Cannot Control Output

[From Fred Nickols (2014.03.27.0704 EDT)]

I’m picking up on a comment made by Martin in the Why PCT? thread; namely, that in PCT a system doesn’t control its output.

MT: What changes your understanding is if you say “This system can only command its output; it doesn’t sense whether its command is obeyed, because all it senses is the input that creates the controlled variable. This system cannot control its output at all.”

Sitting next to me on my workstation is a thermal cup of coffee. I take a sip now and then, which involves grasping the cup, raising it to my lips, tilting it and sipping the coffee that comes out. I understand that I’m controlling several variables but it seems to me that some of them involve my hand and arm. Grasping the cup and moving my arm are instances of “output” are they not? Do I not control them? Do I not make them do my will?

I ask because it seems to me that millions upon millions of people will have a hard time digesting the assertion that they do not control their own movements. Are there not reference conditions for grasping, raising and tilting?

Help!

Regards,

Fred Nickols, CPT

Performance Improvement Professional

Distance Consulting LLC

The Knowledge Workers’ Tool Room

[From Fred Nickols (2014.03.27.0704 EDT)]

I’m picking up on a comment made by Martin in the Why PCT? thread; namely, that in PCT a system doesn’t control its output.

MT: What changes your understanding is if you say “This system can only command its output; it doesn’t sense whether its command is obeyed, because all it senses is the input that creates the controlled variable. This system cannot control its output at all.”

Sitting next to me on my workstation is a thermal cup of coffee. I take a sip now and then, which involves grasping the cup, raising it to my lips, tilting it and sipping the coffee that comes out. I understand that I’m controlling several variables but it seems to me that some of them involve my hand and arm. Grasping the cup and moving my arm are instances of “output� are they not? Do I not control them? Do I not make them do my will?

I ask because it seems to me that millions upon millions of people will have a hard time digesting the assertion that they do not control their own movements. Are there not reference conditions for grasping, raising and tilting?

Help!

Regards,

Fred Nickols, CPT

Performance Improvement Professional

Distance Consulting LLC

The Knowledge Workers’ Tool Room

[From Fred Nickols (2014.03.27.0816 EDT)]

Let me try again.

What is there in PCT that says I can’t have reference conditions for movements of my arm, hands and fingers? I then perceive these limbs and appendages and they move so as to align with my reference conditions. My output (movements) vary so as to align with my reference conditions. I can perceive – and bring about – €“ sensations, configurations, patterns, movements, etc. Why am I not in control of my output? Maybe I’m confusing ordinary meanings of control with the way control works. As I sit here typing this I have a hard time seeing how anyone could tell me that I’m not controlling my keystrokes. Am I paying attention to what appears on the screen? You bet. Are my “typing skillsâ€? quite good? You bet. They fall under the heading of “automaticâ€? so far as I’m concerned, which is to say I don’t have to think about it, I just do it. (Thanks goodness for that typing class in high school.)Â

Anyway, I think it’s a long uphill slog to convince people they don’t control their output. I think PCT does a dandy job of explaining just how they do that.

Fred Nickols

···

From: Warren Mansell [mailto:wmansell@GMAIL.COM]
Sent: Thursday, March 27, 2014 7:51 AM
To: CSGNET@LISTSERV.ILLINOIS.EDU
Subject: Re: Cannot Control Output

Hi Fred, that’s exactly why most people have a hard time accepting PCT but that’s the fundamental tenet of PCT. We control our input, not our output.

So, for grasping, we might set the resistance we expect to perceive as we close our hands on the cup, but we don’t control those movements of the hand - we use them to provide a sense of grasping as they act on the cup that we are sensing. We might shift our perceptual goal to control the movement of one finger, for example, but then it is the sensation of motion, both tactile and visual, that we are controlling using the muscle movements that shift the finger.

If we controlled actions directly then we would often be inflexible to disturbances and changes in the environment.

Fred, you sort of do have to get this or you’re not really ‘doing’ PCT… Or does anyone disagree?

Warren

Sent from my iPhone

On 27 Mar 2014, at 12:09, Fred Nickols fred@NICKOLS.US wrote:

[From Fred Nickols (2014.03.27.0704 EDT)]

I’m picking up on a comment made by Martin in the Why PCT? thread; namely, that in PCT a system doesn’t control its output.

MT: What changes your understanding is if you say “This system can only command its output; it doesn’t sense whether its command is obeyed, because all it senses is the input that creates the controlled variable. This system cannot control its output at all.”

Sitting next to me on my workstation is a thermal cup of coffee. I take a sip now and then, which involves grasping the cup, raising it to my lips, tilting it and sipping the coffee that comes out. I understand that I’m controlling several variables but it seems to me that some of them involve my hand and arm. Grasping the cup and moving my arm are instances of “output� are they not? Do I not control them? Do I not make them do my will?

I ask because it seems to me that millions upon millions of people will have a hard time digesting the assertion that they do not control their own movements. Are there not reference conditions for grasping, raising and tilting?

Help!

Regards,

Fred Nickols, CPT

Performance Improvement Professional

Distance Consulting LLC

The Knowledge Workers’ Tool Room

[From Fred
Nickols (2014.03.27.0816 EDT)]

Â

        Let me try

again.

Â

        What is there

in PCT that says I can’t have reference conditions for
movements of my arm, hands and fingers? I then perceive
these limbs and appendages and they move so as to align with
my reference conditions. My output (movements) vary so as
to align with my reference conditions. I can perceive – and
bring about – sensations, configurations, patterns,
movements, etc. Why am I not in control of my output?Â
Maybe I’m confusing ordinary meanings of control with the
way control works. As I sit here typing this I have a hard
time seeing how anyone could tell me that I’m not
controlling my keystrokes. Am I paying attention to what
appears on the screen? You bet. Are my “typing skills�
quite good? You bet. They fall under the heading of
“automatic� so far as I’m concerned, which is to say I don’t
have to think about it, I just do it. (Thanks goodness for
that typing class in high school.)Â

···

From:
Warren Mansell [mailto:wmansell@GMAIL.COM]
Sent: Thursday, March 27, 2014 7:51 AM
To: CSGNET@LISTSERV.ILLINOIS.EDU
Subject: Re: Cannot Control Output

Â

          Hi Fred, that's exactly why most people

have a hard time accepting PCT but that’s the fundamental
tenet of PCT. We control our input, not our output.Â

Â

          So, for grasping, we might set the

resistance we expect to perceive as we close our hands on
the cup, but we don’t control those movements of the hand

  • we use them to provide a sense of grasping as they act
    on the cup that we are sensing. We might shift our
    perceptual goal to control the movement of one finger, for
    example, but then it is the sensation of motion, both
    tactile and visual, that we are controlling using the
    muscle movements that shift the finger.

Â

          Â If we controlled actions directly then

we would often be inflexible to disturbances and changes
in the environment.

Â

          Fred, you sort of do have to get this

or you’re not really ‘doing’ PCT… Or does anyone
disagree?

Â

Warren

Â

Â

          Sent from my iPhone

          On 27 Mar 2014, at 12:09, Fred Nickols <fred@NICKOLS.US              >

wrote:

            [From Fred Nickols (2014.03.27.0704

EDT)]

Â

            I’m picking up on a comment made by

Martin in the Why PCT? thread; namely, that in PCT a
system doesn’t control its output.

Â

            MT: What changes your understanding

is if you say “This system can only command its
output; it doesn’t sense whether its command is obeyed,
because all it senses is the input that creates the
controlled variable. This system cannot control its
output at all.”

Â

            Sitting next to me on my workstation

is a thermal cup of coffee. I take a sip now and then,
which involves grasping the cup, raising it to my lips,
tilting it and sipping the coffee that comes out. I
understand that I’m controlling several variables but it
seems to me that some of them involve my hand and arm.Â
Grasping the cup and moving my arm are instances of
“output� are they not? Do I not control them? Do I not
make them do my will?

Â

            I ask because it seems to me that

millions upon millions of people will have a hard time
digesting the assertion that they do not control their
own movements. Are there not reference conditions for
grasping, raising and tilting?

Â

Help!

Â

Regards,

Â

Fred Nickols, CPT

              Performance

Improvement Professional

Distance
Consulting LLC

The
Knowledge Workers’ Tool Room

Â

Â

[From Kenny Kitzke (2014.03.27 EDT)}

I struggled with this issue from the get-go as I studied PCT.

Talking to a PCT layman, I would now try to explain behavior this way. My actions are the attempts to achieve my purpose. In PCT a purpose is defined as a reference perception which exists within the living organism such as a human being.

PCT allows us to take various actions (behave) so that what we perceive/sense externally through our senses matches our internal reference perception. To a layman, I would attempt to use the term “control for” instead of “control.” What living organisms control for is making what it perceives to be as close to its desired reference perceptions. For the PCTer, this essentially means minimizing the error between perceived and reference perceptions.

What is so revolutionary about PCT to me is that one organism may take various actions which will help minimize this error. There is not just one action that will cause the error to be small or even zero. The common psychological approach to find a root cause, or a best cause, for any one organism is utter nonsense and a waste of time. Perhaps more importantly, it is foolish to think that there is a single, most successful right action for every other human organism to cause them to achieve the desired purpose. The idea that I, or statistical science, can provide the “right” action to achieve a highly similar purpose provides at best a higher probability for success than some other action on average. This idea provides a cherished freedom of action that seems hard wired into the reference perceptions of humans. Rejoice in PCT! You select your actions and I’ll select mine (within limits of course).

In summary, humans select the output actions they and others can observe as “behavior.” To the layman, one might call this control of actions. But, in PCT, what is controlled for is the error between the input and the reference. The actions vary to control for the internal reference perceptions.

My own experience is that many purposes have been achieved by actions that are essentially committed to memory. They seem to be selected automatically with no thought at all. When I made my oatmeal breakfast with fresh fruit and cinnamon this morning, I have a sequence that seems to always produce the purpose I desire. However, I may go to use my red raspberries form the refrigerator only to perceive them as having become moldy. Now, what fruit could I use instead? How about some blueberries or bananas? Perhaps slice up an apple? Perhaps open a can of peaches? So, I vary my actions to control for no error in enjoying my oatmeal breakfast. I do select the actions but it is a trial prelude to controlling the error in a new way. I am free to use my intelligence to choose an alternate action that will produce the purpose I desire. But, speaking of those selected actions as controlled actions destroys the fundamental premise of PCT. How can you properly call the actions controlled when you can’t tell in advance whether they will bring the perceived input to the point of the desired reference perception as a satisfying oatmeal breakfast.

There are wonderful times when no obvious alternative action has ever been found to satisfy my reference perception. This allows me to get out of my box and try something I never have before. So, using creativity, I select using packaged raisen’s and whipping cream to sweeten my oat meal. I won’t know how successful this uncontrolled and unproven and untried action will be until I compare it to my reference conditions. It could be that the action of adding fresh raspberries falls off my sequence of achieving a satisfying oatmeal breakfast I would learn a better sequence of actions. Us PCTers would probably call this some kind of reorganization.

Hope this helps a bit, my friend.

Kenny

In a message dated 3/27/2014 8:42:51 A.M. Eastern Daylight Time, fred@NICKOLS.US writes:

···

[From Fred Nickols (2014.03.27.0816 EDT)]

Let me try again.

What is there in PCT that says I can’t have reference conditions for movements of my arm, hands and fingers? I then perceive these limbs and appendages and they move so as to align with my reference conditions. My output (movements) vary so as to align with my reference conditions. I can perceive – andd bring about – sensations, configurations, patterns, movements, etc. Whyy am I not in control of my output? Maybe I’m confusing ordinary meanings of control with the way control works. As I sit here typing this I have a hard time seeing how anyone could tell me that I’m not controlling my keystrokes. Am I paying attention to what appears on the screen? You bet. Are my “typing skillsâ€? quite good? You bet. They fall under the heading of “automaticâ€? so far as I’m concerned, which is to say I don’t have to think about it, I just do it. (Thanks goodness for that typing class in high school.)

Anyway, I think it’s a long uphill slog to convince people they don’t control their output. I think PCT does a dandy job of explaining just how they do that.

Fred Nickols

From: Warren Mansell [mailto:wmansell@GMAIL.COM]
Sent: Thursday, March 27, 2014 7:51 AM
To: CSGNET@LISTSERV.ILLINOIS.EDU
Subject: Re: Cannot Control Output

Hi Fred, that’s exactly why most people have a hard time accepting PCT but that’s the fundamental tenet of PCT. We control our input, not our output.

So, for grasping, we might set the resistance we expect to perceive as we close our hands on the cup, but we don’t control those movements of the hand - we use them to provide a sense of grasping as they act on the cup that we are sensing. We might shift our perceptual goal to control the movement of one finger, for example, but then it is the sensation of motion, both tactile and visual, that we are controlling using the muscle movements that shift the finger.

If we controlled actions directly then we would often be inflexible to disturbances and changes in the environment.

Fred, you sort of do have to get this or you’re not really ‘doing’ PCT… Or does anyone disagree?

Warren

Sent from my iPhone

On 27 Mar 2014, at 12:09, Fred Nickols <fred@NICKOLS.US > wrote:

[From Fred Nickols (2014.03.27.0704 EDT)]

I’m picking up on a comment made by Martin in the Why PCT? thread; namely, that in PCT a system doesn’t control its output.
MT: What changes your understanding is if you say "This system can only _command_ its output; it doesn't sense whether its command is obeyed, because all it senses is the input that creates the controlled variable. This system cannot _control_ its output at all."
Sitting next to me on my workstation is a thermal cup of coffee.  I take a sip now and then, which involves grasping the cup, raising it to my lips, tilting it and sipping the coffee that comes out.  I understand that I’m controlling several variables but it seems to me that some of them involve my hand and arm.  Grasping the cup and moving my arm are instances of “output� are they not?  Do I not control them?  Do I not make them do my will?
I ask because it seems to me that millions upon millions of people will have a hard time digesting the assertion that they do not control their own movements.  Are there not reference conditions for grasping, raising and tilting?

Help!

Regards,

Fred Nickols, CPT

Performance Improvement Professional

Distance Consulting LLC

The Knowledge Workers’ Tool Room

[From Erling Jorgensen (2014.03.27 1220 EDT)]

Fred Nickols (2014.03.27.0704 EDT)

Sitting next to me on my workstation is a thermal cup of coffee. I take a
sip now and then, which involves grasping the cup, raising it to my lips,
tilting it and sipping the coffee that comes out. I understand that I'm
controlling several variables but it seems to me that some of them involve
my hand and arm. Grasping the cup and moving my arm are instances of
"output" are they not? Do I not control them? Do I not make them do my
will?

I ask because it seems to me that millions upon millions of people will
have a hard time digesting the assertion that they do not control their
own movements. Are there not reference conditions for grasping, raising
and tilting?

Hi Fred,
I have wrestled with the same question, because it seems so natural &
intuitive to say we control our movements. What seems to help for me is to
keep reminding myself that we _generate_ our movements, so as to control
the _results_ of our movements.

I, too, have my thermal cup sitting near me, & I use arm movements to get
the cup near my lips & the flavor of coffee into my mouth. So already,
deconstructing the action starts to lead to various perceptual results that
are the real objects of my action. But then when I observe the movements
themselves more closely, they too seem to dissolve into their perceptual
components.

For instance, it is not just any arm movements, but the ones that include
the right combinations of shoulder & elbow & wrist angles, so that my arm
does not overshoot the target or, worse, knock the dang cup over. So there
is this carefully graded acceleration & deceleration of my arm, that I'm
barely aware of, (unless I am being so in a hurry that I mindlessly spill
the coffee on my desk.) And it is not just any grasping, but grasping with
the right pressure sensations against my fingers, so that the cup does not
slip from my grasp as it traverses over the keyboard. And it's a funny
thing that I never seem to tilt the cup so that my lips go to the far side
of the rim. Somehow, the spatial relationship between my mouth & the rim
gets controlled for -- (I like Kenny's reminder about using that phrase.)
And even the timing of the tilting gets controlled, because if the coffee
is still too hot, I adjust what my mouth is doing to control for a slow,
slurping event, until I can perceptually gauge the liquid's temperature.

So, yes, movements & actions are involved. But -- like the "turtles all
the way down" -- it's perceptions all the way in, & controlled results all
the way out. Hope this is helpful.

All the best,
Erling

[From Bruce Abbott (2014.03.27.1315 EDT)]

Fred Nickols (2014.03.27.0704 EDT) –

FN: I’m picking up on a comment made by Martin in the Why PCT? thread; namely, that in PCT a system doesn’t control its output.

MT: What changes your understanding is if you say “This system can only command its output; it doesn’t sense whether its command is obeyed, because all it senses is the input that creates the controlled variable. This system cannot control its output at all.”

FN: Sitting next to me on my workstation is a thermal cup of coffee. I take a sip now and then, which involves grasping the cup, raising it to my lips, tilting it and sipping the coffee that comes out. I understand that I’m controlling several variables but it seems to me that some of them involve my hand and arm. Grasping the cup and moving my arm are instances of “output” are they not? Do I not control them? Do I not make them do my will?

FN: I ask because it seems to me that millions upon millions of people will have a hard time digesting the assertion that they do not control their own movements. Are there not reference conditions for grasping, raising and tilting?

BA: The problem is that the term “behavior” can be used in two distinctly different ways. Within PCT a behavior is an action, an output that serves to drive a controlled perception toward its internally specified reference value. Such actions must vary as necessary to oppose the effects of any disturbances to that perception. In contrast, to most folks “behavior” is something one is “doing,” such as reaching for that cup of coffee. What one is “doing” is usually under one’s control – reaching for that cup entails controlling the path of movement of your hand toward the cup and probably also controlling the configuration of the wrist and fingers so that the fingers properly grasp the cup when it comes within reach. As controlled variables, these things are controlled by producing actions (muscle contractions) that vary as required to compensate for errors as they arise during these movements.

But how do these control systems “know” whether the arm, wrist, and fingers are moving toward achieving their respective goals? We have no direct access to reality, so the only things we can know about these movements are our perceptions of them, as communicated to us via various sensory receptors and their associated perceptual systems. Technically speaking, our control systems act so as to control those perceptions (thus Behavior: the Control of Perception). But unless you believe in solipsism (the philosophy which holds that your perceptions are the only reality), those perceptions of arm, wrist, and finger movement correspond is a useful way to the actual movements of your arm, wrist, and fingers. To the extent that this correspondence holds, it is correct to say that some behavior is controlled, and that the means of control is through other behavior, actions that vary as necessary to maintain that control.

This analysis holds even for nonliving physical systems such as cruise control. Cruise control maintains the speed of a car at a reference value; thus a behavior of the car (its speed) is under control. It does so by varying another behavior, the positioning of the engine throttle, as required to compensate for disturbances such as wind, frictional drag, and encounters with hills and valleys. So far as I know, cruise control does not sense the position of the throttle; it just sends an electrical signal to a motor the moves the throttle’s position. Thus the throttle setting is not controlled in the sense of being the CV of a negative feedback system. It’s just an output.

It would be possible to make the throttle setting itself a controlled variable. There could be a sensor that determines the actual position of the throttle and varies motor torque as necessary to make the sensed throttle position agree with its reference value. The output of the cruise control would then set the reference for throttle position and the throttle positioning control system would then take care of seeing to it that the (sensed) throttle position agrees with its reference position. In that system, motor torque is not controlled; rather, the output of the throttle-positioning system causes motor torque to vary as needed to keep throttle position close to its reference position. Throttle position is now a controlled variable, but for the cruise control that is regulating the speed of the car, the output of the cruise-control system is not something under the control of the cruise control, since that output must be made to vary as needed to keep the car’s speed matching its reference value. From the throttle-positioning system’s point of view, however, throttle position is a controlled variable.

It’s enough to make your head spin, isn’t it?

In all these examples, there is a physical variable whose value is sensed to create what PCT defines as a perception. The perception is intended to reflect the actual state of the physical variable, so by controlling the perception, one also controls the physical variable and its “behavior.” But a control system “knows” only what it perceives, and if the link between physical variable and perception is altered, control over the physical variable may be corrupted or lost entirely. This problem was highlighted a couple of years ago when a French airliner crashed into the Atlantic Ocean after leaving Brazil on a flight to Paris. The plane crashed because its speed sensors iced over and began to give conflicting readings that confused the autopilot. Unfortunately the pilots failed to recognize the problem in time, leading to a low-speed stall from which the plane was unable to recover before it struck the ocean. The autopilot tried to correct for changes in airspeed that were not actually happening, leading ultimately to the disaster.

Although many perceptions reflect the states of physical variables out there in the real world beyond the control system, It is also the case that some perceptions represent combinations of inputs rather than reflecting the state of a single physical variable such as a joint angle or a car’s ground-speed. For these reasons, Bill Powers chose to emphasize the fact that what we control directly are not those environmental variables but our perceptions of them, or of combinations of them. This strategy allowed him to define “behavior” as actions that are uncontrolled from the perspective of the control system producing them, with perceptions being the entities under control, not behaviors. Unfortunately, that way of defining “behavior” is at odds with what we commonly think of as behavior (what we are “doing”) and can lead those not familiar with the PCT definition to quickly reject PCT on commonsense grounds.

Bruce

[From Rick Marken (2014.03.27.1020)]

Fred Nickols (2014.03.27.0704 EDT)

FN: I'm picking up on a comment made by Martin in the Why PCT? thread; namely,
that in PCT a system doesn't control its output.

RM: You've already gotten excellent replies from Warren, Martin and
Kenny. I'll just throw in my 2 cents which, I hope, will not be too
redundant with what has already been said. I'll answer it in terms of
your nice example of taking a sip of coffee:

FN: Sitting next to me on my workstation is a thermal cup of coffee. I take a
sip now and then, which involves grasping the cup, raising it to my lips,
tilting it and sipping the coffee that comes out. I understand that I'm
controlling several variables but it seems to me that some of them involve
my hand and arm. Grasping the cup and moving my arm are instances of
"output" are they not?

RM: They look like outputs from the point of view of an observer
(which includes you, when you watch your own hand grasp and lift the
cup). But if you close your eyes and make a grasping movement with
your hand I think you will see that what you are doing is creating a
perception for yourself; a feeling (consisting of proprioceptive and
kinesthetic perceptions) of a hand configuration that you call
"grasp".

RM: Another way to demonstrate the fact that you are always
controlling perceptions when you are controlling "outputs" is to try
to try to grasp an object without perceiving the grasp. That is, just
"will" a grasp output and see what happens. When I do this, nothing
happens at all. Willing a grasp, for me, is willing a feeling (a
perception).

RM: I think there are two main reasons why people have a hard time
getting the idea that control always involves the control of
perception, not output. One reason is the conflation of control with
consciousness. When we do things like take a sip of coffee we are
usually unconscious of the kinesthetic and proprioceptive perceptions
we control as the means of producing this higher level perception. And
when we are not conscious of perceptions -- especially perceptions of
"motor output" -- we assume that perception is not involved in
behavior. My little exercise above is aimed at overcoming this
"consciousness" problem; when you direct you consciousness to the
kinesthetic and proprioceptive perceptions controlled when producing
"motor outputs" you realize that you are producing desired
perceptions, not outputs.

RM: Another reason for the problem of understanding that "output" is a
controlled perception is the "viewpoint" problem that Martin mentioned
in his answer to the "Why PCT" thread. Control engineers think of (and
refer to) the variable controlled by a control system as its "output".
This is the way it looks from a viewpoint that is "outside" the
control system. And it's the way it looks to you as an observer of
behavior (including your own). This point of view is fine for the
person building a control system because the goal is to produce a
system that controls the "output" variable and controls it well. But
this is the wrong point of view for the person who wants to understand
how an existing control system works. For that person, the correct
viewpoint is from the perspective of the system itself -- the PCT
perspective on control -- and from that viewpoint the "outputs" of a
system are controlled perceptions.

FN: I ask because it seems to me that millions upon millions of people will have
a hard time digesting the assertion that they do not control their own
movements. Are there not reference conditions for grasping, raising and
tilting?

RM: We'll just have to find ways to help them understand -- perhaps
using simple demos like the one I described above -- that grasping,
raising the arm and tilting the hand are outputs from the point of
view of people watching those activities but perceptions from the
point of view of the person doing them.

Best

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken PhD
www.mindreadings.com

It is difficult to get a man to understand something, when his salary
depends upon his not understanding it. -- Upton Sinclair

I agree generally with people that there are problems with how behaviour is defined. But that may not be the main problem with people's' acceptance. Even when we clearly define what we call behaviour for the sake of demonstration - the movement of the pen trace on the white board during the rubber band demonstration - then 99% of viewers still think that
this behaviour is being controlled ('she's doing the opposite of you!') when actually it is the knot on the dot that is being controlled. If anything, this behaviour is being controlled by the environmental disturbance, but only because the person is focusing on controlling the knot over the dot!
So there seems to be some assumption that the actions we see are, and should, be controlled. What would it mean if all of a person's behaviour is not under their own control?
Warren

···

Sent from my iPhone

On 27 Mar 2014, at 18:22, Richard Marken <rsmarken@GMAIL.COM> wrote:

[From Rick Marken (2014.03.27.1020)]

Fred Nickols (2014.03.27.0704 EDT)

FN: I'm picking up on a comment made by Martin in the Why PCT? thread; namely,
that in PCT a system doesn't control its output.

RM: You've already gotten excellent replies from Warren, Martin and
Kenny. I'll just throw in my 2 cents which, I hope, will not be too
redundant with what has already been said. I'll answer it in terms of
your nice example of taking a sip of coffee:

FN: Sitting next to me on my workstation is a thermal cup of coffee. I take a
sip now and then, which involves grasping the cup, raising it to my lips,
tilting it and sipping the coffee that comes out. I understand that I'm
controlling several variables but it seems to me that some of them involve
my hand and arm. Grasping the cup and moving my arm are instances of
"output" are they not?

RM: They look like outputs from the point of view of an observer
(which includes you, when you watch your own hand grasp and lift the
cup). But if you close your eyes and make a grasping movement with
your hand I think you will see that what you are doing is creating a
perception for yourself; a feeling (consisting of proprioceptive and
kinesthetic perceptions) of a hand configuration that you call
"grasp".

RM: Another way to demonstrate the fact that you are always
controlling perceptions when you are controlling "outputs" is to try
to try to grasp an object without perceiving the grasp. That is, just
"will" a grasp output and see what happens. When I do this, nothing
happens at all. Willing a grasp, for me, is willing a feeling (a
perception).

RM: I think there are two main reasons why people have a hard time
getting the idea that control always involves the control of
perception, not output. One reason is the conflation of control with
consciousness. When we do things like take a sip of coffee we are
usually unconscious of the kinesthetic and proprioceptive perceptions
we control as the means of producing this higher level perception. And
when we are not conscious of perceptions -- especially perceptions of
"motor output" -- we assume that perception is not involved in
behavior. My little exercise above is aimed at overcoming this
"consciousness" problem; when you direct you consciousness to the
kinesthetic and proprioceptive perceptions controlled when producing
"motor outputs" you realize that you are producing desired
perceptions, not outputs.

RM: Another reason for the problem of understanding that "output" is a
controlled perception is the "viewpoint" problem that Martin mentioned
in his answer to the "Why PCT" thread. Control engineers think of (and
refer to) the variable controlled by a control system as its "output".
This is the way it looks from a viewpoint that is "outside" the
control system. And it's the way it looks to you as an observer of
behavior (including your own). This point of view is fine for the
person building a control system because the goal is to produce a
system that controls the "output" variable and controls it well. But
this is the wrong point of view for the person who wants to understand
how an existing control system works. For that person, the correct
viewpoint is from the perspective of the system itself -- the PCT
perspective on control -- and from that viewpoint the "outputs" of a
system are controlled perceptions.

FN: I ask because it seems to me that millions upon millions of people will have
a hard time digesting the assertion that they do not control their own
movements. Are there not reference conditions for grasping, raising and
tilting?

RM: We'll just have to find ways to help them understand -- perhaps
using simple demos like the one I described above -- that grasping,
raising the arm and tilting the hand are outputs from the point of
view of people watching those activities but perceptions from the
point of view of the person doing them.

Best

Rick

--
Richard S. Marken PhD
www.mindreadings.com

It is difficult to get a man to understand something, when his salary
depends upon his not understanding it. -- Upton Sinclair

[From Rick Marken (2014.03.28.1255)]

WM: I agree generally with people that there are problems with how behaviour is defined. But that may not be the main problem with people's' acceptance. Even when we clearly define what we call behaviour for the sake of demonstration - the movement of the pen trace on the white board during the rubber band demonstration - then 99% of viewers still think that this behaviour is being controlled ('she's doing the opposite of you!') when actually it is the knot on the dot that is being controlled. If anything, this behaviour is being controlled by the environmental disturbance, but only because the person is focusing on controlling the knot over the dot!

RM: But the pen trace is being controlled, isn't it? If you pull
(lightly) on the person's hand (with the pen in it) in the rubber band
demo this pull will be resisted. The pen position is controlled but in
varying locations to compensate for the experimenter's pull on the
other end of the rubber band.

RM: I've run into this same objection before when teaching PCT -- the
student who objects to the idea that it is the position of the knot
and not the position of the finger in the rubber band, that is
controlled in the rubber band demo -- and found myself blubbering and
at a loss to give a nice, clear answer. Because the position of the
finger is controlled in the rubber band demo. The problem, of course,
is that control is hierarchical: we control pen position as the means
of controlling the position of the knot. But getting into that when
introducing PCT is way too complicated.

RM: So I no longer talk about the pen (or finger) movements in the
rubber band demo not being controlled , because this is only true from
the point of view of the system controlling the position of the knot.
I think the main thing to get across is that what is always controlled
in any example of behavior is a perception, even in the case of a
behavior that appears to be an emitted output. So I would use the pen
(or finger) movements as examples of behaviors that look like emitted
outputs but are, in fact, controlled perceptions. The fact that it is
perception that is controlled can be illustrated in the way I
suggested earlier. Just have the subject close his or her eyes and
become aware of the proprioceptive/kinestetic perceptions (the
feelings in the arm and hand that you when you move your hand) that
subject is producing for themselves (controlling) when the pen (or
finger) is being moved. Perhaps ask them to imagine how hard (or
impossible) it would be to do this task if their arm/hand were
anesthetized and they couldn't experience those
proprioceptive/kinestetic feelings.

WM: So there seems to be some assumption that the actions we see are, and should, be controlled. What would it mean if all of a person's behaviour is not under their own control?

RM: Of course, the actions we see are controlled; but what we control
are not the visible actions themselves (unless we are looking in a
mirror or at our limbs while we are producing the actions) but the
proprioceptive/kinestetic perceptions of muscle tension, length, etc
that, when brought to varying reference states, result in what an
observer sees as actions, outputs or behaviors.

RM: It's understandable that people learning PCT would have trouble
understanding this (that it's perception, not externally visible
behavior, that is controlled). In order to understand it one has to
know 1) what control _is_, how control works, how control differs from
cause and how a hierarchical control organization works. So you've got
to keep people's attention long enough to teach them these things. My
experience is that it takes people at least three years to understand
PCT (if they are willing to try to understand it; much longer, if
ever, if they are not) so you can't really expect people to understand
the fact that all behavior -- even behavior that looks like emitted
action -- is controlled perception after one or two runs of the rubber
band demo. You have to keep their attention for at least three years
(unless they have the computer skills of Adam Matic, who apparently
violates my three year rule; I think Adam got the basics of PCT down
in about three weeks!)

RM: So be patient but do keep trying to thinking of ways to help
people understand PCT. Never give up. The future of humankind is at
stake!

Best

Rick

···

On Thu, Mar 27, 2014 at 2:03 PM, Warren Mansell <wmansell@gmail.com> wrote:

Warren

Sent from my iPhone

On 27 Mar 2014, at 18:22, Richard Marken <rsmarken@GMAIL.COM> wrote:

[From Rick Marken (2014.03.27.1020)]

Fred Nickols (2014.03.27.0704 EDT)

FN: I'm picking up on a comment made by Martin in the Why PCT? thread; namely,
that in PCT a system doesn't control its output.

RM: You've already gotten excellent replies from Warren, Martin and
Kenny. I'll just throw in my 2 cents which, I hope, will not be too
redundant with what has already been said. I'll answer it in terms of
your nice example of taking a sip of coffee:

FN: Sitting next to me on my workstation is a thermal cup of coffee. I take a
sip now and then, which involves grasping the cup, raising it to my lips,
tilting it and sipping the coffee that comes out. I understand that I'm
controlling several variables but it seems to me that some of them involve
my hand and arm. Grasping the cup and moving my arm are instances of
"output" are they not?

RM: They look like outputs from the point of view of an observer
(which includes you, when you watch your own hand grasp and lift the
cup). But if you close your eyes and make a grasping movement with
your hand I think you will see that what you are doing is creating a
perception for yourself; a feeling (consisting of proprioceptive and
kinesthetic perceptions) of a hand configuration that you call
"grasp".

RM: Another way to demonstrate the fact that you are always
controlling perceptions when you are controlling "outputs" is to try
to try to grasp an object without perceiving the grasp. That is, just
"will" a grasp output and see what happens. When I do this, nothing
happens at all. Willing a grasp, for me, is willing a feeling (a
perception).

RM: I think there are two main reasons why people have a hard time
getting the idea that control always involves the control of
perception, not output. One reason is the conflation of control with
consciousness. When we do things like take a sip of coffee we are
usually unconscious of the kinesthetic and proprioceptive perceptions
we control as the means of producing this higher level perception. And
when we are not conscious of perceptions -- especially perceptions of
"motor output" -- we assume that perception is not involved in
behavior. My little exercise above is aimed at overcoming this
"consciousness" problem; when you direct you consciousness to the
kinesthetic and proprioceptive perceptions controlled when producing
"motor outputs" you realize that you are producing desired
perceptions, not outputs.

RM: Another reason for the problem of understanding that "output" is a
controlled perception is the "viewpoint" problem that Martin mentioned
in his answer to the "Why PCT" thread. Control engineers think of (and
refer to) the variable controlled by a control system as its "output".
This is the way it looks from a viewpoint that is "outside" the
control system. And it's the way it looks to you as an observer of
behavior (including your own). This point of view is fine for the
person building a control system because the goal is to produce a
system that controls the "output" variable and controls it well. But
this is the wrong point of view for the person who wants to understand
how an existing control system works. For that person, the correct
viewpoint is from the perspective of the system itself -- the PCT
perspective on control -- and from that viewpoint the "outputs" of a
system are controlled perceptions.

FN: I ask because it seems to me that millions upon millions of people will have
a hard time digesting the assertion that they do not control their own
movements. Are there not reference conditions for grasping, raising and
tilting?

RM: We'll just have to find ways to help them understand -- perhaps
using simple demos like the one I described above -- that grasping,
raising the arm and tilting the hand are outputs from the point of
view of people watching those activities but perceptions from the
point of view of the person doing them.

Best

Rick

--
Richard S. Marken PhD
www.mindreadings.com

It is difficult to get a man to understand something, when his salary
depends upon his not understanding it. -- Upton Sinclair

--
Richard S. Marken PhD
www.mindreadings.com

It is difficult to get a man to understand something, when his salary
depends upon his not understanding it. -- Upton Sinclair

[From Adam Matic (2014.03.29 1740 cet]

image9.png

···

Rick Marken (2014.03.28.1255)

You have to keep their attention for at least three years

(unless they have the computer skills of Adam Matic, who apparently

violates my three year rule; I think Adam got the basics of PCT down

in about three weeks!)

AM:

I’d say your three year rule is still holding, because it’s been more than three years and I’m just starting to get a feel for what is going on.

I agree with most of what everyone said on the topic, here is just a different angle: the expression ‘control of input’ comes from the description of how an operational amplifier (op-amp) control loop works. It is not apparent right away which element is analogous to which one in the PCT diagram or the cybernetics diagram of a control loop.

The triangle in the middle is a the op-amp and it is like the comparator in the PCT loop. It has two inputs. One of the inputs is positive, that would be the reference, and one is negative, that is the perceptual signal. The perceptual signal coming into the comparator is Vin + the feedback voltage, so the Vin signal is more like a disturbance.

What the op-amp is doing, as described by G.A. Philbrick, one of the inventors of the op-amp, is maintaining it’s negative input voltage at the same level as it’s positive input voltage, by varying the output voltage (the op-amp has a separate power source for the output).

In this case, the r signal is zero (that is what those three lines mean). If we would plug this op-amp and measure just what happens with which signal, we would see that p is always very close to 0, and the Vout signal would be inverse and proportional to the disturbance.

You can find Bill’s description of this realization in the Archives, just search for ‘Philbrick’, specifically dates 11.12.1993. and 24.7.2009.


What is meant by ‘controlled variable’ is that variable which is kept at it’s reference value, against all disturbances. It is done by means of changing the output variable. It seems that these expressions can only be used when talking about a single loop. When we talk about a multilevel system, there are many controlled variables and outputs from one level vary the reference values for lower level controlled variables.

The main difference between input and output voltages in the operational amplifier is that when disturbances (Vin) are applied, the input (p) is not changing, and the output (qo) is changing.

Adam

Hi Rick

RM:
It's understandable that people learning PCT would have trouble
understanding this (that it's perception, not externally visible
behavior, that is controlled). In order to understand it one has to
know 1) what control _is_, how control works, how control differs from
cause and how a hierarchical control organization works. So you've got
to keep people's attention long enough to teach them these things. My
experience is that it takes people at least three years to understand
PCT (if they are willing to try to understand it; much longer, if
ever, if they are not) so you can't really expect people to understand
the fact that all behavior -- even behavior that looks like emitted
action -- is controlled perception after one or two runs of the rubber
band demo. You have to keep their attention for at least three years
(unless they have the computer skills of Adam Matic, who apparently
violates my three year rule; I think Adam got the basics of PCT down
in about three weeks!)

HB :
Do you really have no better work to do, than insult people on CSGnet. After
Martin and Bruce and Fred, and I don't know excatly how many others, you
"dive straight" at Adam. What's this time ? He is not thinking like you want
him to think. Or your "majesty Princ" starts to think that you are the
"reference" for PCT knowledge ? Remember how many mistakes did you make,
when you were learning PCT.

Let people enjoy conversating and exploring. People brain doesn't work as
computer. So you can't program it, to do what you want it to do. Brains are
creative, reorganizible and that's the "prior" way of learning. Think of
what reorganization is. Mostly neurons seek for new connections all the
time. That is natural working, and I suppose you will not change that with
childish attempts of control. You have to be aware of that you are control
system too, and what ever you do, are attempts to reach your goals. And Adam
is trying to reach his. So it would be nice if you'll help him if you can
(that's how people also advance and improve themselves) , if you can't help,
then........

Best,

Boris

···

-----Original Message-----
From: Control Systems Group Network (CSGnet)
[mailto:CSGNET@LISTSERV.ILLINOIS.EDU] On Behalf Of Richard Marken
Sent: Friday, March 28, 2014 8:58 PM
To: CSGNET@LISTSERV.ILLINOIS.EDU
Subject: Re: Cannot Control Output

[From Rick Marken (2014.03.28.1255)]

On Thu, Mar 27, 2014 at 2:03 PM, Warren Mansell <wmansell@gmail.com> wrote:

WM: I agree generally with people that there are problems with how

behaviour is defined. But that may not be the main problem with people's'
acceptance. Even when we clearly define what we call behaviour for the sake
of demonstration - the movement of the pen trace on the white board during
the rubber band demonstration - then 99% of viewers still think that this
behaviour is being controlled ('she's doing the opposite of you!') when
actually it is the knot on the dot that is being controlled. If anything,
this behaviour is being controlled by the environmental disturbance, but
only because the person is focusing on controlling the knot over the dot!

RM: But the pen trace is being controlled, isn't it? If you pull
(lightly) on the person's hand (with the pen in it) in the rubber band
demo this pull will be resisted. The pen position is controlled but in
varying locations to compensate for the experimenter's pull on the
other end of the rubber band.

RM: I've run into this same objection before when teaching PCT -- the
student who objects to the idea that it is the position of the knot
and not the position of the finger in the rubber band, that is
controlled in the rubber band demo -- and found myself blubbering and
at a loss to give a nice, clear answer. Because the position of the
finger is controlled in the rubber band demo. The problem, of course,
is that control is hierarchical: we control pen position as the means
of controlling the position of the knot. But getting into that when
introducing PCT is way too complicated.

RM: So I no longer talk about the pen (or finger) movements in the
rubber band demo not being controlled , because this is only true from
the point of view of the system controlling the position of the knot.
I think the main thing to get across is that what is always controlled
in any example of behavior is a perception, even in the case of a
behavior that appears to be an emitted output. So I would use the pen
(or finger) movements as examples of behaviors that look like emitted
outputs but are, in fact, controlled perceptions. The fact that it is
perception that is controlled can be illustrated in the way I
suggested earlier. Just have the subject close his or her eyes and
become aware of the proprioceptive/kinestetic perceptions (the
feelings in the arm and hand that you when you move your hand) that
subject is producing for themselves (controlling) when the pen (or
finger) is being moved. Perhaps ask them to imagine how hard (or
impossible) it would be to do this task if their arm/hand were
anesthetized and they couldn't experience those
proprioceptive/kinestetic feelings.

WM: So there seems to be some assumption that the actions we see are, and

should, be controlled. What would it mean if all of a person's behaviour is
not under their own control?

RM: Of course, the actions we see are controlled; but what we control
are not the visible actions themselves (unless we are looking in a
mirror or at our limbs while we are producing the actions) but the
proprioceptive/kinestetic perceptions of muscle tension, length, etc
that, when brought to varying reference states, result in what an
observer sees as actions, outputs or behaviors.

RM: It's understandable that people learning PCT would have trouble
understanding this (that it's perception, not externally visible
behavior, that is controlled). In order to understand it one has to
know 1) what control _is_, how control works, how control differs from
cause and how a hierarchical control organization works. So you've got
to keep people's attention long enough to teach them these things. My
experience is that it takes people at least three years to understand
PCT (if they are willing to try to understand it; much longer, if
ever, if they are not) so you can't really expect people to understand
the fact that all behavior -- even behavior that looks like emitted
action -- is controlled perception after one or two runs of the rubber
band demo. You have to keep their attention for at least three years
(unless they have the computer skills of Adam Matic, who apparently
violates my three year rule; I think Adam got the basics of PCT down
in about three weeks!)

RM: So be patient but do keep trying to thinking of ways to help
people understand PCT. Never give up. The future of humankind is at
stake!

Best

Rick

Warren

Sent from my iPhone

On 27 Mar 2014, at 18:22, Richard Marken <rsmarken@GMAIL.COM> wrote:

[From Rick Marken (2014.03.27.1020)]

Fred Nickols (2014.03.27.0704 EDT)

FN: I'm picking up on a comment made by Martin in the Why PCT? thread;

namely,

that in PCT a system doesn't control its output.

RM: You've already gotten excellent replies from Warren, Martin and
Kenny. I'll just throw in my 2 cents which, I hope, will not be too
redundant with what has already been said. I'll answer it in terms of
your nice example of taking a sip of coffee:

FN: Sitting next to me on my workstation is a thermal cup of coffee. I

take a

sip now and then, which involves grasping the cup, raising it to my

lips,

tilting it and sipping the coffee that comes out. I understand that I'm
controlling several variables but it seems to me that some of them

involve

my hand and arm. Grasping the cup and moving my arm are instances of
"output" are they not?

RM: They look like outputs from the point of view of an observer
(which includes you, when you watch your own hand grasp and lift the
cup). But if you close your eyes and make a grasping movement with
your hand I think you will see that what you are doing is creating a
perception for yourself; a feeling (consisting of proprioceptive and
kinesthetic perceptions) of a hand configuration that you call
"grasp".

RM: Another way to demonstrate the fact that you are always
controlling perceptions when you are controlling "outputs" is to try
to try to grasp an object without perceiving the grasp. That is, just
"will" a grasp output and see what happens. When I do this, nothing
happens at all. Willing a grasp, for me, is willing a feeling (a
perception).

RM: I think there are two main reasons why people have a hard time
getting the idea that control always involves the control of
perception, not output. One reason is the conflation of control with
consciousness. When we do things like take a sip of coffee we are
usually unconscious of the kinesthetic and proprioceptive perceptions
we control as the means of producing this higher level perception. And
when we are not conscious of perceptions -- especially perceptions of
"motor output" -- we assume that perception is not involved in
behavior. My little exercise above is aimed at overcoming this
"consciousness" problem; when you direct you consciousness to the
kinesthetic and proprioceptive perceptions controlled when producing
"motor outputs" you realize that you are producing desired
perceptions, not outputs.

RM: Another reason for the problem of understanding that "output" is a
controlled perception is the "viewpoint" problem that Martin mentioned
in his answer to the "Why PCT" thread. Control engineers think of (and
refer to) the variable controlled by a control system as its "output".
This is the way it looks from a viewpoint that is "outside" the
control system. And it's the way it looks to you as an observer of
behavior (including your own). This point of view is fine for the
person building a control system because the goal is to produce a
system that controls the "output" variable and controls it well. But
this is the wrong point of view for the person who wants to understand
how an existing control system works. For that person, the correct
viewpoint is from the perspective of the system itself -- the PCT
perspective on control -- and from that viewpoint the "outputs" of a
system are controlled perceptions.

FN: I ask because it seems to me that millions upon millions of people

will have

a hard time digesting the assertion that they do not control their own
movements. Are there not reference conditions for grasping, raising and
tilting?

RM: We'll just have to find ways to help them understand -- perhaps
using simple demos like the one I described above -- that grasping,
raising the arm and tilting the hand are outputs from the point of
view of people watching those activities but perceptions from the
point of view of the person doing them.

Best

Rick

--
Richard S. Marken PhD
www.mindreadings.com

It is difficult to get a man to understand something, when his salary
depends upon his not understanding it. -- Upton Sinclair

--
Richard S. Marken PhD
www.mindreadings.com

It is difficult to get a man to understand something, when his salary
depends upon his not understanding it. -- Upton Sinclair

-----
No virus found in this message.
Checked by AVG - www.avg.com
Version: 2014.0.4354 / Virus Database: 3722/7262 - Release Date: 03/28/14

Hi Rick,

Please except my apologie for what I wrote. If you can just forget it :)).
Adam contacted me directly and explained that you comment was meant as
compliment. You know my English and sloopy understanding.

And beside I hope that you will accept that I'm LCS, and I read it as I
wanted to read it or as I'm used to read your text. I though that there were
only evil "arrows" inside.

I'm really sorry this time as you turned to be nobel and helpfull. Real
Princ...:):slight_smile:

Best,

Boris

···

-----Original Message-----
From: Control Systems Group Network (CSGnet)
[mailto:CSGNET@LISTSERV.ILLINOIS.EDU] On Behalf Of Richard Marken
Sent: Friday, March 28, 2014 8:58 PM
To: CSGNET@LISTSERV.ILLINOIS.EDU
Subject: Re: Cannot Control Output

[From Rick Marken (2014.03.28.1255)]

On Thu, Mar 27, 2014 at 2:03 PM, Warren Mansell <wmansell@gmail.com> wrote:

WM: I agree generally with people that there are problems with how

behaviour is defined. But that may not be the main problem with people's'
acceptance. Even when we clearly define what we call behaviour for the sake
of demonstration - the movement of the pen trace on the white board during
the rubber band demonstration - then 99% of viewers still think that this
behaviour is being controlled ('she's doing the opposite of you!') when
actually it is the knot on the dot that is being controlled. If anything,
this behaviour is being controlled by the environmental disturbance, but
only because the person is focusing on controlling the knot over the dot!

RM: But the pen trace is being controlled, isn't it? If you pull
(lightly) on the person's hand (with the pen in it) in the rubber band
demo this pull will be resisted. The pen position is controlled but in
varying locations to compensate for the experimenter's pull on the
other end of the rubber band.

RM: I've run into this same objection before when teaching PCT -- the
student who objects to the idea that it is the position of the knot
and not the position of the finger in the rubber band, that is
controlled in the rubber band demo -- and found myself blubbering and
at a loss to give a nice, clear answer. Because the position of the
finger is controlled in the rubber band demo. The problem, of course,
is that control is hierarchical: we control pen position as the means
of controlling the position of the knot. But getting into that when
introducing PCT is way too complicated.

RM: So I no longer talk about the pen (or finger) movements in the
rubber band demo not being controlled , because this is only true from
the point of view of the system controlling the position of the knot.
I think the main thing to get across is that what is always controlled
in any example of behavior is a perception, even in the case of a
behavior that appears to be an emitted output. So I would use the pen
(or finger) movements as examples of behaviors that look like emitted
outputs but are, in fact, controlled perceptions. The fact that it is
perception that is controlled can be illustrated in the way I
suggested earlier. Just have the subject close his or her eyes and
become aware of the proprioceptive/kinestetic perceptions (the
feelings in the arm and hand that you when you move your hand) that
subject is producing for themselves (controlling) when the pen (or
finger) is being moved. Perhaps ask them to imagine how hard (or
impossible) it would be to do this task if their arm/hand were
anesthetized and they couldn't experience those
proprioceptive/kinestetic feelings.

WM: So there seems to be some assumption that the actions we see are, and

should, be controlled. What would it mean if all of a person's behaviour is
not under their own control?

RM: Of course, the actions we see are controlled; but what we control
are not the visible actions themselves (unless we are looking in a
mirror or at our limbs while we are producing the actions) but the
proprioceptive/kinestetic perceptions of muscle tension, length, etc
that, when brought to varying reference states, result in what an
observer sees as actions, outputs or behaviors.

RM: It's understandable that people learning PCT would have trouble
understanding this (that it's perception, not externally visible
behavior, that is controlled). In order to understand it one has to
know 1) what control _is_, how control works, how control differs from
cause and how a hierarchical control organization works. So you've got
to keep people's attention long enough to teach them these things. My
experience is that it takes people at least three years to understand
PCT (if they are willing to try to understand it; much longer, if
ever, if they are not) so you can't really expect people to understand
the fact that all behavior -- even behavior that looks like emitted
action -- is controlled perception after one or two runs of the rubber
band demo. You have to keep their attention for at least three years
(unless they have the computer skills of Adam Matic, who apparently
violates my three year rule; I think Adam got the basics of PCT down
in about three weeks!)

RM: So be patient but do keep trying to thinking of ways to help
people understand PCT. Never give up. The future of humankind is at
stake!

Best

Rick

Warren

Sent from my iPhone

On 27 Mar 2014, at 18:22, Richard Marken <rsmarken@GMAIL.COM> wrote:

[From Rick Marken (2014.03.27.1020)]

Fred Nickols (2014.03.27.0704 EDT)

FN: I'm picking up on a comment made by Martin in the Why PCT? thread;

namely,

that in PCT a system doesn't control its output.

RM: You've already gotten excellent replies from Warren, Martin and
Kenny. I'll just throw in my 2 cents which, I hope, will not be too
redundant with what has already been said. I'll answer it in terms of
your nice example of taking a sip of coffee:

FN: Sitting next to me on my workstation is a thermal cup of coffee. I

take a

sip now and then, which involves grasping the cup, raising it to my

lips,

tilting it and sipping the coffee that comes out. I understand that I'm
controlling several variables but it seems to me that some of them

involve

my hand and arm. Grasping the cup and moving my arm are instances of
"output" are they not?

RM: They look like outputs from the point of view of an observer
(which includes you, when you watch your own hand grasp and lift the
cup). But if you close your eyes and make a grasping movement with
your hand I think you will see that what you are doing is creating a
perception for yourself; a feeling (consisting of proprioceptive and
kinesthetic perceptions) of a hand configuration that you call
"grasp".

RM: Another way to demonstrate the fact that you are always
controlling perceptions when you are controlling "outputs" is to try
to try to grasp an object without perceiving the grasp. That is, just
"will" a grasp output and see what happens. When I do this, nothing
happens at all. Willing a grasp, for me, is willing a feeling (a
perception).

RM: I think there are two main reasons why people have a hard time
getting the idea that control always involves the control of
perception, not output. One reason is the conflation of control with
consciousness. When we do things like take a sip of coffee we are
usually unconscious of the kinesthetic and proprioceptive perceptions
we control as the means of producing this higher level perception. And
when we are not conscious of perceptions -- especially perceptions of
"motor output" -- we assume that perception is not involved in
behavior. My little exercise above is aimed at overcoming this
"consciousness" problem; when you direct you consciousness to the
kinesthetic and proprioceptive perceptions controlled when producing
"motor outputs" you realize that you are producing desired
perceptions, not outputs.

RM: Another reason for the problem of understanding that "output" is a
controlled perception is the "viewpoint" problem that Martin mentioned
in his answer to the "Why PCT" thread. Control engineers think of (and
refer to) the variable controlled by a control system as its "output".
This is the way it looks from a viewpoint that is "outside" the
control system. And it's the way it looks to you as an observer of
behavior (including your own). This point of view is fine for the
person building a control system because the goal is to produce a
system that controls the "output" variable and controls it well. But
this is the wrong point of view for the person who wants to understand
how an existing control system works. For that person, the correct
viewpoint is from the perspective of the system itself -- the PCT
perspective on control -- and from that viewpoint the "outputs" of a
system are controlled perceptions.

FN: I ask because it seems to me that millions upon millions of people

will have

a hard time digesting the assertion that they do not control their own
movements. Are there not reference conditions for grasping, raising and
tilting?

RM: We'll just have to find ways to help them understand -- perhaps
using simple demos like the one I described above -- that grasping,
raising the arm and tilting the hand are outputs from the point of
view of people watching those activities but perceptions from the
point of view of the person doing them.

Best

Rick

--
Richard S. Marken PhD
www.mindreadings.com

It is difficult to get a man to understand something, when his salary
depends upon his not understanding it. -- Upton Sinclair

--
Richard S. Marken PhD
www.mindreadings.com

It is difficult to get a man to understand something, when his salary
depends upon his not understanding it. -- Upton Sinclair

-----
No virus found in this message.
Checked by AVG - www.avg.com
Version: 2014.0.4354 / Virus Database: 3722/7262 - Release Date: 03/28/14

[From Fred Nickols (2014.03.30.0843 EDT)]

Boris:

I see you've already apologized for this blast but I thought I would add a
comment anyway. I can't recall ever being insulted by Rick. I've seen some
posts of his that could be taken that way but never any aimed at me.

As for his "crown prince" status, it's a dirty job but someone has to do it.

Fred (Slow Learner) Nickols

From: Boris Hartman [mailto:boris.hartman@masicom.net]
Sent: Sunday, March 30, 2014 3:35 AM
To: 'Control Systems Group Network (CSGnet)'
Subject: RE: Cannot Control Output

Hi Rick

RM:
It's understandable that people learning PCT would have trouble
understanding this (that it's perception, not externally visible behavior,

that

is controlled). In order to understand it one has to know 1) what control

_is_,

how control works, how control differs from cause and how a hierarchical
control organization works. So you've got to keep people's attention long
enough to teach them these things. My experience is that it takes people

at

least three years to understand PCT (if they are willing to try to

understand it;

much longer, if ever, if they are not) so you can't really expect people

to

understand the fact that all behavior -- even behavior that looks like

emitted

action -- is controlled perception after one or two runs of the rubber

band

demo. You have to keep their attention for at least three years (unless

they

have the computer skills of Adam Matic, who apparently violates my three
year rule; I think Adam got the basics of PCT down in about three weeks!)

HB :
Do you really have no better work to do, than insult people on CSGnet.

After

Martin and Bruce and Fred, and I don't know excatly how many others, you
"dive straight" at Adam. What's this time ? He is not thinking like you

want

him to think. Or your "majesty Princ" starts to think that you are the
"reference" for PCT knowledge ? Remember how many mistakes did you
make, when you were learning PCT.

Let people enjoy conversating and exploring. People brain doesn't work as
computer. So you can't program it, to do what you want it to do. Brains

are

creative, reorganizible and that's the "prior" way of learning. Think of

what

reorganization is. Mostly neurons seek for new connections all the time.

That

is natural working, and I suppose you will not change that with childish
attempts of control. You have to be aware of that you are control system
too, and what ever you do, are attempts to reach your goals. And Adam is
trying to reach his. So it would be nice if you'll help him if you can

(that's how

people also advance and improve themselves) , if you can't help,

then........

Best,

Boris

From: Control Systems Group Network (CSGnet)
[mailto:CSGNET@LISTSERV.ILLINOIS.EDU] On Behalf Of Richard Marken
Sent: Friday, March 28, 2014 8:58 PM
To: CSGNET@LISTSERV.ILLINOIS.EDU
Subject: Re: Cannot Control Output

[From Rick Marken (2014.03.28.1255)]

>WM: I agree generally with people that there are problems with how
behaviour is defined. But that may not be the main problem with people's'
acceptance. Even when we clearly define what we call behaviour for the

sake

of demonstration - the movement of the pen trace on the white board
during the rubber band demonstration - then 99% of viewers still think

that

this behaviour is being controlled ('she's doing the opposite of you!')

when

actually it is the knot on the dot that is being controlled. If anything,

this

behaviour is being controlled by the environmental disturbance, but only
because the person is focusing on controlling the knot over the dot!

RM: But the pen trace is being controlled, isn't it? If you pull
(lightly) on the person's hand (with the pen in it) in the rubber band

demo

this pull will be resisted. The pen position is controlled but in varying

locations

to compensate for the experimenter's pull on the other end of the rubber
band.

RM: I've run into this same objection before when teaching PCT -- the
student who objects to the idea that it is the position of the knot and

not the

position of the finger in the rubber band, that is controlled in the

rubber

band demo -- and found myself blubbering and at a loss to give a nice,

clear

answer. Because the position of the finger is controlled in the rubber

band

demo. The problem, of course, is that control is hierarchical: we control

pen

position as the means of controlling the position of the knot. But getting

into

that when introducing PCT is way too complicated.

RM: So I no longer talk about the pen (or finger) movements in the rubber
band demo not being controlled , because this is only true from the point

of

view of the system controlling the position of the knot.
I think the main thing to get across is that what is always controlled in

any

example of behavior is a perception, even in the case of a behavior that
appears to be an emitted output. So I would use the pen (or finger)
movements as examples of behaviors that look like emitted outputs but are,
in fact, controlled perceptions. The fact that it is perception that is

controlled

can be illustrated in the way I suggested earlier. Just have the subject

close

his or her eyes and become aware of the proprioceptive/kinestetic
perceptions (the feelings in the arm and hand that you when you move your
hand) that subject is producing for themselves (controlling) when the pen

(or

finger) is being moved. Perhaps ask them to imagine how hard (or
impossible) it would be to do this task if their arm/hand were

anesthetized

and they couldn't experience those proprioceptive/kinestetic feelings.

> WM: So there seems to be some assumption that the actions we see are,
> and
should, be controlled. What would it mean if all of a person's behaviour

is not

under their own control?

RM: Of course, the actions we see are controlled; but what we control are
not the visible actions themselves (unless we are looking in a mirror or

at our

limbs while we are producing the actions) but the

proprioceptive/kinestetic

perceptions of muscle tension, length, etc that, when brought to varying
reference states, result in what an observer sees as actions, outputs or
behaviors.

RM: It's understandable that people learning PCT would have trouble
understanding this (that it's perception, not externally visible behavior,

that

is controlled). In order to understand it one has to know 1) what control

_is_,

how control works, how control differs from cause and how a hierarchical
control organization works. So you've got to keep people's attention long
enough to teach them these things. My experience is that it takes people

at

least three years to understand PCT (if they are willing to try to

understand it;

much longer, if ever, if they are not) so you can't really expect people

to

understand the fact that all behavior -- even behavior that looks like

emitted

action -- is controlled perception after one or two runs of the rubber

band

demo. You have to keep their attention for at least three years (unless

they

have the computer skills of Adam Matic, who apparently violates my three
year rule; I think Adam got the basics of PCT down in about three weeks!)

RM: So be patient but do keep trying to thinking of ways to help people
understand PCT. Never give up. The future of humankind is at stake!

Best

Rick

> Warren
>
>
> Sent from my iPhone
>
>>
>> [From Rick Marken (2014.03.27.1020)]
>>
>>> Fred Nickols (2014.03.27.0704 EDT)
>>
>>> FN: I'm picking up on a comment made by Martin in the Why PCT?
>>> thread;
namely,
>>> that in PCT a system doesn't control its output.
>>
>> RM: You've already gotten excellent replies from Warren, Martin and
>> Kenny. I'll just throw in my 2 cents which, I hope, will not be too
>> redundant with what has already been said. I'll answer it in terms
>> of your nice example of taking a sip of coffee:
>>
>>> FN: Sitting next to me on my workstation is a thermal cup of coffee.
>>> I
take a
>>> sip now and then, which involves grasping the cup, raising it to my
lips,
>>> tilting it and sipping the coffee that comes out. I understand that
>>> I'm controlling several variables but it seems to me that some of
>>> them
involve
>>> my hand and arm. Grasping the cup and moving my arm are instances
>>> of "output" are they not?
>>
>> RM: They look like outputs from the point of view of an observer
>> (which includes you, when you watch your own hand grasp and lift the
>> cup). But if you close your eyes and make a grasping movement with
>> your hand I think you will see that what you are doing is creating a
>> perception for yourself; a feeling (consisting of proprioceptive and
>> kinesthetic perceptions) of a hand configuration that you call
>> "grasp".
>>
>> RM: Another way to demonstrate the fact that you are always
>> controlling perceptions when you are controlling "outputs" is to try
>> to try to grasp an object without perceiving the grasp. That is,
>> just "will" a grasp output and see what happens. When I do this,
>> nothing happens at all. Willing a grasp, for me, is willing a
>> feeling (a perception).
>>
>> RM: I think there are two main reasons why people have a hard time
>> getting the idea that control always involves the control of
>> perception, not output. One reason is the conflation of control with
>> consciousness. When we do things like take a sip of coffee we are
>> usually unconscious of the kinesthetic and proprioceptive perceptions
>> we control as the means of producing this higher level perception.
>> And when we are not conscious of perceptions -- especially
>> perceptions of "motor output" -- we assume that perception is not
>> involved in behavior. My little exercise above is aimed at overcoming
>> this "consciousness" problem; when you direct you consciousness to
>> the kinesthetic and proprioceptive perceptions controlled when
>> producing "motor outputs" you realize that you are producing desired
>> perceptions, not outputs.
>>
>> RM: Another reason for the problem of understanding that "output" is
>> a controlled perception is the "viewpoint" problem that Martin
>> mentioned in his answer to the "Why PCT" thread. Control engineers
>> think of (and refer to) the variable controlled by a control system as

its

"output".
>> This is the way it looks from a viewpoint that is "outside" the
>> control system. And it's the way it looks to you as an observer of
>> behavior (including your own). This point of view is fine for the
>> person building a control system because the goal is to produce a
>> system that controls the "output" variable and controls it well. But
>> this is the wrong point of view for the person who wants to
>> understand how an existing control system works. For that person, the
>> correct viewpoint is from the perspective of the system itself -- the
>> PCT perspective on control -- and from that viewpoint the "outputs"
>> of a system are controlled perceptions.
>>
>>> FN: I ask because it seems to me that millions upon millions of
>>> people
will have
>>> a hard time digesting the assertion that they do not control their
>>> own movements. Are there not reference conditions for grasping,
>>> raising and tilting?
>>
>> RM: We'll just have to find ways to help them understand -- perhaps
>> using simple demos like the one I described above -- that grasping,
>> raising the arm and tilting the hand are outputs from the point of
>> view of people watching those activities but perceptions from the
>> point of view of the person doing them.
>>
>> Best
>>
>> Rick
>>
>>
>> --
>> Richard S. Marken PhD
>> www.mindreadings.com
>>
>> It is difficult to get a man to understand something, when his salary
>> depends upon his not understanding it. -- Upton Sinclair

--
Richard S. Marken PhD
www.mindreadings.com

It is difficult to get a man to understand something, when his salary

depends

···

-----Original Message-----
-----Original Message-----
On Thu, Mar 27, 2014 at 2:03 PM, Warren Mansell <wmansell@gmail.com> > wrote:
>> On 27 Mar 2014, at 18:22, Richard Marken <rsmarken@GMAIL.COM> > wrote:
upon his not understanding it. -- Upton Sinclair

-----
No virus found in this message.
Checked by AVG - www.avg.com
Version: 2014.0.4354 / Virus Database: 3722/7262 - Release Date: 03/28/14

[From Rick Marken (2014.03.30.0915)]

Hi Rick,

Please except my apologie for what I wrote. If you can just forget it :)).

RM: No problem Boris. Thanks for the apology but it was really
unnecessary. I know you're an LCS; I'm one too, with all the pluses
and minuses that go along with that.

Best

Rick

···

On Sun, Mar 30, 2014 at 2:11 AM, Boris Hartman <boris.hartman@masicom.net> wrote:

Adam contacted me directly and explained that you comment was meant as
compliment. You know my English and sloopy understanding.

And beside I hope that you will accept that I'm LCS, and I read it as I
wanted to read it or as I'm used to read your text. I though that there were
only evil "arrows" inside.

I'm really sorry this time as you turned to be nobel and helpfull. Real
Princ...:):slight_smile:

Best,

Boris

-----Original Message-----
From: Control Systems Group Network (CSGnet)
[mailto:CSGNET@LISTSERV.ILLINOIS.EDU] On Behalf Of Richard Marken
Sent: Friday, March 28, 2014 8:58 PM
To: CSGNET@LISTSERV.ILLINOIS.EDU
Subject: Re: Cannot Control Output

[From Rick Marken (2014.03.28.1255)]

On Thu, Mar 27, 2014 at 2:03 PM, Warren Mansell <wmansell@gmail.com> wrote:

WM: I agree generally with people that there are problems with how

behaviour is defined. But that may not be the main problem with people's'
acceptance. Even when we clearly define what we call behaviour for the sake
of demonstration - the movement of the pen trace on the white board during
the rubber band demonstration - then 99% of viewers still think that this
behaviour is being controlled ('she's doing the opposite of you!') when
actually it is the knot on the dot that is being controlled. If anything,
this behaviour is being controlled by the environmental disturbance, but
only because the person is focusing on controlling the knot over the dot!

RM: But the pen trace is being controlled, isn't it? If you pull
(lightly) on the person's hand (with the pen in it) in the rubber band
demo this pull will be resisted. The pen position is controlled but in
varying locations to compensate for the experimenter's pull on the
other end of the rubber band.

RM: I've run into this same objection before when teaching PCT -- the
student who objects to the idea that it is the position of the knot
and not the position of the finger in the rubber band, that is
controlled in the rubber band demo -- and found myself blubbering and
at a loss to give a nice, clear answer. Because the position of the
finger is controlled in the rubber band demo. The problem, of course,
is that control is hierarchical: we control pen position as the means
of controlling the position of the knot. But getting into that when
introducing PCT is way too complicated.

RM: So I no longer talk about the pen (or finger) movements in the
rubber band demo not being controlled , because this is only true from
the point of view of the system controlling the position of the knot.
I think the main thing to get across is that what is always controlled
in any example of behavior is a perception, even in the case of a
behavior that appears to be an emitted output. So I would use the pen
(or finger) movements as examples of behaviors that look like emitted
outputs but are, in fact, controlled perceptions. The fact that it is
perception that is controlled can be illustrated in the way I
suggested earlier. Just have the subject close his or her eyes and
become aware of the proprioceptive/kinestetic perceptions (the
feelings in the arm and hand that you when you move your hand) that
subject is producing for themselves (controlling) when the pen (or
finger) is being moved. Perhaps ask them to imagine how hard (or
impossible) it would be to do this task if their arm/hand were
anesthetized and they couldn't experience those
proprioceptive/kinestetic feelings.

WM: So there seems to be some assumption that the actions we see are, and

should, be controlled. What would it mean if all of a person's behaviour is
not under their own control?

RM: Of course, the actions we see are controlled; but what we control
are not the visible actions themselves (unless we are looking in a
mirror or at our limbs while we are producing the actions) but the
proprioceptive/kinestetic perceptions of muscle tension, length, etc
that, when brought to varying reference states, result in what an
observer sees as actions, outputs or behaviors.

RM: It's understandable that people learning PCT would have trouble
understanding this (that it's perception, not externally visible
behavior, that is controlled). In order to understand it one has to
know 1) what control _is_, how control works, how control differs from
cause and how a hierarchical control organization works. So you've got
to keep people's attention long enough to teach them these things. My
experience is that it takes people at least three years to understand
PCT (if they are willing to try to understand it; much longer, if
ever, if they are not) so you can't really expect people to understand
the fact that all behavior -- even behavior that looks like emitted
action -- is controlled perception after one or two runs of the rubber
band demo. You have to keep their attention for at least three years
(unless they have the computer skills of Adam Matic, who apparently
violates my three year rule; I think Adam got the basics of PCT down
in about three weeks!)

RM: So be patient but do keep trying to thinking of ways to help
people understand PCT. Never give up. The future of humankind is at
stake!

Best

Rick

Warren

Sent from my iPhone

On 27 Mar 2014, at 18:22, Richard Marken <rsmarken@GMAIL.COM> wrote:

[From Rick Marken (2014.03.27.1020)]

Fred Nickols (2014.03.27.0704 EDT)

FN: I'm picking up on a comment made by Martin in the Why PCT? thread;

namely,

that in PCT a system doesn't control its output.

RM: You've already gotten excellent replies from Warren, Martin and
Kenny. I'll just throw in my 2 cents which, I hope, will not be too
redundant with what has already been said. I'll answer it in terms of
your nice example of taking a sip of coffee:

FN: Sitting next to me on my workstation is a thermal cup of coffee. I

take a

sip now and then, which involves grasping the cup, raising it to my

lips,

tilting it and sipping the coffee that comes out. I understand that I'm
controlling several variables but it seems to me that some of them

involve

my hand and arm. Grasping the cup and moving my arm are instances of
"output" are they not?

RM: They look like outputs from the point of view of an observer
(which includes you, when you watch your own hand grasp and lift the
cup). But if you close your eyes and make a grasping movement with
your hand I think you will see that what you are doing is creating a
perception for yourself; a feeling (consisting of proprioceptive and
kinesthetic perceptions) of a hand configuration that you call
"grasp".

RM: Another way to demonstrate the fact that you are always
controlling perceptions when you are controlling "outputs" is to try
to try to grasp an object without perceiving the grasp. That is, just
"will" a grasp output and see what happens. When I do this, nothing
happens at all. Willing a grasp, for me, is willing a feeling (a
perception).

RM: I think there are two main reasons why people have a hard time
getting the idea that control always involves the control of
perception, not output. One reason is the conflation of control with
consciousness. When we do things like take a sip of coffee we are
usually unconscious of the kinesthetic and proprioceptive perceptions
we control as the means of producing this higher level perception. And
when we are not conscious of perceptions -- especially perceptions of
"motor output" -- we assume that perception is not involved in
behavior. My little exercise above is aimed at overcoming this
"consciousness" problem; when you direct you consciousness to the
kinesthetic and proprioceptive perceptions controlled when producing
"motor outputs" you realize that you are producing desired
perceptions, not outputs.

RM: Another reason for the problem of understanding that "output" is a
controlled perception is the "viewpoint" problem that Martin mentioned
in his answer to the "Why PCT" thread. Control engineers think of (and
refer to) the variable controlled by a control system as its "output".
This is the way it looks from a viewpoint that is "outside" the
control system. And it's the way it looks to you as an observer of
behavior (including your own). This point of view is fine for the
person building a control system because the goal is to produce a
system that controls the "output" variable and controls it well. But
this is the wrong point of view for the person who wants to understand
how an existing control system works. For that person, the correct
viewpoint is from the perspective of the system itself -- the PCT
perspective on control -- and from that viewpoint the "outputs" of a
system are controlled perceptions.

FN: I ask because it seems to me that millions upon millions of people

will have

a hard time digesting the assertion that they do not control their own
movements. Are there not reference conditions for grasping, raising and
tilting?

RM: We'll just have to find ways to help them understand -- perhaps
using simple demos like the one I described above -- that grasping,
raising the arm and tilting the hand are outputs from the point of
view of people watching those activities but perceptions from the
point of view of the person doing them.

Best

Rick

--
Richard S. Marken PhD
www.mindreadings.com

It is difficult to get a man to understand something, when his salary
depends upon his not understanding it. -- Upton Sinclair

--
Richard S. Marken PhD
www.mindreadings.com

It is difficult to get a man to understand something, when his salary
depends upon his not understanding it. -- Upton Sinclair

-----
No virus found in this message.
Checked by AVG - www.avg.com
Version: 2014.0.4354 / Virus Database: 3722/7262 - Release Date: 03/28/14

--
Richard S. Marken PhD
www.mindreadings.com

It is difficult to get a man to understand something, when his salary
depends upon his not understanding it. -- Upton Sinclair

Fred,

I'm glad that you were not hurt in the cloud of Rick "arrows" :)))

FN :
As for his "crown prince" status, it's a dirty job but someone has to do it.

HB:
I know but he could do it as a Prince, with patient and understanding :)).
Like in his roll of teacher.

I think that you are too fast learner for your age. I was wondering if you
would accept nicknaim "Prince of learning". :))

Best,

Boris

···

-----Original Message-----
From: csgnet-request@lists.illinois.edu
[mailto:csgnet-request@lists.illinois.edu] On Behalf Of Fred Nickols
Sent: Sunday, March 30, 2014 2:44 PM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: RE: Cannot Control Output

[From Fred Nickols (2014.03.30.0843 EDT)]

Boris:

I see you've already apologized for this blast but I thought I would add a
comment anyway. I can't recall ever being insulted by Rick. I've seen some
posts of his that could be taken that way but never any aimed at me.

As for his "crown prince" status, it's a dirty job but someone has to do it.

Fred (Slow Learner) Nickols

-----Original Message-----
From: Boris Hartman [mailto:boris.hartman@masicom.net]
Sent: Sunday, March 30, 2014 3:35 AM
To: 'Control Systems Group Network (CSGnet)'
Subject: RE: Cannot Control Output

Hi Rick

RM:
It's understandable that people learning PCT would have trouble
understanding this (that it's perception, not externally visible behavior,

that

is controlled). In order to understand it one has to know 1) what control

_is_,

how control works, how control differs from cause and how a hierarchical
control organization works. So you've got to keep people's attention long
enough to teach them these things. My experience is that it takes people

at

least three years to understand PCT (if they are willing to try to

understand it;

much longer, if ever, if they are not) so you can't really expect people

to

understand the fact that all behavior -- even behavior that looks like

emitted

action -- is controlled perception after one or two runs of the rubber

band

demo. You have to keep their attention for at least three years (unless

they

have the computer skills of Adam Matic, who apparently violates my three
year rule; I think Adam got the basics of PCT down in about three weeks!)

HB :
Do you really have no better work to do, than insult people on CSGnet.

After

Martin and Bruce and Fred, and I don't know excatly how many others, you
"dive straight" at Adam. What's this time ? He is not thinking like you

want

him to think. Or your "majesty Princ" starts to think that you are the
"reference" for PCT knowledge ? Remember how many mistakes did you
make, when you were learning PCT.

Let people enjoy conversating and exploring. People brain doesn't work as
computer. So you can't program it, to do what you want it to do. Brains

are

creative, reorganizible and that's the "prior" way of learning. Think of

what

reorganization is. Mostly neurons seek for new connections all the time.

That

is natural working, and I suppose you will not change that with childish
attempts of control. You have to be aware of that you are control system
too, and what ever you do, are attempts to reach your goals. And Adam is
trying to reach his. So it would be nice if you'll help him if you can

(that's how

people also advance and improve themselves) , if you can't help,

then........

Best,

Boris

-----Original Message-----
From: Control Systems Group Network (CSGnet)
[mailto:CSGNET@LISTSERV.ILLINOIS.EDU] On Behalf Of Richard Marken
Sent: Friday, March 28, 2014 8:58 PM
To: CSGNET@LISTSERV.ILLINOIS.EDU
Subject: Re: Cannot Control Output

[From Rick Marken (2014.03.28.1255)]

On Thu, Mar 27, 2014 at 2:03 PM, Warren Mansell <wmansell@gmail.com> > wrote:
>WM: I agree generally with people that there are problems with how
behaviour is defined. But that may not be the main problem with people's'
acceptance. Even when we clearly define what we call behaviour for the

sake

of demonstration - the movement of the pen trace on the white board
during the rubber band demonstration - then 99% of viewers still think

that

this behaviour is being controlled ('she's doing the opposite of you!')

when

actually it is the knot on the dot that is being controlled. If anything,

this

behaviour is being controlled by the environmental disturbance, but only
because the person is focusing on controlling the knot over the dot!

RM: But the pen trace is being controlled, isn't it? If you pull
(lightly) on the person's hand (with the pen in it) in the rubber band

demo

this pull will be resisted. The pen position is controlled but in varying

locations

to compensate for the experimenter's pull on the other end of the rubber
band.

RM: I've run into this same objection before when teaching PCT -- the
student who objects to the idea that it is the position of the knot and

not the

position of the finger in the rubber band, that is controlled in the

rubber

band demo -- and found myself blubbering and at a loss to give a nice,

clear

answer. Because the position of the finger is controlled in the rubber

band

demo. The problem, of course, is that control is hierarchical: we control

pen

position as the means of controlling the position of the knot. But getting

into

that when introducing PCT is way too complicated.

RM: So I no longer talk about the pen (or finger) movements in the rubber
band demo not being controlled , because this is only true from the point

of

view of the system controlling the position of the knot.
I think the main thing to get across is that what is always controlled in

any

example of behavior is a perception, even in the case of a behavior that
appears to be an emitted output. So I would use the pen (or finger)
movements as examples of behaviors that look like emitted outputs but are,
in fact, controlled perceptions. The fact that it is perception that is

controlled

can be illustrated in the way I suggested earlier. Just have the subject

close

his or her eyes and become aware of the proprioceptive/kinestetic
perceptions (the feelings in the arm and hand that you when you move your
hand) that subject is producing for themselves (controlling) when the pen

(or

finger) is being moved. Perhaps ask them to imagine how hard (or
impossible) it would be to do this task if their arm/hand were

anesthetized

and they couldn't experience those proprioceptive/kinestetic feelings.

> WM: So there seems to be some assumption that the actions we see are,
> and
should, be controlled. What would it mean if all of a person's behaviour

is not

under their own control?

RM: Of course, the actions we see are controlled; but what we control are
not the visible actions themselves (unless we are looking in a mirror or

at our

limbs while we are producing the actions) but the

proprioceptive/kinestetic

perceptions of muscle tension, length, etc that, when brought to varying
reference states, result in what an observer sees as actions, outputs or
behaviors.

RM: It's understandable that people learning PCT would have trouble
understanding this (that it's perception, not externally visible behavior,

that

is controlled). In order to understand it one has to know 1) what control

_is_,

how control works, how control differs from cause and how a hierarchical
control organization works. So you've got to keep people's attention long
enough to teach them these things. My experience is that it takes people

at

least three years to understand PCT (if they are willing to try to

understand it;

much longer, if ever, if they are not) so you can't really expect people

to

understand the fact that all behavior -- even behavior that looks like

emitted

action -- is controlled perception after one or two runs of the rubber

band

demo. You have to keep their attention for at least three years (unless

they

have the computer skills of Adam Matic, who apparently violates my three
year rule; I think Adam got the basics of PCT down in about three weeks!)

RM: So be patient but do keep trying to thinking of ways to help people
understand PCT. Never give up. The future of humankind is at stake!

Best

Rick

> Warren
>
>
> Sent from my iPhone
>
>> On 27 Mar 2014, at 18:22, Richard Marken <rsmarken@GMAIL.COM> > wrote:
>>
>> [From Rick Marken (2014.03.27.1020)]
>>
>>> Fred Nickols (2014.03.27.0704 EDT)
>>
>>> FN: I'm picking up on a comment made by Martin in the Why PCT?
>>> thread;
namely,
>>> that in PCT a system doesn't control its output.
>>
>> RM: You've already gotten excellent replies from Warren, Martin and
>> Kenny. I'll just throw in my 2 cents which, I hope, will not be too
>> redundant with what has already been said. I'll answer it in terms
>> of your nice example of taking a sip of coffee:
>>
>>> FN: Sitting next to me on my workstation is a thermal cup of coffee.
>>> I
take a
>>> sip now and then, which involves grasping the cup, raising it to my
lips,
>>> tilting it and sipping the coffee that comes out. I understand that
>>> I'm controlling several variables but it seems to me that some of
>>> them
involve
>>> my hand and arm. Grasping the cup and moving my arm are instances
>>> of "output" are they not?
>>
>> RM: They look like outputs from the point of view of an observer
>> (which includes you, when you watch your own hand grasp and lift the
>> cup). But if you close your eyes and make a grasping movement with
>> your hand I think you will see that what you are doing is creating a
>> perception for yourself; a feeling (consisting of proprioceptive and
>> kinesthetic perceptions) of a hand configuration that you call
>> "grasp".
>>
>> RM: Another way to demonstrate the fact that you are always
>> controlling perceptions when you are controlling "outputs" is to try
>> to try to grasp an object without perceiving the grasp. That is,
>> just "will" a grasp output and see what happens. When I do this,
>> nothing happens at all. Willing a grasp, for me, is willing a
>> feeling (a perception).
>>
>> RM: I think there are two main reasons why people have a hard time
>> getting the idea that control always involves the control of
>> perception, not output. One reason is the conflation of control with
>> consciousness. When we do things like take a sip of coffee we are
>> usually unconscious of the kinesthetic and proprioceptive perceptions
>> we control as the means of producing this higher level perception.
>> And when we are not conscious of perceptions -- especially
>> perceptions of "motor output" -- we assume that perception is not
>> involved in behavior. My little exercise above is aimed at overcoming
>> this "consciousness" problem; when you direct you consciousness to
>> the kinesthetic and proprioceptive perceptions controlled when
>> producing "motor outputs" you realize that you are producing desired
>> perceptions, not outputs.
>>
>> RM: Another reason for the problem of understanding that "output" is
>> a controlled perception is the "viewpoint" problem that Martin
>> mentioned in his answer to the "Why PCT" thread. Control engineers
>> think of (and refer to) the variable controlled by a control system as

its

"output".
>> This is the way it looks from a viewpoint that is "outside" the
>> control system. And it's the way it looks to you as an observer of
>> behavior (including your own). This point of view is fine for the
>> person building a control system because the goal is to produce a
>> system that controls the "output" variable and controls it well. But
>> this is the wrong point of view for the person who wants to
>> understand how an existing control system works. For that person, the
>> correct viewpoint is from the perspective of the system itself -- the
>> PCT perspective on control -- and from that viewpoint the "outputs"
>> of a system are controlled perceptions.
>>
>>> FN: I ask because it seems to me that millions upon millions of
>>> people
will have
>>> a hard time digesting the assertion that they do not control their
>>> own movements. Are there not reference conditions for grasping,
>>> raising and tilting?
>>
>> RM: We'll just have to find ways to help them understand -- perhaps
>> using simple demos like the one I described above -- that grasping,
>> raising the arm and tilting the hand are outputs from the point of
>> view of people watching those activities but perceptions from the
>> point of view of the person doing them.
>>
>> Best
>>
>> Rick
>>
>>
>> --
>> Richard S. Marken PhD
>> www.mindreadings.com
>>
>> It is difficult to get a man to understand something, when his salary
>> depends upon his not understanding it. -- Upton Sinclair

--
Richard S. Marken PhD
www.mindreadings.com

It is difficult to get a man to understand something, when his salary

depends

upon his not understanding it. -- Upton Sinclair

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