Beliefs--reference or actual?

CSGnet Archive CSG1998
1

[Martin Taylor 981227 17:37]

[From Rick Marken (981227.0940)]

Richard Kennaway (941226.2243 GMT)

What are beliefs, then?

Bruce Gregory (981226.1835 EDT)

Good question. Maybe Bill or Rick will enlighten us.

I think a belief is the reference state of an imagined
perception.

I don't agree with this. I think a belief is just a perception. You can
act on the environment to change a belief just as you can for any other
perception. You can have a reference state for a belief (a belief that
you would like to be able to hold) that is different from the current
state of your belief. I would like to believe I understand what people
are trying to do, but I don't believe I understand, so I act to try to
learn more. And so on and so forth.

Why use the two terms "perception" and "belief," then? The words have
different connotations. If I were to give PCT technical meaning to
"belief" I would take beliefs to be a subclass of perception. All
beliefs are perceptions, but not all perceptions are beliefs. Perceptions
that are not beliefs are primarily based on current sensory inputs.
Beliefs may be influenced by current sensory inputs, but they are more
dependent on "imagination" and memory.

To say this requires that "imagination" be clearly defined. In PCT, there
is an "imagination loop," but I don't remember a definition of what
imagination is. In some way, it must depend on modelling the environment.
The "imagination loop" provides the perception that would be produced
by some action if the action were to be performed. So, imagination must
involve the interactions of perceptions, but __not__ through the output
functions of the Elementary Control Units controlling those perceptions.
This doesn't define "imagination" but it suggests a characteristic that
imagination must have, if the term means anything in PCT.

If this is reasonable, it implies that beliefs depend substantially on the
interactions of perceptions, perhaps also on the interactions in imagination
of the control loops through which the interacting perceptions are
controlled.

In my Layered Protocol papers for the IJHCS special issue, I used the term
"belief" to mean a cluster of interacting perceptions, rather than a
single scalar-valued perception. In that usage, a belief is a complex,
vector-valued perception. I don't think that's an important difference
from saying that belief is just a subclass of perception, since any vector
can be part of an input function that produces a controllable scalar
perception.

I don't see why a belief has to refer to an __imagined__ perception,
whether it is a reference value or an actual value. I can change my beliefs
about states of the world by watching or reading the news, by observing
other people or the waving of tree branches, or whatever. These all may
create disturbances to my beliefs, if I am actually controlling them.

My version: a belief is a perception that has imagination as a major part
of its structure, whereas low-level perceptions depend more strongly on
current sensory values.

Martin

2

[From Rick Marken (981227.2010)]

Bruce Gregory (981226.1627 EDT)--

Beliefs are not reference levels.

Bill Powers (981227.1020 MST) --

I contend that they are, where they are not simply imagined
perceptions. It is very useful to look upon one's own beliefs
in this way.

Try interpreting some other beliefs this way and see if it
doesn't make sense.

I agree that a belief (one that is not simply an imagined
perception, like the belief in a god or gods) is a reference
signal; but some of these beliefs can be very _pliable_
references. The example I'm thinking of is scientific belief.
About 8 years ago (as you will recall) I believed that if
I played back the disturbing outputs of a low gain control
system as a disturbance during a second tracking task, control
would be the same in both cases. What I saw was not what I
believed I would see; I saw better control when the disturbance
was the output of a low gain control system. So I started acting
to control my perception of the results, trying to make them
consistent with my belief (reference) for what those results should
be. I started trying to make the results I got match the results
I believed I should get. But after several hours of experimentation
I became convinced that I could not make the results match what
I believed these results should be (according to PCT). Since I
saw no way -- short of faking the results - to make the results
match my belief reference I started searching for a way to revise
my belief reference so that the results would make sense in terms
of all my other beliefs that I was successfully controlling for.

My point is that my belief _did_ serve as a reference, but it
was a _revisable_ reference. I consider it a "good" kind of
belief because it led me to do experiments in an effort to
produce perceptions consistent with my belief reference; and
it was a belief that I was willing to revise when I found I
could not (legitimately, according to the rules of science)
produce perceptions that matched that belief.

