intense crying until they are just worn out and the system collapses.

RY: Chapter 8

Chapter 8 gives a clear description of the interaction between different control systems and the dependency between them in a hierarchical manner.  This is very important in understanding the fundamentals of what perceptions are;  not entities or events that exist in the outside world, but constructs of the nervous system which can be manipulated (controlled), to achieve goals which will only have significance for the organism. I use this insight to answer the old question of does a tree in a forest make a sound if there is no-one there to hear it; no, as a sound is a perception, which requires a perceptual apparatus to be present.

There was some allusion to neural support for parts of the discussion, but I don't know enough to accept the validity, or if the neuroscience has moved on since publication. It would be useful if we had a neuroscientist on board, though I suspect that neuroscientists haven't been looking out for the things that would confirm PCT.

The discussion of the propagation and consolidation of input functions to higher levels is fairly understandable, though I am less clear on how higher outputs form lower references, as the description is minimal. It is here amongst the general vagueness of the definitions of how transfer functions between levels operate that I feel PCT is missing a significant chunk of explaining the complexity of how control systems work in practice. Although I think PCT is the best theory of how living systems work some scepticism remains for me until I can see the details of how the control systems actually operate in the real world.

RM: These are all great thoughts. As far as how the hierarchy works (like how higher order output form lower level references) this is all described in great detail in part 4 of Bill’s Byte series (which I’ll try to point to in my summary). If you can understand spreadsheet computations, you can see how it’s done in a working model of a hierarchy that includes the sensation level and one more level, in my spreadsheet model at:

https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/31298693/Control%20Hierarchy.xls

I’ll get to the leading questions when I write up the chapter summary.

Best regards

Rick

Leading questions:

  Even green, like purple, is a perception derived from multiple lower-order signals. Whereas purple is derived from a combination of first-order signals activated by both red-type and blue-type wavelengths, only green-type wavelengths are present at the first level for a perception of green to occur. In fact, "green" and "purple" are just the labels we give to one-dimensional perceptions at the second level.

Temperature.
Temperature (though surely depends on what the actions are).

  I suppose, the combination of all the signals in the input functions from the environmental boundary to the sensation-of-chocolate level itself.

Biting into, or chewing, something sweet.
Feeling how hard your fingertips are gripping the egg.

Regards,
Rupert

–
Richard S. Marken PhD
rsmarken@gmail.com
www.mindreadings.com

rupert · September 5, 2013, 7:18pm

[From Rupert Young (2013.09.05 20.20 BST)]

HB :I don't see it, why babies cry is positive feed-back ? Baby's cry seems to me to be a normal negative feed-back. At least I see it as genetically produced function of "protecting" organism against disturbances. Not outer. Inside...

You seem to be implying that crying behaviour has evolved for a purpose. I think that adds an unnecessary level of explanation. I think it is actually simpler. The baby hasn't developed any control systems so when it is hungry it just does everything (screaming, waving limbs); there is error, hence output, but output that doesn't affect the perception, so doesn't reduce the error.

There is a negative feedback loop, but that requires a caregiver, who is controlling for the baby not screaming, by providing food. In terms of the the baby's control systems it is just by happen stance that the baby receives what it wants, not by "design".

Regards,
Rupert

wmansell · September 6, 2013, 9:25am

Hi there, I think it is both. That ‘everything’ behaviour is what it initially looks like to lose control of your intrinsic variables, as a baby. However, it also has a second output function of eliciting care from the carer, who then becomes the feedback function for the negative feedback system of the baby. The cries get more subtle and specific over time, presumably as the baby’s systems reorganise to generate more fruitful cries and the parent develops more refined ways to perceive them. So I think you are both right!
Warren

···

On Thu, Sep 5, 2013 at 8:18 PM, Rupert Young rupert@moonsit.co.uk wrote:

  [From Rupert Young (2013.09.05 20.20

BST)]

      HB :I don't see it, why babies cry is positive feed-back ?

      Baby's cry seems to me to be a normal
negative feed-back. At least I see it as genetically produced
function of “protecting” organism against disturbances. Not
outer. Inside…
      You seem to be implying               that
cryin g behaviour has evolved for a purpose.
I think th at adds an unnecessary level of
explanation. I think it is
actually simpler. The baby hasn’t developed any control
systems so when it is hungry it just
does everything (screaming, waving limbs );
there is error , hence output, but output that doesn’t
affect the perception, so doesn’t reduce the error.
                                  There is a negative feedback loop, but
that requires a caregiver, who is controlling for
the baby not screaming, by providing food. In terms of the the
baby’s control systems it is just by happen stance
that the baby receives what it wants,
not by “design”.

Regards,
Rupert

–
Dr Warren Mansell
Reader in Psychology
Cognitive Behavioural Therapist & Chartered Clinical Psychologist
School of Psychological Sciences

Coupland I
University of Manchester
Oxford Road
Manchester M13 9PL
Email: warren.mansell@manchester.ac.uk

Tel: +44 (0) 161 275 8589

Website: http://www.psych-sci.manchester.ac.uk/staff/131406

See teamstrial.net for further information on our trial of CBT for Bipolar Disorders in NW England

The highly acclaimed therapy manual on A Transdiagnostic Approach to CBT using Method of Levels is available now.

Check www.pctweb.org for further information on Perceptual Control Theory

_Boris_Hartman · September 6, 2013, 4:11pm

Hi Rupert,

RY :

You seem to be implying that crying behaviour has evolved for a purpose.

HB :

Of course Rupert. All behaviors are goal-directed (purposefull, intentional). By Bill’s definition.

RY :

I think that adds an unnecessary level of explanation. I think it is actually simpler.

HB :

Nothing conserning organisms is not simple. It’s very complex-

RY :

The baby hasn’t developed any control systems…

HB :

Wrong. Baby has as far as I know from physiology bilions of already organized control units. Maybe you were misleaded by “behavioral or perceptual illusion” as the PCT is simplifying human control system to one general, behavioral model of “control loop”, which by my oppinion implays that most of the control events happens outside the organism. Most of the control events happen inside the organism and as I see it they are prolonged to outside by behavior. So I see behavior as control of perception that has basis in control events in organism.

RY :

…so when it is hungry it just does everything (screaming, waving limbs); there is error, hence output, but output that doesn’t affect the perception, so doesn’t reduce the error.

HB :

That’s true that baby does everything (screaming, waving limbs) because reorganization is going on even in one minute born baby. Where do you suppose it’s “error” and which output is being affected ?

RY :
There is a negative feedback loop, but that requires a caregiver, who is controlling for the baby not screaming, by providing food.

HB:

Bayby’s crying probably “predict” presence of cargiver. But it’s not necesary. Baby will cry even if there is no caregiver.
Caregiver is not “controlling” baby’s screaming, crying but he tries to control it. As if you give baby wrong food or the cause of baby’s crying is not food, baby will still be screaming on and on, till he gets what he needs for his control of “essential or intrinsic variables” or till he is exhausted. But baby is controlling for himself. “Shocked” parents are probably trying to guess in reorganizing attempts how to reduce or eliminate crying.

Some of this theme was described in Bill’s book “Making sense of behavior”, 1998. I agreed with him.

RY:

In terms of the the baby’s control systems it is just by happen stance that the baby receives what it wants, not by “design”.

HB:

Sorry, I didn’t understand this one…

Best,

Boris

···

----- Original Message -----

From:
Rupert Young

To: CSGNET@LISTSERV.ILLINOIS.EDU

Sent: Thursday, September 05, 2013 9:18 PM

Subject: Re: B:CP Course Week 9: Study Guide for CH. 8 Sensation Control

[From Rupert Young (2013.09.05 20.20 BST)]

HB :I don’t see it, why babies cry is positive feed-back ? Baby’s cry seems to me to be a normal negative feed-back. At least I see it as genetically produced function of “protecting” organism against disturbances. Not outer. Inside…

You seem to be implying that crying behaviour has evolved for a purpose. I think that adds an unnecessary level of explanation. I think it is actually simpler. The baby hasn’t developed any control systems so when it is hungry it just does everything (screaming, waving limbs); there is error , hence output, but output that doesn’t affect the perception, so doesn’t reduce the error.

There is a negative feedback loop, but that requires a caregiver, who is controlling for the baby not screaming, by providing food. In terms of the the baby’s control systems it is just by happen stance that the baby receives what it wants, not by “design”.

Regards,
Rupert

rupert · September 6, 2013, 8:00pm

[From Rupert Young (2013.09.06 21.00 BST)]

Me: ...is there any reason, for example, why not, in some cases, an input function at one level might get its input from an error function at a lower level? This may indicate a perception of no error, or a control system having "finished" control.

Any thoughts on this particular point?
Regards,
Rupert

[From Rick Marken (2013.09.01.1205)]

I've got to write up my summary of Ch. 8 on this Labor Day Holiday. But firs let me reply to our most diligent student:

Rupert Young (2013.08.31 13.00 BST)--

RY:My comments and answers to leading questions below. Though first a few loose ends.

Ch.4, question 9 says, "How does the arm respond to the disturbance due to the book's weight? Hint: Watch the tendon in the crook of the elbow."

I didn't see anything, what should I be seeing?

RM: I see slight movement of the tendon; it's more obvious if you just you just flex the bicep.

RY:Ch. 6, question 1 asked if you can create a sensation of pressure without effort. Rick and David said no, but I thought if you had a brick resting on your hand you could perceive pressure without effort. Am I misunderstanding something? Perhaps, the meanings of pressure and effort could be clarified..

