I am posting this  for Bruce Abbott because he is apparently have trouble getting the listserver to distribute it. Hope it works. Best Rick
Richard S. MarkenÂ
"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery
[From Rick Marken (2016.01.16.1230)]
RM: This discussion of belief has taken place under three different subject heads and I am going to try to consolidate them under this, the original subject head. I’ve copied the posts below. The participants so far are Bruce Abbott., Warren Mansell. and Lynndal Daniels
RM: I’ll just say that I think Warren and Lynndal have it basically right: both imply that belief does not need to be “explicitly represented” in the PCT model. The reason is that “belief” refers to a phenomenon – actually, several different phenomena – not to an explanation of a phenomenon. Lynndal mentioned one of the phenomena to which “belief” refers: thoughts. In which case, Lynndal points out that they are already explained in PCT as perceptions (actually, imagined perceptions).Â
RM: But “belief” can also refer to other things, like the desired states of perceptions; in which case they are also explained by the PCT model as references for the state of perceptions (this was Powers belief about this connotation about “belief”; when I once said that I didn’t believe person X who ever “get” PCT Bill chided me for saying it, pointing out that I was implicitly describing my reference for that result). “Belief” can also refer to remembered information as in “I believe the first line of Sonnet XXIX is “When in disgrace with fortune and men’s eyes””,.
RM: The point is that “belief” points to several different phenomena and the appropriate question is not whether these phenomena can be “explicitly represented” in PCT (that would be using a “dormitive principle”) but whether PCT can account for the phenomena. In order to test this you have to be able to clearly and objectively describe the phenomenon to be explained. That might be tough to do with the phenomena that are pointed to by the word “belief”. But I think these are the phenomena of interest to psychologists who study “cognitive” phenomena; so I’m pretty sure that, once we are able to describe these phenomena, we can start seeing how well PCT, in its present state, can account for them. And since cognitive psychology (and especially cognitive neuroscience) is the hot area of psychology (still), PCT might get more attention from psychologists if we could show how it can account for the phenomena of interest to them, such as memory, mental imagery, reading
comprehension and problem solving.Â
Best
Rick
Hi everyone, I often just try substituting ‘wants to believe’ for ‘believes’. There are certainly some things we believe that we don’t want to believe (for example I might want to believe that I have a million pounds but I don’t believe I do). However, in most of the cases where beliefs seem to drive an extreme action, like terrorism, the ‘want’ to believe seems to be the key driver. In fact religious ‘beliefs’, given they are supported by faith and not evidence, actually seem to be almost totally volitional, and therefore very easily explicable by PCT. Back to the mundane example, surely we just use the term ‘belief’ as short hand to say whether one person’s perception of something in the environment (the money in my bank
account) corresponds to the (probably correct) consensus from other people. Again easily within the PCT domain. I think that high level processes may or may not be involved.
So I have a strong hunch we don’t need to program ‘beliefs’ into PCT as they are implicitly within each of our perceptual hierachies already…
Warren
Â
[From Lynndal Daniels (2017.01.16.0755 PST)]
Aren’t thoughts included as perceptions?   And aren’t beliefs, thoughts?  If that’s the case, then beliefs are perceptions.
The above is more of an inquiry than a statement.
Lynndal
On Sun, Jan 15, 2017 at 10:13 AM, Richard Marken rsmarken@gmail.com wrote:
I am posting this  for Bruce Abbott because he is apparently have trouble getting the listserver to distribute it. Hope it works. Best Rick
[From Bruce Abbott (2017.01.12.0945 EST)]
Â
The current discussion of Jeff Vancouver’s recent paper on self-efficacy has me thinking once again about how belief relates to perceptual control theory. Jeff defines self-efficacy as “a belief in one’s capacity,� and gives it a role in his model. I don’t wish to focus here on self-efficacy or its role within this model, but rather on belief in general and what role (if any) it should play in perceptual control theory.
Â
Belief seems to play a crucial role in determining what actions a person takes. To take a modest example, if I believe that someone is trying to help me (even if that “help� is actually interfering), I will behave differently toward that person than if I believe that the person is trying to get in my way.
Â
We tend to believe our senses implicitly, so the usual PCT model doesn’t include belief as a variable. PCT recognizes that perceptions are all we have, although it presumes that perceptions arising directly from the processing of sensory input normally relate to an underlying reality in such a way that by controlling certain of those perceptions, we improve our survival. A person afflicted with schizophrenia may be hearing voices or even seeing people even though there is no corresponding entity in the environment that is affecting sensory receptors to produce those perceptions. We call these perceptions “hallucinations,� but to the schizophrenic person they may be as real as any sense-based perception; the person implicitly believes in them and acts accordingly.
Â
Beliefs may be defined as perceptions that we hold to be accurate or true with varying degrees of confidence. They may be based on personal experience, inference, logical deduction, and other factors such as perceived support for those beliefs by others. When I walk up to a car in the parking lot and press the unlock button on my key fob, it is because I believe that this is my car and that pressing that button will unlock it. The car may turn out to be an identical make, model, and color as mine but belong to someone else. When the button fails to unlock it I begin to entertain explanations (has the battery in the fob died? Is this really my car?); eventually I find evidence that the car is not mine (that’s not my stuff inside) and change my belief of ownership.
Â
My assertion is that we act according to what we believe to be true. Because much of what we believe emerges from higher-level cognitive processes (making inferences, drawing conclusions, etc.), they are not easily incorporated into the usual PCT diagram. Yet those beliefs mediate what actions we take.
Â
An extreme case is the terrorist who blows himself up, taking numerous innocent people with him, because he has been taught by those he trusts that such actions are demanded by God and that God will reward him in heaven for them. Such cases only highlight how much influence beliefs may have on what a person does. Yet beliefs are not explicitly represented in perceptual control theory (or so I believe!). Is there a place for them, and if so, how can they be represented within the theory?
Â
Bruce
–
Richard S. MarkenÂ
"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery
[From Bruce Abbott (2017.01.17.2055 EST)]
Rick Marken (2016.01.16.1230)]
RM: This discussion of belief has taken place under three different subject heads and I am going to try to consolidate them under this, the original subject head. I’ve copied the posts below. The participants so far are Bruce Abbott., Warren Mansell. and Lynndal Daniels
BA: To which you can now add Eetu Pikkarainen.
RM: I’ll just say that I think Warren and Lynndal have it basically right: both imply that belief does not need to be “explicitly represented” in the PCT model. The reason is that “belief” refers to a phenomenon – actually, several different phenomena – not to an explanation of a phenomenon. Lynndal mentioned one of the phenomena to which “belief” refers: thoughts. In which case, Lynndal points out that they are already explained in PCT as perceptions (actually, imagined perceptions).
BA: I don’t follow. “Belief does not need to be explicitly represented in the PCT model because it refers to a phenomenon and not to an explanation of a phenomenon.� If that is the criterion for inclusion in the PCT model, then you may as well remove perceptions, signals, and outputs from the PCT model, as all of these are phenomena and not explanations for phenomena.
BA: You state that beliefs are already explained in PCT as imagined perceptions. Well, calling them imagined perceptions is not an explanation, it’s a definition, or at least a partial one (one would have to distinguish this kind of imagined perception from other kinds).  What roles do imagined perceptions play within PCT?
RM: But “belief” can also refer to other things, like the desired states of perceptions; in which case they are also explained by the PCT model as references for the state of perceptions (this was Powers belief about this connotation about “belief”; when I once said that I didn’t believe person X who ever “get” PCT Bill chided me for saying it, pointing out that I was implicitly describing my reference for that result). “Belief” can also refer to remembered information as in "I believe the first line of Sonnet XXIX is "When in disgrace with fortune and men’s eyes.â€?
BA: I don’t see belief as a desired state of a perception. I may fervently want to believe something, but this is not belief, it is desired state of belief, a reference.  Is it within my ability to control the state of my belief? I’m not sure. There are many things I do not want to believe but believe them anyway, and other things I want to believe but can’t make myself do so. Your last example, of the word “beliefâ€? referring to remembered information, defines belief as a level of confidence in the truth of some statement.  Perhaps that’s what belief is – a level of confidence in the truthh of some perception.
RM: The point is that “belief” points to several different phenomena and the appropriate question is not whether these phenomena can be “explicitly represented” in PCT (that would be using a “dormitive principle”) . . .
BA: Why would that be using a dormitive principle? You stated that a dormitive principle is a circular explanation. How does including belief in the PCT model make belief into a circular explanation?
RM: . . .but whether PCT can account for the phenomena. In order to test this you have to be able to clearly and objectively describe the phenomenon to be explained. That might be tough to do with the phenomena that are pointed to by the word “belief”. But I think these are the phenomena of interest to psychologists who study “cognitive” phenomena; so I’m pretty sure that, once we are able to describe these phenomena, we can start seeing how well PCT, in its present state, can account for them. And since cognitive psychology (and especially cognitive neuroscience) is the hot area of psychology (still), PCT might get more attention from psychologists if we could show how it can account for the phenomena of interest to them, such as memory, mental imagery, reading comprehension and problem solving.
BA: The phenomenon I am interested in under the heading of “belief� is, I think, a perception of a perception (a meta-perception?) – a perception of its truth. It is the outcome of an evaluative process whose result can vary between unquestionably untrue (zero truth) through various degrees between (e.g., likely true) to unquestionably true.  How do we arrive at such an evaluation (consciously or unconsciously)? How does this evaluation affect what perceptions we will seek to control, and how we endeavor to control them?  For example, if I believe that vaccinations of young children cause autism, I may refuse to have mine vaccinated.  Some readily buy into this belief but many do not (I do not, based on my perception of the scientific evidence).
BA: Beliefs may play a variety of roles related to control system functioning. A belief may act as a disturbance to a strongly defended perception. As such it can be expected to produce strong action as the individual attempts to counter it. Or it might result in a certain kind of action being adopted as a means of controlling a given perception. For instance, I believe that there are lions roaming the area around my home and consequently have set up some devices guaranteed to keep them away. I’m convinced I’ve spent my money wisely as I have seen not a single lion on the property since doing so. No doubt there are other ways in which beliefs may relate to what a person attempts to control and how.
Beliefs have consequences – Auschwitz is one really nasty example. We don’t just control what our sensory perceptual systems provide to our control systems directly. It might be important to understand how they relate to the PCT model.
Bruce
BA: We don’t just control what our sensory perceptual systems provide to our control systems directly
WM: Exactly. We control imagined perceptions too. So with the example of the lions, I would model this as controlling for the imagined perception of lions (I.e a stored memory of lions recurrently fed back within the imagination mode). Because my behaviour removes the imagined perception, I continue to do it. I don't realise the the reason my actions remove the imagined perception is because my actions distract me and I perceive something different. Only through suspending my imagination and actually paying attention to whether or not there are lions in my garden will I be able to realise I can remove my perception of them through no action at all. From a clinical perspective I think the typical reason why people don't do this is because they have such a strong need to experience no lions that they don't do what then would need to do to learn that they need to do nothing.
I have found that unpacking 'beliefs' in a dynamic way like this tells me so much more about working mechanisms than the cognitive approach to beliefs - which I do see as largely a dormitive principle rather than a working mechanism.
I do agree though Bruce that there will be a facet of beliefs that is a metaperception of the degree of truth, but I think this needs to be explains only once we have tried to explain all the other elements of what we call a belief using the PCT model. I also recognise that Bill's model of the imagination mode is currently incomplete. It is unclear how the imagination mode and awareness and language are connected, even though we know they can be connected through our own experience. There is no description of a model of how a full 'train of thought' unfolds at multiple perceptual levels as we mentally simulate an experience within imagination. And we have only started to consider the importance of collective control in PCT and virtually nothing on the collective control of imagined perceptions, which also surely occurs when people share or enhance one another's 'beliefs'.
So I think I am agreeing with Bruce that there is currently a great deal missing in PCT accounts to fully explain what we call beliefs, but I agree with Rick that all the right ingredients are already there in PCT and that the term 'belief' is a vague way of describing a whole range of connected phenomena, some of which are already easily modelled with the PCT components we have... but I say not the whole lot by any stretch...
I know I am comfortable now because I can feel the fence splinters...
I won't add a time stamp and admit how late this message is (two wakings from little ones so far...)
Warren
On 17 Jan 2017, at 01:56, Bruce Abbott <bbabbott@frontier.com> wrote:
We don’t just control what our sensory perceptual systems provide to our control systems directly
[From Rick Marken (2016.01.17.1800)]
 Bruce Abbott (2017.01.17.2055 EST)–
Â
Rick Marken (2016.01.16.1230)]
Â
RM: I’ll just say that I think Warren and Lynndal have it basically right: both imply that belief does not need to be “explicitly represented” in the PCT model. The reason is that “belief” refers to a phenomenon – actually, several different phenomena – not to an explanation of a phenomenon.Â
Â
BA: I don’t follow. “Belief does not need to be explicitly represented in the PCT model because it refers to a phenomenon and not to an explanation of a phenomenon.� If that is the criterion for inclusion in the PCT model, then you may as well remove perceptions, signals, and outputs from the PCT model, as all of these are phenomena and not explanations for phenomena.