I think this kind of revisable reference is the basis of science.
Such beliefs really are a necessary part of science because they
lead us to try to control for certain perceptions by doing
experiments. By they can obviously be a problem too: if people
are unwilling to revise their belief references when the
perceptions specified by these references cannot be produced
by legitimate means we get scientific fraud, religious dogma and
postmodernism.

If you buy this analysis, do you have any thoughts about
why some beliefs are readily revised while others are not?

Best

Rick

···

--

Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313
Life Learning Associates e-mail: rmarken@earthlink.net
http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken/

3

[Bruce Gregory (981228.0805 EDT)]

Martin Taylor 981227 17:37

My version: a belief is a perception that has imagination as a major part
of its structure, whereas low-level perceptions depend more strongly on
current sensory values.

This fits my understanding as well.

Bruce Gregory

4

[From Bruce Gregory (981228.0820 EDT)]

Rick Marken (981227.2010)

I think this kind of revisable reference is the basis of science.
Such beliefs really are a necessary part of science because they
lead us to try to control for certain perceptions by doing
experiments. By they can obviously be a problem too: if people
are unwilling to revise their belief references when the
perceptions specified by these references cannot be produced
by legitimate means we get scientific fraud, religious dogma and
postmodernism.

If you buy this analysis, do you have any thoughts about
why some beliefs are readily revised while others are not?

I agree with the thrust of this analysis, but, like Martin, I think a belief
is a perception. What you are really controlling for, it seems to me, is for
your beliefs to match your perceptions that contain a minimum of
imagination. You revise your beliefs when you see they clash with your
observations. This is what science is about. I think those of us who take it
serious are controlling for making our perceptions that include a strong
element of imagination (our theories) match our perceptions that contain a
lesser element of imagination (our observations). We are willing to revise
the former to achieve that match. Those imagination-laden perceptions that
we are unwilling to revise are "beliefs" in the unrevisable sense. We seem
to have the conviction that if we revised these, we would no longer be "who
we are". In some sense, holding on to these beliefs is part of a survival
program. I'll admit I still haven't thought this through enough to make a
case for it.

Bruce Gregory

5

[From Bruce Gregory (981228.0910 EDT)]

One further conjecture. There seems to be a position from which it is
possible to "see" yourself, not as the perceptions (beliefs) but as the
perceiver. From this position, all beliefs seem to be potentially revisable.

Bruce Gregory

6

[From Rick Marken (981228.0800)]

Bruce Gregory (981228.0820 EDT)--

like Martin, I think a belief is a perception. What you are
really controlling for, it seems to me, is for your beliefs to
match your perceptions that contain a minimum of imagination.

So perceptions are references and beliefs are perceptions? Could
you draw a diagram of your model of belief?

You revise your beliefs when you see they clash with your
observations.

So you revise your perceptions (beliefs) when you see (have
perceptions) that they clash with your observations (perceptions)?
I guess I don't really understand your model of belief. Maybe a
diagram would help.

Best

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313
Life Learning Associates e-mail: rmarken@earthlink.net
http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken

7

[from Greg Wierzbicki (981228.1030 EST)]

Bruce Gregory (981228.0820 EDT)

You revise your beliefs when you see they clash with your
observations. This is what science is about.

Forgive my obtuseness, but how is it that scientists, let alone plain ol' common
folk, can ever get clear that they aren't just choosing to revise what they
observe (pay attention to) whenever they perceive a clash with their beliefs?

To take great liberties in paraphrasing Max Planck when asked how it was that
ideas seemingly evolve/progress within a community of scientists: '...those who
believe in the old ideas die off." Or was it Neils Bohr? Or did I just make it up?

Thanks,

Greg

8

[Martin Taylor 981228 10:15]

[From Rick Marken (981227.2010)]

Bruce Gregory (981226.1627 EDT)--

Beliefs are not reference levels.

Bill Powers (981227.1020 MST) --

I contend that they are, where they are not simply imagined
perceptions. It is very useful to look upon one's own beliefs
in this way.

Try interpreting some other beliefs this way and see if it
doesn't make sense.

I agree that a belief (one that is not simply an imagined
perception, like the belief in a god or gods) is a reference
signal;

Bruce Gregory seems to be taking these comments as saying that beliefs are
always reference levels. I admit that on first reading, I also read them
as saying that beliefs are reference levels. But now I re-read them
differently. Both Rick and Bill now seem to me to be saying that
a belief can be an imagined perception, and that like any controllable
perception, it can be brought toward and maintained near a reference level.
Their wording, I grant, makes it sound as if they think the reference
belief is the more important, but what is a reference for if not as
something against which to compare an actual value?

In standard PCT, all that is controlled is a value of a signal. The
(perceptual) signal is greater or less than another (reference) signal,
and that is all we know about them. Any labels applied to them are not
components of the signals themselves. A signal does not know that it is
a reference or a perception. It just _is_.

We, as external analysts, characterize perceptual signals and their
comparable reference signals according to the kinds of perception we
conceive the signal value to represent. Some are "intensities," others
are "sequences" or "principles." In the present discussion, I seem to
hear distant echoes of a tendency to install a new level, a "belief"
level. I'm not sure I like that tendency, even though it may prove correct
in the long run. I have a different view.

There are a few words in PCT that have technical meanings. Perceptual
Signal and Reference Signal are two. I do not believe that Belief Signal
has (yet) been accorded a technical meaning. Rick has read my Layered
Protocol papers for the IJHCS special issue, and has not complained about
my characterization (I should not say definition) of "belief" as a set of
interacting perceptions in imagination. They are perceptions of aspects
of the available environmental feedback functions. This does not make
belief a new level of perception, but allows it to occur at any level
for which the imagination loop is effective.

(Perhaps this also ensures that a belief can become available to conscious
perception--but that's another thread entirely).

Summary:
(1) Where there's a reference signal, there's a perceptual signal
for which it is a reference, so if there is a reference signal properly
labelled "belief," so also there is a perceptual signal properly labelled
"belief."

(2) Ordinarily in PCT, it is the perceptual signals that are available to
conscious perception, so when we perceive that we have a belief, we would
normally refer to the perceptual signal, not the corresponding reference
signal.

(3) In everyday language, a belief refers to a presently perceived state
of the world (particularly a perception of the way the world works--i.e. of
some of the available environmental feedback functions). What I would
like to believe of the world relates to my current belief in the same way
as a reference perception relates to a current perception.

(4) If "belief" relates to the environmental feedback functions of the
world, it is tied into the imagination loop. In fact, it seems to me that
if defines the operation of one or more imagination loops.

(Point 4 is, of course, rather more speculative than the others, but it
alone argues for the use of a specific new word to describe, technically,
a specific kind of perceptual--and reference--signal. And I haven't ignored
the complexities of trying to control one's imagined perceptions of the
world's environmental feedback functions. It's a problem.)

Martin

9

[From Bruce Gregory (981218.1140 EDT)]

Rick Marken (981228.0800)

Bruce Gregory (981228.0820 EDT)--

> like Martin, I think a belief is a perception. What you are
> really controlling for, it seems to me, is for your beliefs to
> match your perceptions that contain a minimum of imagination.

So perceptions are references and beliefs are perceptions? Could
you draw a diagram of your model of belief?

If you can diagram an imagined perception, I will use it to illustrate a
belief.

> You revise your beliefs when you see they clash with your
> observations.

So you revise your perceptions (beliefs) when you see (have
perceptions) that they clash with your observations (perceptions)?
I guess I don't really understand your model of belief. Maybe a
diagram would help.

I believe (imagined perception) that it is raining in LA. You tell me that
it is in fact sunny in LA. My imagined perception conflicts with your
report. If I am controlling for consistency between my imagined perceptions
and the reports of observations I receive, I can do one of two things. I can
revise my imagined perception or I can deny that your report is accurate. In
this case, revising my belief has few costs. I do not have a great system of
imagined perceptions whose consistency depends upon it raining in LA. So I
revise my imagined perception. I don't know how PCT models this process, but
I know how to do it.

Bruce Gregory

10

[From Rick Marken (981228.0940)]

Bruce Gregory (981218.1140 EDT)

If you can diagram an imagined perception, I will use it to
illustrate a belief.

