BCT and PCT reorganization

CSGnet Archive CSG1999
1

[Martin Taylor 990312 10:18]

From John A 11 mar 99

You know it strikes me that in PCT and BCT we both are trying to do the
same thing,
namely to control something.. BCT tries to control behavior. PCT tries to,
or does,
show how to control perceptions. I have difficulty learning PCT; and
niether you,
nor any one in CSG seems interested in learning about BCT. I wish we could
find
some way of getting together.

Taking this question seriously requires a bit of analysis, I'm afraid.
Of course, I come from a PCT perspective. This can't be helped. It's
what I know. BCT I know only from your messages. By the way, is it
possible for you to refrain from attaching a copy of each message to
the message you mail?

------------(1)-----------

Firstly, let's ask what it means to "control" something. To "control"
something is not the same as to "influence" it, to "affect" it, or to
"intend" it.

(a) To control something, one has to be able to influence or to affect it
(I take those words to mean about the same). That means that one's
actions must be able to change the state of whatever "it" might be.

(b) To control something, one must have some notion of what the something
"ought" to be. One must "intend" it to take on some value. Most talk in
PCT zeros in on a single numerical value of a single variable (as with
the temperature registered by a thermostat), one could also "intend" a
more complicated state of something.

(c) If one "intends" something to take on a particular state, and if one
can "influence" its state, one is almost in a position to "control" it.
But one thing more is needed. One has to be able to determine what the
state is, at the moment, so that one's influence on it moves it toward
and not away from the desired state--which might even be exactly where
one intends it to be, and then one wouldn't want to influence it at all.
In other words, one must "perceive" the something, and must be able to
compare the resulting perception with the intended state.

Put these requirements into the language ordinarily used on CSGnet, and
(a) we have a "reference value," (b) we have the ability to "act"
effectively (some call this the ability to "behave"), and (c) we can
"perceive" the results of the action or behaviour and compare the
"perception" with the reference value. All of these are necessary,
and also they are sufficient for control of something.

What is the "something" being controlled? We want it to be whatever in
the environment is important--the thing whose state is perceived and
compared with the intention. But we cannot _know_ what its state
really is, and we therefore cannot compare its true state with our
intention for its state. The best we can do is to compare our perception
of its state with our intention for its real state.

All we can _ever_ do, then, is to control our _perceptions_ of things,
however much we may want to control the "things" themselves.

-------------(2)---------------

If you accept the premises and conclusion above, we can now enquire about
"control of behaviour".

The presumption implicit in "control of behaviour" is that certain actions
are intended. The consequences of those actions are of no interest, and
may be unobserved, for if the actor had intentions for the consequences of
the actions and observed those consequences, it would be "control of
perception" and not "control of behaviour."

So, BCT implies that people perceive the actions they take, but do not
perceive what happens as a consequence of those actions, or at least
do not care about the consequences. I'll mitigate that comment a little,
by acknowledging that if the environment is totally stable and
predictable, the consequences of action may also be predictable and
may be as intended without being checked through overt perception. This
kind of situation does occur, and PCT handles it (by control in
imagination-- one imagines what one wants to occur and what actions will
bring it about, and then executes those actions; but ordinarily one
observes the consequences of planned actions and corrects them, which
again is "control of perception.")

If BCT has as its fundamental premise that people are unaware of, or are
unconcerned about, the consequences of their actions, so long as the
actions themselves are accurately performed, then it seems an unlikely
candidate to be a viable theory of how people behave. People do seem to
care more about, say, whether a car arrives at its destination safely
than about whether a precise series of pulls and pushes at the steering
wheel, brake pedal, and accelerator are executed. In social relations,
people care more about whether a partner smiles or seems to understand
than about whether they have executed the "proper" smile-causing protocol
or instructional rigmarole.

There do seem to be people who care more about executing the protocol or
about presenting the "right" instructions than about whether the protocol
or the instructions have the desired effect. We may be tempted to call
such people "insane", and perhaps BCT may apply in part to them--but
only in respect of these incomplete feedback loops, the loops in which
the actions are _supposed_ to cause particular social effects, but in
which the actions are not modified when the desired effects don't happen.

In this respect, it is possible that there might be an accommodation
between BCT and PCT. PCT describes, even for "insane" people, how they
stand and sit, eat, work, and play. But there may be times for some
people--even most people--when they act without regard to the consequences
or without changing the actions when the consequences don't match the
intentions. For those times and people, BCT (PCT applied to the
perception _of_ behaviour) may perhaps be applicable.

-------------(3)------------

If BCT (as I understand what you have said about it) applies at all, it
can apply under two conditions. (1) The consequences of an action are
totally predictable by the actor, and (2) the actions are attempts to
influence very high-level perceptions, for which there are reference
"intentions" but for which effective influencing actions have not yet
been found. In PCT terms, condition (2) occurs during "reorganization".

"Reorganization" is a PCT technical term roughly synonymous with "learning
how". There are many possible facets to reorganization, one of which is
the re-linking of different possible lower-level "intentions" in support
of a higher-level control. In other language, a high-level goal is
served by lower-level goals, but thus far, the chosen lower-level goals
have not succeeded in achieving the higher-level goal, so new lower-level
goals may be substituted for some of the ones that did not result in
higher-level success.

When the actions--the "behaviour"--of the lower level control systems
(in PCT) do not influence the higher-level perception, the situation is
either "command outflow," if the actions are unperceived, or "control of
behaviour" if the actions are perceived and their pereption controlled.
BCT may therefore apply as a mechanism in support of reorganization.

If BCT does apply in reorganization, this may be why you find it useful
in pathological situations. By its very definition, pathology implies
that the organism is not performing at its best--perceptual control is
failing at some level between biochemical and social. The feedback loop
for some perceptual control system is not closed, and the system has to
be reorganized so that one of two things happen. Either (1) the feedback
loop must be closed by the discovery of actions that do influence the
perception for which there is an "intended" state, or (2) the intention
for the state must vanish--the perception must not only be uncontrolled,
but must intentionally become uncontrolled. Option (2) means that any
yet higher-level goal that was the source of the "intention" must be
achieved in some different way.

Both options (1) and (2) involve the discovery of new actions to serve
a purpose. In option (1) the frustrated intention is the one that was
obviously not satisfied. In (2) the trail leads upward, to discover why
that intention was there, and to serve the higher-level purpose in a
way that the person can accomplish.

In PCT, failure to accomplish successful control is often caused by
conflict between attempts to control two perceptions that need common
lower-level support. Reorganization may be able to take away the conflict,
so that one of the conflicted perceptions starts to use other actions to
influence the "thing" that it is perceiving (whether that "thing" be
as high as self-image, or as low as the size of a window-opening).
But not all control failure is due to conflict, especially at higher
levels. It may take a lifetime (or more) of reorganization to find
actions that effectively influence some of the important perceptions,
or to eliminate their importance, as Zen training tries to do.

···

----------------

I hope this may help to illustrate the relationship between BCT and PCT,
and why BCT has had a rather frosty reception on CSGnet. It isn't
because BCT is seen as a threat, but because (unless I totally
misunderstand it, and it is really PCT with another label) it cannot
describe actual behaviour under most circumstances. I suspect you find
BCT to be useful precisely because it does not describe the behaviour
of people acting successfully. I think you would find PCT more useful,
since it can describe people behaving both normally and abnormally, and
can give you both reasons for abnormal behaviour and a target for
improving people's mental health _as seen by themselves_.

Martin

2

from John Appel 11 Mar '99

Martin Taylor wrote:

[Martin Taylor 990312 10:18]
>>From John A 11 mar 99

>You know it strikes me that in PCT and BCT we both are trying to do the
>same thing,
>namely to control something.. BCT tries to control behavior. PCT tries to,
>or does,
>show how to control perceptions. I have difficulty learning PCT; and
>niether you,
>nor any one in CSG seems interested in learning about BCT. I wish we could
>find
>some way of getting together.

Taking this question seriously requires a bit of analysis, I'm afraid.
Of course, I come from a PCT perspective. This can't be helped. It's
what I know. BCT I know only from your messages.

And I come from a BCT perspective. I am not trying to challenge PCT. Rather I
am trying to share BCT with CSG. I am very excited by, what to me, is the
power of BTC to help me treat my patients. I hoped CSG might become interested
in BCT, not as a rival ,but another theory. My way of going about doing so may
have misled CSG BCT explains, to me, normal and abnormal behavior much
better than PCT does. Rather than say so outright I thought it would be
respectful to ask for examples of PCT explanations of specific behavior, such
as that of my patient, Leslie, or the dangers of tailgating, then to juxtapose
the BCT version, hopefully to show that BCT was much more understandable and
successful. My intent was not to gain more understanding of PCT, as it
apparently appeared to CSG.

Obviously my method failed and I'm about to give up, Our viewpoints may be too
far apart .But both theories use the word CONTROL and I shall attempt to give
my viewpoint on your generous and thoughtful message below.

------------(1)-----------

Firstly, let's ask what it means to "control" something. To "control"
something is not the same as to "influence" it, to "affect" it, or to
"intend" it.