RM: Right. I should have said “Belief is a phenomenon to be explained by the PCT model”. Perceptions, neural signals and outputs are, indeed, phenomena, but they are phenomena that are explained by other models besides PCT – models of perception, neurophysiology and physics, respectively. PCT is a proposal regarding the functional organization of the relationships between these phenomena – an organization that can account for the phenomena of control seen in the behavior of living organisms.
Â
BA: You state that beliefs are already explained in PCT as imagined perceptions. Well, calling them imagined perceptions is not an explanation, it’s a definition, or at least a partial one (one would have to distinguish this kind of imagined perception from other kinds). What roles do imagined perceptions play within PCT?
RM: I think the first step is defining the phenomenon that is “pointed to” by the word “belief”. Later in this post you say you are talking about the phenomenon of believing something is true. This is a phenomenon that I am aware of subjectively. I often believe things to be true that turn out not to be true. For example, I believed it was true that only a very small minority of the voters in the US would be stupid or mean enough to vote for Trump. (If only I had heeded the great H.L Mencken who said something like "No one even gone broke (or lost an election) by underestimating the intelligence of the American people). I can certainly come up with a PCT explanation of that belief and, of course, “belief” would not be part of that explanation; just the existing components of the PCT model as described in B:CP.
RM: The problem, of course, is that beliefs like this are completely private so it’s hard to know how one would test the PCT explanation of them. But it would be great if someone could develop a way to do this. It should be possible. After all Roger Shepard and Jacqueline Metzler came up with an ingenious way to “look at” the very private phenomenon of mental imagery (Shepard, R. N. & Metzler, J. (1971). “Mental
Rotation of Three-Dimensional Objects”. Science, 171, 701–703).
BestÂ
Rick
RM: But “belief” can also refer to other things, like the desired states of perceptions; in which case they are also explained by the PCT model as references for the state of perceptions (this was Powers belief about this connotation about “belief”; when I once said that I didn’t believe person X who ever “get” PCT Bill chided me for saying it, pointing out that I was implicitly describing my reference for that result). “Belief” can also refer to remembered information as in "I believe the first line of Sonnet XXIX is "When in disgrace with fortune and men’s eyes.â€?
Â
BA: I don’t see belief as a desired state of a perception. I may fervently want to believe something, but this is not belief, it is desired state of belief, a reference. Is it within my ability to control the state of my belief? I’m not sure. There are many things I do not want to believe but believe them anyway, and other things I want to believe but can’t make myself do so. Your last example, of the word “beliefâ€? referring to remembered information, defines belief as a level of confidence in the truth of some statement. Perhaps that’s what belief is – a level of confidence in the truth of some perception.<
Â
RM: The point is that “belief” points to several different phenomena and the appropriate question is not whether these phenomena can be “explicitly represented” in PCT (that would be using a “dormitive principle”) . . .
Â
BA: Why would that be using a dormitive principle? You stated that a dormitive principle is a circular explanation. How does including belief in the PCT model make belief into a circular explanation?
Â
RM: . . .but whether PCT can account for the phenomena. In order to test this you have to be able to clearly and objectively describe the phenomenon to be explained. That might be tough to do with the phenomena that are pointed to by the word “belief”. But I think these are the phenomena of interest to psychologists who study “cognitive” phenomena; so I’m pretty sure that, once we are able to describe these phenomena, we can start seeing how well PCT, in its present state, can account for them. And since cognitive psychology (and especially cognitive neuroscience) is the hot area of psychology (still), PCT might get more attention from psychologists if we could show how it can account for the phenomena of interest to them, such as memory, mental imagery, reading comprehension and problem solving.Â
Â
BA: The phenomenon I am interested in under the heading of “beliefâ€? is, I think, a perception of a perception (a meta-perception?) – a perception of its truth. It is the outcomme of an evaluative process whose result can vary between unquestionably untrue (zero truth) through various degrees between (e.g., likely true) to unquestionably true. How do we arrive at such an evaluation (consciously or unconsciously)? How does this evaluation affect what perceptions we will seek to control, and how we endeavor to control them? For example, if I believe that vaccinations of young children cause autism, I may refuse to have mine vaccinated. Some readily buy into this belief but many do not (I do not, based on my perception of the scientific evidence).
Â
BA: Beliefs may play a variety of roles related to control system functioning. A belief may act as a disturbance to a strongly defended perception. As such it can be expected to produce strong action as the individual attempts to counter it. Or it might result in a certain kind of action being adopted as a means of controlling a given perception. For instance, I believe that there are lions roaming the area around my home and consequently have set up some devices guaranteed to keep them away. I’m convinced I’ve spent my money wisely as I have seen not a single lion on the property since doing so. No doubt there are other ways in which beliefs may relate to what a person attempts to control and how.
Â
Beliefs have consequences – Auschwittz is one really nasty example. We don’t just control what our sensory perceptual systems provide to our control systems directly. It might be important to understand how they relate to the PCT model.
Â
Bruce
Â
–
Richard S. MarkenÂ
"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery
[From Bruce Abbott (990112.1335 EST)]
Bill Powers (990112.1007 MST) --
I have identified several possible meanings for the term "belief." One of
them is an assertion that a proposition is true. Another is a perception of
something in a certain state, with no verbal propositions being involved.
Another is a reference to a memory (I believe it rained this morning). Of
course by converting any of these examples into statements someone makes,
you can reduce all definitions to yours, even if the actor is not declaring
any proposition to be true.
Yes. I believe that God exists = In my evaluation, the proposition that God
exists is true. I believe it rained this morning = In my evaluation, the
proposition that it rained this morning is true (although in this case, I
think that you are using "believe" to express uncertainty (as in "It rained
this morning").
But I'd like to modify my proposed definition. In the description of my
position that I offered earlier, I suggested that belief should be viewed as
a variable, ranging from "certainly false" to "certainly true," with varying
levels of uncertainty between, including "I don't know," which would
represent varying levels of confidence in the assertion.
We seem to have no trouble evaluating propositions as to our level of belief
in them. Try evaluating the following propositions:
Bruce Abbott exists.
The universe was created in seven days.
Bill Clinton should be censured by the Senate.
Two plus two equals four.
I am hallucinating the post I am now reading.
Space aliens have abducted human beings.
There is life after death.
Were you able to perceive a state of belief for each of these?
Some of us will evaluate these statements differently than others. In each
case, however, somehow we _know_ what the state of our belief is (even if
that state is "I'm not sure"). [I am assuming that your experience is like
mine.] From this observation I conclude that belief is a variable whose
value is assigned by an evaluative process. Thus, to evaluate something as
true ("I believe it.") represents something of a simplification, a
conversion of a continuous variable into a categorical one (believe,
neutral, don't believe) or even a dichotomous one (true/false). I think it
should be treated as a continuous variable.
However, if you would like to propose that we define belief as stating that
you evaluate some proposition as true (i.e., declare in words or thought,
"X is true"), I'd be willing to go along with that, at least in formal
discussions. However, I think you would need to expand the definition to
include "X is false" as a "disbelief", unless you want to kludge up
something like " 'X is false' is true".
I think the correction offered above takes care of that problem.
Probably what's been missing from the most part in our discussions is a
careful discription of the phenomenon (or phenomena) for which the model is
to account. In good science, description precedes analysis. The
observation that beliefs are often defended against disturbance has been
presented and used to justify the notion that beliefs may function as
reference values. Others have noted that many beliefs do not seem to be
defended; when contradictory evidence appears, they are immediately revised.
It might be a good idea, if we wish to pursue this line of enquiry further,
to try to describe just subjective and objective phenomena we are trying to
account for in our model of belief. What are the characteristics of belief?
Bruce
[From Bill Powers (990112.1325 MST)]
Bruce Abbott (990112.1335 EST) --
But I'd like to modify my proposed definition. In the description of my
position that I offered earlier, I suggested that belief should be viewed as
a variable, ranging from "certainly false" to "certainly true," with varying
levels of uncertainty between, including "I don't know," which would
represent varying levels of confidence in the assertion.
OK, the continuous variable appeals to me, too.
We seem to have no trouble evaluating propositions as to our level of belief
in them. Try evaluating the following propositions:Bruce Abbott exists.
The universe was created in seven days.
Bill Clinton should be censured by the Senate.
Two plus two equals four.
I am hallucinating the post I am now reading.
Space aliens have abducted human beings.
There is life after death.
It strikes me that these are all propositions about things I am not
perceiving at the time I consider them.
Were you able to perceive a state of belief for each of these?
Some of us will evaluate these statements differently than others. In each
case, however, somehow we _know_ what the state of our belief is (even if
that state is "I'm not sure"). [I am assuming that your experience is like
mine.] From this observation I conclude that belief is a variable whose
value is assigned by an evaluative process. Thus, to evaluate something as
true ("I believe it.") represents something of a simplification, a
conversion of a continuous variable into a categorical one (believe,
neutral, don't believe) or even a dichotomous one (true/false). I think it
should be treated as a continuous variable.However, if you would like to propose that we define belief as stating that
you evaluate some proposition as true (i.e., declare in words or thought,
"X is true"), I'd be willing to go along with that, at least in formal
discussions. However, I think you would need to expand the definition to
include "X is false" as a "disbelief", unless you want to kludge up
something like " 'X is false' is true".I think the correction offered above takes care of that problem.