        >
        v
   ---| C |---
  > >
>S> >O>
   \ /|
  > s2--p'-s1 |
  p |
  > > System
.....................
  ^ | Environment
  > >
  qi<---------

The system shown must be level 2 or higher. s1 and s2 are
neural switches (see the "Memory" chapter in B:CP). If both
switches are "thrown" to the positions shown in the diagram
then the system's output is fed right back into its input; it
perceives (p') what it wants; p' is an imagined perception
because it is not a representation of variables in the
external environment. This

I believe (imagined perception) that it is raining in LA. You
tell me that it is in fact sunny in LA.

These are two imagined perceptions. The only real perception
is your perception of what I tell you.

My imagined perception conflicts with your report.

What is the mechanism that creates this "conflict"?

If I am controlling for consistency between my imagined
perceptions and the reports of observations I receive, I can
do one of two things.

Ah, so you have a reference for consistency between perceptions.
You are controlling for consistency. Apparently you _believe_
that consistency is important; you have a reference for
consistency: belief = reference.

Best

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313
Life Learning Associates e-mail: rmarken@earthlink.net
http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken

11

[From Bruce Gregory (981228.1255 EDT)]

Rick Marken (981228.0940)

Ah, so you have a reference for consistency between perceptions.
You are controlling for consistency. Apparently you _believe_
that consistency is important; you have a reference for
consistency: belief = reference.

If you wish to say that any time I control a perception I believe in the
reference signal that I am comparing the perception to, I have no objection.
Belief is then a technical PCT term that differs from everyday usage. In
this usage, Republicans do not believe that lying under oath is unacceptable
because they do not use "lying under oath is unacceptable" as a reference
signal when they control for confirming Supreme Court Justices. Republicans
believe that Bill Clinton must be removed from office by whatever means
available. Republicans, however, apparently believe that is appropriate to
_say_ that lying under oath is unacceptable because this is what they say
and they resist efforts to make them say otherwise (mentioning Clarence
Thomas).

To say that I believe that the earth orbits the sun is apparently
misleading. What I should say is that I believe it is appropriate to say
that the earth orbits the sun, because this is what I do say and, like
Galileo, I resist efforts to make me say otherwise.

Bruce Gregory

12

[From Bruce Gregory (981228.1435 EST)]

Greg Wierzbicki (981228.1030 EST)

Forgive my obtuseness, but how is it that scientists, let alone
plain ol' common
folk, can ever get clear that they aren't just choosing to revise
what they
observe (pay attention to) whenever they perceive a clash with
their beliefs?

Can you distinguish between what you observe and the scheme you use to
explain what you observe?. Admittedly many people cannot make this
distinction. For this reason, many people are not scientists.

To take great liberties in paraphrasing Max Planck when asked how
it was that
ideas seemingly evolve/progress within a community of scientists:
'...those who
believe in the old ideas die off." Or was it Neils Bohr? Or did
I just make it up?

I have the thought that Max Planck said something to that effect.

Bruce Gregory

13

[From Bruce Gregory (981228.1500 EST)]

Rick Marken (981228.0940)

If I understand you correctly, we can only infer our beliefs from our
actions. This is fine by me. In fact, I recall that I tried to make exactly
this point in the past.

Bruce Gregory

14

[From Rick Marken (981228.1130)]

Bruce Gregory (981228.1255 EDT)

To say that I believe that the earth orbits the sun is apparently
misleading. What I should say is that I believe it is appropriate
to say that the earth orbits the sun, because this is what I do
say and, like Galileo, I resist efforts to make me say otherwise.

Your belief that the earth orbits the sun is the reference state
of an imagined perception. this belief could function as a
reference signal (as it did for Galileo) if you became a scientist.
In that case, you would try to make observations (produce perceptions)
that match this reference.

A good example of belief as (non-revisable) reference signal
is the Church's belief that the sun orbits the earth. The
Church, unconstrained by the rules of science, had no trouble
producing perceptions consistent with that belief, protecting
those perceptions from disturbances like Galileo and Copernicus.

Best

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313
Life Learning Associates e-mail: rmarken@earthlink.net
http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken

15

[From Bruce Gregory (981228.1545 EST)]

Rick Marken (981228.1130)

Bruce Gregory (981228.1255 EDT)

> To say that I believe that the earth orbits the sun is apparently
> misleading. What I should say is that I believe it is appropriate
> to say that the earth orbits the sun, because this is what I do
> say and, like Galileo, I resist efforts to make me say otherwise.