I agree "control" is not the same as to "influence," or to "affect" it. Nor is
it the same as to "persuade" another person to do something. Control is more
akin to "making" another person do something.

(a) To control something, one has to be able to influence or to affect it
(I take those words to mean about the same).

No, To me to control another person means to make decisions for him, dominate
him, take charge of him.

That means that one's
actions must be able to change the state of whatever "it" might be.

The "it," from my viewpoint is a person, or at least a living thing. One
cannot take charge of a rock, for example, or make a rock "do" anything.

(b) To control something, one must have some notion of what the
something"ought" to be. One must "intend" it to take on some value.

Yes. Get a two year to go to bed, or stop running out onto the street

(c) If one "intends" something to take on a particular state, and if one
can "influence" its state, one is almost in a position to "control" it.
But one thing more is needed. One has to be able to determine what the
state is, at the moment, so that one's influence on it moves it toward
and not away from the desired state--which might even be exactly where
one intends it to be, and then one wouldn't want to influence it at all.
In other words, one must "perceive" the something, and must be able to
compare the resulting perception with the intended state.

Dos this mean perceive a child is tired and should be in bed?

This as far as I want to go right now. I'll proceed soon with h remainder of
your message.. Do any of my comments bring our perspectives any closer?

Yours

John Appel

jappel21.vcf (61 Bytes)

3

[from Tracy Harms (990312.1400)]

John Appel (Fri, 12 Mar 1999 16:30:36 -0500) wrote:

...
And I come from a BCT perspective. I am not trying to challenge PCT. Rather I
am trying to share BCT with CSG. I am very excited by, what to me, is the
power of BTC to help me treat my patients. I hoped CSG might become interested
in BCT, not as a rival ,but another theory.

The main idea you have not understood is that *either* BCT is a rival
theory to PCT, *or* it is not a theory of control (in anything close to
the PCT sense of the word). Insofar as it is a rival there are
standards which must be met in order to compare, contrast, and decide
between the rival theories. Insofar as it isn't, participants in this
forum would not have better than random likelihood of taking interest.

... My intent was not to gain more understanding of PCT, as it
apparently appeared to CSG.

I suspect most here understood that this was not your intent. The
requests for you to learn PCT came from the judgement that you were
unable to contrast BCT with PCT. If the two are to be resolved one
against the other, both must be considered.

Obviously my method failed and I'm about to give up, Our viewpoints may be too
far apart .But both theories use the word CONTROL ...

Consider that the names of a great many nations share the word
"Republic", but nobody with any political savvy would mistake this as a
guarantee that they thereby share what the US Constitution refers to as
a republican form of government. Various people often use the same word
for different meanings and purposes.

No, To me to control another person means to make decisions for him, dominate
him, take charge of him.

I tend to prefer the word "coerce" for such relationships.

... Get a two year to go to bed ...

I am morally repelled by this example, but I don't expect any resolution
of our differences. I mention this only to satisfy my need to perceive
public denunciation of senseless impositions upon innocents.

Tracy Harms
Bend, Oregon

4

[Martin Taylor 990312 17:27]

From John Appel 11 Mar '99

(a) To control something, one has to be able to influence or to affect it
(I take those words to mean about the same).

No, To me to control another person means to make decisions for him, dominate
him, take charge of him.

Fine, I think any PCT-er would accept that, but would ask how one would
accomplish this domination if one could not influence the person you
were trying to control.

That means that one's
actions must be able to change the state of whatever "it" might be.

The "it," from my viewpoint is a person, or at least a living thing. One
cannot take charge of a rock, for example, or make a rock "do" anything.

I can take a rock from the ground and put it on a table (if it isn't
too heavy). Can't you do that?

(b) To control something, one must have some notion of what the
something"ought" to be. One must "intend" it to take on some value.

Yes. Get a two year to go to bed, or stop running out onto the street

Good examples. You do seem to be following what I was trying to say.

(c) If one "intends" something to take on a particular state, and if one
can "influence" its state, one is almost in a position to "control" it.
But one thing more is needed. One has to be able to determine what the
state is, at the moment, so that one's influence on it moves it toward
and not away from the desired state--which might even be exactly where
one intends it to be, and then one wouldn't want to influence it at all.
In other words, one must "perceive" the something, and must be able to
compare the resulting perception with the intended state.

Dos this mean perceive a child is tired and should be in bed?

One may perceive that the child is tired. One may have a reference for
a different perception, to perceive "tired child in bed" rather than
"tired child in living room." The word "should" often (always?) suggests
that one is talking about a reference value for a perception.