RM: I think the idea is that you can't vary the pressure felt on the hand when you, say, press the hand against a wall, without perceiving the effort required to produce this this pressure. I'm not sure this is such a great example, though, if the goal is to demonstrate a hierarchical relationship between these perceptions (pressure higher level than effort) since we can experience pressure without effort when an object is placed on our resting hand. But maybe I'm missing something; perhaps Kent McClelland can again see what I'm missing.

RY: There has been some discussion about steps and levels. I have always taken the theory described by Bill to be an idealised model of the basic principles of perceptual control and the dependency of control systems on others deriving increasingly abstract perceptions (which logically may be organised in a hierarchy). And that the reality is likely to be far more messy than indicated by the theory; many levels, and processing steps, within levels, overlap between levels and interactions between functions that may not conform to the ideal picture presented. With regards to the latter point, is there any reason, for example, why not, in some cases, an input function at one level might get its input from an error function at a lower level? This may indicate a perception of no error, or a control system having "finished" control.

RM: I think you are absolutely right about the hierarchical model being idealized (I would say, it's a hypothesis to be tested). Indeed, I think Bill is laying out this model of the hierarchy in detail as 1) a demonstration of feasibility, to show that a control of perception model can, in principle, account for all behavior, from tracking a target to playing chess and 2) as a basis for further research and testing. I think the enterprise of research on PCT is to test this hierarchical model and modify it, as necessary, based on the results of that research.

RY: Would the crying of a baby be an example of positive feedback, in that its output is not directly controlling its hunger, though of course it is indirectly controlled by the actions of its mother (or father)?

RM: Yes, it seem like it, at least temper tantrums seem like positive feedback, where crying leads to more intense crying until they are just worn out and the system collapses.

RY: Chapter 8

Chapter 8 gives a clear description of the interaction between different control systems and the dependency between them in a hierarchical manner. This is very important in understanding the fundamentals of what perceptions are; not entities or events that exist in the outside world, but constructs of the nervous system which can be manipulated (controlled), to achieve goals which will only have significance for the organism. I use this insight to answer the old question of does a tree in a forest make a sound if there is no-one there to hear it; no, as a sound is a perception, which requires a perceptual apparatus to be present.

There was some allusion to neural support for parts of the discussion, but I don't know enough to accept the validity, or if the neuroscience has moved on since publication. It would be useful if we had a neuroscientist on board, though I suspect that neuroscientists haven't been looking out for the things that would confirm PCT.

The discussion of the propagation and consolidation of input functions to higher levels is fairly understandable, though I am less clear on how higher outputs form lower references, as the description is minimal. It is here amongst the general vagueness of the definitions of how transfer functions between levels operate that I feel PCT is missing a significant chunk of explaining the complexity of how control systems work in practice. Although I think PCT is the best theory of how living systems work some scepticism remains for me until I can see the details of how the control systems actually operate in the real world.

RM: These are all great thoughts. As far as how the hierarchy works (like how higher order output form lower level references) this is all described in great detail in part 4 of Bill's Byte series (which I'll try to point to in my summary). If you can understand spreadsheet computations, you can see how it's done in a working model of a hierarchy that includes the sensation level and one more level, in my spreadsheet model at:

<https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/31298693/Control%20Hierarchy.xls>https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/31298693/Control%20Hierarchy.xls

I'll get to the leading questions when I write up the chapter summary.

Best regards

Rick

Leading questions:

1. Even green, like purple, is a perception derived from multiple lower-order signals. Whereas purple is derived from a combination of first-order signals activated by both red-type and blue-type wavelengths, only green-type wavelengths are present at the first level for a perception of green to occur. In fact, "green" and "purple" are just the labels we give to one-dimensional perceptions at the second level.

2. Temperature.
3. Temperature (though surely depends on what the actions are).
4. I suppose, the combination of all the signals in the input functions from the environmental boundary to the sensation-of-chocolate level itself.
5. Biting into, or chewing, something sweet.
6. Feeling how hard your fingertips are gripping the egg.

Regards,

Rupert

···

On 01/09/2013 20:04, Richard Marken wrote:

--
Richard S. Marken PhD
<mailto:rsmarken@gmail.com>> rsmarken@gmail.com
<http://www.mindreadings.com>> www.mindreadings.com

rupert · September 6, 2013, 9:12pm

Just because we can see something doing something does not mean that
that “behaviour” is purposeful, or has been “chosen” by natural
selection. And in this case we are talking about control systems
which have not yet benefited from reorganisation and therefore are
unsuccessful, so the output (behaviour) we are seeing is not
purposeful, as it does not reduce the error. In other words it is
not directed towards the goal.
Complexity is relative; some things are simpler than others. Your
explanation had an additional element (so was more complex) which I
don’t think is necessary.
You misunderstand me. I meant, that in the context of acquiring
replenishment, the baby’s control systems have not yet reorganised.
Yes it is, the caregiver is controlling for giving care, which in
this case corresponds to controlling a perception of the baby not
crying.

The crying of the baby is (initially) a side-effect of unsuccessful
control systems, and the baby only receives what it wants because a
caregiver happens to be there.

···

[From Rupert Young (2013.09.06 22.10
BST)]

  On 06/09/2013 17:11, Boris Hartman wrote:

RY :
You seem to be implying that
crying behaviour has evolved for a purpose.

HB :

      Of course Rupert. All behaviors
are goal-directed (purposefull, intentional). By Bill’s
definition.

RY :

      I think that adds an unnecessary
level of explanation. I
think it is actually simpler.

HB :

      Nothing conserning organisms is
not simple. It’s very complex-

RY :

      The baby hasn't developed any

control systems…

HB :

Wrong. B aby has as far as I know from physiology bilions of
already organized control units. Maybe you were misleaded by
“behavioral or perceptual illusion” as the PCT is
simplifying human control system to one general, behavioral
model of “control loop”, which by my oppinion implays that
most of the control events happens outside the organism.
Most of the control events happen inside the organism and as
I see it they are prolonged to outside by behavior. So I see
behavior as control of perception that has basis in
control events in organism.

RY :

      ....so when it is hungry it just
does everything (screaming, waving limbs); there is error, hence output, but output
that doesn’t affect the perception, so doesn’t reduce the
error.

HB :

      That's true that baby does
everything (screaming, waving limbs) because reorganization is
going on even in one minute born baby. Where do you suppose
it’s “error” and which output is being affected ?

      RY :

      There is a negative feedback loop, but that requires a
caregiver, who is controlling for the baby not screaming, by
providing food.

HB:

Bayby’s crying probably “predict” presence of cargiver.

    No, I don't think that is the case at all.

          Caregiver is not
“controlling” baby’s screaming,

RY:

      In terms of the the baby's control systems it is just by
happen stance that the baby receives what it wants, not by
“design”.

HB:

Sorry, I didn’t understand this one…

Regards,
Rupert

Bob_Hintz · September 7, 2013, 1:06am

bob hintz -

I would just like to remind folks that every mammalian infant ever born would die within days without the assistance of at least one caregiver, who makes it possible for the very limited output capacity of an infant to accomplish control of the essential internal perceptions of intrinsic variables necessary for life. Deaf parents and their children have a difficult time communicating when assistance is needed. One can conceive of crying as a response to internal distress and/or as an effort to control the presence of a caregiver when distress is noticed by the infant. When a caregiver succeeds in helping an infant relieve distress (hunger, cold, loneliness?, gas, etc.) changes in internal sensations can be associated with changes in external sensations (all of which are facilitated by the caregiver). Human control is greatly facilitated by interpersonal communication from birth onward as very few of us could take care of ourselves even as adults.

I have enjoyed reading recent comments even though I have not been reading the book.

bob

···

On Fri, Sep 6, 2013 at 4:12 PM, Rupert Young rupert@moonsit.co.uk wrote:

  [From Rupert Young (2013.09.06 22.10

BST)]

  On 06/09/2013 17:11, Boris Hartman wrote:

RY :
You seem to be implying that
crying behaviour has evolved for a purpose.

HB :

      Of course Rupert. All behaviors
are goal-directed (purposefull, intentional). By Bill’s
definition.

Just because we can see something doing something does not mean that
that “behaviour” is purposeful, or has been “chosen” by natural
selection. And in this case we are talking about control systems
which have not yet benefited from reorganisation and therefore are
unsuccessful, so the output (behaviour) we are seeing is not
purposeful, as it does not reduce the error. In other words it is
not directed towards the goal.

RY :

      I think that adds an unnecessary
level of explanation. I
think it is actually simpler.

HB :

      Nothing conserning organisms is
not simple. It’s very complex-

Complexity is relative; some things are simpler than others. Your
explanation had an additional element (so was more complex) which I
don’t think is necessary.

RY :

      The baby hasn't developed any

control systems…

HB :

Wrong. B aby has as far as I know from physiology bilions of
already organized control units. Maybe you were misleaded by
“behavioral or perceptual illusion” as the PCT is
simplifying human control system to one general, behavioral
model of “control loop”, which by my oppinion implays that
most of the control events happens outside the organism.
Most of the control events happen inside the organism and as
I see it they are prolonged to outside by behavior. So I see
behavior as control of perception that has basis in
control events in organism.

You misunderstand me. I meant, that in the context of acquiring
replenishment, the baby’s control systems have not yet reorganised.

RY :

      ....so when it is hungry it just
does everything (screaming, waving limbs); there is error, hence output, but output
that doesn’t affect the perception, so doesn’t reduce the
error.

HB :

      That's true that baby does
everything (screaming, waving limbs) because reorganization is
going on even in one minute born baby. Where do you suppose
it’s “error” and which output is being affected ?

      RY :

      There is a negative feedback loop, but that requires a
caregiver, who is controlling for the baby not screaming, by
providing food.

HB:

Bayby’s crying probably “predict” presence of cargiver.

    No, I don't think that is the case at all.

          Caregiver is not
“controlling” baby’s screaming,

Yes it is, the caregiver is controlling for giving care, which in
this case corresponds to controlling a perception of the baby not
crying.

RY:

      In terms of the the baby's control systems it is just by
happen stance that the baby receives what it wants, not by
“design”.

HB:

Sorry, I didn’t understand this one…

The crying of the baby is (initially) a side-effect of unsuccessful
control systems, and the baby only receives what it wants because a
caregiver happens to be there.
Regards,
Rupert

_Boris_Hartman · September 7, 2013, 7:55am

Hi Rupert,

···

----- Original Message -----

From:
Rupert Young

To: CSGNET@LISTSERV.ILLINOIS.EDU

Sent: Friday, September 06, 2013 11:12 PM

Subject: Re: B:CP Course Week 9: Study Guide for CH. 8 Sensation Control

[From Rupert Young (2013.09.06 22.10 BST)]

On 06/09/2013 17:11, Boris Hartman wrote:

RY :
You seem to be implying that crying behaviour has evolved for a purpose.

HB :

Of course Rupert. All behaviors are goal-directed (purposefull, intentional). By Bill's definition.

RY

Just because we can see something doing something does not mean that that "behaviour" is purposeful, or has been "chosen"  by natural selection. And in this case we are talking about control systems which have not yet  benefited from reorganisation and therefore are unsuccessful, so the output (behaviour) we are seeing is not purposeful, as it does not reduce the error. In other words it is not directed towards the goal.

HB :
Bill’s definition of purposefull behavior is :

“The purpose of any given behavior is to prevent controlled perception from changing away from the reference condition. Purpose implies goal : The goal of ANY BEHAVIOR is defined as the reference condition of the controlled perception” (B:CP, p. 50, 2005).

The definition Bill gave is general, for any behavior. Aren’t we talking about Bill’s book ? That’s how I understood you original question…

The goal of any baby’s behavior is to keep intrinsic variables in physiological limits (reference condition of controlled “intrinsic” variables), preventing controlled perception from changing away from the reference condition.

And behaviors of baby’s screaming and crying were “chosen” by natural selection, otherwise they wouldn’t be here and there. If you can see these behaviors than they were developed through evolution, and here they are. How could it be otherwise ? How could one minute born baby learn any behavior from outside ?

RY :

I think that adds an unnecessary level of explanation.     I think it is actually simpler.

HB :

Nothing conserning organisms is not simple. It's very complex..

RY :

Complexity is relative; some things are simpler than others. Your explanation had an additional element (so was more complex) which I don't think is necessary.

HB:
Whether behavior is purposefull or not doesn’t depend on it’s succesfulness. And most baby’s behaviors are succefull Usualy always if some “caretaker” is near to hear baby’s cry.

It seems to me that you are talking about two different problems.

One is whether behavior is purposefull or not (and I argumented that it is purposefull) and

problem is whether purposeful behavior (directed toward reducing the error in intrinsic variables) is succesfull or not, and obviously baby’s crying is succesfull in most cases as baby’s all over the world quite succesfully control the error in intrinsic variables. You did to.

RY :

The baby hasn't developed any control systems...

HB :

Wrong. B aby has as far as I know from physiology bilions of already organized control units. Maybe you were misleaded by “behavioral or perceptual illusion” as the PCT is simplifying human control system to one general, behavioral model of “control loop”, which by my oppinion implays that most of the control events happens outside the organism. Most of the control events happen inside the organism and as I see it they are prolonged to outside by behavior. So I see behavior as control of perception that has basis in control events in organism.

RY :

You misunderstand me. I meant, that in the context of acquiring replenishment, the baby's control systems have not yet reorganised.

HB :

Sorry to misunderstood you…

RY :

....so when it is hungry it just does everything (screaming, waving limbs);     there is error, hence output, but output that doesn't affect the perception, so doesn't reduce the error.

HB :

That's true that baby does everything (screaming, waving limbs) because reorganization is going on even in one minute born baby. Where do you suppose it's "error" and which output is being affected ?

RY :
There is a negative feedback loop, but that requires a caregiver, who is controlling for the baby not screaming, by providing food.

HB:

Bayby’s crying probably “predict” presence of cargiver.

RY :
No, I don’t think that is the case at all.

HB :

Sorry I don’t understand your answer. You just expressed your thinking without arguments.

HB : Caregiver is not "controlling" baby's screaming,

RY :
Yes it is, the caregiver is controlling for giving care, which in this case corresponds to controlling a perception of the baby not crying.

HB :

I think we agree on this one. Do I understand right ?

Baby is controlling the error in intrinsic variables with behavior called screaming. And baby will stop screaming when it’s behavior is succesfull. Parents just help his control of intrinsic variables (giving care as you said), but they can’t entirely controll baby’ intrinsic variables and their references and they can’f control behavior that is reorganized through baby’s internal control loops more than disturbances allow. Baby is in control with it’s behavior but parents can make such a disturbances that will help and “satisfy” baby’s control.

So parents behavior (caretakers) has something to do with baby’s controlling the intrinsic variables. But caretakesrs can’t control “reference condtions” of baby’s intrinsic variables. Only baby can do that. Caretaker can control “baby not crying”, but that is their controlled perception and effect of their control are disturbances to baby’s control. If disturbances are such to help minimizing the error in baby’s controlled perceptions, than caretakers behaviors are probably succesfull. And also are baby’ behavior.

RY:

In terms of the the baby's control systems it is just by happen stance that the baby receives what it wants, not by "design".

HB:

Sorry, I didn’t understand this one…

RY :The crying of the baby is (initially) a side-effect of unsuccessful control systems, and the baby only receives what it wants because a caregiver happens to be there.

HB :

The crying of the baby (initially) is main effect of succesfull control system with reorganization that is “seeking” for behavior that will succesfully close the “whole” or “grand” control loop (minimize “error” in intrinsic variables). I took “grand” from Ashby.

The baby receive what it wants because it’s crying. And if parents or caregivers are there, the probability that it’s behavior will be succefull is very high.

Best,

Boris

Regards,
Rupert

MartinT · September 7, 2013, 5:20pm

[Martin Taylor 2013.09.07.12.54]

I think it depends on what you call "behaviour". When we observe

some actions from the outside, everything we see can be “behaviour”,
but a lot of that, seen with the analyst’s viewpoint from inside the
behaving organism, is “side effects”. The outside observer can’t
tell what results of observed actions are influencing controlled
perceptions inside the organism, and therefore can’t tell what
“behaviours” are intentional. Suppose I see someone at a high-class dining table move his arm, the
hand holding a fork, and a wine glass crashes to the floor as the
moving arm hits it. What was the intended behaviour – the reference
value for a controlled perception? Was it to perceive the smash of
the glass? To test the quality of the floor or of the “unbreakable”
glass? Maybe it was. Maybe the person wanted to make a dramatic
gesture to influence his dining partner in some way, and the smash
was part of this intended gesture. What perception(s) was he
controlling? Was the ambience too quiet, and he had a reference for
making it a bit more exciting? All, and many more, are possible
“intentional behaviours”. But maybe it was just an accident – a side-effect – and his
reference was to see his hand encompass the salt shaker, or to make
a gesture to emphasise something he said. You can’t tell without
using the Test for the Controlled Variable, and you can’t easily set
up the situation and disturb your candidate perceptions so that he
does or doesn’t knock the test glass off the table. He did smash it
once, and that’s all you can know without asking him. If you set up
another glass and he had intended to knock it off, maybe doing it
once eliminated the error in the controlled perception and he
wouldn’t do it again. It was a behaviour, as seen from outside, but
was it an intended behaviour, one that influenced a controlled
variable so as to reduce its error? Or did it create a disturbance
to a lot of other controlled perceptions, resulting in intended
behaviours such as saying “I’m so sorry; I’m too clumsy, and I will
pay for a replacement glass and for cleaning your lovely carpet”?
The baby has muscles that move arms and legs. They presumably move
according to changing reference values for their positions. But for
what reason does the right leg get moved precisely “there” and the
left leg “that way” when the baby is hungry? To me it seems more
likely that the actual positions and the screaming are side effects
of a reorganization process that keeps changing reference values for
lots of things in the absence of related perceptions that are being
controlled, other than the internal perceptions of the intrinsic
variables. I see it as being probably part of the general
reorganization process that builds higher-level control systems on
top of existing low-level ones, a process that might well continue
over an entire lifetime.
Martin

···

Hi Rupert,

----- Original Message -----

From: Rupert Young

To: CSGNET@LISTSERV.ILLINOIS.EDU

Sent: Friday, September 06,
2013 11:12 PM

Subject: Re: B:CP Course
Week 9: Study Guide for CH. 8 Sensation Control

07

      [From Rupert Young (2013.09.06

22.10 BST)]

      On 06/09/2013 17:11, Boris Hartman wrote:

RY :
You seem to be implying that
crying behaviour has evolved for a purpose.

HB :

          Of course Rupert. All
behaviors are goal-directed (purposefull, intentional). By
Bill’s definition.