Your belief that the earth orbits the sun is the reference state
of an imagined perception. this belief could function as a
reference signal (as it did for Galileo) if you became a scientist.
In that case, you would try to make observations (produce perceptions)
that match this reference.

But since I cannot perceive a reference state (or to put it another way, a
reference state is not a perception) I must infer its existence from my
actions. It is only by noticing that I am carrying out observations
(producing perceptions, and noticing the models I use to interpret them),
that I can infer my beliefs (reference states).

A good example of belief as (non-revisable) reference signal
is the Church's belief that the sun orbits the earth. The
Church, unconstrained by the rules of science, had no trouble
producing perceptions consistent with that belief, protecting
those perceptions from disturbances like Galileo and Copernicus.

Again the Church infers that it believes that the sun orbits the earth by
observing that it prosecutes people like Galileo. The church has privileged
access to its perceptions, but not to its reference signals. It must infer
them exactly the way we do. Unless, of course, there is a system outside the
HPCT system that observes the reference states in the hierarchy. Are you
proposing such a system?

Bruce Gregory

16

[From Rick Marken (981228.1420)]

Bruce Gregory (981228.1500 EST) --

If I understand you correctly, we can only infer our beliefs
from our actions.

No. We know what we believe. I know what I believe, anyway.
All I'm saying is that beliefs can acts as references for
perceptions. If you believe that X= 10 then this belief is
acting as a reference when you try to perceive X = 10; if you
perceive X = 9 then that's an error and you will do what you
can to make what you perceive match what you _believe_ you
should perceive.

Bruce Gregory (981228.1545 EST)--

But since I cannot perceive a reference state

Look at my diagram:

        >
        v
   ---| C |--- Level 2
  > >
>S> >O>
   \ /|
  > s2--p'-s1 |
  p |
  > > System
.....................
  ^ | Environment
  > >
  qi<---------

The output of the level 2 system (the output of |O|) is the
reference input to lower level systems (not shown). So when
you are perceiving p' you are perceiving the reference
for the lower level system's controlled perception, p.

Again the Church infers that it believes that the sun orbits
the earth by observing that it prosecutes people like Galileo.

The Church doesn't have to infer anything in order to control
for it's belief in an earth centered universe. The Church
(actually, the Pope) _did_ believe in an earth centered universe,
he knew he believed in an earth centered universe, he even knew
_why_ he believed in an earth centered universe (to control
for the principle of biblical inerrancy) and, fortunately, we
have a pretty good record of the lengths to which he would go
to control for that belief.

Best

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313
Life Learning Associates e-mail: rmarken@earthlink.net
http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken

17

[From Bruce Gregory (981228.1905)]

Rick Marken (981228.1420)

Bruce Gregory (981228.1500 EST) --

> If I understand you correctly, we can only infer our beliefs
> from our actions.

No. We know what we believe. I know what I believe, anyway.

I'm sure you'll explain this to me...

All I'm saying is that beliefs can acts as references for
perceptions. If you believe that X= 10 then this belief is
acting as a reference when you try to perceive X = 10; if you
perceive X = 9 then that's an error and you will do what you
can to make what you perceive match what you _believe_ you
should perceive.

So I am constantly trying to modify my perceptions to make them match my
beliefs. "I'll see that when I believe it" is a perfect candidate for the
PCT motto. Now I understand why no one questioned George Bush's claim that
race had nothing to do with the Clarence Thomas appointment, he was simply
the most qualified person in the country for the job. That's what George
wanted to believe and that's what he perceived. Too bad they don't extend
the same charity to Clinton. He wanted to believe he didn't have sex with
Monica, so that's what he perceived. If only the Republican's understood
PCT...

Bruce Gregory (981228.1545 EST)--

> But since I cannot perceive a reference state

Look at my diagram:

        >
        v
   ---| C |--- Level 2
  > >
>S> >O>
   \ /|
  > s2--p'-s1 |
  p |
  > > System
.....................
  ^ | Environment
  > >
  qi<---------

The output of the level 2 system (the output of |O|) is the
reference input to lower level systems (not shown). So when
you are perceiving p' you are perceiving the reference
for the lower level system's controlled perception, p.

So the way to know your beliefs is to cut yourself off from the experienced
world and imagine it the way you want it to be. That should catch on.

