Behavior IS Control?

[bnhpct]

@rsmarken

BN: We’ve noticed many times that there are two senses of ‘behavior’, behavior from the control system’s point of view and behavioral actions or outputs as seen from an observer’s point of view. […]

RM: This is … a fundamental misunderstanding of the scientific basis of PCT

Indeed it is.

Trouble is, everybody in the world who does not understand PCT has this misunderstanding. Over the years, to help them understand PCT we have sometimes said that outputs, actions, control actions, behavioral outputs, etc. are the observable means for affecting the state of the controlled variable. I agree that we should reserve “behavior” to refer to what the entire control loop does.

The process of coming to understand PCT develops new perceptual input functions. At first, these are abstract concepts with mostly imagined inputs. Looking at an activity and saying that we are observing control at this stage is something of a hopeful (and instructive) pretense. Over time applying PCT our perception of control in a given situation is more richly supplied with lower-level perceptual inputs, and we can more legitimately make the claim.

@rsmarken

I think there is really no way to avoid this usage of “behave” (as a synonym for the more appropriate “action”) and I don’t think it’s necessary to try to avoid it. Once you understand that the lay meaning of “behavior” corresponds to observed reference states of controlled variables you’ve got your PCT glasses on correctly.

The lay meaning of “behavior” corresponds to observed reference states of controlled variables when the lay meaning refers to the intent of the observed actions. He’s pushing the doorbell, he’s seeing if anyone is home, he’s selling vacuum cleaners, etc. It’s hard to describe an activity without implying intent. Does anybody except a conventional psychologist attempt that veneer of ‘objectivity’, with no attribution of purpose?

Everybody (except ‘scientific psychologists’, and even they most of the time) attributes intent to observed actions. With PCT, we describe intent as reference values in a hierarchy of controlled perceptions. There lie avenues of communication.

The common-parlance usage of ‘behavior’ meaning actions is more apt when perceptions of actions come under control. Example: the dancer before a mirror in a practice studio. Or in another way, perceptions of outputs for controlling A may be among the perceptual inputs for control of B at a higher level. Examples include threats, welcomes, and all kinds of more sophisticated communication-perceptions. In these situations, the perceptions of behavioral outputs may themselves also come under direct control. “Don’t do that, it can break!” “Do it upside down.” “Insert tab A into slot B this way.” The speaker is using language to control their perception of the listeners’ behavioral outputs, and the attentive, compliant listeners thereupon attend to and control their own perceptions of those outputs and their consequences.

Blast from the past, this is from another nice exposition of yours, Rick, that’s worth revisiting:

@rsmarken

RM: So I believe Bill used the word “perception” in the title of his book because he knew that psychologists would see it as referring to the “input” of an organism, while the word “behavior” would be seen as referring to the organism’s “output”. But if that’s true then why not call the book “Behavior: The control of the environment”? Psychologists know that perceptions are caused by environmental variables so the environment is as much an input as is perception. I think Bill used “perception” rather than “environment” in the title, not only because “environment” is not an accurate description of what is controlled by organisms (it is aspects – functions – of the environment that are controlled) but because he knew that psychologists would understand that the word “perception” refers not only to the input to an organism but also to the fact that this input is a function of the organism’s environment.

RM: So for a psychologist (like me) the title of Powers’ book is making two claims: 1) output controls input and 2) input is a function physical variables in the organism’s environment. A psychologist would find the second claim non-controversial (perceptions are understood to be functions of physical variables; the whole field of perceptual psychology is aimed at trying to figure out what these functions are and how they work). It’s the first claim – that output controls input – that is the tough one (for psychologists), so tough that it has been nearly impossible to get psychologists to pay attention to PCT for more than a few seconds.