Probably what's been missing from the most part in our discussions is a
careful discription of the phenomenon (or phenomena) for which the model is
to account. In good science, description precedes analysis. The
observation that beliefs are often defended against disturbance has been
presented and used to justify the notion that beliefs may function as
reference values. Others have noted that many beliefs do not seem to be
defended; when contradictory evidence appears, they are immediately revised.
It might be a good idea, if we wish to pursue this line of enquiry further,
to try to describe just subjective and objective phenomena we are trying to
account for in our model of belief. What are the characteristics of belief?Bruce
[From Rick Marken (990112.1340)]
Bruce Abbott (990112.1335 EST)
We seem to have no trouble evaluating propositions as to our
level of belief in them. Try evaluating the following
propositions:Bruce Abbott exists.
The universe was created in seven days.
Bill Clinton should be censured by the Senate.
Two plus two equals four.
I am hallucinating the post I am now reading.
Space aliens have abducted human beings.
There is life after death.Were you able to perceive a state of belief for each of these?
Not me. I _am_ able to perceive the statements and the meanings
(imagined perceptions) evoked by them. I do feel better about
some of these perceptions than others (for exmaple, the statement
"Bill Clinton should be censured by the Senate" got me a little
angry; I would have rather seen "Bill Clinton should get an
apology from the Senate and an _abject_ apology from the House".
But I don't perceive any state of belief. At least, it's not a
nice, clear, meaty perception like my perception of the statements
themselves.
Best
Rick
--
Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313
Life Learning Associates e-mail: rmarken@earthlink.net
http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken
[From Rick Marken (990113.0750)]
Bruce Abbott (990112.1335 EST)
Were you able to perceive a state of belief for each of these?
Me:
I don't perceive any state of belief.
Bruce Abbott (990113.1005 EST)
I don't believe you. You are stating that you don't know what
you believe or don't believe.
No I'm not. I'm stating that I know what I _perceive_. And I
don't think I perceive anything that could be called a "state
of belief". This doesn't mean I don't know what I believe;
I do know what I believe. I believe that you exist, for example.
But I don't have a perception of anything I would call a "state
of belief" that you exist. My belief that you exist is a bunch
of _imaginings_: that you are out there, that you are working
hard to make PCT fit into your existing ideas about how behavior
works, that you are a nice fellow with a vested interest in
conventional psychology, etc. I also imagine that these imaginings
are "true"; that if I got on a plane and went to Indiana I could
produce a perception of a very nice you, sitting there, typing
away, trying to convince yourself and everyone else that PCT
doesn't conflict in any way with what you are teaching in your
conventional psychology classes.
I guess I could imagine something that I would call a "state of
belief"; For example, I could imagine being in Israel, which
is a state of belief in Judaism. This is an imagined state of belief
that I could turn into a perception by going to Israel. Is Israel
what you had in mind as a percpetion of a "state of belief"?
Maybe if you described what you perceive when you perceive a
"state of belief" I would be able to pick it out from among my
own perceptions.
Best
Rick
--
Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313
Life Learning Associates e-mail: rmarken@earthlink.net
http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken
[From Bruce Abbott (990113.1005 EST)]
Bruce Abbott (990112.1335 EST)
We seem to have no trouble evaluating propositions as to our
level of belief in them. Try evaluating the following
propositions:Bruce Abbott exists.
The universe was created in seven days.
Bill Clinton should be censured by the Senate.
Two plus two equals four.
I am hallucinating the post I am now reading.
Space aliens have abducted human beings.
There is life after death.Were you able to perceive a state of belief for each of these?
Rick Marken (990112.1340)
I don't perceive any state of belief.
I don't believe you. You are stating that you don't know what you believe
or don't believe.
It strikes me that these are all propositions about things I am not
perceiving at the time I consider them.
That's nice, but you neglected to answer the questions asked.
I perceive both of you as being uncooperative in this exercise. If that's
the way it's going to go, what's the point in continuing?
Bruce
[From Bill Powers (990113.0912 MST)]
Bruce Abbott (990113.1005 EST)--
Bruce Abbott (990112.1335 EST)
We seem to have no trouble evaluating propositions as to our
level of belief in them. Try evaluating the following
propositions:Bruce Abbott exists.