RY
        Just because we can see something doing something does not
mean that that “behaviour” is purposeful, or has been
“chosen” by natural selection. And in this case we are
talking about control systems which have not yet benefited
from reorganisation and therefore are unsuccessful, so the
output (behaviour) we are seeing is not purposeful, as it
does not reduce the error. In other words it is not directed
towards the goal.

HB :
Bill’s definition of purposefull
behavior is :

          "The purpose of any given behavior is

to prevent controlled perception from changing away from
the reference condition. Purpose implies goal : The goal
of ANY BEHAVIOR is defined as the reference condition of
the controlled perception" (B:CP, p. 50, 2005).

          The definition Bill gave is general,

for any behavior. Aren’t we talking about Bill’s book ?
That’s how I understood you original question…

          The goal of any baby's behavior is to

keep intrinsic variables in physiological limits
(reference condition of controlled “intrinsic” variables),
preventing controlled perception from changing away from
the reference condition.

          And behaviors of baby's screaming and

crying were “chosen” by natural selection, otherwise they
wouldn’t be here and there. If you can see these
behaviors than they were developed through evolution, and
here they are. How could it be otherwise ? How could one minute born baby learn
any behavior from outside ?

JohnK · September 8, 2013, 1:21am

[John Kirkland 20130908]

Comments and observations

I can grasp the notion of ascending levels representing qualitative differences as typified in many stage theories of development, Vygotsky, Freud, Piaget and so on. Whilst these are reconstructive (reorganisational) representations, how does one deconstruct this matrix? Is this the role of reference signals? Like a snakes’nladders board: climb the (levels) ladders and descend (references) via snakes? Given the sheer complexity of combinations and permutations during ascent, perhaps care needs to be taken when descending or else one may arrive at a different place (un-coordination). What is it that holds the centre and retains an overfall pattern so the entire enterprise does not fly apart? Intention/purpose/goal? Keeping your eye on the ball so the game continues.

A good mate once opined a metaphor is an analogy’s analogy. Thus a second order is an analog of the first order.

Where is the perfect cup of coffee, cigar, glass of wine (Dubonnet, Fred) or perfume? In short, can there ever be the sliver bullet? Advertising and marketing agencies know the answer, it’s with their clients’ products.

p 110 para 2 sentence 4: As a teacher I am most interested in finding out how to initiate mild potentially controllable disturbances in students (and vice-versa; them me too). I’ve not yet been able to find a place for what’s usually called ‘curiosity’ in PCT since curiosity would seem to be a never ending quest-maker, is never settled. Rick, Martin, others – please leave me to ponder this some more and I’ll seek assistance later on if it sticks in my craw.

What I would like a comment about though is the notion of ‘resonance’, when it all seems to come together as, possibly, a sense of bliss or ecstasy. Garrison Keillor’s voice-over for that infamous Honda advert, “Isn’t it nice when things - just work” ( http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yylNWKoifgk )

Is perfect pitch an example of a pure sensation (p. 106)?

With kind regards

JohnK

PS – the San Fran Bay boat race – when function is design, design function.

···

On Sun, Sep 8, 2013 at 5:20 AM, Martin Taylor mmt-csg@mmtaylor.net wrote:

[Martin Taylor 2013.09.07.12.54]

Hi Rupert,

----- Original Message -----

From: Rupert Young

To: CSGNET@LISTSERV.ILLINOIS.EDU

Sent: Friday, September 06,
2013 11:12 PM

Subject: Re: B:CP Course
Week 9: Study Guide for CH. 8 Sensation Control

07

      [From Rupert Young (2013.09.06

22.10 BST)]

      On 06/09/2013 17:11, Boris Hartman wrote:

RY :
You seem to be implying that
crying behaviour has evolved for a purpose.

HB :

          Of course Rupert. All
behaviors are goal-directed (purposefull, intentional). By
Bill’s definition.

RY
        Just because we can see something doing something does not
mean that that “behaviour” is purposeful, or has been
“chosen” by natural selection. And in this case we are
talking about control systems which have not yet benefited
from reorganisation and therefore are unsuccessful, so the
output (behaviour) we are seeing is not purposeful, as it
does not reduce the error. In other words it is not directed
towards the goal.

HB :
Bill’s definition of purposefull
behavior is :

          "The purpose of any given behavior is
to prevent controlled perception from changing away from
the reference condition. Purpose implies goal : The goal
of ANY BEHAVIOR is defined as the reference condition of
the controlled perception" (B:CP, p. 50, 2005).

          The definition Bill gave is general,
for any behavior. Aren’t we talking about Bill’s book ?
That’s how I understood you original question…

          The goal of any baby's behavior is to
keep intrinsic variables in physiological limits
(reference condition of controlled “intrinsic” variables),
preventing controlled perception from changing away from
the reference condition.

          And behaviors of baby's screaming and
crying were “chosen” by natural selection, otherwise they
wouldn’t be here and there. If you can see these
behaviors than they were developed through evolution, and
here they are. How could it be otherwise ? How could one minute born baby learn
any behavior from outside ?

I think it depends on what you call "behaviour". When we observe
some actions from the outside, everything we see can be “behaviour”,
but a lot of that, seen with the analyst’s viewpoint from inside the
behaving organism, is “side effects”. The outside observer can’t
tell what results of observed actions are influencing controlled
perceptions inside the organism, and therefore can’t tell what
“behaviours” are intentional.
Suppose I see someone at a high-class dining table move his arm, the
hand holding a fork, and a wine glass crashes to the floor as the
moving arm hits it. What was the intended behaviour – the reference
value for a controlled perception? Was it to perceive the smash of
the glass? To test the quality of the floor or of the “unbreakable”
glass? Maybe it was. Maybe the person wanted to make a dramatic
gesture to influence his dining partner in some way, and the smash
was part of this intended gesture. What perception(s) was he
controlling? Was the ambience too quiet, and he had a reference for
making it a bit more exciting? All, and many more, are possible
“intentional behaviours”.
But maybe it was just an accident -- a side-effect -- and his
reference was to see his hand encompass the salt shaker, or to make
a gesture to emphasise something he said. You can’t tell without
using the Test for the Controlled Variable, and you can’t easily set
up the situation and disturb your candidate perceptions so that he
does or doesn’t knock the test glass off the table. He did smash it
once, and that’s all you can know without asking him. If you set up
another glass and he had intended to knock it off, maybe doing it
once eliminated the error in the controlled perception and he
wouldn’t do it again. It was a behaviour, as seen from outside, but
was it an intended behaviour, one that influenced a controlled
variable so as to reduce its error? Or did it create a disturbance
to a lot of other controlled perceptions, resulting in intended
behaviours such as saying “I’m so sorry; I’m too clumsy, and I will
pay for a replacement glass and for cleaning your lovely carpet”?
The baby has muscles that move arms and legs. They presumably move
according to changing reference values for their positions. But for
what reason does the right leg get moved precisely “there” and the
left leg “that way” when the baby is hungry? To me it seems more
likely that the actual positions and the screaming are side effects
of a reorganization process that keeps changing reference values for
lots of things in the absence of related perceptions that are being
controlled, other than the internal perceptions of the intrinsic
variables. I see it as being probably part of the general
reorganization process that builds higher-level control systems on
top of existing low-level ones, a process that might well continue
over an entire lifetime.
Martin

rupert · September 8, 2013, 7:09pm

As Martin says, it depends on what you mean by the term “behaviour”,
and in this case crying “behaviour” refers to the observed output of
the entity, rather than to the behaviour of a whole control system.
The question then is, is this output the intended outcome of a
control system. I am saying no, because the control system has not
yet reorganised. If it was intended (to reduce error) then the
output we might see is the entity going into McDonald’s and ordering
a Big Mac. What is being seen is the side-effect of an unorganised
control system. Actually I don’t think we can even say a control
system is present, as, until its organisation has developed it is
just a bunch of neurons connected together.
Natural selection may have “chosen” the neural structure which has
the potential for control, but not the output of an unorganised
system. In fact the fact that the system does reorganise is,
perhaps, an indication that the observed crying output was not
selected, otherwise the wouldn’t need to reorganise.
Just because we can see an entity do something does not mean that
that something was selected, by evolution. There are many behaviours
(in the general sense) that humans have that weren’t selected, such
as watching TV, riding a bicycle and walking on a catwalk.
Similarly you can have “behaviours” that were selected, but are not
purposive. A prime example being procreation; no animals, apart from
(most) humans control for having offspring.
Yes, I think so, though I am saying that the screaming is not an
intended output of a working control system, but the unintended
side-effect of an unorganised system. Also I don’t think the
parents giving care is a big influence on baby’s intrinsic control
otherwise the baby wouldn’t need to reorganise and it could just
continue screaming as to get what it wants. Regards,
Rupert

···

[From Rupert Young (2013.09.08 20.10
BST)]

  On 07/09/2013 08:55, Boris Hartman wrote:

HB :
Bill’s definition of purposefull
behavior is :

          "The purpose of any given behavior is
to prevent controlled perception from changing away from
the reference condition. Purpose implies goal : The goal
of ANY BEHAVIOR is defined as the reference condition of
the controlled perception" (B:CP, p. 50, 2005).

          The definition Bill gave is general,
for any behavior. Aren’t we talking about Bill’s book ?
That’s how I understood you original question…

          And behaviors of baby's screaming and
crying were “chosen” by natural selection, otherwise they
wouldn’t be here and there. If you can see these
behaviors than they were developed through evolution, and
here they are. How could it be otherwise ? How could one minute born baby learn
any behavior from outside ?

Bayby’s crying probably “predict” presence of cargiver.

RY :

            No, I don't                   think that is the case at

all.

HB :

            Sorry I don't understand your
answer. You just expressed your thinking without
arguments.

I was just following your lead

              HB : Caregiver is not
“controlling” baby’s screaming,

RY :
          Yes it is, the caregiver is controlling for giving care,
which in this case corresponds to controlling a perception
of the baby not crying.

HB :

            I think we agree on this one. Do I understand

right ?

            Baby is controlling the error in intrinsic
variables with behavior called screaming. And baby will
stop screaming when it’s behavior is succesfull. Parents
just help his control of intrinsic variables (giving
care as you said), but they can’t entirely
controll baby’ intrinsic variables and their references
and they can’f control behavior that is reorganized
through baby’s internal control loops more than
disturbances allow. Baby is in control with it’s
behavior but parents can make such a disturbances that
will help and “satisfy” baby’s control.

rsmarken · September 8, 2013, 8:59pm

[From Rick Marken (2013.09.08.1400)]

I seem to have set off a bit of a tempest in a teapot by suggesting that a baby’s cry could be an example of positive feedback. It is, to the extent that the crying leads to more crying. But in retrospect (to my kids, not me) it seems that this is not what happens. Crying is just what most of you have suggested it is; an error signal that is not being reduced. The error may be a result of a mismatch between the reference for and perception of blood sugar level (ie., hunger) or between the reference for and perception of comfort, etc. Whatever, it’s an error that the baby is not yet able to act to reduce (control). So the built in response of uncontrollable error is crying; and as the error increases the crying gets worse. The crying, of course, will result in error reduction if there is an adult around who is controlling for keeping the baby quiet – ie. a parent. So that’s what crying is about, as Bob Hintz correctly notes below. So forget crying as an example of positive feedback.

Best

Rick

···

On Fri, Sep 6, 2013 at 6:06 PM, Bob Hintz bob.hintz@gmail.com wrote:

bob hintz -

I would just like to remind folks that every mammalian infant ever born

would die within days without the assistance of at least one caregiver, who

makes it possible for the very limited output capacity of an infant to

accomplish control of the essential internal perceptions of intrinsic

variables necessary for life. Deaf parents and their children have a

difficult time communicating when assistance is needed. One can conceive of

crying as a response to internal distress and/or as an effort to control the

presence of a caregiver when distress is noticed by the infant. When a

caregiver succeeds in helping an infant relieve distress (hunger, cold,

loneliness?, gas, etc.) changes in internal sensations can be associated

with changes in external sensations (all of which are facilitated by the

caregiver). Human control is greatly facilitated by interpersonal

communication from birth onward as very few of us could take care of

ourselves even as adults.

I have enjoyed reading recent comments even though I have not been reading

the book.

bob

On Fri, Sep 6, 2013 at 4:12 PM, Rupert Young rupert@moonsit.co.uk wrote:

[From Rupert Young (2013.09.06 22.10 BST)]

On 06/09/2013 17:11, Boris Hartman wrote:

RY :

You seem to be implying that crying behaviour has evolved for a purpose.

HB :

Of course Rupert. All behaviors are goal-directed (purposefull,

intentional). By Bill’s definition.

Just because we can see something doing something does not mean that that

“behaviour” is purposeful, or has been “chosen” by natural selection. And

in this case we are talking about control systems which have not yet

benefited from reorganisation and therefore are unsuccessful, so the output

(behaviour) we are seeing is not purposeful, as it does not reduce the

error. In other words it is not directed towards the goal.

RY :

I think that adds an unnecessary level of explanation. I think it is

actually simpler.

HB :

Nothing conserning organisms is not simple. It’s very complex-

Complexity is relative; some things are simpler than others. Your

explanation had an additional element (so was more complex) which I don’t

think is necessary.

RY :

The baby hasn’t developed any control systems…

HB :

Wrong. Baby has as far as I know from physiology bilions of already

organized control units. Maybe you were misleaded by "behavioral or

perceptual illusion" as the PCT is simplifying human control system to one

general, behavioral model of “control loop”, which by my oppinion implays

that most of the control events happens outside the organism. Most of the

control events happen inside the organism and as I see it they are prolonged

to outside by behavior. So I see behavior as control of perception that has

basis in control events in organism.

You misunderstand me. I meant, that in the context of acquiring

replenishment, the baby’s control systems have not yet reorganised.

RY :

…so when it is hungry it just does everything (screaming, waving

limbs); there is error, hence output, but output that doesn’t affect the

perception, so doesn’t reduce the error.

HB :

That’s true that baby does everything (screaming, waving limbs) because

reorganization is going on even in one minute born baby. Where do you

suppose it’s “error” and which output is being affected ?

RY :

There is a negative feedback loop, but that requires a caregiver, who is

controlling for the baby not screaming, by providing food.

HB:

Bayby’s crying probably “predict” presence of cargiver.

No, I don’t think that is the case at all.

Caregiver is not “controlling” baby’s screaming,

Yes it is, the caregiver is controlling for giving care, which in this

case corresponds to controlling a perception of the baby not crying.

RY:

In terms of the the baby’s control systems it is just by happen stance

that the baby receives what it wants, not by “design”.

HB:

Sorry, I didn’t understand this one…

The crying of the baby is (initially) a side-effect of unsuccessful

control systems, and the baby only receives what it wants because a

caregiver happens to be there.

Regards,

Rupert

–

Richard S. Marken PhD

rsmarken@gmail.com

www.mindreadings.com

–
Richard S. Marken PhD
rsmarken@gmail.com
www.mindreadings.com

rsmarken · September 8, 2013, 9:06pm

[From Rick Marken(2013.09.08.1410)]

[Martin Taylor 2013.09.07.12.54]

I think it depends on what you call "behaviour". When we observe
some actions from the outside, everything we see can be “behaviour”,
but a lot of that, seen with the analyst’s viewpoint from inside the
behaving organism, is “side effects”. The outside observer can’t
tell what results of observed actions are influencing controlled
perceptions inside the organism, and therefore can’t tell what
“behaviours” are intentional.

Very nice post Martin. And very important points, I think.

Best

Rick

···

Suppose I see someone at a high-class dining table move his arm, the
hand holding a fork, and a wine glass crashes to the floor as the
moving arm hits it. What was the intended behaviour – the reference
value for a controlled perception? Was it to perceive the smash of
the glass? To test the quality of the floor or of the “unbreakable”
glass? Maybe it was. Maybe the person wanted to make a dramatic
gesture to influence his dining partner in some way, and the smash
was part of this intended gesture. What perception(s) was he
controlling? Was the ambience too quiet, and he had a reference for
making it a bit more exciting? All, and many more, are possible
“intentional behaviours”.
But maybe it was just an accident -- a side-effect -- and his
reference was to see ]his hand encompass the salt shaker, or to make
a gesture to emphasise something he said. You can’t tell without
using the Test for the Controlled Variable, and you can’t easily set
up the situation and disturb your candidate perceptions so that he
does or doesn’t knock the test glass off the table. He did smash it
once, and that’s all you can know without asking him. If you set up
another glass and he had intended to knock it off, maybe doing it
once eliminated the error in the controlled perception and he
wouldn’t do it again. It was a behaviour, as seen from outside, but
was it an intended behaviour, one that influenced a controlled
variable so as to reduce its error? Or did it create a disturbance
to a lot of other controlled perceptions, resulting in intended
behaviours such as saying “I’m so sorry; I’m too clumsy, and I will
pay for a replacement glass and for cleaning your lovely carpet”?
The baby has muscles that move arms and legs. They presumably move
according to changing reference values for their positions. But for
what reason does the right leg get moved precisely “there” and the
left leg “that way” when the baby is hungry? To me it seems more
likely that the actual positions and the screaming are side effects
of a reorganization process that keeps changing reference values for
lots of things in the absence of related perceptions that are being
controlled, other than the internal perceptions of the intrinsic
variables. I see it as being probably part of the general
reorganization process that builds higher-level control systems on
top of existing low-level ones, a process that might well continue
over an entire lifetime.
Martin

–
Richard S. Marken PhD
rsmarken@gmail.com
www.mindreadings.com

rsmarken · September 8, 2013, 9:31pm

[from Rick Marken (2013.09.08.1430)]

[John Kirkland 20130908]

Comments and observations

I can grasp the notion of ascending levels representing qualitative differences as typified in many stage theories of development, Vygotsky, Freud, Piaget and so on. Whilst these are reconstructive (reorganisational) representations, how does one deconstruct this matrix? Is this the role of reference signals? Like a snakes’nladders board: climb the (levels) ladders and descend (references) via snakes? Given the sheer complexity of combinations and permutations during ascent, perhaps care needs to be taken when descending or else one may arrive at a different place (un-coordination). What is it that holds the centre and retains an overfall pattern so the entire enterprise does not fly apart? Intention/purpose/goal? Keeping your eye on the ball so the game continues.

I think a good way to see how the hierarchy works is to study my spreadsheet model of a three level hierarchy with six systems at each level. I’m on an iPad now so I can’t easily get to the address but I think I give it as well as a brief description of the model in my summary of ch 8 of B:CP. There is also a paper in Mind Readings describing an older version of the hierarchy. But I think the questions you pose above are addressed, if not answered by that spreadsheet model.

A good mate once opined a metaphor is an analogy’s analogy. Thus a second order is an analog of the first order.

Where is the perfect cup of coffee, cigar, glass of wine (Dubonnet, Fred) or perfume? In short, can there ever be the sliver bullet? Advertising and marketing agencies know the answer, it’s with their clients’ products.

p 110 para 2 sentence 4: As a teacher I am most interested in finding out how to initiate mild potentially controllable disturbances in students (and vice-versa; them me too). I’ve not yet been able to find a place for what’s usually called ‘curiosity’ in PCT since curiosity would seem to be a never ending quest-maker, is never settled. Rick, Martin, others – please leave me to ponder this some more and I’ll seek assistance later on if it sticks in my craw.

Great. I look forward to hearing what you come up with. I think PCT has an explanation for curiosity; if it didn’t that would be a big problem. But see if you can come up with a PCT explanation of curiosity on your own; I’d be curious to see what you come up with!

What I would like a comment about though is the notion of ‘resonance’, when it all seems to come together as, possibly, a sense of bliss or ecstasy. Garrison Keillor’s voice-over for that infamous Honda advert, “Isn’t it nice when things - just work” ( World’s Costliest Ad… after 606 takes )

It sounds to me like you are taking about the experience of going from a fairly large, persistent error to little or no error. Now that is ecstasy.

Is perfect pitch an example of a pure sensation (p. 106)?

I think all pitch perceptions are sensations, based on the intensity of stimulation on different locations on the basilar membrane.

Best

Rick

···

With kind regards

JohnK

PS – the San Fran Bay boat race – when function is design, design function.

On Sun, Sep 8, 2013 at 5:20 AM, Martin Taylor mmt-csg@mmtaylor.net wrote:

[Martin Taylor 2013.09.07.12.54]

Hi Rupert,

----- Original Message -----

From: Rupert Young

To: CSGNET@LISTSERV.ILLINOIS.EDU

Sent: Friday, September 06,
2013 11:12 PM

Subject: Re: B:CP Course
Week 9: Study Guide for CH. 8 Sensation Control

07

      [From Rupert Young (2013.09.06

22.10 BST)]

      On 06/09/2013 17:11, Boris Hartman wrote:

RY :
You seem to be implying that
crying behaviour has evolved for a purpose.

HB :

          Of course Rupert. All
behaviors are goal-directed (purposefull, intentional). By
Bill’s definition.

RY
        Just because we can see something doing something does not
mean that that “behaviour” is purposeful, or has been
“chosen” by natural selection. And in this case we are
talking about control systems which have not yet benefited
from reorganisation and therefore are unsuccessful, so the
output (behaviour) we are seeing is not purposeful, as it
does not reduce the error. In other words it is not directed
towards the goal.

HB :
Bill’s definition of purposefull
behavior is :

          "The purpose of any given behavior is
to prevent controlled perception from changing away from
the reference condition. Purpose implies goal : The goal
of ANY BEHAVIOR is defined as the reference condition of
the controlled perception" (B:CP, p. 50, 2005).

          The definition Bill gave is general,
for any behavior. Aren’t we talking about Bill’s book ?
That’s how I understood you original question…

          The goal of any baby's behavior is to
keep intrinsic variables in physiological limits
(reference condition of controlled “intrinsic” variables),
preventing controlled perception from changing away from
the reference condition.

          And behaviors of baby's screaming and
crying were “chosen” by natural selection, otherwise they
wouldn’t be here and there. If you can see these
behaviors than they were developed through evolution, and
here they are. How could it be otherwise ? How could one minute born baby learn
any behavior from outside ?

I think it depends on what you call "behaviour". When we observe
some actions from the outside, everything we see ca

–
Richard S. Marken PhD
rsmarken@gmail.com
www.mindreadings.com

_Boris_Hartman · September 10, 2013, 5:02am

Hi Rupert,

···

----- Original Message -----

From:
Rupert Young

To: CSGNET@LISTSERV.ILLINOIS.EDU

Sent: Sunday, September 08, 2013 9:09 PM

Subject: Re: B:CP Course Week 9: Study Guide for CH. 8 Sensation Control

[From Rupert Young (2013.09.08 20.10 BST)]

On 07/09/2013 08:55, Boris Hartman wrote:

HB :
Bill’s definition of purposefull behavior is :

  "The purpose of any given behavior is to prevent controlled perception from changing away from the reference condition. Purpose implies goal : The goal of ANY BEHAVIOR is defined as the reference condition of the controlled perception" (B:CP, p. 50, 2005).

  The definition Bill gave is general, for any behavior. Aren't we talking about Bill's book ? That's how I understood you original question...

  RY :

  As Martin says, it depends on what you mean by the term "behaviour", and in this case crying "behaviour" refers to the observed output of the entity, rather than to the behaviour of a whole control system. The question then is, is this output the intended outcome of a control system. I am saying no, because the control system has not yet reorganised. If it was intended (to reduce error) then the output we might see is the entity going into McDonald's and ordering a Big Mac. What is being seen is the side-effect of an unorganised control system. Actually I don't think we can even say a control system is present, as, until its organisation has developed it is just a bunch of neurons connected together.

HB :

Baby’s crying behavior as output is the result of “errors” in whole organism in the moment when it’s happening, no matter how you call it or observe it from different angles. Crying is the actual “answer” (output) of reoganizing system on “error” in intrinsic variables. And the purpose of crying is to stabilize intrinsic variables and it’s usualy done through more or less attempts. That’s what baby’s all over the world do and succesfully survive. Maintain homeostasis with all organized control units in organism and continuously vary (reorganize) behavior (produce output) to achieve that goal.

All behaviors as Bill defined them, are “control of perception” and he wrote that behaviors are meant “to prevent controlled perception from changing away from the reference condition”. And I use it in this meaning. And crying is intentional behavior with purpose of “minimizing” the error in esential variables or in maintaining homeostasis, or preventing “controlled perception from changing away from the reference condition”.

As I said before it would be good if you read Bill’s oppinion about this question in his book “Making sense of behavior, 1998” and give your oppinion on his oppinion. I would appreaciate if you find some evidence that nervous system in baby’s is not yet organized in control units or that it is a " bunch of neurons connected together".

Bill’s main assumption is that organism contains huge amount of control systems with negative feed-back that are organized and are meant to maintain homeostsis or eliminte “intrinsic error”. Similar description you can find in any physiology you take in your hands. If I understood right Bill, his assumption was also

So I think if we want to get answer on your question whether nerv net is already organized in baby’s or not, needs knowledge of physiology, neuroscience, development psychology and so on… From that view is obvious to me, that nerv net in baby’s nervous system is already orgnaized in hugh amount of control units that succesfully maintain homestasis in baby, child and so on and is developing in the direction Martin described : “I see it as being probably part of the general reorganization process that builds higher-level control systems on top of existing low-level ones, a process that might well continue over an entire lifetime”. I agree with Martin if he meant “reorganization” as genetically and functionally driven process of nervous system in the youth. There are some differences in not allready formed nerv net and mostly formed nerv-net. Something can be found in Gary Cziko’s book “The things we do”.
Maybe Plooij could say something.

  HB :And behaviors of baby's screaming and crying were "chosen" by natural selection, otherwise they wouldn't be here and there. If you can see these behaviors than they were developed through evolution, and here they are. How could it be otherwise ?       How could one minute born baby learn any behavior from outside ?

  RY :Natural selection may have "chosen" the neural structure which has the potential for control, but not the output of an unorganised system. In fact the fact that the system does reorganise is, perhaps, an indication that the observed crying output was not selected, otherwise the wouldn't need to reorganise.

HB :

You can see the output of baby one minute after baby is born and next few days and so on. Does it seem to you that baby’s behvior was learned in uterus ? It’'s function is obvious : to maintain homeostasis or to prevent controlled perception from changing away from the reference condition of “essential variables”. And that’s what probaly was built in the structure of nervous system during evolution. Contribution to maintaining homeostasis.

Why by your oppinion baby’s cry is there and how did it develope ? Could you present your theory of how baby’s cry is being there, when baby is born. I think it has obvious goal, to maintain baby’s homeostaiss. What else could it be it’s function ? Every behavior that is produced by nervous system has that function. but how is realized through the nerv net it’s another question. Nerv-net has several characteristics and one of them is that pathways can’t be determined precisly. Always there are different connections for signals traveling from input to output. That’s probably because of complexity of nerv-net. You can’t determine the pathway, there will be always some random connections and thus random movements.

RY :
Just because we can see an entity do something does not mean that that something was selected, by evolution. There are many behaviours (in the general sense) that humans have that weren’t selected, such as watching TV, riding a bicycle and walking on a catwalk.

HB :

You are putting together inborn and learned behaviors, although thier function in general is probably the same. But our theme is : inborn behavior, crying…

It seems to me that we can’t “uniform” our oppinions on organization of nerv net in baby. It seems to me highly professional question and by my oppinioon needs knowledge of some sciences. Can you use some of knowledge from other sciences in further conversation. With “pure” abstract theorizing, conflict of our oppinions stay.

Regards,
Rupert

Best,

Boris

Kent · September 10, 2013, 8:40pm

[From Kent McClelland (2013.09.10.1500 EDT)

Rick Marken (2013.09.08.1430)

RM: I think a good way to see how the hierarchy works is to study my spreadsheet model of a three level hierarchy with six systems at each level. I'm on an iPad now so I can't easily get to the address but I think I give it as well as a brief description of the model in my summary of ch 8 of B:CP.