This as far as I want to go right now. I'll proceed soon with h remainder of
your message.. Do any of my comments bring our perspectives any closer?

Well, little of what you say causes me a problem, except the claim that
you are unable to influence the state of an inanimate object or to control
it, and the apparent claim that one can control something without being
able to influence it. But those claims may be based on one of us misreading
the other.

Other than that, we seem to be doing fine. All my comments about control
apply whether the "thing" being controlled is a perception of a state in
another person or a state of an inanimate object or an abstraction such
as the level of democracy in one's government.

Martin

5

[Martin Taylor 990312 17:38]

From John Appel 11 Mar '99

BCT explains, to me, normal and abnormal behavior much
better than PCT does.

Perhaps one strategy might be to explain BCT a little better. I find it
hard even to imagine a theory that can explain normal and abnormal
behaviour better than PCT does, but I think everyone on this mailing
list would be delighted if such a possibility could be demonstrated.

As I pointed out in my message earlier today (990312 10:18), it is
possible that BCT might apply, compatibly, with PCT, in two unusual
circumstances, but neither occurs when the person is behaving effectively
(i.e. normally).

Rather than say so outright I thought it would be
respectful to ask for examples of PCT explanations of specific behavior, such
as that of my patient, Leslie, or the dangers of tailgating, then to juxtapose
the BCT version, hopefully to show that BCT was much more understandable and
successful.

So far, either I have understood BCT well, and my comments earlier are
correct, or it is much _less_ understandable than PCT. Or maybe it applies
only in the restricted circumstances I mentioned earlier, and we have
wrongly been looking at it as a general theory. As for its success, you
might like to check out the many writings on PCT in applied situations,
references to which can be found on the CSG web site, and more that will
appear in the special issue of IJHCS in a couple of months. There is, of
course, a mountain of questions that have not been addressed by either
theory, so one cannot assess the overall success of each. One can treat
only those questions that each has been tested on. And on that point, PCT
does pretty well!

My intent was not to gain more understanding of PCT, as it
apparently appeared to CSG.

If not, how are you able to claim either that BCT is more understandable
or that it is more successful than PCT? What would be the basis of such
claims?

Obviously my method failed and I'm about to give up,

I guess BCT was not successful in this application, then? But consider...
according to BCT, why have you made the effort? According to PCT, the
answer at one level to that question is straightforward--I leave it
as an exercise for the reader.

Our viewpoints may be too
far apart .But both theories use the word CONTROL and I shall attempt to give
my viewpoint on your generous and thoughtful message below.

Perhaps the problem is the use of the same word "Control." In PCT it has
a precise engineering definition--loosely paraphrased as to make something
do what you want it to do. How is it defined in BCT? Perhaps if you
presented a precise definition of "control" in BCT, it might help us to
understand BCT better. We are trying to understand behaviour, not to
make propaganda on behalf of a religion.

There are straightforward thermodynamic reasons why any living thing,
from bacterium to human, has to control its perceptions. There may be
equally good reasons why one has to control actions in addition, but I
don't know them, and at first sight the concepts seem to be incompatible.
Perhaps you could write a BCT tutorial that would resolve some of these
issues.

Martin

6

from [ Marc Abrams (990312.2007)

From John Appel 11 Mar '99

I hoped CSG might become interested
in BCT, not as a rival ,but another theory.

Another theory of what? BCT does _not_ explain _HOW_ and _WHY_ people
"behave" ( act is a better description ) the way they do or _WHAT_ might be
the mechanisms involved in _changing_ those actions. At least not from the
descriptions you have supplied.

Unfortunarely, you will never take the neccessary time to understand PCT so
you will never understand that "insane" and a lot of other mumbo jumbo words
you use don't really _define_ ANYTHING except what _you_ think they define.

My way of going about doing so may

have misled CSG BCT explains, to me, normal and abnormal behavior much
better than PCT does.

That is a true statement. But since you don't have a clue about PCT why
should it be any different. As I stated above, PCT does not _define_ normal
and abnormal behavior. We as people do.

Rather than say so outright I thought it would be
respectful to ask for examples of PCT explanations of specific behavior,

such

as that of my patient, Leslie, or the dangers of tailgating, then to

juxtapose

the BCT version, hopefully to show that BCT was much more understandable

and

successful.

The mistake was yours my friend. PCT _was not_ nor will it ever be useful in
"explaining" human actions as _you_ think of them. Again, your lack of
understanding of PCT makes this all moot. As Mary suggested, come back after
you've done some reading.

My intent was not to gain more understanding of PCT, as it
apparently appeared to CSG.

_THIS_ was and is _VERY_ apparent. :slight_smile:

Obviously my method failed and I'm about to give up, Our viewpoints may be

too

far apart .

Good, I couldn't agree more. Come back when you have a bit of a clue about
PCT.

But both theories use the word CONTROL and I shall attempt to give
my viewpoint on your generous and thoughtful message below.

It's not the word that is the problem. It's the definition and application.
You made a wrong assumption.

This as far as I want to go right now. I'll proceed soon with h remainder

of

your message.. Do any of my comments bring our perspectives any closer?

For a smart man you act pretty stupid. Martin, Rick, Mary, Dag, Bruce, &
Tracy have all tried to explain to you what "control" means on this list.
They have been patient and tried several different angles. They have treated
your "theory" with respect. You can't seem to understand that _your_
unwillingness to exert the _least_ bit of effort to learn the _RUDIMENTRY_
principles of PCT has turned most of us off.

Go peddle your crap somewhere else.

Marc

7

[From Rick Marken (990313.1010)]

John Appel (11 Mar '99) --

You know it strikes me that in PCT and BCT we both are trying to do
the same thing, namely to control something.

No. PCT is trying to _explain_ something: control.

BCT tries to control behavior.

If you really did use BCT to try to control behavior you would
not be as successful at helping people as you say you are.

PCT tries to, or does, show how to control perceptions.

No. PCT shows that behavior is the control of perception. It also
explains how people control their perceptions and how an observer
can determine what perceptions a person is controlling.

I have difficulty learning PCT

You would have less difficulty if you were willing to learn it.

niether you, nor any one in CSG seems interested in learning
about BCT.

That's because, from what we have heard about BCT, it is clearly
BCT that needs to learn from PCT.

I wish we could find some way of getting together.

It's easy; just give up BCT and start learning (and applying) PCT;-)

I am very excited by, what to me, is the power of BTC to help me
treat my patients.

I think you have made an important observation: human problems are
control problems. You seem to be satisfied with the "power of BCT"
to deal with these problems. So enjoy.

I hoped CSG might become interested in BCT, not as a rival ,but
another theory.

But the problem is that your descriptions of BCT make it clear that
it _is_ a rival to PCT. In fact, BCT sounds exactly the same as
reinforcement theory. So BCT is not only a rival to PCT, it is
(like reinforcement theory) inconsistent with the facts of behavior.
The fact that you still get good results using BCT in therapy is
no surprise since people also get good results using behavior
modification (applied reinforcement theory) in therapy. Heck, most
medical theories are wrong, too, but people still manage to get well
after medical "treatment". Living systems are control systems -- they
are usually able to fix themselves, even after the superstitious
ministrations (disturbances) of medical practitioners;-)

I think PCT could help you do your work much more effectively. But
BCT is working for you so I think it's unlikely that you will
put in the effort required to learn PCT. Don't worry about it;
maybe the folks on the BBS net will be interested in BCT. Or maybe
there's a psychiatric group that would be interested.

Sorry it hasn't worked out for you.

Best

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313
Life Learning Associates e-mail: rmarken@earthlink.net
http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken/

8

from John Appel 13 Mar '99 1500

Martin Taylor wrote:

[Martin Taylor 990312 17:38]
>From John Appel 11 Mar '99

> BCT explains, to me, normal and abnormal behavior much
>better than PCT does.

Perhaps one strategy might be to explain BCT a little better

Perhaps the problem is the use of the same word "Control." In PCT it has
a precise engineering definition--loosely paraphrased as to make something
do what you want it to do. How is it defined in BCT? Perhaps if you
presented a precise definition of "control" in BCT, it might help us to
understand BCT better.

In BCT the word "control" means to control other living things, especially other
people. According to BCT a rock cannot be controlled. A rock cannot "do" anything.
It cannot react to what you do to it.. If you pick it up and throw it over a
cliff, the rock has not "done" anything. You are the one who has done something
[picked it up and thrown it] The rock has been merely the inert recipient of what
you did.

It strikes me this may be the essence of the difference between BCT and PCT. PCT
may be much more general. BCT applies only to social interaction. It would apply
to controlling a dog, or a mule, if you accept such control as social interaction.

Your suggestion that I try to explain BCT to CSG more fully is welcome and I'll do
so, particularly if I seem to be having some success. .

Yours

John Appel

jappel211.vcf (62 Bytes)

9

[Martin Taylor 990314 11:28]

From John Appel 13 Mar '99 1500

In BCT the word "control" means to control other living things, especially
other
people. According to BCT a rock cannot be controlled. A rock cannot "do"
anything.
It cannot react to what you do to it.. If you pick it up and throw it over a
cliff, the rock has not "done" anything. You are the one who has done
something
[picked it up and thrown it] The rock has been merely the inert recipient
of what
you did.

I can see only one way in which the PCT-controlled rock differs from the
BCT-controlled person: the person being controlled supplies some of the
physical energy involved in the controlled actions. Even with the thrown
rock, gravity supplies some of the energy, so even that difference is not
clear-cut.

It strikes me this may be the essence of the difference between BCT and
PCT. PCT
may be much more general. BCT applies only to social interaction. It
would apply
to controlling a dog, or a mule, if you accept such control as social
interaction.

Sure, no problem there. PCT applies to those social interactions just
as much as to any other aspect of behaviour.

But it would help if you were to define what "control" MEANS, in BCT.
I gave a crude PCT/engineering definition: "to make something do what you
want it to do". Your response suggests that it means something different in
BCT. Can you provide a similar one-liner that clarifies the difference?
Or a longer, but more precise definition that would allow everyone to
contrast the two usages of the word?

I don't accept "to make someone do what you want them to do" as a change,
because that leaves the definition, _and_ the consequent requirements,
the same. If I can requote from my earlier message (990312 10:18), the
requirements if we are to "make something [or someone] do what we want"
(i.e to apply PCT/engineering control) are:

(a) we have a "reference value," (b) we have the ability to "act"
effectively (some call this the ability to "behave"), and (c) we can
"perceive" the results of the action or behaviour and compare the
"perception" with the reference value. All of these are necessary,
and also they are sufficient for control of something.

Your suggestion that I try to explain BCT to CSG more fully is welcome and
I'll do
so, particularly if I seem to be having some success. .

I think the most important start to that is to define what "control" in
BCT means, and to show precisely what is required for it to occur, as I
have done in respect of "control" as the word is used in PCT.

For example, was I correct in an earlier message to interpret you as
having said that to "control" in BCT one has no need to be able to see
the effects of one's actions on the person being controlled, provided
that one can see the actions themselves?

I suppose what I am really asking is for the explanation to be sufficiently
precise that we can imagine testable propositions based on it, and
mechanisms whereby the claimed effects could come to pass. If, for
example, the interpretation cited in the previous paragraph was correct,
what mechanism in BCT would allow the controlling person to get the
controlled person to do what the controller wants?

Martin

10

Martin Taylor wrote:

[Martin Taylor 990314 11:28]
>From John Appel 13 Mar '99 1500

>In BCT the word "control" means to control other living things, especially
>other
>people. According to BCT a rock cannot be controlled. A rock cannot "do"
>anything.
>It cannot react to what you do to it.. If you pick it up and throw it over a
>cliff, the rock has not "done" anything. You are the one who has done
>something
>[picked it up and thrown it] The rock has been merely the inert recipient
>of what
>you did.

I can see only one way in which the PCT-controlled rock differs from the
BCT-controlled person: the person being controlled supplies some of the
physical energy involved in the controlled actions.

Correct, the rock thrower does supply the energy. The rock supplies no energy,
though gravity does so I guess..

I suppose what I am really asking is for the explanation to be sufficiently
precise that we can imagine testable propositions based on it, and
mechanisms whereby the claimed effects could come to pass. If, for
example, the interpretation cited in the previous paragraph was correct,
what mechanism in BCT would allow the controlling person to get the
controlled person to do what the controller wants?

BCT is a metaphor for what goes on neurophysiologically in the brain. According
to BCT, control is by decision to act. If a person is autonomous, decides for
himself what he does, then he retains his identity [sanity]. If he lets some
one else tell him what to do, and does so constantly, then he loses his ability
to make decisions--becomes a zombie, [mentally disordered]. For example if he
sees he's getting too close to the car in front of him and decides to slow down,
then he is OK. If he slows down because the back seat driver tells him to, and
gives in to her endlessly, after a while he goes nuts, especially if she
[usually back eat drivers are shese] is always screaming at him to slow down,
even when the car in front is nowhere nearly too close. I guess this could be
called a metaphor within a metaphor.

At the neurophysiological level, light waves from the car in front strike the
retinas of the driver and are changed into electro chemical waves which proceed
to the visual center of the occipital lobes and thence spread, out into other
cites n the brain. When they hit the frontal lobes where he considers the
consequences of his actions, and decides to slow down. Then he feels good, [his
brain reward system is stimulated.] If the electro chemical waves go to the
mental representations of his wife's angry face, and then to the amygdala, which
process emotional memories. and then, by-passing the the frontal decision
-making centers, go directly to the motor centers in the prefrontal lobes which
then contract the muscles of his foot on the pedal and optical waves from the
car in front hit his retinas again and he perceives the space becoming longer,
he he feels bad, his wife had taken control of his frontal lobes. He feel like a
fucking zombie.

Martin, I didn't give you a one liner, as you asked, but perhaps this will give
you some idea of where BCT is coming from.

Yours

John A

jappel212.vcf (62 Bytes)

11

[from T. Harms (990315.0930 Pacific)]

John Appel (Mon, 15 Mar 1999 11:48:53 -0500) wrote:

At the neurophysiological level, light waves from the car in front strike the
retinas of the driver and are changed into electro chemical waves which proceed
to the visual center of the occipital lobes and thence spread, out into other
cites n the brain. When they hit the frontal lobes where he considers the
consequences of his actions, and decides to slow down. Then he feels good, [his
brain reward system is stimulated.] If the electro chemical waves go ...

I'll leave the topic of the "brain reward system" for other members.
What I wish to speak to is what appears to be a confusion and conflation
between sensation and perception. (I started to write something on this
some days ago when you posted something similar, but set it aside.)

Knowledge never flows into a knower. This includes knowledge in the
form of perceptions. Perceptions are *created* within the perceiver.
They do not arrive from the outside in the form of a signal. Yes, there
are electro chemical waves involved that are vital to animal
perception. Insofar as these are signals, however, they are so entirely
by the contrivance of the organism. There is never any signal of
{seeing a car} to be found in the optic nerves. The coupling between
light waves and awareness of a thing seen is very loose. The idea that
the thing is presented as a thing by means of the effects that stimulate
sensory nerves is incorrect. It was a reasonable guess on the part of
Descarte, but after some centuries of reconsideration that crude
presumption has been thoroughly discredited.

I must keep this brief for now, but may write more on the topic later.

Tracy Harms
Bend, Oregon

12

[Martin Taylor 990315 15:45]

John Appel (undated, but apparently Mon, 15 Mar 1999 11:48:53)

I suppose what I am really asking is for the explanation to be sufficiently
precise that we can imagine testable propositions based on it, and
mechanisms whereby the claimed effects could come to pass. If, for
example, the interpretation cited in the previous paragraph was correct,
what mechanism in BCT would allow the controlling person to get the
controlled person to do what the controller wants?

I don't think you have grasped the import of the question, so I'll leave
it hanging and deal with what you wrote.

BCT is a metaphor for what goes on neurophysiologically in the brain.

It would be easier to treat a model, but a metaphor can be useful if the
limits of its application are carefully noted. I hope they are in the
BCT->neurophysiology metaphor.

According
to BCT, control is by decision to act.

If I am to understand this clearly, I still have to be told what "control"
means in BCT. To help you, here are some possible interpretations of this
sentence. Maybe you can say which, if any, is correct.

1) "control" occurs when a person decides to act. That decision is itself
what is meant by "control", no matter what the act is supposed to
accomplish, or whether it is actually executed.

2a) "control" is accomplished by an act that requires some decision before
it is executed. In this interpretation, "control" remains undefined, but
a necessary precondition for it to exist has been specified.

2b) "control" requires that a decision to act has been made, but the act
need not have been executed. The decision is necessary, though the act is
not, but the decision may not be sufficient to ensure control.

3) A sufficient precondition for "control" to exist is that a decision to
act has been made. In this interpretation, if there is a decision to act,
control, exists, whether or not the act is executed, and whether or not
the act has any effect on the outer world when it is executed.

Are any of the above close to what you mean to say?

···

---------------------------------------------------------

If a person is autonomous, decides for
himself what he does, then he retains his identity [sanity]. If he lets some
one else tell him what to do, and does so constantly, then he loses his
ability
to make decisions--becomes a zombie, [mentally disordered].

This is a statement of the consequences of allowing someone else to make
one's choices. Whether it is true or not is an empirical question. However,
I think it is not a well-posed question, because it leaves open the meaning
of "do." Here's an example to show why:

I observe a person standing outside a closed door with his finger pressing
a button located beside the door. Which of the following is the person
"doing?" Which of them is an independent choice? Which of those choices
may be specified by another person?

1. He is pressing a button.
2. He is ringing a doorbell.
3. He is making a person inside the house get up and come to the door.
4. He is visiting Aunt Helen.
5. He is trying to sort out problems about a legacy.

For example if he
sees he's getting too close to the car in front of him and decides to slow
down,
then he is OK. If he slows down because the back seat driver tells him
to, and
gives in to her endlessly, after a while he goes nuts, especially if she
[usually back eat drivers are shese] is always screaming at him to slow down,
even when the car in front is nowhere nearly too close. I guess this could be
called a metaphor within a metaphor.

Here's a PCT take on that. The distance to the car in front is a perception
that is controlled so that at each moment it matches a reference value
as closely as the driver is able to make it do.

The reference value changes over time, for many reasons. If one is driving
alone, those reasons usually have to do with perceptions of traffic density
and speed, and the variability of the driving behaviour of the nearby cars.
We can call these reasons the control of safety-related perceptions.

When there is a back-seat driver (BSD), there is an additional high-level
control system working in the front-seat driver (FSD), that has a
controlled perception of the degree to which the BSD is happy with the FSD.
If the "BSD-happiness" control system has very low gain (the FSD doesn't
care
what the BSD thinks about him) the reference value for distance to the car
in front will still be determined by safety-related perceptions.

If the BSD-happiness control system has high gain but a reference value
of zero, the FSD wants to annoy the BSD, and the reference value for
distance will be influenced not only by safety-related perceptions, but
also by the opposite of what FSD perceives BSD to want.

If FSD does not care about safety-related perceptions (or is just learning
to drive and does not trust his own safety-related perceptions), and
has a high reference value and high gain for BSD-happiness, the reference
value for distance will be predominantly influenced by what FSD perceives
BSD to want.

None of the above states present a "going nuts" likelihood. Even in the
second (annoy BSD) case, where there might be a conflict between anti-BSD
and safety-related settings of the distance reference value, it should be
easy to achieve "annoy-BSD" without compromising safety, unless BSD always
makes sensible safety-related commands.

The condition that may lead to "going nuts" is a persistent conflict. BSD
persists in proposing distance reference values that conflict with the
values FSD would get from safety-related perceptions, and FSD has a high
gain both for BSD-happy and for driving based on safety-related perceptions.

What presumably happens here (in PCT terms) is a persistent error in a
controlled perception related to self image. FSD wants to perceive self as
a good driver, but BSD's back-seat commands generate a disturbance to the
"my quality as a driver" perception. So long as FSD fails to reorganize to
eliminate BSD's comments from contributing to that perception, and BSD
continues to make non-safety-related commands, FSD will be unable to control
the "my quality as driver" to match a "good" reference value, not least
because keeping BSD happy is incompatible with good driving.

If BSD always makes good suggestions, that match exactly what FSD would do
anyway, it is still hard for FSD to control the "my quality as a driver"
perception to a "good" reference value, because BSD's perception of
"my quality as a driver" is perceived to be "bad." If FSD includes this
in the input data to the MQAAD perception, and if FSD accepts that the
reference value for "distance to car in front" is determined by BSD's
suggestions, there is no direct way FSD can influence his perception
of MQAAD, without reorganizing to ignore BSD's proposals for the "distance"
reference value, which is to say that he must reorganize to give the
"BSD-happiness" control system a low or zero gain.

In your language, I think that means FSD must "take control" of the
driving, and "make his own decisions" to "stay sane". The PCT mechanism
may not sound as simple, but it is a worked-out mechanism that uses no
loaded words to support a metaphor.

An alternative reorganization that removes the conflict is to eliminate
the "my quality as a driver" perception from the control hierarchy. What
this means is that the reference value for distance to the next car is
no longer influenced by safety-related perceptions (since they are
controlled in support of "MQAAD=good"), and the BSD commands become the
prime influence. This, transposed into other realms is the "zombie"
condition you describe.

There's no metaphor here. There's a mechanism. It's a mechanism that Bill
Powers would justifiably call a "just-so story." But it is not what Bill
calls a "dormative principle" (e.g. people go to sleep because the
sleepiness factor is increased beyond some threshold).

Persistent error in the control of a component of self-image might well
lead to "going nuts," whatever that means. In PCT there would be a high
probability of reorganization around such high-level control systems.
One not improbable reorganization is the construction of a new set
of high-level control systems controlling a differently specified set
of perceptions. We call such a reorganization "multiple personality
disorder." But whether that's why MPD happens is a wild speculation.

Does BCT provide a mechanism (even at the just-so story level) for your
first statement above?:

If a person is autonomous, decides for
himself what he does, then he retains his identity [sanity]. If he lets some
one else tell him what to do, and does so constantly, then he loses his
ability
to make decisions--becomes a zombie, [mentally disordered].

If BCT does provide a mechanism, a second approach to helping us understand
BCT might be to walk us through an example, as I have done above for a
PCT mechanism. No metaphors, just a guide to the way it works, and why.

Martin