The universe was created in seven days.
Bill Clinton should be censured by the Senate.
Two plus two equals four.
I am hallucinating the post I am now reading.
Space aliens have abducted human beings.
There is life after death.Were you able to perceive a state of belief for each of these?
Rick Marken (990112.1340)
I don't perceive any state of belief.
I don't believe you. You are stating that you don't know what you believe
or don't believe.
The next was actually from me, WTP -- I twitched and sent the message
before I finished replying to it.
It strikes me that these are all propositions about things I am not
perceiving at the time I consider them.That's nice, but you neglected to answer the questions asked.
I can perceive the propositions as having various degrees of truth, ranging
from possibly untrue to possibly true. This fits my concept of 9th-order
perceptions, with the "rules" determining truth-value being not boolean but
continuous and probabilistic. However, since the subject matter in each
case is something I am not currently perceiving, in each case it is
something I have to imagine before I can say anything about it. And nothing
that I imagine attains the status of truth, for me. It's simply a possibility.
I perceive both of you as being uncooperative in this exercise. If that's
the way it's going to go, what's the point in continuing?
Not so much uncooperative as careful about what I am agreeing to. Beliefs
do not play a very large part in my life, even beliefs about PCT. They
aren't very important to me. Also, I have had experiences that lead me to
see statements like "I am hallucinating the post I am now reading" as
simply sentences that I can think or not think -- without any implication
that they refer to something either true or false. So the idea of
"propositions" means something different to me from what I assume it means
to you. Yes, I can entertain each proposition you listed as possibly true.
But no, that does not mean I _accept_ each or any of them as true.
What I do accept as true is what I perceive. That, I can't doubt. What I
say or think ABOUT what I perceive is another matter.
Best,
Bill P.
[From Bill Powers (990113.0932 MST)]
Rick Marken (990113.0750)--
I share your difficulty with Bruce's "state of belief."]
You said
Maybe if you described what you perceive when you perceive a
"state of belief" I would be able to pick it out from among my
own perceptions.
That would be helpful to me, too. I know what it is to agree with someone
who makes a statement, and to hear or think a statement which I think is
probably, or even definitely, true or false. But the term "belief" wouldn't
come up, for me, in any special sense that seems like a state of
consciousness or being. In fact, the term "belief" makes me think of making
some sort of wholehearted committment to defend the truth of some statement
or idea, something I try to avoid doing as part of my attempt to be a
scientist. When someone says I have a belief, my first reaction is one of
alarm, and a desire to know what it is so I can get rid of it. I don't
think of a belief as something to defend, but as something to avoid, like
superstition or prejudice.
Best,
Bill P.
Phil Runkel replying to Bill P's of 990113.0912 on the truth of
propositions:
Thanks, pal. That's the kind of truthfulness about assertions about the
"real" world to which I resonate. I am reminded again of Korzybski, also
a man shamefully under-appreciated. --P.
[From Bruce Gregory (970519.1840 GMT)]
"Believe in it? Why, man, I've _seen_ it."
William James, when asked whether
he believed in baptism.
Bruce
[From Bill Powers (970519.1304 MDT)]
[From Bruce Gregory (970519.1840 GMT)]
"Believe in it? Why, man, I've _seen_ it."
William James, when asked whether
he believed in baptism.
Betcha it was Mark Twain.
Best,
Bill P.
[From Bruce Gregory (970519.1740 EDT)]
Bill Powers (970519.1304 MDT)]
>[From Bruce Gregory (970519.1840 GMT)]
>
>"Believe in it? Why, man, I've _seen_ it."
>
> William James, when asked whether
> he believed in baptism.Betcha it was Mark Twain.
I agree that it _sounds_ like Mark Twain. More research is
needed...
Bruce
[From Bruce Abbott (2015.11.14.2135 EST)]
I currently have no clear understanding as to how belief relates to PCT, if it relates at all. We behave on the basis of what we believe to be true implicitly or explicitly, so it would seem that any adequate theory of behavior should be equipped to deal with belief: to understand how it is established and supported, and how it may be changed. The Paris attacks were presumably motivated and justified by certain beliefs on the parts of those involved in carrying them out. So what, if anything, does PCT have to say about belief? Are beliefs perceptions? Are they meta-perceptions (perceptions of perceptions)? Something else?
Bruce A.
Maybe It’s time for Pinker to have a epiphany!!
‘How The Mind Works’ was written in 1997,
18 years ago if my maths is correct 
Maybe I’ll email him the link to the PCT handbook!
http://www.livingcontrolsystems.com/download/download.html
And of course a link to 1 or 2 of yours Rick
On 20 November 2015 at 20:25, Richard Marken rsmarken@gmail.com wrote:
[From Rick Marken (2015.11.20.1225)]
On Thu, Nov 19, 2015 at 11:03 AM, John Caines johncaines@gmail.com wrote:
JC: I like Pinkers explaination of beliefs via Computational theory,
I quote;
“The computational theory of mind resolves the paradox. It says that beliefs and desires are information, incarnated as configurations of symbols.
The symbols are the physical states of bits of matter, like chips in a computer or neurons in the brain. They symbolize things in the world because they are triggered by those things via our sense organs, and because of what they do once they are triggered. If the bits of matter that constitute a symbol are arranged to bump into the bits of matter constituting another symbol in just the right way, the symbols corresponding to one belief can give rise to new symbols corresponding to another belief logically related to it, which can give rise to symbols corresponding to other beliefs, and so on. Eventually the bits of matter constituting a symbol bump into bits of matter connected to the muscles, and behavior happens. The computational theory of mind thus allows us to keep beliefs and desires in our explanations of behavior while planting them squarely in the physical universe. It allows meaning to cause and be caused.”
Page 25 - How The Mind Works
Steven Pinker Ph.D
Pinker Rules!
RM: I am a fan of Pinker as well. He is an extraordinary writer and a very bright guy. But the above paragraph is an explanation of belief in the context of a model of behavior that is unquestionably wrong. It is the causal model of behavior. The model works only in the mind of those who propose it.
RM: The crucial failing of the model is seen in this sentence: "Eventually the bits of matter constituting a symbol bump into bits of matter connected to the muscles, and behavior happens." In fact behavior can’t possibly just “happen” because the events we call “behavior” are the results of efferent neural activity (the “bits of matter connected to muscles”) that are produced consistently in a world of constantly varying disturbances. So even a simple behavior, like lifting a cup of coffee to your lips, doesn’t just “happen”. It happens despite variations in the weight of the cup (due to drinking the coffee), the angle of the arm relative to gravity, and so on. Behaviors are, therefore, the result of muscle forces being varied in exactly the right way so that, when added to these disturbing forces, the cup always makes to you lips rather than to some other location on your face.
RM: So behavior doesn’t just happen; it is a controlled result of efferent neural activity, where “controlled” means a result produced consistently (one that remains in a reference state) despite the effects of unpredictable and often undetectable disturbances. Behavior is not an output that just happens – that is emitted like light from a light bulb: behavior is control. This is what Pinker doesn’t understand, which is understandable since “behavior as emitted output” is the current dogma in psychology (including cognitive science, Pinker’s specialty) and Pinker is by far one of the best at explaining the current dogma.
RM: By the way, I actually used this quote from Pinker in one of my papers – the one called “You say you had a revolution” – which is reprinted in “Doing Research in Psychology”. Be sure to buy several copies today!! As you’ll see, I’ve been pretty much singing the same tune for years; maybe some day I can form a choir but so far the best I’ve been able to do is a quartet;-)
Best
Rick
–
Richard S. Marken
www.mindreadings.com
Author of Doing Research on Purpose.
Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble
[From Bruce Abbott (2015.11.14.2135 EST)]
I currently have no clear understanding as to how belief relates to PCT, if it relates at all. We behave on the basis of what we believe to be true implicitly or explicitly, so it would seem that any adequate theory of behavior should be equipped to deal with belief: to understand how it is established and supported, and how it may be changed. The Paris attacks were presumably motivated and justified by certain beliefs on the parts of those involved in carrying them out. So what, if anything, does PCT have to say about belief? Are beliefs perceptions? Are they meta-perceptions (perceptions of perceptions)? Something else?
Bruce A.
[From Rupert Young (2015.11.15 16.30)]
I'd always viewed beliefs as a natural part of PCT, as higher level perceptions though based on imagination more than on reality. Is not anyone's view (reference) of honesty not just a belief of what is the right (to them) perspective to have regarding honesty. Other beliefs, including religious, are similar though the content of them usually refers to truth claims about the world; the sun orbits the earth, a god created the universe, Jesus rose from the dead, suicide bombing is rewarded by 72 virgins and eternal life etc, etc.
They're perspectives (perceptions) of the world distorted by imagination, and people act in the world to maintain those perspectives, such as banning education on evolution (a disturbance) or forcing women to cover up because they believe women emanate lust.
Rupert