> Again the Church infers that it believes that the sun orbits
> the earth by observing that it prosecutes people like Galileo.

The Church doesn't have to infer anything in order to control
for it's belief in an earth centered universe. The Church
(actually, the Pope) _did_ believe in an earth centered universe,

He discovered this by going into imagination mode, I take it.

he knew he believed in an earth centered universe,

Ditto.

he even knew
_why_ he believed in an earth centered universe (to control
for the principle of biblical inerrancy)

I'll have to take your word for it.

and, fortunately, we
have a pretty good record of the lengths to which he would go
to control for that belief.

Again I'll have to take your word for it. Nobody said understanding PCT
would be easy.

Bruce Gregory

"I'll see that when I believe it."

18

[From Rick Marken (981228.2050)]

Me:

We know what we believe. I know what I believe, anyway.

Bruce Gregory (981228.1905) --

I'm sure you'll explain this to me...

What's to explain? If you asked me if I believed in god or a
heliocentric solar system or PCT I would be able to answer you.
Don't you know what you believe?

So I am constantly trying to modify my perceptions to make them
match my beliefs.

Yes. If your beliefs are references.

"I'll see that when I believe it"

If you want to turn the PCT view of belief into a slogan I think
a better slogan would be "I see it _because_ I believe it".

Me:

The output of the level 2 system (the output of |O|) is the
reference input to lower level systems (not shown). So when
you are perceiving p' you are perceiving the reference
for the lower level system's controlled perception, p.

Ye:

So the way to know your beliefs is to cut yourself off from
the experienced world and imagine it the way you want it to be.

Basicaly, yes. It's called "thinking".

That should catch on.

I think it already has. People who believe in god imagine (think)
that there is some kind of god; they don't perceive it; they
imagine it. People who believe in PCT imagine (think) that the
nervous system consists of reference neurons carrying signals that
specify the desired value of the signals carried by afferent
(perceptual) neurons; we don't perceive this; we just imagine it.

Me:

The Church doesn't have to infer anything in order to control
for it's belief in an earth centered universe. The Church
(actually, the Pope) _did_ believe in an earth centered universe,

Ye:

He discovered this by going into imagination mode, I take it.

I presume so. He knew what he was _thinking_. I think it's a
little odd to say that people "discover" what they believe.
My experience is that one's beleifs are just there -- like
one's perceptions.

Nobody said understanding PCT would be easy.

What's so hard about it? PCT explains the phenomenon of
belief. Looking at _some_ beliefs as reference signals
explains why we see people acting to protect their beliefs
from disturbance. It explains, for example, why some people
will work hard to protect their belief in creationism from
the overwhelming disturbance that is the evidence of evolution.
According to PCT, it's not because these people are stupid;
it's because they are control systems -- very good control
systems.

Best

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313
Life Learning Associates e-mail: rmarken@earthlink.net
http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken/

19

[From Bruce Gregory (981229.0805 EST)]

Rick Marken (981228.2050)

What's to explain? If you asked me if I believed in god or a
heliocentric solar system or PCT I would be able to answer you.
Don't you know what you believe?

No. But I do know what I think, if that helps at all. I also know what I
say.

If you want to turn the PCT view of belief into a slogan I think
a better slogan would be "I see it _because_ I believe it".

It's not easy to tell science from religion, is it? Simply different
beliefs, I guess.

> So the way to know your beliefs is to cut yourself off from
> the experienced world and imagine it the way you want it to be.

Basically, yes. It's called "thinking".

But how can I tell a thought from a belief? Or are all thoughts beliefs? Or
doesn't it matter?

I think it already has. People who believe in god imagine (think)
that there is some kind of god; they don't perceive it; they
imagine it. People who believe in PCT imagine (think) that the
nervous system consists of reference neurons carrying signals that
specify the desired value of the signals carried by afferent
(perceptual) neurons; we don't perceive this; we just imagine it.

The way you imagine me, for example.

I presume so. He knew what he was _thinking_. I think it's a
little odd to say that people "discover" what they believe.
My experience is that one's beliefs are just there -- like
one's perceptions.

My thoughts differ considerably from my perceptions, but I may unusual.

What's so hard about it? PCT explains the phenomenon of
belief. Looking at _some_ beliefs as reference signals
explains why we see people acting to protect their beliefs
from disturbance.

How can I tell a belief that is a reference signal from one that isn't? Does
it come with a neural tag? Can I just think and will the beliefs that are
reference systems pop up to let me know their status?

It explains, for example, why some people
will work hard to protect their belief in creationism from
the overwhelming disturbance that is the evidence of evolution.
According to PCT, it's not because these people are stupid;
it's because they are control systems -- very good control
systems.

You and Ken Starr are living demonstrations of this principle. Of course you
will see in this statement whatever your beliefs dictate, just as I saw in
yours whatever mine dictate. I must admit this viewpoint makes it a lot
easier to understand CSGnet.

Bruce Gregory

"I'll see that because I believe it." RM

20

[From Rick Marken (981229.0840)]

Me:

Don't you know what you believe?

Bruce Gregory (981229.0805 EST) --

No.

I bet you do. Here's a list. See if you can answer "yes" to
any of these.

1. I believe for every drop of rain that falls a flower grows.

2. I believe that living systems have evolved to their current
forms over millions of years by some as yet unknown mechanism.

3. I believe that god created life in one 24 hour day.

4. I believe that Rick Marken is obsessed with being right.

5. I believe that it will be 80 degrees and sunny tommorrow.

It's not easy to tell science from religion, is it? Simply
different beliefs, I guess.

I think it's very easy to tell science from religion. Scientific
beliefs (references) are _revisable_ based on observable evidence.
Scientific beliefs are _tentative_; this means that scientific
beliefs must be set by higher level control systems that are
more interested in principles like "true understanding" than in
the specific beliefs (the specific setting of the lower level
references) themselves.

But how can I tell a thought from a belief?

I don't know. How can you tell a dog from a cat? I don't
know _how_ I can tell (that's a job for theory); I just
know the difference experientially.

My thoughts differ considerably from my perceptions, but I
may unusual.

I can (usually) tell the difference between my thoughts and
my perceptions (this difference seems to break in dreams).
But my thoughts involve the same dimensions of experience as
my perceptions; I think (just as I perceive) in terms of
sensations (colors, tones), configurations (shapes, timbres),
transitions (movements, trills), sequences, events, programs,
principles, etc. Don't you?

How can I tell a belief that is a reference signal from one
that isn't?

A belief that is a reference signal specifies a perceptual
state of affairs that you work to protect from disturbance. For
example, you seem to believe that beliefs are not references
for controlled variables; you are acting to protect a perception
that corresponds to that belief from the disturbance of the
things I say. I believe that beliefs often _are_ references for
controlled variables; I am obviously acting to protect a
perception that corresponds to that belief from disturbance.

Me:

It [the PCT theory of belief] explains, for example, why some
people will work hard to protect their belief in creationism from
the overwhelming disturbance that is the evidence of evolution.
According to PCT, it's not because these people are stupid;
it's because they are control systems -- very good control
systems.

Ye:

You and Ken Starr are living demonstrations of this principle.

Now you're getting it! In fact, every human is a living
demonstration of this principle. I am _exactly_ like Ken Starr
in this way (as are you and everyone else; one of the most
important things to learn from PCT is that we are _all_
controllers). Starr believes that Clinton is the anti-Christ
and Starr is acting to protect that belief from disturbance. I
believe that PCT is the correct model of human nature and I
am acting to protect that belief from disturbance.

The only difference between Ken and me (other than the obvious,
superficial ones -- Ken can't help the way he looks;-)) is that
I (actually, other control systems in me) actively subject my
belief in PCT to the disturbance of experimental test because
higher level systems in me are willing to _revise_ my belief
in PCT if the results of those experimental tests prove to be
insuperable disturbances. Starr does not appear to be willing
to subject his own beliefs to experimental test or to revise
those beliefs based on the outcome of those tests. Both Starr
and I have beliefs that are reference signals -- but my belief
is revisable (scientific) on the basis of experimental evidence;
Starr's beliefs do not appear to be revisable (they are
religious beliefs); they cannot be revised _in principle_ (the
principle, of course, being that certain things must be
_absolutely_ true).

Best

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313
Life Learning Associates e-mail: rmarken@earthlink.net
http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken