From Bill Powers (2011.04.01.1214 MDT)]
Here are some things I wrote without any target for them. Do with
them as you like. They illustrate the kind of up-a-level discourse
I've been trying to describe. The second one, What is a Goal, is just
a few questions to suggest a line of approach in papers referring to
purpose, goals, intentions, and the like.
Best,
Bill P.
CauseVsMechanism.doc (33.5 KB)
WhatIsAGoal.doc (10 KB)
[From Fred Nickols (2011.04.01.1209 PDT)]
From Bill Powers (2011.04.01.1214 MDT)]
BP: Here are some things I wrote without any target for them. Do with them
as you like. They illustrate the kind of up-a-level discourse I've been
trying to describe. The second one, What is a Goal, is just a few questions
to suggest a line of approach in papers referring to purpose, goals,
intentions, and the like.
FN: Well, I'd better respond to the second one because I make use of "goals"
in my Target Model.
For me, a "goal" refers to the desired (or required) state of some variable
that has been targeted for control. I might target the error rate in a
certain process for control. The error rate is the target (or targeted)
variable. I might establish an acceptable/desired/required value for the
error rate of three parts per million. A goal, then, specifies some
circumstance we wish to achieve (and probably maintain). The "circumstance"
consists of some variable to be controlled and the value we wish that
variable to satisfy. We can "know" a goal when it hasn't yet been achieved
owing to our ability to communicate, to use language, diagrams, symbols,
mathematics, etc to develop some kind of shared understanding.
How is it that we can find just the actions and the effects of those actions
that will achieve the goal condition? Well, obviously, some of us are
better at it than others. Moreover, our relative abilities vary with the
kind of situations and variables we're grappling with. A physician is no
doubt better at finding and fixing the causes of a disease than I am;
however, I can probably outperform the physician when it comes to analyzing
and improving the performance of a process or of people performing work. In
any case, we able to link actions, their effects, and impact on our goals by
way of a grasp of the structure in which they are all embedded. In
organizational settings, I refer to this structure as the performance
architecture of the organization. Thus, financial performance can be linked
to operational performance and operational performance can be linked to
human performance. Identifying these linkages is necessary if one wishes to
link proximate performance (direct and immediate effects) with ultimate
performance (indirect and delayed effects).
In other words, for most complex performances in organizations, we intervene
in some structure at one place and time so as to realize certain effects at
other places and other times. If we are to intervene responsibly, we had
better be able to show with reasonable certainty that this action produces
that effect or, conversely, that this effect requires that action.
("Responsible intervention" was one of the first lessons I was taught as a
fledgling Organization Development consultant.)
There are my quick responses to your questions, Bill.
Fred Nickols
fred@nickols.us
[From Rick Marken (2011.04.01.1400)]
Bill Powers (2011.04.01.1214 MDT)--
Here are some things I wrote without any target for them. Do with them as
you like. They illustrate the kind of up-a-level discourse I've been trying
to describe.
The essay on cause vs. mechanism is superb, as usual. If this is an
example of "up-a-level discourse" then it strikes me as the kind of
discourse you have been using since I began reading your work. And it
reminded of what I went through went I first encountered your writing
(in B:CP). Some of it struck me as a bit strange -- but great -- so I
kind of skimmed over the stuff that was "over my head". I now think
that what I considered strange was the "up a level" part of the
discussion; the parts that I now see as an attempt to discuss control
theory in a way that was "above" the conflict between causal and
control theory models.
I think the reason I found the up-a-level aspects of your writing
difficult is because I had not yet gone up-a-level myself, a step that
I reached only after a period of trying to deal with control theory as
a direct competitor to conventional theories. I spent at least a year
at this level [I remember it quite well, now; I was trying to see
similarities between your work and some new book by Neisser -- a
prominent cognitive psychologist who has developed some ideas about
circular cognition or something like that]. I was stuck a the level of
the conflict between causal and control theories. I remember trying
desperately to get control theory to fit into the conventional
"paradigm" as a rival to conventional theories. I don' think I really
went up a level until I had collected some data (based on your Psych
Rev paper) and came up with some little tests of my own. The up a
level came (as I now look back on it) in the form of me (higher level
me) starting to ask myself questions about why I was trying so hard to
fit control theory into the conventional perspective.
The point of all this is just to say that, based on my experience, the
up-a-level discourse that you recommend (and which I love) is only
useful to people who have already gone up a level. And the people I am
trying to communicate to about purpose -- experimental psychologists
-- have not gone up a level and are probably resistant to going up a
level. So my approach is not to try talk to psychologists from a
higher level; my aim is to confront psychologists with experimental
evidence that will get them "talking to themselves" from that higher
level. Of course, this is not likely to work with many psychologists;
but to the extent that there are experimental psychologists who
respect observational evidence, I hope to develop that experimental
tests -- like the reaction time test described in my paper -- that
will produce results that will get them talking to themselves and,
hopefully, start seeing some of what I am doing from a level up.
But maybe I'm just an April Fool.
Best
Rick
--
Richard S. Marken PhD
rsmarken@gmail.com
www.mindreadings.com
[From Bill Powers (2011.04.01.1425 MDT)]
[From Fred Nickols (2011.04.01.1209 PDT)]
FN: For me, a "goal" refers to the desired (or required) state of some variable that has been targeted for control. I might target the error rate in a certain process for control. The error rate is the target (or targeted)
variable. I might establish an acceptable/desired/required value for the
error rate of three parts per million. A goal, then, specifies some
circumstance we wish to achieve (and probably maintain).
BP: My questions were not about what a goal refers to, but about what it IS and how it accomplishes what it does. What is the physical form and nature of a goal? Where would you look to observe a goal? How can it have any effect on real physical behavior? Given that it specifies something, how does it do that "specifying"?
FN: We can "know" a goal when it hasn't yet been achieved owing to our ability to communicate, to use language, diagrams, symbols, mathematics, etc to develop some kind of shared understanding.
BP: But how do you know what your own goal is inside yourself before you've achieved it and without communicating it to anyone else? Suppose your goal is to answer the questions I'm asking here. Before you've even started, how do you know what the goal is? Here's a word -- in this case marks written on a computer screen: GOAL. Is that the goal? Or is that just a word indicating something else that isn't a word? How do you know what experience the word is referring to? When I ask how, I mean to ask you to try to identify the experience and then tell me what you did to identify it. After all, it happened right there inside of you where you had a better look at it than anyone else can have. What did you see or otherwise experience?
FN: How is it that we can find just the actions and the effects of those actions that will achieve the goal condition? Well, obviously, some of us are better at it than others. Moreover, our relative abilities vary with the
kind of situations and variables we're grappling with. A physician is no
doubt better at finding and fixing the causes of a disease than I am;
however, I can probably outperform the physician when it comes to analyzing
and improving the performance of a process or of people performing work. In
any case, we able to link actions, their effects, and impact on our goals by
way of a grasp of the structure in which they are all embedded. In
organizational settings, I refer to this structure as the performance
architecture of the organization.
BP: Again, you didn't answer the question I asked (I didn't expect many people, if any, to do that, so don't take this personally). I wasn't asking if some people could do it better than others. I was asking how ANYONE can do it AT ALL. If you have the goal of answering a question, how does this lead to tension in the right muscle for causing your finger to descend on the right key to cause the right first letter of your answer to appear on the screen? How do you know that what you type does in fact accomplish the goal? That is the kind of question that led to PCT in the first place.
These are not the usual kinds of questions that psychologists ask or try to answer. They assume the answer is obvious, or that the question can't be answered. They answer some other question instead. It's like asking about consciousness. Books have been written about when we are conscious, what we are conscious of (or not), how accurate conscious experience is, how consciousness affects behavior -- all while completely avoiding the question of what consciousness IS. Psychology and philosophy and related fields are full of words like this, which makes them look very superficial when you realize what it is that's being avoided: a straight answer.
Rick Marken has eloquently identified what I think is "up a level" (or so) about this kind of question. You have to step out of your usual way of thinking and look at it as if it belonged to a stranger. Then you can see that the first or second or third answer that comes to you isn't an answer at all, because it's at the wrong level. When you finally realize this, you most likely will come up with a shattering realization, after all the words you have emitted, of what the right answer is. It is "I don't know."
I think science makes its biggest and most important strides forward when it comes up against a reasonable question to which the only correct answer is "I don't know." A scientist is supposed to know everything, so saying "I don't know" sounds like a defeat and a failure. It is neither: it is a rare opportunity to learn or discover something truly new. When a well-educated, practiced and experienced, highly intelligent scientist says "I don't know," everyone within earshot should drop whatever is going on and pay close attention, because something of great interest and importance may be about to happen. Maybe not, but there's a chance.
Best,
Bill P.
From Bill Powers (2011.04.01.1214 MDT)]
They illustrate the kind of up-a-level discourse I’ve been trying to describe.
So, you’re saying mainstream explanations are stuck at event and programs levels, and
researchers need (should) try to go to principles level when explaining behavior; or that they
have wrong principle level explanations?
It took me a while to formulate this sentence, this is confusing. 
The second one, What is a Goal, is just a few questions to suggest a line of approach in papers referring to purpose, goals, intentions, and the like.
It appears that most of the goals and intentions people talk about are at programs level - "I need to go to the
store and buy some bread". A reference signal to a single loop is it’s “goal state”, but people don’t talk of
lower-order reference signals as their goals.
So, goals are signals at programs level. I guess they are formed somehow by imagining programs and comparing
them to memorised programs and sequences. The one which results in least error on the principles level is kept.
Adam
"[Martin Taylor 2011.04.02.10.32]
From Bill Powers (2011.04.01.1214 MDT)] Here are some things I wrote without any target for them. Do withthem as you like. They illustrate the kind of up-a-level discourse
I’ve been trying to describe. The second one, What is a Goal, is
just a few questions to suggest a line of approach in papers
referring to purpose, goals, intentions, and the like.
I usually assume that messages with your dateline are jokes, and in
a perverse sense I suppose your messages were, since the joke is on
me when I saw that your documents were serious
You ask: "
What
is
a goal, that we can know about it? That we can know it when it
hasn’t yet
been achieved? That we can find just the actions and the effects
of actions
that will alter the world so we will perceive that the
goal-condition has been
achieved"
Apart from the point that we often can't find those actions and
effects, I think the question is badly posed. The critical word is
“know”. You are asking “What is consciousness and where does it
come from”. It’s the old question of the observer.
Referring to your other document "CauseVsMechanism", if you
believe PCT, there is no problem about the control system
“knowing” that a goal has or has not been achieved and the degree
to which it has not, in the same sense that there is no problem
about the thermostat “knowing” whether the furnace should be
switched on. The thermostat “knows” nothing about the furnace, nor
yet about its own switching state. When the thermostat’s error
value is sufficiently large, an electrical contact is made and it
emits output. What that output does, it knows not.
The same is true of any control system, no matter how complex.
Each elementary control unit simply emits output that is some
function of its present error value and the history of its error
value over time. It “knows” not what it does.
"I" know (some of) my goals, and "I" know (some of) the methods at
a variety of levels that I use to achieve those goals. You are
asking “What is this ‘I’ that knows?”. When you can answer that,
you immediately have the answer to “What is a goal”. It is the
value of a reference signal (but see below), associated
with the functions that determine the nature of the perception for
which this is a reference , in a way that can be
determined only in the course of answering “What is ‘I’”.
------Blue Skies ahead----------
Being wildly speculative, I suspect that a clue to "what is "I"
may exist in your important B:CP speculation that the values of
reference signals are not the direct outputs of higher-level
control units, but entries in an associative memory addressed by
the output of the higher-level system. The entries that are stored
in such an associative memory closely in time might well be
themselves associated. Such a cross-tagged set of
memories/perceptions would constitute a kind of global perception
of what what happening at that moment. (See Science 18 Feb 2011
p869-90 and 924-928 “Early tagging of cortical networks is
required for the formation of enduring associative memory” for a
neuro-molecular study of this in the rat). “I” only see such
global perceptions; only with difficulty do “I” extract simple
properties from what “I” “know” of this global state of the world.
Going back to your "What is a Goal that I may know it", I wonder
if perhaps the “Goal” that “I” may know is not also a global set
of reference values rather than a single reference value in a
single control unit.
So I think your question cannot be answered without previously
answering “how is self-consciousness produced, and what is it?”
To that question I have no answer, but a surmise that the answer
may be found in the blue skies above.
Martin
[From Bill Powers (2011.04.02.1257 MDT)]
Martin Taylor 2011.04.02.10.32 –
MMT: You ask: " What is a
goal, that we can know about it? That we can know it when it hasn’t yet
been achieved? That we can find just the actions and the effects of
actions that will alter the world so we will perceive that the
goal-condition has been achieved"Apart from the point that we often can’t find those actions and effects,
I think the question is badly posed. The critical word is
“know”. You are asking “What is consciousness and where
does it come from”. It’s the old question of the
observer.
BP: In a way, yes, but I’m asking for a description of what you
experience that you express by saying you have a goal. The context of
both offerings was thinking about how to write for a general
psychological readership in a way that brings the background issues to
the fore, to emphasize the fact that PCT offers possible explanations
where other approaches simply ignore the questions. Right at present,
this effort looks rather pointless, but I assume that the reason it
seemed worth thinking about may come around again.
MMT: Referring to your other
document “CauseVsMechanism”, if you believe PCT, there is no
problem about the control system “knowing” that a goal
has or has not been achieved and the degree to which it has not, in the
same sense that there is no problem about the thermostat
“knowing” whether the furnace should be switched on. The
thermostat “knows” nothing about the furnace, nor yet about its
own switching state. When the thermostat’s error value is sufficiently
large, an electrical contact is made and it emits output. What that
output does, it knows not.The same is true of any control system, no matter how complex. Each
elementary control unit simply emits output that is some function of its
present error value and the history of its error value over time. It
“knows” not what it does.
BP: Once you accept that a control-system model might be appropriate,
questions like yours do arise, and I agree that we haven’t solved the
basic problems concerning consciousness and “knowing.” If our
modeled control systems don’t “know” what is going on, then
there is something missing from the model, because we human beings DO
know what is going on; we are aware of it, conscious of it, and aware
that we are observing. The model should explain that, and it doesn’t.
We’ll get to that, some day. Perhaps.
I’m looking for a middle ground where PCT can offer some answers to basic
questions where the conventional approaches don’t even try, without
having to tackle the ultimate issues.
MMT: Going back to your
“What is a Goal that I may know it”, I wonder if perhaps the
“Goal” that “I” may know is not also a global set of
reference values rather than a single reference value in a single control
unit.So I think your question cannot be answered without previously answering
“how is self-consciousness produced, and what is
it?”
BP: These are hard theoretical questions, and I’m trying not to make them
the center of the discussion. All I’m after right now is phenomenology.
Explanations aside, what seems to be going on when you have a
goal, are aware that you have it, and it hasn’t been achieved yet? I want
to put that question so that the reader will be encouraged to think about
it and recognize that there’s another level of problem above wrangling
about this or that explanation of behavior.
Best,
Bill P.
[From Bill Powers ()2011.04.02.1718 MDT)]
Rick Marken (2011.04.01.1400) ==
RM: The point of all this is just to say that, based on my experience, the
up-a-level discourse that you recommend (and which I love) is only
useful to people who have already gone up a level. And the people I am
trying to communicate to about purpose -- experimental psychologists
-- have not gone up a level and are probably resistant to going up a
level.
BP: Sure, if you tell them "Now I'm going to make you go up a level." The most likely response to that stimulus is "No, you aren't!"
The easiest way to get a person to go up a level is to ask a question about the current level that requires examining it to find the answer. "Are you really pretty angry right now?" In order to see the level you're identifying with, you have to step back to some other point of view. You can't see the level you're in. You have to be at a higher level even to see where you were. So it seems to me.
I'm trying to ask question which, to be answered, require that you examine your own ideas, meaning that you have to exit from the level of rthe idea and look at it from a higher level. Does that really work? Maybe. It seems to, if you do it innocently enough. Does it work with you?
RM: So my approach is not to try talk to psychologists from a
higher level; my aim is to confront psychologists with experimental
evidence that will get them "talking to themselves" from that higher
level.
BP: The evidence has to be of such a nature that it reveals something about the current point of view -- some kind of problem with it. It doesn't matter if you go up a level; the point is to get the reader to do it. You want to raise a question that can't just be answered off the top of the head or from memory. The person has to examine something to see what the answer is.
RM: Of course, this is not likely to work with many psychologists,
but to the extent that there are experimental psychologists who
respect observational evidence, I hope to develop that experimental
tests -- like the reaction time test described in my paper -- that
will produce results that will get them talking to themselves and,
hopefully, start seeing some of what I am doing from a level up.
In the case of that experiment, what is the higher-level viewpoint that they have to find? And what do you think the current viewpoint is?
Best,
Bill P.
[From Rick Marken (2011.04.02.1140)]
Bill Powers ()2011.04.02.1718 MDT)--
Rick Marken (2011.04.01.1400) --
RM: �Of course, this is not likely to work with many psychologists,
but to the extent that there are experimental psychologists who
respect observational evidence, �I hope to develop that experimental
tests -- like the reaction time test described in my paper -- that
will produce results that will get them talking to themselves and,
hopefully, start seeing some of what I am doing from a level up.In the case of that experiment, what is the higher-level viewpoint that they
have to find? And what do you think the current viewpoint is?
I'm going to have to put on my thinking cap for that one. But now that
I've submitted the paper describing that work I'll have time to try to
think this one through and, possibly, write another paper that is so
clever that it can changes a person's viewpoint like a prism changes
the path of light;-)
Best
Rick
--
Richard S. Marken PhD
rsmarken@gmail.com
www.mindreadings.com
[From Fred Nickols (2011.04.03.0639 MST)]
Bill Powers (2011.04.01.1425 MDT)]
Fred Nickols (2011.04.01.1209 PDT)]
FN: For me, a "goal" refers to the desired (or required) state of
some variable that has been targeted for control. I might target
the error rate in a certain process for control. The error rate is
the target (or targeted)
variable. I might establish an acceptable/desired/required value for the
error rate of three parts per million. A goal, then, specifies some
circumstance we wish to achieve (and probably maintain).
BP: My questions were not about what a goal refers to, but about what
it IS and how it accomplishes what it does. What is the physical form
and nature of a goal? Where would you look to observe a goal? How can
it have any effect on real physical behavior? Given that it specifies
something, how does it do that "specifying"?
FN: Hmm. I'll try again. A goal IS an imagined perception, a mental model
if you will of some future state of affairs. We use words to describe it
and communicate it but it IS an imagined perception. Just as the
semanticists are fond of pointing out that the map is not the territory, the
words used to describe and communicate a goal are not the goal. A goal
exists only in imagination, as a perception (or at least I think "imagined
perceptions" are legitimate in PCT). As for who or what does the imagining,
I think that takes us to questions related to consciousness, awareness, etc.
"Real" perceptions (i.e., perceptions of the "actual" state of affairs) can
be compared and differences ("error") result in actions that, if effective,
reduce or eliminate that error. In short, a goal IS an imagined state of
affairs.
Regards,
Fred Nickols
fred@nickols.us
[From Bill Powers (2011.04.03.0912 MDT)]
Fred Nickols (2011.04.03.0639 MST) --
>BP earlier: My questions were not about what a goal refers to, but about what it IS and how it accomplishes what it does.\
FN: Hmm. I'll try again. A goal IS an imagined perception, a mental model
if you will of some future state of affairs. We use words to describe it
and communicate it but it IS an imagined perception. Just as the
semanticists are fond of pointing out that the map is not the territory, the
words used to describe and communicate a goal are not the goal. A goal
exists only in imagination, as a perception (or at least I think "imagined
perceptions" are legitimate in PCT). As for who or what does the imagining,
I think that takes us to questions related to consciousness, awareness, etc.
"Real" perceptions (i.e., perceptions of the "actual" state of affairs) can
be compared and differences ("error") result in actions that, if effective,
reduce or eliminate that error. In short, a goal IS an imagined state of
affairs.
That's exactly what I had in mind. Now try this:
You first said this: "For me, a "goal" refers to the desired (or required) state of some variable that has been targeted for control. ... A goal, then, specifies some circumstance we wish to achieve (and probably maintain)."
This time you said " A goal IS an imagined perception, a mental model
if you will of some future state of affairs."
What do you see as the difference between these two answers?
Best,
Bill P.
Bill Powers (2011.04.03.0912 MDT)]
Fred Nickols (2011.04.03.0639 MST) --
>BP earlier: My questions were not about what a goal refers to, but
about what it IS and how it accomplishes what it does.\
FN: Hmm. I'll try again. A goal IS an imagined perception, a mental model
if you will of some future state of affairs. We use words to describe it
and communicate it but it IS an imagined perception. Just as the
semanticists are fond of pointing out that the map is not the territory,
the
words used to describe and communicate a goal are not the goal. A goal
exists only in imagination, as a perception (or at least I think "imagined
perceptions" are legitimate in PCT). As for who or what does the
imagining,
I think that takes us to questions related to consciousness, awareness,
etc.
"Real" perceptions (i.e., perceptions of the "actual" state of affairs) can
be compared and differences ("error") result in actions that, if effective,
reduce or eliminate that error. In short, a goal IS an imagined state of
affairs.
BP: That's exactly what I had in mind. Now try this:
BP: You first said this: "For me, a "goal" refers to the desired (or
required) state of some variable that has been targeted for control.
... A goal, then, specifies some circumstance we wish to achieve (and
probably maintain)."
BP: This time you said " A goal IS an imagined perception, a mental model
if you will of some future state of affairs."
BP: What do you see as the difference between these two answers?
FN: As succinctly as I can put it, my first answer put my goal "out there"
and my second answer put my goal "in here." My first answer separated me
and my goal; my second answer made my goal part of me. Who am I? Well, at
the risk of offending our Lord (and perhaps Kenny), I am who I am. In a
perhaps more PCT-oriented way, "I" am situated at the top of the HPCT
hierarchy. The levels below me are levels of means to the ends I seek,
consciously or otherwise.
Regards,
Fred Nickols
fred@nickols.us
[From Bill Powers (2011.04.05.0953 MDT)]
BP: What do you see as the difference between these two answers?
FN: As succinctly as I can put it, my first answer put my goal "out there"
and my second answer put my goal "in here."
That's how I see it, too.
Beyond the "inside" and "outside" idea, however, there's another angle. In PCT, a goal is defined as a reference signal in a control-system kind of organization. The reference signal is a neural signal of the same kind as a perceptual signal. If we had a "neurovoltmeter" we could touch the tip of the probe to the path where the reference signal is and get a reading on a scale, like 10 "neurovolts." Touching the probe to the perceptual signal path, we might read 9 neurovolts; the error signal pathway would register 1 neurovolt.
So now we're talking about the nature of a goal without even knowing what the goal is. It's just whatever the neurovoltage in that pathway corresponds to. In fact, to interpret the readings, we would have to have a reference sheet listing all the places where signals could be measured, what each signal represents, and the calibration that determines what magnitude of something is represented by a certain number of impulses per second.
This is exactly how electronic analog computing works. All the signals are alike. They're all just some amount of voltage -- real volts, not neurovolts. All the signals are measured with the same voltmeter, or another just like it. You can't tell what you're measuring just from the reading on the voltmeter. You might be startled to find that the error signal is 50 volts, only to have someone say "You're measuring the wrong signal -- that's the output signal."
The implication for neuroscience is clear. There's no point in tracing out all the connections in the brain until you know what the signals represent, and you can't discover that just by measuring signals. You have to look at the relationship between external variables and neural signals in the brain. You have to do behavioral experiments, or at least psychophysical experiments.
This is a very weird situation. Here the observer is, a brain in one body, trying to interpret perceptions of neural signals in another body in relation to the perceptual signals in the observer that are called "external variables." It sounds like a closed system, without any way to find out what anything really means or really is. One is reminded of Godel's Incompleteness Theorem. "The second incompleteness theorem shows that if such a system is also capable of proving certain basic facts about the natural numbers, then one particular arithmetic truth the system cannot prove is the consistency of the system itself." We have the PCT incompleteness theorem now -- or maybe we should call it a relativity theorem. "A model of the brain cannot be proven to be consistent with the reality represented in that model," or "The organization of the brain can be represented only relative to the organization of the brain observing it."
Best,
Bill P.
At 01:10 PM 4/3/2011 -0700, Fred Nickols wrote:
[From Kenny Kitzke (2011.05.1230EDT)
Fred, having mentioned my name, you have caused me to respond. Ha!
More likely, I respond because of a “goal” I have about myself. Yep, it’s an imagined perception of who I want to be as I examine/observe myself. I suspect you realize that you Fred can’t possibly know what variables are within that imagined perception of mine? As a matter of fact, I would have a difficult time explaining precisely my conscious awareness of those variables or their magnitudes. I suspect that many of my goals are, well you might say, sub-conscious. That is they are real and part of my human spirit, but they are not input from my senses of the external environment, or even my conscious mind and will. They are somewhat like emotions, real but not part of my conscious mind or will.
Unfortunately, PCT/HPCT models do not directly or succinctly include such human phenomena as “hate” in the determination of intrinsic human behavior. So, while it does a great job of analyzing how humans drive cars, catch baseballs and track computer screen targets, it seems woefully weak in explaining how reference perceptions for “who is Fred?” come into being at the top of your perceptual hierarchy.
That is not offensive for me. And, the Lord I serve, seems willing to let you have a Fred as you decide to be. I actually rejoice over that. It sure beats having some man (even a PCTer) or government bureaucrat deciding what you or I should be or control for! 8-))
Kenny
In a message dated 4/3/2011 4:11:17 P.M. Eastern Daylight Time, fred@NICKOLS.US writes:
BP: That’s exactly what I had in mind. Now try this:
BP: You first said this: “For me, a “goal” refers to the desired (or
required) state of some variable that has been targeted for control.
… A goal, then, specifies some circumstance we wish to achieve (and
probably maintain).”BP: This time you said " A goal IS an imagined perception, a mental model
if you will of some future state of affairs."BP: What do you see as the difference between these two answers?
FN: As succinctly as I can put it, my first answer put my goal “out there”
and my second answer put my goal “in here.” My first answer separated me
and my goal; my second answer made my goal part of me. Who am I? Well, at
the risk of offending our Lord (and perhaps Kenny), I am who I am. In a
perhaps more PCT-oriented way, “I” am situated at the top of the HPCT
hierarchy. The levels below me are levels of means to the ends I seek,
consciously or otherwise.Regards,
Fred Nickols
fred@nickols.us
[From Rick Marken (2011.04.05.1615)]
Kenny Kitzke (2011.05.1230EDT)
Unfortunately, PCT/HPCT�models do not directly or succinctly include
such�human phenomena as "hate" in the determination of intrinsic human
behavior.
Actually, it does. You should read the "Emotions" chapter of the
latest edition of B:CP. The word "hate" refers to a subjective state
that is known as an "emotion". As I understand it, in PCT an emotion
results from failure to control. One control system -- such as the one
controlling for punching someone -- doesn't achieve that goal because
it would create an error in another control system that is controlling
for not hurting other people. So there is no punch; only preparation
for punch.
The error in the punching control system causes the physiological
changes -- such as adrenaline secretion -- that would produce an
effective punch. But since there is no punch the error just keeps
causing the physiological preparation for output that is perceived as
arousal. That's the "feeling" component of an emotion. There is also a
cognitive component of an emotion, which perceives the same
physiological arousal as either "hate", "anger", "excitement", or
"joy" depending on the nature of the goal that's being frustrated.
The arousal is perceived as "hate" or "anger" if it results from error
in a control system that is trying to hurt someone; it is perceived as
"excitement" or "joy" if it results from error that results from
partying to celebrate victory over evil.
That is not offensive for me.� And, the Lord I serve, seems willing to let
you have a�Fred as you decide to be.� I actually rejoice over that.� It sure
beats having some man (even a PCTer) or government bureaucrat deciding what
you or I should be or control for!� 8-))
I find it difficult to understand why you, a citizen of the US, think
government bureaucrats decide what we should control for. Some guys in
Philadelphia (the "founders") went to some trouble, back in the last
1700s, to figurie out how to organize a government so that decisions
about "what we should control" are decided by we the people, not by
bureaucrats.
The founders included in the blueprint for this government a
description of things (rights) that people should not be able to be
prevented from controlling for, even if a majority says that they
should. This is the Bill of Rights. Since these rights are described
verbally there is ambiguity so the founders invented a court system
-- the supreme court -- to interpret these rights as well as the rest
of this founding document.
The system isn't perfect, of course, and sometimes low level
bureaucrats do manage to get in a position where they tell you what to
control (I know, I own property) but, still, what we have seems pretty
good to me. I don't think there is any system of government that will
let everyone feel like they are in complete control of everything
they want controlled; but the one we have here in the US is pretty
good. Not as good as the one in Norway, for example, but that's
because the people in Norway are just a lot better at governing
themselves. I guess they got all that fascist stuff that we're going
through now out of their system in Viking days;-)
Best
Rick
--
Richard S. Marken PhD
rsmarken@gmail.com
www.mindreadings.com
(Gavin Ritz 2011.04.06.11.47NZT)
[From Bill Powers
(2011.04.05.0953 MDT)]
BP: What do you see as the difference between
these two answers?
FN: As succinctly as I can put it, my first answer
put my goal “out there”
and my second answer put my goal “in
here.”
That’s how I see it, too.
Me too
Is this not the essence
of learning, the objective outside and the control of that objective inside?
That objective inside is
an energetic signature (electrical if one likes).
Objectives-goals-missions.
Goals are also Imperative
Logic (commands) we command our energies inside. Some of us are pretty good at
it, other not so. How we manage to concentrate (control) our internal energies.
The very basic unit of
command is related to work, so it’s simply a task. And a task is a form
of entropy production.
Hence the barium sulphate
reaction (Ostwald’s
Ripening) is a very good analogy.
First just a solution,
then many small crystals grow, and then larger more perfect crystals eat
smaller less perfect crystals. (predator-prey), then a few large crystals are
left. Does this sound familiar?
That’s why the
Gibbs free Energy (de Lange) for non equilibrium
systems is so important.
It has only 4 terms.
(The change in quantities
between the external environment and the internal system: A) (the objectives and/or low order qualities
of the environment: B) (the difference
between the internal energies and the environmental energies: C)
It’s really simple
to see from this function’s descriptions that the environment A and B has a big
role to play, such as a rich resources environment (oil, food, water, sex
(mates)) changes the function’s value dramatically. It is no wonder our
energies concentrate to fight for those resources.
Everything is control and
the control is for all the internal energies and external resources (energies).
Until we all understand
this clearly greed, avarice and rapaciousness will continue. These are really
words for selfish energetic control.
The goal
or the mission of any living organism is concentration (control) of its own energies
and accumulation (control) of the external energies. (Resources).
Doesn’t
this describe our economic system and evolutionary theories?
How do
we do this? Through Work the smallest unit of external control.
Rick
your humanist stuff might help here. It’s not pretty.
We see this Control right
here on this very list. As I’ve said before PCT is really the Control of
Our own Realities and that is our internal energies.
I have presented PCT in
another way on two other major lists and have got very little resistance.
Regards
Gavin
Beyond the “inside” and “outside”
idea, however, there’s another
angle. In PCT, a goal is defined as a reference signal
in a
control-system kind of organization. The reference
signal is a neural
signal of the same kind as a perceptual signal. If we
had a
“neurovoltmeter” we could touch the tip of
the probe to the path
where the reference signal is and get a reading on a
scale, like 10
“neurovolts.” Touching the probe to the
perceptual signal path, we
might read 9 neurovolts; the error signal pathway
would register 1 neurovolt.
So now we’re talking about the nature of a goal
without even knowing
what the goal is. It’s just whatever the neurovoltage
in that pathway
corresponds to. In fact, to interpret the readings, we
would have to
have a reference sheet listing all the places where
signals could be
measured, what each signal represents, and the
calibration that
determines what magnitude of something is represented
by a certain
number of impulses per second.
This is exactly how electronic analog computing works.
All the
signals are alike. They’re all just some amount of
voltage – real
volts, not neurovolts. All the signals are measured
with the same
voltmeter, or another just like it. You can’t tell
what you’re
measuring just from the reading on the voltmeter. You
might be
startled to find that the error signal is 50 volts,
only to have
someone say “You’re measuring the wrong signal –
that’s the output signal.”
The implication for neuroscience is clear. There’s no
point in
tracing out all the connections in the brain until you
know what the
signals represent, and you can’t discover that just by
measuring
signals. You have to look at the relationship between
external
variables and neural signals in the brain. You have to
do behavioral
experiments, or at least psychophysical experiments.
This is a very weird situation. Here the observer is,
a brain in one
body, trying to interpret perceptions of neural
signals in another
body in relation to the perceptual signals in the
observer that are
called “external variables.” It sounds like
a closed system, without
any way to find out what anything really means or
really is. One is
reminded of Godel’s Incompleteness Theorem. "The
second
incompleteness theorem shows that if such a system is
also capable of
proving certain basic facts about the natural numbers,
then one
particular arithmetic truth the system cannot prove is
the
consistency of the system itself." We have the
PCT incompleteness
theorem now – or maybe we should call it a relativity
theorem. "A
model of the brain cannot be proven to be consistent
with the reality
represented in that model," or "The
organization of the brain can be
represented only relative to the organization of the
brain observing it."
Best,
Bill P.
At 01:10 PM 4/3/2011 -0700, Fred Nickols wrote:
[Martin Taylor 2011.04.05.22.57]
[From Rick Marken (2011.04.05.1615)]
... I don't think there is any system of government that will
let everyone feel like they are in complete control of everything
they want controlled; but the one we have here in the US is pretty
good. Not as good as the one in Norway, for example, but that's
because the people in Norway are just a lot better at governing
themselves. I guess they got all that fascist stuff that we're going
through now out of their system in Viking days;-)
I think any system of government can be subverted if the people allow it to be. As for Norway, don't forget Vidkun Quisling. And you often extol the Canadian Parliamentary system, but even that has been subverted over the last few years by a Peerless Leader who seems determined to overturn the supremacy of Parliament and change it into a system of one-man rule. The latest polls seem to suggest that enough people want that to happen that he will get a majority and be able to complete the transition. The US system may have problems of being unwieldy and oppositional, but sometimes that's not a bad thing.
I don't know how this relates to PCT or to Cause and mechanism, but maybe someone can find a link.
Martin
On 2011/04/5 7:14 PM, Richard Marken wrote:
(Gavin Ritz 2011.04.06.15.11NZT)
[Martin Taylor
2011.04.05.22.57]
[From Rick Marken
(2011.04.05.1615)]
I think any system of government can be subverted if
the people allow it
to be. As for Norway, don’t forget Vidkun Quisling. And you often extol
the Canadian Parliamentary system, but even that has
been subverted over
the last few years by a Peerless Leader who seems
determined to overturn
the supremacy of Parliament and change it into a
system of one-man rule.
The latest polls seem to suggest that enough people
want that to happen
that he will get a majority and be able to complete
the transition. The
US system may have
problems of being unwieldy and oppositional, but
sometimes that’s not a bad thing.
I don’t know how this relates to PCT or to Cause and
mechanism, but
maybe someone can find a link.
I just did in my last email.
Here it is again. This statement tells us everything we need to know about
Control.
The goal
or the mission of any living organism is concentration (control) of its own
energies and accumulation (control) of the external energies. (Resources).
The Gibbs ** formula I
just showed you depicts this scenario beautifully.**
“Confusion
between A and B, C (in the formula) is also a reason why democracies are so easily
corrupted. The majority vote (A) (in the formula) does not ensure a free
society, but the inner quantities (C) and qualities (C) of its members”
delange 1980.
Regards
Gavin
On 2011/04/5 7:14 PM, Richard Marken wrote:
[Martin Taylor 2011.04.06.09.44]
On 2011/04/5 11:30 PM, Gavin Ritz wrote:
(Gavin Ritz
2011.04.06.15.11NZT)
[Martin Taylor
2011.04.05.22.57]
On 2011/04/5 7:14 > PM, Richard Marken wrote:
[From Rick Marken
(2011.04.05.1615)]
I think any systemof government can be subverted if
the people allow it
to be. As for Norway , don’t forget
Vidkun Quisling. And you often extol
the CanadianParliamentary system, but even that has
been subverted over
the last few yearsby a Peerless Leader who seems
determined to overturn
the supremacy ofParliament and change it into a
system of one-man rule.
The latest pollsseem to suggest that enough people
want that to happen
that he will get amajority and be able to complete
the transition. The
US system may have
problems of being unwieldy and oppositional, but
sometimes that's nota bad thing.
I don't know howthis relates to PCT or to Cause and
mechanism, but
maybe someone canfind a link.
I just did in my last email.Here it is again. This statement tells us everything we
need to know about
Control.
** The goal
or the mission of any living organism is concentration
(control) of its own
energies and accumulation (control) of the external
energies. (Resources).**
The Gibbs ** formula I
just showed you depicts this scenario beautifully.**
** “Confusion
between A and B, C (in the formula) is also a reason why
democracies are so easily
corrupted. The majority vote (A) (in the formula) does
not ensure a free
society, but the inner quantities (C) and qualities (C)
of its members”
delange 1980.**
For me, this requires a lot more explanation. I see no links between
what you say and the political problem. I’m clear that you think the
linkage is obvious. For me, the steps need to be an order of
magnitude smaller and individually more direct.
Martin
[From Rick Marken (2011.04.06.1150)]
Martin Taylor (2011.04.05.22.57)–
I think any system of government can be subverted if the people allow it to be. As for Norway, don’t forget Vidkun Quisling…
I don’t know how this relates to PCT or to Cause and mechanism, but maybe someone can find a link.
Everything (living) relates to PCT because living is controlling.
Best
Rick