KM: Thanks, Rick, for making available a copy of the Excel file for your three-level hierarchy demo.
[available at Dropbox - Error - Simplify your life ]

I took a look at it, and it looks very nifty, but there was a problem when I opened it on my Mac using Excel for Mac 2011. It gave me a "circular reference" error message for cell D5, which is probably the first one the program encounters that contains a real formula, rather than just a constant. Here's the formula for cell D5, which does indeed refer to cell D5, and hence, I guess, has the circular reference: =IF(D2="*",D5,D5+$A$9*($B$5*(D3-D4)-D5)

Obviously, if you're running an iterative program, you have to use the result from the previous iteration in calculating the new one, so the formula makes sense in the context of a control model, but my version of Excel seems not to like it.

I see that the extension on the file name is .xls, and my version of Excel saves files as .xlsx, so I'm guessing what happened was that this file works perfectly well in an earlier version of Excel, but doesn't on my newer version because the Microsoft engineers, in their infinite wisdom, have "improved" the new release of the software so that a procedure that worked before doesn't work in the new version.

But if you can think of a fix or have a different idea about what's wrong, please let me know. It would also be great if you could include a little more documentation in your demo program, because I'd really like to see it in action.

By the way, I also took a look at the article you referred to in the summary for Chapter 9 on configuration control: the Mechsner et al. article on symmetric and anti-phase arm-circle experiments with two deafferented subjects. [available at https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/31298693/MechsStennColeDeaffCircl07.pdf ]

Although, as I've said before, I'm no expert on this stuff, the interpretations of the study's results in your Chapter 9 summary make a lot of sense to me. As you say, the results seem like low-gain control, where the supposedly deafferented subjects are getting at least some minimal feedback. It seems particularly significant that the subject with a smaller degree of deafferenting did a lot better on the experimental tasks.

And although the authors of the study speculate (with no real evidence) that the reason for the second subject's better performance was the possible use of a "forward model," in other words open-loop control, it's clear throughout their study that feedback is king when it comes to motor performance. The remark they make about their two deafferented subjects on page 279 of the article says it all, in my view:

"GLï¿½s and IWï¿½s rehabilitation ï¿½ starting from a virtually complete loss of voluntary
movement control ï¿½ was based on movement practice under visual control [i.e., feedback] and on
mental rehearsal and mental concentration on movements. Still, years later, GL and IW
have to think about movement [sic] to perform them, whether writing, standing, or feeding.
They no longer have automatic habitual movements."

Bottom line: to have automatic habitual movements you need feedback.

Best,

Kent

···

On Sep 8, 2013, at 5:31 PM, Richard Marken wrote:

[from Rick Marken (2013.09.08.1430)]

[John Kirkland 20130908]

Comments and observations

I can grasp the notion of ascending levels representing qualitative differences as typified in many stage theories of development, Vygotsky, Freud, Piaget and so on. Whilst these are reconstructive (reorganisational) representations, how does one deconstruct this matrix? Is this the role of reference signals? Like a snakes'nladders board: climb the (levels) ladders and descend (references) via snakes? Given the sheer complexity of combinations and permutations during ascent, perhaps care needs to be taken when descending or else one may arrive at a different place (un-coordination). What is it that holds the centre and retains an overfall pattern so the entire enterprise does not fly apart? Intention/purpose/goal? Keeping your eye on the ball so the game continues.

I think a good way to see how the hierarchy works is to study my spreadsheet model of a three level hierarchy with six systems at each level. I'm on an iPad now so I can't easily get to the address but I think I give it as well as a brief description of the model in my summary of ch 8 of B:CP. There is also a paper in Mind Readings describing an older version of the hierarchy. But I think the questions you pose above are addressed, if not answered by that spreadsheet model.

A good mate once opined a metaphor is an analogy's analogy. Thus a second order is an analog of the first order.

Where is the perfect cup of coffee, cigar, glass of wine (Dubonnet, Fred) or perfume? In short, can there ever be the sliver bullet? Advertising and marketing agencies know the answer, it's with their clients' products.

p 110 para 2 sentence 4: As a teacher I am most interested in finding out how to initiate mild potentially controllable disturbances in students (and vice-versa; them me too). I've not yet been able to find a place for what's usually called 'curiosity' in PCT since curiosity would seem to be a never ending quest-maker, is never settled. Rick, Martin, others -- please leave me to ponder this some more and I'll seek assistance later on if it sticks in my craw.

Great. I look forward to hearing what you come up with. I think PCT has an explanation for curiosity; if it didn't that would be a big problem. But see if you can come up with a PCT explanation of curiosity on your own; I'd be curious to see what you come up with!

What I would like a comment about though is the notion of 'resonance', when it all seems to come together as, possibly, a sense of bliss or ecstasy. Garrison Keillor's voice-over for that infamous Honda advert, "Isn't it nice when things - just work" ( World's Costliest Ad... after 606 takes )

It sounds to me like you are taking about the experience of going from a fairly large, persistent error to little or no error. Now that is ecstasy.

Is perfect pitch an example of a pure sensation (p. 106)?

I think all pitch perceptions are sensations, based on the intensity of stimulation on different locations on the basilar membrane.

Best

Rick

With kind regards

JohnK

PS -- the San Fran Bay boat race -- when function is design, design function.

On Sun, Sep 8, 2013 at 5:20 AM, Martin Taylor <mmt-csg@mmtaylor.net> wrote:
[Martin Taylor 2013.09.07.12.54]

Hi Rupert,
----- Original Message -----
From: Rupert Young
To: CSGNET@LISTSERV.ILLINOIS.EDU
Sent: Friday, September 06, 2013 11:12 PM
Subject: Re: B:CP Course Week 9: Study Guide for CH. 8 Sensation Control
07
[From Rupert Young (2013.09.06 22.10 BST)]

On 06/09/2013 17:11, Boris Hartman wrote:

RY :
You seem to be implying that crying behaviour has evolved for a purpose.

HB :
Of course Rupert. All behaviors are goal-directed (purposefull, intentional). By Bill's definition.
RY

Just because we can see something doing something does not mean that that "behaviour" is purposeful, or has been "chosen" by natural selection. And in this case we are talking about control systems which have not yet benefited from reorganisation and therefore are unsuccessful, so the output (behaviour) we are seeing is not purposeful, as it does not reduce the error. In other words it is not directed towards the goal.

HB :
Bill's definition of purposefull behavior is :
"The purpose of any given behavior is to prevent controlled perception from changing away from the reference condition. Purpose implies goal : The goal of ANY BEHAVIOR is defined as the reference condition of the controlled perception" (B:CP, p. 50, 2005).

The definition Bill gave is general, for any behavior. Aren't we talking about Bill's book ? That's how I understood you original question...

The goal of any baby's behavior is to keep intrinsic variables in physiological limits (reference condition of controlled "intrinsic" variables), preventing controlled perception from changing away from the reference condition.

And behaviors of baby's screaming and crying were "chosen" by natural selection, otherwise they wouldn't be here and there. If you can see these behaviors than they were developed through evolution, and here they are. How could it be otherwise ? How could one minute born baby learn any behavior from outside ?

I think it depends on what you call "behaviour". When we observe some actions from the outside, everything we see ca

--
Richard S. Marken PhD
rsmarken@gmail.com
www.mindreadings.com

rsmarken · September 10, 2013, 11:10pm

[From Rick Marken (2013.09.10.1610)]

Kent McClelland (2013.09.10.1500 EDT)--

Rick Marken (2013.09.08.1430)

RM: I think a good way to see how the hierarchy works is to study my spreadsheet model of a three level hierarchy with six systems at each level. I'm on an iPad now so I can't easily get to the address but I think I give it as well as a brief description of the model in my summary of ch 8 of B:CP.

KM: Thanks, Rick, for making available a copy of the Excel file for your three-level hierarchy demo.
[available at Dropbox - Error - Simplify your life ]

I took a look at it, and it looks very nifty, but there was a problem when I opened it on my Mac using Excel for Mac 2011. It gave me a "circular reference" error message for cell D5, which is probably the first one the program encounters that contains a real formula, rather than just a constant. Here's the formula for cell D5, which does indeed refer to cell D5, and hence, I guess, has the circular reference: =IF(D2="*",D5,D5+$A$9*($B$5*(D3-D4)-D5)

RM: I really should provide more detailed instructions on how to use
this sheet. I'm just trying to get out of doing all that work. But I
can easily tell you how to solve the "circular reference" problem.
Just find the "Options" pick in whatever version of Excel you are
using (it's in the "Tools" menu in my 2003 version). ONe og the
Options picks is "Calculation" Select that option and you will see a
menu of Calculation options that includes "Iteration"; click the box
next to "Iteration" and Bob's you Uncle.

Now go back to the spreadsheet and press function key 9 -- F9-- (which
does recalculation) and you will see the numbers in the sheet start
rolling. The sheet is now iteratively computing the variables in all
the control systems; these variables are changing because the six
environmental variables are varying due to a variations over time of
six different smoothed random disturbances. Each press of F9 leads to
100 iterations (if you left the default at 100 in the Calculation
menu).

Things to look for as you press F9:

1. Note that the Perceptions (P(j,i) in each system at each level are
kept close to their reference specifications (R(j,i)). Indeed, note
that the highest level perceptions -- which are perceptions of logical
relationships between lower level perceptions -- are kept exactly
equal to their references.

2. Note that the overall error at each level is kept quite low (as
indicated by the Average Error claculations in column J).

3. It may be hard to tell but note that the higher level perceptions
are maintained at their references via variation in the outputs going
to lower level systems.

4. You can see that the sheet will control for changes in the
references (goals) for the logical relationship perceptions controlled
by the highest level perceptions by by changing these references
manually. The highest level references can be either 1 (meaning keep
the relationship "true") or -1 (meaning keep it false). So, for
example, you can change the reference for the relationship perception
controlled by System 2 at level 3 by changing the number in cell E3
from 1 to -1. The relationship controlled is keeping P(2,2)>P(2,3)--
that is, keeping the perception value in cell E8 > that in cell F8.
When you push F9 you will see that the hierarchy makes this
relationship false (as demanded by the reference) by making the
perceptual value in F8 > that in E8. It does this while keeping all
other perceptions in the hierarchy under control. Pretty nifty!

5. One very interesting experiment you can do is to change the
perceptions controlled by the systems at level 2. There are sensation
perceptions (as per Ch.8 in B:CP) and they are defined by the sensory
weights in the Matrix in cells N1-S64. You can change the sensory
weights that are used to defined a level 2 perception for a system by
changing the number in cells V1-V6. The number is an index of a row of
the matrix that is used to calculate a perception. If you change the
number in cell V2 from 12 to 7, then the perception controlled by
system 2 at level 2 will be the same as the one controlled by system 1
at level 2. Now go back to the hierarchy display and press F9 and see
what happens (hint: it won't be pretty). What you get is conflict: the
errors in systems 1 and 2 at level two just go off the map; But notice
that this has no effect on the systems at level 1; they are all
control just fine; and only system at level three is affected, the one
that depends on systems 1 and 2 at level 2. But all the other level 3
systems are controlling just fine. This should be of interest to
clinicians because it shows how people can behave adaptively in many
ways even when they have major conflict, because the effects of are
remarkably localized in a control hierarchy.

6. Finally, for those of you who are still awake, you might try doing
some therapy on the hierarchy by returning the perception controlled
by system 2, level 2 to it's original value (12). Press F9 a couple
time and all is better. If only MOL therapists could fix people up
like that. But now that it's healed you can do some more experiments
to see whether the perceptions controlled by different systems have to
be exactly the same to result in conflict. It turns out that they
don't. For example, try setting the system 1 level 2 perception
(PWi1) to 1 and system 2 level 2 perception (PWi2) to 3. These are
two different perceptions but they are similar enough that you end up
with conflict. This is also something that might be interesting to
clinicians since it shows how easy it would be for the reorganizing
system to come up with ways of perceiving the world that are
completely legitimate when considered in isolation but may end up
producing conflict with other systems at the same level (controlling
perceptions of the same type). That is, one can see how easy it is for
a complex hierarchy of control to end up with conflicts.

That's it for the Excel comments. Thanks for asking about it Kent. If
there are any other questions about it let me know. If you think the
spreadsheet is educationally useful I may have to revise it, amking it
more usable and giving it more functionality, now that I know a bit
more about Excel's capabilities. Let me know what you think.

And thanks for your nice comments about the Mechsner deafferentiation study.

Best regards

Rick

···

Obviously, if you're running an iterative program, you have to use the result from the previous iteration in calculating the new one, so the formula makes sense in the context of a control model, but my version of Excel seems not to like it.

I see that the extension on the file name is .xls, and my version of Excel saves files as .xlsx, so I'm guessing what happened was that this file works perfectly well in an earlier version of Excel, but doesn't on my newer version because the Microsoft engineers, in their infinite wisdom, have "improved" the new release of the software so that a procedure that worked before doesn't work in the new version.

But if you can think of a fix or have a different idea about what's wrong, please let me know. It would also be great if you could include a little more documentation in your demo program, because I'd really like to see it in action.

By the way, I also took a look at the article you referred to in the summary for Chapter 9 on configuration control: the Mechsner et al. article on symmetric and anti-phase arm-circle experiments with two deafferented subjects. [available at https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/31298693/MechsStennColeDeaffCircl07.pdf ]

Although, as I've said before, I'm no expert on this stuff, the interpretations of the study's results in your Chapter 9 summary make a lot of sense to me. As you say, the results seem like low-gain control, where the supposedly deafferented subjects are getting at least some minimal feedback. It seems particularly significant that the subject with a smaller degree of deafferenting did a lot better on the experimental tasks.

And although the authors of the study speculate (with no real evidence) that the reason for the second subject's better performance was the possible use of a "forward model," in other words open-loop control, it's clear throughout their study that feedback is king when it comes to motor performance. The remark they make about their two deafferented subjects on page 279 of the article says it all, in my view:

"GLï¿½s and IWï¿½s rehabilitation ï¿½ starting from a virtually complete loss of voluntary
movement control ï¿½ was based on movement practice under visual control [i.e., feedback] and on
mental rehearsal and mental concentration on movements. Still, years later, GL and IW
have to think about movement [sic] to perform them, whether writing, standing, or feeding.
They no longer have automatic habitual movements."

Bottom line: to have automatic habitual movements you need feedback.

Best,

Kent

On Sep 8, 2013, at 5:31 PM, Richard Marken wrote:

[from Rick Marken (2013.09.08.1430)]

[John Kirkland 20130908]

Comments and observations

I can grasp the notion of ascending levels representing qualitative differences as typified in many stage theories of development, Vygotsky, Freud, Piaget and so on. Whilst these are reconstructive (reorganisational) representations, how does one deconstruct this matrix? Is this the role of reference signals? Like a snakes'nladders board: climb the (levels) ladders and descend (references) via snakes? Given the sheer complexity of combinations and permutations during ascent, perhaps care needs to be taken when descending or else one may arrive at a different place (un-coordination). What is it that holds the centre and retains an overfall pattern so the entire enterprise does not fly apart? Intention/purpose/goal? Keeping your eye on the ball so the game continues.

I think a good way to see how the hierarchy works is to study my spreadsheet model of a three level hierarchy with six systems at each level. I'm on an iPad now so I can't easily get to the address but I think I give it as well as a brief description of the model in my summary of ch 8 of B:CP. There is also a paper in Mind Readings describing an older version of the hierarchy. But I think the questions you pose above are addressed, if not answered by that spreadsheet model.

A good mate once opined a metaphor is an analogy's analogy. Thus a second order is an analog of the first order.

Where is the perfect cup of coffee, cigar, glass of wine (Dubonnet, Fred) or perfume? In short, can there ever be the sliver bullet? Advertising and marketing agencies know the answer, it's with their clients' products.

p 110 para 2 sentence 4: As a teacher I am most interested in finding out how to initiate mild potentially controllable disturbances in students (and vice-versa; them me too). I've not yet been able to find a place for what's usually called 'curiosity' in PCT since curiosity would seem to be a never ending quest-maker, is never settled. Rick, Martin, others -- please leave me to ponder this some more and I'll seek assistance later on if it sticks in my craw.

Great. I look forward to hearing what you come up with. I think PCT has an explanation for curiosity; if it didn't that would be a big problem. But see if you can come up with a PCT explanation of curiosity on your own; I'd be curious to see what you come up with!

What I would like a comment about though is the notion of 'resonance', when it all seems to come together as, possibly, a sense of bliss or ecstasy. Garrison Keillor's voice-over for that infamous Honda advert, "Isn't it nice when things - just work" ( World's Costliest Ad... after 606 takes )

It sounds to me like you are taking about the experience of going from a fairly large, persistent error to little or no error. Now that is ecstasy.

Is perfect pitch an example of a pure sensation (p. 106)?

I think all pitch perceptions are sensations, based on the intensity of stimulation on different locations on the basilar membrane.

Best

Rick

With kind regards

JohnK

PS -- the San Fran Bay boat race -- when function is design, design function.

On Sun, Sep 8, 2013 at 5:20 AM, Martin Taylor <mmt-csg@mmtaylor.net> wrote:
[Martin Taylor 2013.09.07.12.54]

Hi Rupert,
----- Original Message -----
From: Rupert Young
To: CSGNET@LISTSERV.ILLINOIS.EDU
Sent: Friday, September 06, 2013 11:12 PM
Subject: Re: B:CP Course Week 9: Study Guide for CH. 8 Sensation Control
07
[From Rupert Young (2013.09.06 22.10 BST)]

On 06/09/2013 17:11, Boris Hartman wrote:

RY :
You seem to be implying that crying behaviour has evolved for a purpose.

HB :
Of course Rupert. All behaviors are goal-directed (purposefull, intentional). By Bill's definition.
RY

Just because we can see something doing something does not mean that that "behaviour" is purposeful, or has been "chosen" by natural selection. And in this case we are talking about control systems which have not yet benefited from reorganisation and therefore are unsuccessful, so the output (behaviour) we are seeing is not purposeful, as it does not reduce the error. In other words it is not directed towards the goal.

HB :
Bill's definition of purposefull behavior is :
"The purpose of any given behavior is to prevent controlled perception from changing away from the reference condition. Purpose implies goal : The goal of ANY BEHAVIOR is defined as the reference condition of the controlled perception" (B:CP, p. 50, 2005).

The definition Bill gave is general, for any behavior. Aren't we talking about Bill's book ? That's how I understood you original question...

The goal of any baby's behavior is to keep intrinsic variables in physiological limits (reference condition of controlled "intrinsic" variables), preventing controlled perception from changing away from the reference condition.

And behaviors of baby's screaming and crying were "chosen" by natural selection, otherwise they wouldn't be here and there. If you can see these behaviors than they were developed through evolution, and here they are. How could it be otherwise ? How could one minute born baby learn any behavior from outside ?

I think it depends on what you call "behaviour". When we observe some actions from the outside, everything we see ca

--
Richard S. Marken PhD
rsmarken@gmail.com
www.mindreadings.com

--
Richard S. Marken PhD
rsmarken@gmail.com
www.mindreadings.com