calculation; control vs modeling

CSGnet Archive CSG2009
1

[from Tracy B. Harms (2009-07-22 17:17 Pacific)]

Today I've been in conversation, via Twitter, with someone I know only
as "fustbariclation" over behavior, and esp. how to construe what is
accomplished at the neural level. It began with two "tweets" by him:

F: Logic is fundamental to our, & other animals, operation, but ¬ to
our conscious thinking, emotion is actually our driver. It helps to
know.
F: Logic is a useful moderator to our more instinctive operation a
wise person uses it as a tool, ¬master, but a valuable, servant.

My initial comment was, alas, rather opaque:

TH: You wrote "Logic is fundamental to our, & other animals,
operation". Can't imagine how this could be so.

He replied:

F: try catching a ball or chasing down a gazelle without logic.
F: Deciding to chase a gazelle without an implicit understanding of,
the law of the excluded middle (is it a gazelle ∨¬) leaves a hungry
lion.

My response to that was:

TH: Balls are caught without applying logic, like they're caught w/o calculus.
TH: It's possible to apply logic to ball-catching or gazelle-chasing,
but that's different.
TH: For a logic-free model of behavior, see Perceptual Control Theory.
http://www.perceptualcontroltheory.org/

Fustbariclation came back with this:

F: I'm aware of that. Perceptual Control Theory, to me, doesn't
exclude logic, just shows it embedded, which is my point, rather.
F: we're talking about logic in different senses. Clearly there's no
symbolic logic in animal behaviour, but it's implicitly applied
F: yes, balls are caught, as I've been saying, w/o conscious calculus,
but the brain performs calculus to do it.
F: brains, solve problems using logic & calculus as embedded
processes. We don't have conscious access to these mechanisms.
F: if we could access our own internal circuitry, we could think like
Mr Spock & calculate like savants, but, mainly, we don't.

TH: I recognize that they're mainstream, but I reject claims that the
brain performs calculus to coordinate movement.
TH: If true, that *would* imply that "if we could access our own
internal circuitry" we'd have computer-like calc. abilities.

F: yes, we would. I think that 'Idiot Savants' establish that this is
actually, surprisingly, the case.

TH: The processes don't, I'm confident, involve that manner of
calculation. Instead, we find error-dampening loops.

F: yeah, call them error dampening loops. These loops are cunning
methods of solving differential equations. prove me wrong.
F: what do you mean by 'performs calculus'? You can solve differential
equations with analogue computers - like brains.
F: now here's the real question: If the brain doesn't coordinate
movements through a calculus, how does it do it?
F: 'that manner of calculation'. No, of course ¬, no maths symbols
used for a start. But an isomorphic calculation by def. ≡ results

TH: Idea that nerve system calculates numeric results is akin to
thinking genes directly encode behavior.

F: analogue systems do calculate numerical results. They don't produce
spreadsheets, certainly, but that's not the correct measure.
F: maybe you should confess you're real objection. Robot & tiger catch
a ball; do you argue one magic, one calculation?

As things stand the dialog seems at risk of breaking down. CSGnet folk
will correctly anticipate that I don't see a different process for
("closed-loop") robots and tigers.I do recognize that what goes on
within an active control system is calculation. I thought (and still
think) he was asserting that what goes on in behavior is the
calculation of modeling, and that if we had some sort of privileged
perspective into the neural networks we'd be able to find the
correlates of values that represent qualities of something in the
environment *other than* perception of the controlled aspects of the
environment.

Perhaps I've dug myself into a hole and have no better course than to
accept that values are computed, implicitly and/or structurally, via
control systems. But, instead, I hope I can bring out my concern about
the flawed idea I think I see here: that when things are accomplished
it is by way of calculating values other than those indicated for PCT
components.

As I'm unsure how to try to get this point across, I'm interested in
any advice or criticism that might be offered here. Thanks!

Tracy

2

(Gavin Ritz 2009.07.23.14.37NZT)

[from Tracy B. Harms (2009-07-22 17:17 Pacific)]

Tracy

Logic is very much fundamental to human thinking. I don’t see anywhere in PCT that rejects it, in fact it is in the Levels of PCT. Maybe not so clearly but it's there. I've found four logic operators within HPCT.

Anyway logic in thinking and human action has been proved by Elliot Jaques in Requisite Organization Theory. Which has specific means to measure logic.

Let me give you an example of logic in your paragraph below. You used two variables (in a conversation with someone I know) "and" (construe at neural levels). In your writing which is a behaviour by the way. In that sentence you used the "and" logic operator.

Your friend also used logic in his next sentence (catching a ball) "or" (chasing down a gazelle). LEM just says I can't be a dog and a man at the same time. Which I could easy argue I very well may be. But that's another level of logic.

Logic is the very foundation of Quantum Mechanics.

Logic by the way is the very foundation of maths "Not" the other way around, Boolean logic. As you have argued below.

Everything we design, create, model and theorise is just a mental projection. So it must contain logic. It’s if-and-only-if connected variables in parallel. That is bi-conditional variables.

It's the very problem of the axioms of our models. Godel's Theorem proved that.

Regards
Gavin

Today I've been in conversation, via Twitter, with someone I know only
as "fustbariclation" over behavior, and esp. how to construe what is
accomplished at the neural level. It began with two "tweets" by him:

F: Logic is fundamental to our, & other animals, operation, but ¬ to
our conscious thinking, emotion is actually our driver. It helps to
know.
F: Logic is a useful moderator to our more instinctive operation a
wise person uses it as a tool, ¬master, but a valuable, servant.

My initial comment was, alas, rather opaque:

TH: You wrote "Logic is fundamental to our, & other animals,
operation". Can't imagine how this could be so.

He replied:

F: try catching a ball or chasing down a gazelle without logic.
F: Deciding to chase a gazelle without an implicit understanding of,
the law of the excluded middle (is it a gazelle ∨¬) leaves a hungry
lion.

My response to that was:

TH: Balls are caught without applying logic, like they're caught w/o calculus.
TH: It's possible to apply logic to ball-catching or gazelle-chasing,
but that's different.
TH: For a logic-free model of behavior, see Perceptual Control Theory.
http://www.perceptualcontroltheory.org/

Fustbariclation came back with this:

F: I'm aware of that. Perceptual Control Theory, to me, doesn't
exclude logic, just shows it embedded, which is my point, rather.
F: we're talking about logic in different senses. Clearly there's no
symbolic logic in animal behaviour, but it's implicitly applied
F: yes, balls are caught, as I've been saying, w/o conscious calculus,
but the brain performs calculus to do it.
F: brains, solve problems using logic & calculus as embedded
processes. We don't have conscious access to these mechanisms.
F: if we could access our own internal circuitry, we could think like
Mr Spock & calculate like savants, but, mainly, we don't.

TH: I recognize that they're mainstream, but I reject claims that the
brain performs calculus to coordinate movement.
TH: If true, that *would* imply that "if we could access our own
internal circuitry" we'd have computer-like calc. abilities.

F: yes, we would. I think that 'Idiot Savants' establish that this is
actually, surprisingly, the case.

TH: The processes don't, I'm confident, involve that manner of
calculation. Instead, we find error-dampening loops.

F: yeah, call them error dampening loops. These loops are cunning
methods of solving differential equations. prove me wrong.
F: what do you mean by 'performs calculus'? You can solve differential
equations with analogue computers - like brains.
F: now here's the real question: If the brain doesn't coordinate
movements through a calculus, how does it do it?
F: 'that manner of calculation'. No, of course ¬, no maths symbols
used for a start. But an isomorphic calculation by def. ≡ results

TH: Idea that nerve system calculates numeric results is akin to
thinking genes directly encode behavior.

F: analogue systems do calculate numerical results. They don't produce
spreadsheets, certainly, but that's not the correct measure.
F: maybe you should confess you're real objection. Robot & tiger catch
a ball; do you argue one magic, one calculation?

As things stand the dialog seems at risk of breaking down. CSGnet folk
will correctly anticipate that I don't see a different process for
("closed-loop") robots and tigers.I do recognize that what goes on
within an active control system is calculation. I thought (and still
think) he was asserting that what goes on in behavior is the
calculation of modeling, and that if we had some sort of privileged
perspective into the neural networks we'd be able to find the
correlates of values that represent qualities of something in the
environment *other than* perception of the controlled aspects of the
environment.

Perhaps I've dug myself into a hole and have no better course than to
accept that values are computed, implicitly and/or structurally, via
control systems. But, instead, I hope I can bring out my concern about
the flawed idea I think I see here: that when things are accomplished
it is by way of calculating values other than those indicated for PCT
components.

As I'm unsure how to try to get this point across, I'm interested in
any advice or criticism that might be offered here. Thanks!

Tracy

3

[From Fred Nickols (2009.07.23.0735 EDT)]

Tracy:

I don't think you can do what he's asked you to do which is prove him wrong. He holds a belief that, according to him, would require access we don't have to prove him right or wrong. I can't think of anything that would cause him to give up his belief. He seems fixated on the brain as computer. You might have some fun asking him who programmed it.

···

--
Regards,

Fred Nickols
Managing Partner
Distance Consulting, LLC
nickols@att.net
www.nickols.us

"Assistance at A Distance"
  
-------------- Original message ----------------------
From: Tracy Harms <kaleidic@GMAIL.COM>

[from Tracy B. Harms (2009-07-22 17:17 Pacific)]

Today I've been in conversation, via Twitter, with someone I know only
as "fustbariclation" over behavior, and esp. how to construe what is
accomplished at the neural level. It began with two "tweets" by him:

F: Logic is fundamental to our, & other animals, operation, but ¬ to
our conscious thinking, emotion is actually our driver. It helps to
know.
F: Logic is a useful moderator to our more instinctive operation a
wise person uses it as a tool, ¬master, but a valuable, servant.

My initial comment was, alas, rather opaque:

TH: You wrote "Logic is fundamental to our, & other animals,
operation". Can't imagine how this could be so.

He replied:

F: try catching a ball or chasing down a gazelle without logic.
F: Deciding to chase a gazelle without an implicit understanding of,
the law of the excluded middle (is it a gazelle ∨¬) leaves a hungry
lion.

My response to that was:

TH: Balls are caught without applying logic, like they're caught w/o calculus.
TH: It's possible to apply logic to ball-catching or gazelle-chasing,
but that's different.
TH: For a logic-free model of behavior, see Perceptual Control Theory.
http://www.perceptualcontroltheory.org/

Fustbariclation came back with this:

F: I'm aware of that. Perceptual Control Theory, to me, doesn't
exclude logic, just shows it embedded, which is my point, rather.
F: we're talking about logic in different senses. Clearly there's no
symbolic logic in animal behaviour, but it's implicitly applied
F: yes, balls are caught, as I've been saying, w/o conscious calculus,
but the brain performs calculus to do it.
F: brains, solve problems using logic & calculus as embedded
processes. We don't have conscious access to these mechanisms.
F: if we could access our own internal circuitry, we could think like
Mr Spock & calculate like savants, but, mainly, we don't.

TH: I recognize that they're mainstream, but I reject claims that the
brain performs calculus to coordinate movement.
TH: If true, that *would* imply that "if we could access our own
internal circuitry" we'd have computer-like calc. abilities.

F: yes, we would. I think that 'Idiot Savants' establish that this is
actually, surprisingly, the case.

TH: The processes don't, I'm confident, involve that manner of
calculation. Instead, we find error-dampening loops.

F: yeah, call them error dampening loops. These loops are cunning
methods of solving differential equations. prove me wrong.
F: what do you mean by 'performs calculus'? You can solve differential
equations with analogue computers - like brains.
F: now here's the real question: If the brain doesn't coordinate
movements through a calculus, how does it do it?
F: 'that manner of calculation'. No, of course ¬, no maths symbols
used for a start. But an isomorphic calculation by def. ≡ results

TH: Idea that nerve system calculates numeric results is akin to
thinking genes directly encode behavior.

F: analogue systems do calculate numerical results. They don't produce
spreadsheets, certainly, but that's not the correct measure.
F: maybe you should confess you're real objection. Robot & tiger catch
a ball; do you argue one magic, one calculation?

As things stand the dialog seems at risk of breaking down. CSGnet folk
will correctly anticipate that I don't see a different process for
("closed-loop") robots and tigers.I do recognize that what goes on
within an active control system is calculation. I thought (and still
think) he was asserting that what goes on in behavior is the
calculation of modeling, and that if we had some sort of privileged
perspective into the neural networks we'd be able to find the
correlates of values that represent qualities of something in the
environment *other than* perception of the controlled aspects of the
environment.

Perhaps I've dug myself into a hole and have no better course than to
accept that values are computed, implicitly and/or structurally, via
control systems. But, instead, I hope I can bring out my concern about
the flawed idea I think I see here: that when things are accomplished
it is by way of calculating values other than those indicated for PCT
components.

As I'm unsure how to try to get this point across, I'm interested in
any advice or criticism that might be offered here. Thanks!

Tracy

4

[From Bill Powers (2009.07.23.0826 MDT)]

Tracy B. Harms (2009-07-22 17:17 Pacific) --

Today I've been in conversation, via Twitter, with someone I know only
as "fustbariclation" over behavior, and esp. how to construe what is
accomplished at the neural level.

The problem here is that computation is in the eye of the beholder. An analog computer does the equivalent of a computation, but without any actual stepwise computation. The components just interact according to their physical properties. The human observer, who has a program level of perception, can see the result in imagination as the same sort of result we would get by manipulating symbols, but since the analog computer doesn't do it that way, that's a mistake.

I have suggested that raindrops operate by using the TOTE unit:

1. Test: Have I hit the ground yet?

    Operate: No: Fall some more, go to 1
             Yes: go to 2

2. Exit: Splat!

Best,

Bill P.

5

[from Tracy B. Harms (2009-07-28 17:10 Pacific)]

Hi Gavin,

I've postponed replying to your comments because it looks to be
difficult, and now that I turn to it I find this difficulty is more
than I'm inclined to surmount. What I'll do instead is note it so that
we may move on.

There isn't anything in PCT that rejects logic. Nor, in my evaluation,
is there any portion of PCT that relies on, it in the sense that a
control system must rely upon logic to function. Logic may be applied
in crafting control systems in a great many ways, but we can't expect
to dissect a fruit fly such that we're able to point to component
structures as constituting existential or universal claims.

It is not perceptual control theory, but critical rationalism, to
which we can attribute my ideas that logic is too often assigned an
unfortunately inflated role. Some PCTers rely heavily on CR, some
don't. My distrust of emphasis on logic is part of a wider distrust
regarding common ideas as to the nature of reasoning, rationality, and
argument. If you're interested in gory details, David Miller's
paper"Do We Reason When We Think We Reason, or Do We Think?" is a fine
starting point:
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/philosophy/staff/miller/lfd-.pdf
(note PDF format).

Regards,

Tracy Harms

···

On Wed, Jul 22, 2009 at 8:01 PM, Gavin Ritz<garritz@xtra.co.nz> wrote:

(Gavin Ritz 2009.07.23.14.37NZT)

[from Tracy B. Harms (2009-07-22 17:17 Pacific)]

Tracy

Logic is very much fundamental to human thinking. I don’t see anywhere in PCT that rejects it, in fact it is in the Levels of PCT. Maybe not so clearly but it's there. I've found four logic operators within HPCT.

Anyway logic in thinking and human action has been proved by Elliot Jaques in Requisite Organization Theory. Which has specific means to measure logic.

Let me give you an example of logic in your paragraph below. You used two variables (in a conversation with someone I know) "and" (construe at neural levels). In your writing which is a behaviour by the way. In that sentence you used the "and" logic operator.

Your friend also used logic in his next sentence (catching a ball) "or" (chasing down a gazelle). LEM just says I can't be a dog and a man at the same time. Which I could easy argue I very well may be. But that's another level of logic.

Logic is the very foundation of Quantum Mechanics.

Logic by the way is the very foundation of maths "Not" the other way around, Boolean logic. As you have argued below.

Everything we design, create, model and theorise is just a mental projection. So it must contain logic. It’s if-and-only-if connected variables in parallel. That is bi-conditional variables.

It's the very problem of the axioms of our models. Godel's Theorem proved that.

Regards
Gavin

Today I've been in conversation, via Twitter, with someone I know only
as "fustbariclation" over behavior, and esp. how to construe what is
accomplished at the neural level. It began with two "tweets" by him:

F: Logic is fundamental to our, & other animals, operation, but ¬ to
our conscious thinking, emotion is actually our driver. It helps to
know.
F: Logic is a useful moderator to our more instinctive operation a
wise person uses it as a tool, ¬master, but a valuable, servant.

My initial comment was, alas, rather opaque:

TH: You wrote "Logic is fundamental to our, & other animals,
operation". Can't imagine how this could be so.

He replied:

F: try catching a ball or chasing down a gazelle without logic.
F: Deciding to chase a gazelle without an implicit understanding of,
the law of the excluded middle (is it a gazelle ∨¬) leaves a hungry
lion.

My response to that was:

TH: Balls are caught without applying logic, like they're caught w/o calculus.
TH: It's possible to apply logic to ball-catching or gazelle-chasing,
but that's different.
TH: For a logic-free model of behavior, see Perceptual Control Theory.
http://www.perceptualcontroltheory.org/

Fustbariclation came back with this:

F: I'm aware of that. Perceptual Control Theory, to me, doesn't
exclude logic, just shows it embedded, which is my point, rather.
F: we're talking about logic in different senses. Clearly there's no
symbolic logic in animal behaviour, but it's implicitly applied
F: yes, balls are caught, as I've been saying, w/o conscious calculus,
but the brain performs calculus to do it.
F: brains, solve problems using logic & calculus as embedded
processes. We don't have conscious access to these mechanisms.
F: if we could access our own internal circuitry, we could think like
Mr Spock & calculate like savants, but, mainly, we don't.

TH: I recognize that they're mainstream, but I reject claims that the
brain performs calculus to coordinate movement.
TH: If true, that *would* imply that "if we could access our own
internal circuitry" we'd have computer-like calc. abilities.

F: yes, we would. I think that 'Idiot Savants' establish that this is
actually, surprisingly, the case.

TH: The processes don't, I'm confident, involve that manner of
calculation. Instead, we find error-dampening loops.

F: yeah, call them error dampening loops. These loops are cunning
methods of solving differential equations. prove me wrong.
F: what do you mean by 'performs calculus'? You can solve differential
equations with analogue computers - like brains.
F: now here's the real question: If the brain doesn't coordinate
movements through a calculus, how does it do it?
F: 'that manner of calculation'. No, of course ¬, no maths symbols
used for a start. But an isomorphic calculation by def. ≡ results

TH: Idea that nerve system calculates numeric results is akin to
thinking genes directly encode behavior.

F: analogue systems do calculate numerical results. They don't produce
spreadsheets, certainly, but that's not the correct measure.
F: maybe you should confess you're real objection. Robot & tiger catch
a ball; do you argue one magic, one calculation?

As things stand the dialog seems at risk of breaking down. CSGnet folk
will correctly anticipate that I don't see a different process for
("closed-loop") robots and tigers.I do recognize that what goes on
within an active control system is calculation. I thought (and still
think) he was asserting that what goes on in behavior is the
calculation of modeling, and that if we had some sort of privileged
perspective into the neural networks we'd be able to find the
correlates of values that represent qualities of something in the
environment *other than* perception of the controlled aspects of the
environment.

Perhaps I've dug myself into a hole and have no better course than to
accept that values are computed, implicitly and/or structurally, via
control systems. But, instead, I hope I can bring out my concern about
the flawed idea I think I see here: that when things are accomplished
it is by way of calculating values other than those indicated for PCT
components.

As I'm unsure how to try to get this point across, I'm interested in
any advice or criticism that might be offered here. Thanks!

Tracy

6

[From Bill Powers (21009.07.29.1217 MDT)]

Tracy B. Harms (2009-07-28 17:10 Pacific) --

TH: It is not perceptual control theory, but critical rationalism, to
which we can attribute my ideas that logic is too often assigned an
unfortunately inflated role. Some PCTers rely heavily on CR, some
don't. My distrust of emphasis on logic is part of a wider distrust
regarding common ideas as to the nature of reasoning, rationality, and
argument.

In PCT (or HPCT as I have proposed it, more exactly), logic is carried out at the 9th level, the level where we do logical manipulations of sequences of categorical variables (variables which either exist or don't exist, 1 or 0), using the learned rules of logic, mathematics, or verbalization. There are two levels of higher order than logic: principles and system concepts.

When I got to the logic level originally, I assumed that I had reached the top because as for most people in the hard sciences that is what I was taught. However, by that time I had got used to stepping back and looking at the idea just completed, and then asking myself "OK, where am I looking at this from, this time?" That led me to system concepts -- I'm doing logic, or math, or reasoning, or being rational, which are not themselves elements of logic but perceptions about logic. I had jumped too far and had trouble seeing the connection, but then I noticed that logical system are built on principles, which nicely spanned the gap. Top level (for example), physics. Level below that, principles of physics. Level below that, mathematics and logic that are rational programs and calculations which are constructed to instantiate and support the principles.

There is good reason to distrust the logic level if the principles are not adequately examined, and good reason to distrust the principles if one does not pay attention to the kind of systems that can be formed out of those principles. But PCT certainly makes a place for logic to live, even if at present it is mainly a placeholder.

Best,

Bill P.

7

[from Tracy B. Harms (2009-07-29 13:20 Pacific)]

Bill,

I think HPCT has a lot of value, and I recognize that logic concepts
are evaluated in that model in the ninth level. This, I think, only
reinforces my criticism of the idea that logic is applied at a very
low level of life. The assertion I initially responded to was:

] Logic is fundamental to our, & other animals, operation, but [not] to
] our conscious thinking

If we adopt HPCT (even provisionally) the foregoing statement can only
be accepted if we posit that all animals operate at least to level 9
of the hierarchy you presented. It seems implausible that anybody who
appreciates the content of HPCT would imagine that this could be so!

When somebody says something like "X is fundamental to our operation"
I'm primed to agree if their X is on the order of a basic control
system or a necessary component of any control system. Logic isn't
even close to that. Logic is more scarce, difficult, and rarefied than
storytelling. If storytelling isn't fundamental to the operation of
each animal, neither is logic.

I don't think we're in disagreement here, by the way.

Tracy

···

On Wed, Jul 29, 2009 at 11:34 AM, Bill Powers<powers_w@frontier.net> wrote:

[From Bill Powers (21009.07.29.1217 MDT)]

Tracy B. Harms (2009-07-28 17:10 Pacific) --

TH: It is not perceptual control theory, but critical rationalism, to
which we can attribute my ideas that logic is too often assigned an
unfortunately inflated role. Some PCTers rely heavily on CR, some
don't. My distrust of emphasis on logic is part of a wider distrust
regarding common ideas as to the nature of reasoning, rationality, and
argument.

In PCT (or HPCT as I have proposed it, more exactly), logic is carried out
at the 9th level, the level where we do logical manipulations of sequences
of categorical variables (variables which either exist or don't exist, 1 or
0), using the learned rules of logic, mathematics, or verbalization. There
are two levels of higher order than logic: principles and system concepts.

When I got to the logic level originally, I assumed that I had reached the
top because as for most people in the hard sciences that is what I was
taught. However, by that time I had got used to stepping back and looking at
the idea just completed, and then asking myself "OK, where am I looking at
this from, this time?" That led me to system concepts -- I'm doing logic, or
math, or reasoning, or being rational, which are not themselves elements of
logic but perceptions about logic. I had jumped too far and had trouble
seeing the connection, but then I noticed that logical system are built on
principles, which nicely spanned the gap. Top level (for example), physics.
Level below that, principles of physics. Level below that, mathematics and
logic that are rational programs and calculations which are constructed to
instantiate and support the principles.

There is good reason to distrust the logic level if the principles are not
adequately examined, and good reason to distrust the principles if one does
not pay attention to the kind of systems that can be formed out of those
principles. But PCT certainly makes a place for logic to live, even if at
present it is mainly a placeholder.

Best,

Bill P.

8

[From Bill Powers (2009.07.30.0132 MDT)]

Tracy B. Harms (2009-07-29 13:20 Pacific) --

I think HPCT has a lot of value, and I recognize that logic concepts
are evaluated in that model in the ninth level. This, I think, only
reinforces my criticism of the idea that logic is applied at a very
low level of life. The assertion I initially responded to was:

] Logic is fundamental to our, & other animals, operation, but [not] to
] our conscious thinking

If we adopt HPCT (even provisionally) the foregoing statement can only
be accepted if we posit that all animals operate at least to level 9
of the hierarchy you presented. It seems implausible that anybody who
appreciates the content of HPCT would imagine that this could be so!

This is a recurrent problem in coming to understand PCT. The basic problem is that what is in the eye of the beholder is not necessarily in that which is beheld. You can see relationships in the way spinal reflexes work, and configurations and sequences and events and system concepts. But spinal reflexes do not control variables at those levels. You see such variables because you are looking through the filter of your own perceptual input functions at different levels.

The way to find out if the variable you perceive is being controlled by the observed system is to generate a disturbance that would alter the variable if there is no control, but fail to alter it if it is being controlled. If the variable changes just as you would predict from knowing the nature of the disturbance, it's not being controlled. This doesn't prove that the system wasn't perceiving it without controlling it, but at least you will know that you have no good reason to think it was being perceived (other than by you).

When somebody says something like "X is fundamental to our operation"
I'm primed to agree if their X is on the order of a basic control
system or a necessary component of any control system. Logic isn't
even close to that. Logic is more scarce, difficult, and rarefied than
storytelling. If storytelling isn't fundamental to the operation of
each animal, neither is logic.

I don't think logic is very difficult. But I think of logic simply as Boolean logic and you may be thinking of something more general. There can be functions at low levels which could be described correctly with Boolean logic: for example, a sensory threshold. If the stimulus is greater than X a perceptual signal is proportional to X else it is zero. That's a logical description applied to an analog process. The system is not controlling logical variables even though your description uses them. If that same system were part of a "9th" level control system, that logical variable could be controlled and would not exist only in the beholder.

Best,

Bill P.

9

[from Tracy B. Harms (2009-08-02 07:43 Pacific)]

[From Bill Powers (2009.07.30.0132 MDT)]

...

When somebody says something like "X is fundamental to our operation"
I'm primed to agree if their X is on the order of a basic control
system or a necessary component of any control system. Logic isn't
even close to that. Logic is more scarce, difficult, and rarefied than
storytelling. If storytelling isn't fundamental to the operation of
each animal, neither is logic.

I don't think logic is very difficult. But I think of logic simply as
Boolean logic and you may be thinking of something more general.

I was thinking of first-order and second-order logics. Those involve
things like proofs, identifying whether a construction is valid, and
identifying whether a statement is consistent with given premises. As
math goes these things aren't particularly hard, but I am talking
about applying symbolic math, even informally.

As your comments also communicated, just because we may apply this
sort of math to represent what happens in an organism does not mean
that what the organism is doing is similarly symbolic.

Tracy

···

On Thu, Jul 30, 2009 at 12:50 AM, Bill Powers<powers_w@frontier.net> wrote: