behaviors are not inherited

CSGnet Archive CSG1999
1

John Appel (Sun, 7 Mar 1999 10:20:54 -0500) wrote:

... An infant is genetically programmed with a set of behaviors
which are then strengthened or weakenned by nurture [vs nature].

This is a common presumption. I have found it to be quite explicit, for
instance, in the evolutionary biology of Richard Dawkins. One fine
feature of PCT is that there are some theories which are in clear
contradiction with PCT. This is one of those.

If PCT is correct then this sort of genetic endowment is not provided in
the form of specified behaviors, but instead takes the form of
perceptual control systems. These systems must come with physiological
output biases, by which I mean that in the "newly grown" state the
output generates changes in the environment which are typically
effective at altering input.

Following Lorenz, I consider this to be innate knowledge. Like Dawkins,
Cziko, and the mainstream of biology, I consider the selectionist
pattern to be the crucial component in the origination of such innate
knowledge. But in light of PCT I cannot agree that such knowledge
consists of "programmed" *behaviors*. (Here Dawkins and Cziko part
ways.)

PCT solves a problem which involves complex variability in the
environment: If the environment of organisms varies in a complex
manner--and it does--then specific behaviors cannot produce consistently
valuable results. When people write of various successful "behaviors"
that they attribute to genetic programming, they invariably use the word
to refer to a sloppy, sweeping category which involves significant
perceptual feedback. This looks to me like saying "See, they behave
effectively, therefore some or all of the behaviors must be inherited."
Such a claim only makes sense if behaviors are indistinguishable from
behavioral competence. With PCT in hand these may be clearly
distinguished, and with that distinction only the latter may be credibly
proposed as products of genetics. The distinction is somewhat fine, but
it is fruitful where theories which lack it are barren.

It is unfortunate that here I have not been able to elaborate on the
application of PCT in this area, but merely point to it. That's the
most I can afford to do at present.

Tracy Harms
Bend, Oregon

2

[From Bill Powers (990311.0958 MST)]

Tracy Harms (990311, I guess) --

If PCT is correct then this sort of genetic endowment is not provided in
the form of specified behaviors, but instead takes the form of
perceptual control systems. These systems must come with physiological
output biases, by which I mean that in the "newly grown" state the
output generates changes in the environment which are typically
effective at altering input.

This could be made even clearer if you explain that to maintain a specific
perception near a given reference level depends on generating actions that
not only bring the perception to a specific state, but simultaneously
compensate for unpredictable disturbances. Knowing only that a given
perception is to have such-and-such a value, you can't even predict what
_direction_ of action will be required, much less _how much_ action. There
is no way that any organism could (usefully) inherit instructions for
producing a specific action or pattern of actions. All that can be usefully
inherited is a set of instructions for the _perceived consequences_ of
actions: reference signals, in other words.

And even then, only the highest level of reference signals could be
inherited (and indeed this is one possible, and non-exclusive, answer to
the question of where they come from). At all other levels, reference
signals must be free to vary in the process of controlling higher-level
perceptions, because disturbances can occur at any level of control and the
only way to counteract their effects is to alter lower-level reference
signals. An inherited reference signal, being unchangeable, cannot vary to
counteract disturbances.

Following Lorenz, I consider this to be innate knowledge.

I'd object to that, because to me "knowledge" must be something
perceivable. Reference signals are perceivable only via imagination, and in
normal operation are not perceived. But you have to allow for my distaste
for metaphors.

I agree with the basic thrust of your post.

Best,

Bill P.